Motives and Consequences of Libor Strategic Reporting: How Much Can We Learn from Banks’ Self-Reported Borrowing Rates?

This journal contribution is published Open Access by the publisher. Follow the DOI link to retrieve a copy of the full text. I would like to thank the editor, Áureo de Paula, and three anonymous referees for their valuable feedback, which greatly improved this paper. Special thanks to my advisor, Ali Hortaçsu, the two other members of my thesis committee, Brent Hickman and Azeem Shaikh, and Jakub Kastl, for their advice, contributions and support. I am also grateful to Felipe García, for excellent research assistance, to Jorge Balat, Stephane Bonhomme, Juan Esteban Carranza, Mervyn King, Ignacia Mecadal, Juan Ospina, Harry J. Paarsch, Isabelle Perrigne, Philip Reny, Yuya Takahashi, and Quang Vuong for very helpful comments, and to seminar and conference participants at Carnegie Mellon Tepper, Rice University, Queen’s University, EIEF, Johns Hopkins Carey, University of Colorado Boulder Leeds, Duke Fuqua School of Business, Universidad del Rosario, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Banco de la República, Analysis Group, Cornerstone Research, Compass Lexicon, and the North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2016 for valuable feedback. A previous version of this paper was presented as my doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, Department of Economics, under the title: “Libor Misreporting as a Bayesian Game with Unobserved Heterogeneity”. All errors and omissions are my own.