Rousseau, Beck, Kim, Splenda, & Young 2019.pdf (626.29 kB)

PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Download (626.29 kB)
journal contribution
posted on 13.04.2020 by Denise Rousseau, Donna Beck, ByeongJo Kim, Ryan Splenda, Sarah Young

This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of

this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict

firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive

terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest

in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting

financial information.

History

Publisher Statement

© 2019 The Authors.Campbell Systematic Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Campbell Collaboration Campbell Systematic Reviews. 2019;15:e1064

Date

02/12/2019

Licence

Exports