A fundamental issue in the network neutrality debate is the extent to which network operators
should be allowed to discriminate among Internet packet streams to selectively block, adjust
quality of service, or adjust prices. This paper first reviews technology now available for traffic
discrimination. It then shows how network operators can use this technology in ways that would
make the Internet less valuable to Internet users, and why a network operator would have
financial incentive to do this if and only if it has sufficient market power. A particular concern is
that network operators could use discrimination to extract oligopoly rents from upstream markets
that are highly competitive. This paper also shows how network operators can use the very same
technology to discriminate in ways that benefit Internet users, as well as the network operator.
Thus, network neutrality supporters are right to fear unlimited discrimination in some cases,
while network neutrality opponents are right to fear a policy that imposes strict limits on
discrimination. From this, we argue that the network neutrality debate should be refocused on
the search for a balanced policy, which is a policy that limits the more harmful discriminatory
practices in markets where there is insufficient competition, with little interference to beneficial
discrimination or innovation. We apply this balanced policy in a few controversial scenarios as
examples. There has been too little attention on the possibility of a nuanced balanced policy, in
part because the network neutrality debate is focusing on the wrong issues. This paper argues
that the debate should shift towards the complex details of differentiating harmful discrimination
from beneficial discrimination, and away from high-level secondary questions like whether
discrimination is inherently just, who ought to pay for certain Internet services, how important
general design principles are, what abstract rights and freedoms consumers and carriers deserve,
or whether network operators can give their affiliates special treatment. Reality is more complex
than these questions would imply, and none of them will serve as a basis for a sufficiently
specific and effective policy.