Carnegie Mellon University
file.pdf (583.55 kB)

Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction

Download (583.55 kB)
journal contribution
posted on 2013-03-01, 00:00 authored by Ion Juvina, Muniba Saleem, Jolie M. Martin, Cleotilde GonzalezCleotilde Gonzalez, Christian LebiereChristian Lebiere

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.