Risk orientation as a predictor in the Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a mixed-motive situation in which noncooperative shortrun maximizing behavior is inconsistent with long-run (cooperative) maximization. It has been investigated experimentally under various conditions, and the literature is summarized in Lave (1965), Rapoport and Onvant (1962), and Gallo and McClintock ( 1965). One version of the situation is illustrated in Matrix I of Table 1. The payoffs to player A, identified by the strategies of A and B respectively, can be ranked from the most to the least preferred: (2,1), (1,1), (2,2), and (1,2). This ranking shows the structure of the game: no matter which strategy the other player chooses, a subject prefers the payoffs resulting from strategy 2. In a one-trial game, (2,2) begins to take on the character of a unique solution.