Carnegie Mellon University
2015_005_001_449522.pdf (1.5 MB)

Extending AADL for Security Design Assurance of Cyber-Physical Systems

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Attacks such as the one that compromised the control systems for Iranian  centrifuges demonstrate a growing need to improve the design of security in cyber-physical systems. While much of the work on security  has focused on coding, many of the common weaknesses that lead to successful attacks are actually introduced by design. This technical report shows how important system-wide security properties can and must be described and validated at the architectural level. This is done  through the adoption and use of the Architecture Analysis and Design  Language (AADL) and a further extension of it to describe security  properties. This report demonstrates the viability and limitations of  this approach through an extended example that allows for specifying and analyzing the security properties of an automotive electronics system.  The report begins with a modeling of threats using the Microsoft STRIDE framework and then translates them into attack scenarios. Next, the report describes -- as AADL components, relationships, and properties -- the architectural structures, services, and properties needed to guard  against such attacks. Finally, the report shows how these properties can be validated at design time using a model checker such as Resolute and  discusses the limitations of this approach in addressing common security weaknesses. 


Publisher Statement

This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by Carnegie Mellon University or its Software Engineering Institute. This report was prepared for the SEI Administrative Agent AFLCMC/AZS 5 Eglin Street Hanscom AFB, MA 01731-2100. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution.



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Copyright 2015 Carnegie Mellon University.

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