Applications of Automated Mechanism Design

1998-06-01T00:00:00Z (GMT) by Vincent Conitzer Tuomas Sandholm
<p><br>Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that desirable systemwide outcomes are obtained even though every agent in the system acts based on self-interest. Mechanism design has traditionally been a manual process. We recently (UAI-02) proposed automated mechanism design (AMD), and studied its worst-case complexity. This paper contains the first experimental work on AMD. We describe our implementation of AMD using a mixed integer/linear programming package (CPLEX 8.0), which we applied to a variety of scenarios that arise in different real-world settings. It created new optimal mechanisms for (divorce) dispute settlement, reinvented the Myerson optimal auction, invented optimal combinatorial auctions (a well-known important open research problem), and created new optimal mechanisms for public goods problems (both single-good and multi-good problems). We contrast the generated optimal mechanisms to the available mechanisms in the game theory literature. Finally, we present experimental scalability results of our implementation of AMD.</p>