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Collusion in Oligopoly: An Experiment on the Effect of Numbers and Information

journal contribution
posted on 01.08.1993, 00:00 authored by F. T. Dolbear, Lester B. Lave, G. Bowman, A. Lieberman, E. Prescott, F. Rueter, R. Sherman

Despite considerable scholarly effort, no theory has provided reliable predictions of price or output in oligopoly markets. Techniques have not been found which can unravel the complex interdependencies between firms. As long as the consequence of each firm's actions depend in large measure on the unknown reactions of other firms, rational behavior (for the firm) will be difficult to define.


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