10.1184/R1/6469184.v1
Giuseppe Ateniese
Giuseppe
Ateniese
Randal Burns
Randal
Burns
Reza Curtmola
Reza
Curtmola
Joseph Herring
Joseph
Herring
Lea Kissner
Lea
Kissner
Zachary Peterson
Zachary
Peterson
Dawn Song
Dawn
Song
Provable Data Possession at Untrusted Stores
Carnegie Mellon University
2007
provable data possession
PDP
homomorphic verifiable tags
archival storage
storage security
2007-01-01 00:00:00
Journal contribution
https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/journal_contribution/Provable_Data_Possession_at_Untrusted_Stores/6469184
We introduce a model for provable data possession (PDP)
that allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted
server to verify that the server possesses the original data
without retrieving it. The model generates probabilistic
proofs of possession by sampling random sets of blocks from
the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client
maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof.
The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant
amount of data, which minimizes network communication.
Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking supports
large data sets in widely-distributed storage systems.
We present two provably-secure PDP schemes that are
more efficient than previous solutions, even when compared
with schemes that achieve weaker guarantees. In particular,
the overhead at the server is low (or even constant), as opposed to linear in the size of the data. Experiments using
our implementation verify the practicality of PDP and reveal that the performance of PDP is bounded by disk I/O
and not by cryptographic computation.