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Envy-Free Division of Sellable Goods

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journal contribution
posted on 01.06.2008, 00:00 by Jeremy Karp, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia

We study the envy-free allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envy-freeness of allocations of sellable goods — the ratio between the maximum social welfare and the social welfare of the best envy-free allocation. We show that envy-free allocations of sellable goods are significantly more efficient than their unsellable counterparts.




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