Relational Autonomy, Freedom as Nondomination, and the Feminist Project

This thesis explores the challenges feminist theorists face in using autonomy and freedom to identify and address oppression. Part I shows that relational accounts of autonomy, which view autonomy as socially shaped, struggle to distinguish oppressive from non-oppressive socialization without relying on circular or overly/insufficiently demanding criteria. Wenner suggests that concept of freedom as nondomination - freedom from the power to arbitrarily interfere – is a better alternative when it comes to creating social conditions to protect autonomy. Part II shows that this framework fails to account for structural injustices that arise from impersonal, systemic conditions.

Part III combines my earlier observations. I argue that the conceptual challenges for theories of autonomy and freedom have a common underlying cause: social mechanisms simultaneously enable and constrain agency. This dual role complicates efforts to draw clear boundaries between legitimate and oppressive social influences, whether our focus is on the internal or external conditions of agency.