Designing for Incentives: Better Information Sharing for Better Software Engineering
Mark Klein
Gabriel A. Moreno
David C. Parkes
Kurt Wallnau
10.1184/R1/6573077.v1
https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/journal_contribution/Designing_for_Incentives_Better_Information_Sharing_for_Better_Software_Engineering/6573077
Software-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society.
The resulting interconnectedness and associated
complexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals.
Thus, contemporary software engineering is plagued by
incentive conflicts,
in settling on design features, allocating resources during the development
of products, and allocating computational resources at runtime. In this
position paper, we describe some of these problems and outline a
research agenda in bridging to the economic theory of mechanism
design, which seeks to align incentives in multi-agent systems
with private information and conflicting goals. The ultimate goal
is to advance a principled
methodology for the design of incentive-compatible approaches
to manage the dynamic
processes of software
engineering.
2010-11-01 00:00:00
software engineering
mechanism design
incentives