Spectrum Management and Policy Implications of a Next-Generation ATSC 3.0 Television Standard

In response to a request from the industry members of the Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC) the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has recently approved voluntary use by broadcasters of a new, non-backwards compatible technical standard for over-the-air (OTA) broadcasting, ATSC 3.0. Compared to the current standard, ATSC 1.0, the 3.0 version will provide local broadcasters, among other things, 1) the ability to
replace a broadcaster’s single transmitter with a multi-transmitter Single Frequency Network (SFN) transmission architecture, 2) a flexible physical layer that allows broadcasters control over the trade-offs between bitrate, coverage and capacity, 3) additional program carrying capacity due to better source and channel coding, and 4) a full-IP platform able to perform interactive TV and
targeted advertising. This new standard will not only bring significant value to broadcast television services but also may reshape the broadcast television industry while both raising challenges for the existing U.S. regulatory framework
and creating new opportunities to realize regulatory goals. Given this context, the thesis addresses some of the economic and public policy implications of a next-generation ATSC 3.0 television standard. This thesis is composed of three techno-economic studies that examine
television spectrum management and policy options related to three distinctive issues. In a first study, we analyze the potential of SFNs to improve broadcast spectrum efficiency by reducing spectrum reuse distances between
broadcasters’ coverage areas, thus potentially freeing spectrum for other uses such as cellular service. In a second study we analyze the flexibility given by
ATSC 3.0 to increase (or reduce) broadcasters coverage areas while still adhering to the power and interference constraints of their existing spectrum licenses,
and the effect of reducing broadcasters authorized transmit power on freeing additional spectrum for additional TV licensees. Additional spectrum licenses could also facilitate simulcasting during the (likely lengthy) transition
from ATSC 1.0 to ATSC 3.0. Finally, in a third study we consider how using ATSC 3.0 to increase a station’s reach may result in increasing coverage overlap
between same-network affiliates with implications for inter-market competition and retransmission consent. Together, these studies will provide insight to policymakers to facilitate understanding of some of the new economic and
policy issues that could arise from the emergence of ATSC 3.0.