Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets
journal contributionposted on 2011-12-01, 00:00 authored by V. V. Chari, Ali Shourideh, Ariel Zetlin-JonesAriel Zetlin-Jones
Loan originators often securitize some loans in secondary loan markets and hold on to others. New issuances in such secondary markets collapse abruptly on occasion, typically when collateral values used to secure the underlying loans fall and these collapses are viewed by policymakers as inefficient. We develop a dynamic adverse selection model in which small reductions in collateral values can generate abrupt inefficient collapses in new issuances in the secondary loan market by affecting reputational incentives. We find that a variety of policies intended to remedy market inefficiencies do not help resolve the adverse selection problem.