posted on 2020-08-18, 22:14authored byShweta Suresh
This
paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of audience effects and
another effect called social risk aversion. I conduct dictator games in a
panel design to collect between- subject and within-subject comparisons. My
experiment modifies Christina Fong and Felix Oberholzer-Gee’s prior
experimental design in order to better identify how the two separate
phenomena of social risk aversion and audience effects work to alter donors’
decisions, especially when they are given the option to purchase information
about the welfare recipient. Results show that giving decreases when donors
decide not to buy information about recipients in the first period, but
bounces back up if they make this decision in later periods. Social risk
aversion is unable to explain this observation; however, a plausible
explanation is that the audience effect is weakened during the first period
but remains strong during later periods. Understanding these motivations
behind people’s decision to donate is important because this information
allows governments and non-governmental organizations to better structure
transfer programs.