Spurious recollection from a dual-process framework: The role of partial matching

Good models account for memory successes and failure; memory failures help constrain cognitive theories (e.g., Bui, Friedman, McDonough, & Castel, 2013; Diana, Peterson, & Reder, 2004; McTighe, Cowell, Winters, Bussey, & Saksida, 2010; Pohl, 2004), which can be useful for future models. Spurious recollection, also known as “illusory recollection” (e.g., Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Gallo, 2010; Gallo & Roediger, 2003), “phantom recall” (e.g., Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & Reyna, 2003; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna & Mojardin, 2001; Stahl & Klauer, 2009), “false recollection” (for a review see Arndt, 2012), “false memory” (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005), or “misrecollection” (e.g., Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007; Dodson, Bawa, & Slotnick, 2007), is memory failure where one claims to ‘Remember’ a spurious study episode, importantly claiming to recollect specific study details. This chapter proposes an account of spurious recollection via the Source of Activation Confusion (SAC) model (Park, Reder, & Dickison, 2005; Reder et al., 2000; Reder, Paynter, Diana, Ngiam, & Dickison, 2007; Reder & Schunn, 1996).