We study the role of mortgage brokers in the subprime crisis using a detailed
sample of loans originated by, formerly, one of the largest subprime loan originators, New Century Financial Corporation. Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage
brokerage firms originated about 65% of all subprime mortgages and yet little is
known about their behavior and contribution to the subprime crisis. Is there empirical support for the allegation that lenders like New Century compensated brokers
in a fashion that encouraged them to originate higher cost loans? Did the incentive
scheme change as New Century’s loan volume surged? How did the mortgage brokers respond to the incentive scheme? How did the lender-broker relationships and
broker competition interact with broker compensation? We decompose the broker
revenues into a cost and profit component and find evidence consistent with broker
market power that is greater for more complex mortgages and for borrower who
may be less informed. We relate the broker profits to the subsequent performance
of the loans. A probit model for loan performance shows that the increased broker
profits lead to worse loan performance suggesting that brokers earned high profits
on loans that turned out to be riskier ex post.