RUNNING HEAD: MORAL EMOTIONS & UNETHICAL BARGAINING

Moral Emotions & Unethical Bargaining: The Differential Effects of Empathy and Perspective Taking in Deterring Deceitful Negotiation

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Abstract

Two correlational studies tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking differentially relate to disapproval of unethical negotiation strategies, such as lies and bribes. Across both studies, empathy, but not perspective taking, discouraged attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and feigning emotions to manipulate opponents. These results suggest that unethical bargaining is more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in guilt proneness and shame proneness inhibited the endorsement of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness predicted disapproval of false promises and misrepresentation. Empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the analysis. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy.

Keywords: Negotiation; Bargaining; Unethical Behavior; Empathy; Perspective Taking; Guilt; Shame; SINS II scale;

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Prescriptive negotiation advice instructs negotiators to get inside the head but not the heart of their opponent (e.g., Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Galinsky, Maddux, & Ku, 2006; Thompson, 2009). The benefits of perspective taking on negotiation outcomes are well-known and clearly established—negotiators who consider their counterpart's perspective by trying to put themselves "in their counterpart's shoes" create more value and claim more value than those who do not (Galinsky et al., 2008; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). But, what about empathy—does considering the feelings of one's counterpart provide any benefit that perspective taking does not? The current literature in negotiation suggests the answer is no (cf. Galinsky et al., 2008), but there is reason to believe that the benefits of empathy in negotiation have yet to be articulated.

Perspective taking is a cognitive response that involves imagining yourself in "someone else's shoes" (Batson et al., 2003) or entertaining the point of view of others (Davis, 1983b). Empathy, on the other hand, is an emotional response that involves considering the feelings of others and is characterized by feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern for others (Davis, 1983b). Although perspective taking and empathy can co-occur, they are distinct constructs that can be theoretically and empirically distinguished (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Davis, 1983b; Galinsky et al., 2008).

Only one prior set of studies has directly compared the effects of empathy and perspective taking in a negotiation context (Galinsky et al., 2008). In these studies, Galinsky and colleagues used personality measures and experimental manipulations of perspective taking and empathy to test which was more advantageous for helping negotiators discover hidden

agreements and create and claim resources. Perspective taking emerged as the clear winner—individual differences in perspective taking, but not empathy, were associated with achieving integrative agreements (Study 1). Moreover, explicitly instructing negotiators to focus on their counterpart's thoughts and interests (perspective taking) rather than their emotions and feelings (empathy) helped them not only to achieve deals (Study 2), but also led them to achieve better deals that increased joint gain (Study 3). Despite their results, Galinsky and colleagues (2008) did not rule out the possibility that empathy may offer negotiation benefits not reflected in their studies. For instance, they speculated that empathy has relationship-enhancing qualities that could help negotiators build interpersonal capital and facilitate future agreements. Another possible advantage empathy may have over perspective taking is that empathy may be more likely to deter unethical negotiation.

Empathy is a moral emotional process that encourages cooperation (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999) and prosocial behavior (Davis, 1983a; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), and discourages prejudice (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Batson et al., 1997; Stephan & Finlay, 1999) and antisocial behavior (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Empathy, along with guilt and shame, is part of a family of moral emotions that aid in socialization and moral development and discourage unethical behavior (for reviews, see Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Although perspective taking may confer some of the same ethical advantages as empathy (e.g., Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000, found that perspective taking reduced stereotyping and ingroup favoritism), when directly compared, empathy is more likely to stimulate moral action, possibly because it is more difficult to take advantage of people once you have considered their feelings, as opposed to their thoughts (Batson et al., 2003). For example, perspective taking elicits distrust and selfish behavior in mixed-motive contexts, such as commons dilemmas and the prisoner's

dilemma game (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006), whereas empathy increases cooperation (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999). Moreover, Batson et al. (2003) found that empathy, but not perspective taking, increased prosocial behavior even though such behavior entailed a cost to one's self. Participants instructed to consider the feelings of another person were less likely to assign that person to complete an undesirable task (i.e., a task that was dull and boring), and by implication were more likely to assign themselves to complete the task. Perspective taking, or imagining oneself in the other person's shoes, did not influence task assignments—participants who engaged in cognitive perspective taking were just as selfish as those in a control condition (Batson et al., 2003).

Given empathy's relative advantage over perspective taking at promoting cooperative and prosocial behavior (Batson et al., 2003), the current research tested whether empathy is more likely than perspective taking to discourage the use of unethical negotiation strategies. Because research examining how moral emotions affect negotiation is sparse, Study 2 also tested whether individual differences in proneness to experiencing guilt and shame discourage unethical bargaining.

Study 1

In Study 1, I tested whether personality differences in empathy and perspective taking were differentially related to the endorsement of ethically questionable negotiation strategies in a sample of undergraduate students.

Hypothesis 1: Individual differences in empathy, but not perspective taking, will be associated with disapproval of unethical negotiation tactics, such as lies and bribes.

Method

Participants & Procedure

Participants were 379 undergraduate students (140 men, 239 women) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of North Carolina.[i] They completed an hour-long online survey on "personality assessment" in order to fulfill a research requirement. The survey included the SINS II scale (Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies II), which measures the perceived appropriateness of ethically questionable negotiation tactics (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2007; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000), and the empathic concern and perspective taking subscales of the IRI (Interpersonal Reactivity Index), which measure individual differences in empathy and perspective taking (Davis, 1980, 1983b). The order of the scales and the order of the items within each scale were randomized for each participant.

SINS II: Unethical Bargaining Tactics

The SINS II scale (Lewicki et al., 2007) contains 25 items that cluster into seven factors: (a) traditional competitive bargaining; (b) attack opponent's network; (c) false promises; (d) misrepresentation; (e) inappropriate information gathering; (f) strategic manipulation of positive emotion; and (g) strategic manipulation of negative emotions. Respondents indicated the extent to which they found each tactic appropriate (1 = *very inappropriate*, 2 = *inappropriate*, 3 = *slightly inappropriate*, 4 = *neutral,* 5 = *slightly appropriate*, 6 = *appropriate*, 7 = *very appropriate*). Items within each subscale were averaged to create seven composites. Because undergraduate students are not as familiar with negotiation as MBA students (the population for whom the survey was designed), I included several sentences in the SINS II instructions to ensure that respondents knew what is meant by negotiation. I adapted these sentences from the introduction of "Getting to Yes" (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991, p. xvii): "Negotiation is a basic

means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed."

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the SINS II subscales. The traditional competitive bargaining subscale contains three items that ask about the appropriateness of common distributive bargaining tactics (e.g., making an extremely high opening offer; making the other party feel as though they are under time pressure and you are not). The attack opponent's network subscale contains three items that ask respondents how appropriate it is to attempt to get your opponent fired or threaten to make your opponent look weak. The false promises subscale contains three items that ask respondents how appropriate it is to make promises to your negotiation counterpart that you do not intend to keep (e.g., promise concessions that you will not provide; promise that your constituency will uphold an agreement that you know they will not). The misrepresentation subscale contains four items that ask respondents about the appropriateness of lying or misrepresenting information to one's opponent (e.g., "Intentionally misrepresent information to your opponent in order to strengthen your negotiating arguments or position") or one's constituency (e.g., "Intentionally misrepresent the progress of negotiations to your constituency in order to make your own position appear stronger."). The inappropriate information gathering subscale contains three items that ask respondents to indicate how appropriate it is to attempt to gain information about your opponent through expensive gifts, paying mutual friends and contacts, and recruiting your opponent's colleagues or teammates. The final two subscales ask about the appropriateness of misrepresenting emotion. These subscales were not included in the original SINS scale (Robinson et al., 2000), but were added later by Barry (Barry, 1999; Lewicki et al., 2007). The

strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion subscale contains three items that ask respondents to indicate how appropriate it is to feign liking, sympathy, and caring. The strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion subscale contains six items that ask respondents to indicate how appropriate it is to feign anger, fury, sadness, disappointment, disgust, and fear.

Of the seven SINS II factors, the traditional competitive bargaining factor consistently shows the highest overall means (Lewicki et al., 2007; Robinson et al., 2000), and this was also true in this sample (see Table 1). The mean level of appropriateness was above the midpoint indicating that most respondents felt that traditional competitive bargaining was *not* inappropriate. On average, respondents thought traditional competitive bargaining was slightly appropriate. The means for the strategic misrepresentation of positive and negative emotion subscales were also above the midpoint. The inclusion of these subscales in the SINS II inventory does not imply that these tactics are unethical.

IRI: Empathy & Perspective Taking

In the IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983b), respondents read a series of statements and indicate how well each statement describes them (1 = *does not describe me at all*, 2 = *describes me a little,* 3 = describes me somewhat, 4 = *describes me well,* 5 = *describes me very well*). The measure contains seven empathy items (i.e., empathic concern) and seven perspective-taking items. The empathy items assess individual differences in the tendency to feel warmth, compassion, sympathy, and concern for others (e.g., "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me."). The perspective-taking items assess individual differences in the tendency to entertain the point of view of others (e.g., "When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while."). The items within each subscale were averaged to create composites. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these measures. Empathy and perspective

taking were moderately correlated (r = .43), indicating that respondents who tended to consider the perspective of others also tended to consider the feelings of others.

Results & Discussion

To determine the differential effects of empathy and perspective taking on the endorsement of ethically questionable negotiation tactics, I regressed each of the SINS II subscales on empathy and perspective taking, controlling for gender of the respondent (0 = *male,* 1 = *female*). Table 2 shows the multiple regression results. In support of Hypothesis 1, there were significant effects of empathy on six of the seven SINS II subscales. The only SINS II subscale with a nonsignificant relationship with empathy was traditional competitive bargaining—a tactic that the majority of respondents do not find inappropriate. Perspective taking was not significantly related to any of the SINS II subscales, but was marginally related to strategic manipulation of positive and negative emotions.

People with a tendency to feel empathy for others expressed greater disapproval of attempting to get opponents fired and threatening to make opponents look weak, making promises and commitments not intended to be honored, misrepresenting or lying about the nature and progress of negotiations, paying contacts and bribing people with expensive gifts to obtain information about opponents, and feigning positive and negative emotions to manipulate opponents. People with a greater tendency to consider the point of view of others and "put themselves in others' shoes" were no more likely to disapprove of these unethical bargaining tactics than those with a lesser perspective-taking disposition, but they did exhibit a marginal tendency to disapprove of the strategic display of positive and negative emotions.

In addition, there were also significant gender differences in traditional competitive bargaining, attacking an opponent's network, and inappropriate information gathering. Women were more likely than men to disapprove of these tactics.

These results provide preliminary evidence that unethical bargaining and deceitful negotiation are more likely to be deterred by empathy than by perspective taking. This discovery extends prior negotiation research by highlighting a benefit provided by empathy that is not provided by perspective taking. Considering an opponent's thoughts helps a negotiator win money and resources (Galinsky et al., 2008; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), but considering an opponent's feelings helps a negotiator avoid harmful breaches of ethics.

Study 2

Study 1 demonstrated that empathy and perspective taking were differentially related to the endorsement of ethically questionable negotiation strategies in a large sample of undergraduate psychology students. In Study 2, I sought to replicate the empathy and perspective taking findings in a sample of Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students—older students who have more negotiation experience than undergraduates. Compared to MBA students, undergraduate psychology students are younger, have less education and work experience, and are more naïve regarding negotiation. Northwestern MBA students (Study 2) are, on average, 28 years old, whereas undergraduate psychology student at University of North Carolina (Study 1) are, on average, 19 years old. If Study 1 and 2 were to yield similar results, it would greatly increase confidence in the reliability of the empathy and perspective taking findings.

A second goal of Study 2 was to explore the differential effects of guilt proneness and shame proneness on the endorsement of unethical bargaining tactics. Guilt proneness and shame

proneness are both emotional traits that reflect individual differences in responses to personal transgressions (for reviews, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007). Responses indicative of guilt proneness are characterized by feeling bad about one's behavior and desiring to make amends. Responses indicative of shame proneness are characterized by feeling bad about one's self and desiring to hide and avoid the situation. Given guilt's status as the quintessential moral emotion (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007; Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2009), I expected unethical negotiation to be deterred more by guilt proneness than by shame proneness.

Hypothesis 1: Individual differences in empathy, but not perspective taking, will be associated with disapproval of ethically marginal negotiation tactics.

Hypothesis 2: Individual differences in guilt-proneness, but not shame-proneness, will be associated with disapproval of ethically marginal negotiation tactics.

Method

Participants & Procedure

Participants were 172 full-time MBA students (133 men, 39 women) enrolled in negotiations courses at Northwestern University. They completed an online survey during the first week of the course that asked them about a variety of topics relevant to negotiation. The survey included: (a) the SINS II scale (Lewicki et al., 2007; Robinson et al., 2000); (b) the empathic concern and perspective taking subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983b), and (c) the TOSCA-3 (Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3), which measures dispositional proneness to guilt and shame (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000). The order of the scales and the order of the items within each scale were randomized for each participant. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for these measures.

TOSCA-3: Guilt & Shame

The TOSCA-3 presents 16 scenarios involving personal transgressions, and respondents indicate the likelihood (1 = *not at all likely*, 2 = *slightly likely,* 3 = *moderately likely,* 4 = *quite likely,* 5 = *very likely*) that they would react to each scenario with a typical guilt response and a typical shame response (Tangney et al., 2000). Guilt responses include negative behavior-evaluations (e.g., I made a mistake.) and approach-oriented behaviors (e.g., apologizing, repairing one's misdeed). Shame responses include negative self-evaluations (e.g., I'm terrible.) and avoidance-oriented behaviors (e.g., hiding, withdrawing from public). For example, "You are taking care of your friends' dog while they are on vacation and the dog runs away. What is the likelihood that: (a) You would vow to be more careful next time. (*guilt*); (b) You would think, "I am irresponsible and incompetent." (*shame*)." The 16 items within each subscale were averaged to create a guilt proneness composite and a shame proneness composite.

Results & Discussion

I regressed the SINS II subscales on empathy, perspective taking, guilt proneness, shame proneness, and gender to investigate which moral emotions and capacities uniquely predict disapproval of ethically marginal negotiation behavior. Table 4 presents the multiple regression results.

Consistent with Study 1, the regression analyses revealed no significant effects of perspective taking. There were significant effects of empathy on misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, strategic manipulation of positive emotion, and strategic manipulation of negative emotion (see Table 4). There was also a marginal effect of empathy on attacking an opponent's network (p = .09)—the bivariate correlation, however, was significant (see Table 3). These results support Hypothesis 1. Empathic individuals disapproved of misrepresenting the

nature and progress of negotiations, paying contacts to obtain information about opponents, and feigning positive and negative emotions to manipulate opponents. They also exhibited a marginal tendency to disapprove of attempting to get opponents fired and threatening to make opponents look weak. Overall, the empathy and perspective-taking results replicate the Study 1 findings by demonstrating that empathy is more likely than perspective taking to deter a variety of unethical bargaining behaviors.

Although the bivariate correlation between empathy and disapproval of false promises was significant (see Table 3), empathy did not predict disapproval of false promises when guilt proneness was included in the regression model (see Table 4). Guilt proneness, but not empathy significantly predicted disapproval of false promises. Guilt proneness also significantly predicted disapproval of misrepresentation. Guilt-prone individuals were especially likely to disapprove of lying during negotiations and making promises not intended to be kept. Shame proneness, on the other hand, also significantly predicted false promises and misrepresentation—but in the opposite direction. Shame-prone individuals were less likely to disapprove of lying and making false promises. Keep in mind, however, the shame proneness effects were only significant in the regression model; the bivariate correlations were nonsignificant (see Table 3). This suggests that the greater endorsement of misrepresentation and false promises among these respondents is due to "guilt-free shame," as opposed to general shame-proneness (cf. Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The guilt and shame results support Hypothesis 2. People with a dispositional tendency to feel guilty about committing transgressions disapproved of negotiation strategies that involved lying to others and making false promises.

The negative relationship between guilt proneness and false promises is consistent with prior research showing that guilt proneness motivates moral behavior (Tangney & Dearing,

2002; Tangney et al., 2007). False promises were regarded as particularly egregious offenses—this subscale had the lowest mean rating of all the SINS II factors in Study 2. One possible reason why guilt proneness discouraged false promises but empathy did not is that false promises require internal self-regulation to be avoided. The sin of false promises is unlikely to be discovered until long after it has been committed. As a result, the offending negotiator may never be publicly admonished for his or her behavior and may never have to face the people affected by the sin. Attacking opponents' networks, misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, and strategic manipulation of emotion—the tactics discouraged by empathy—are comparatively more public than false promises and are relatively more likely to have immediate interpersonal consequences. Together, the empathy and guilt proneness findings suggest that offenses with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy, while offenses that are private are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt. This conclusion is consistent with research indicating that guilt is relatively more likely than shame to be experienced following private transgressions (Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Wolf et al., 2009).

In addition to the empathy and guilt-proneness effects, there were also significant gender differences in disapproval of attacking an opponent's network and inappropriate information gathering, and a marginal gender difference in disapproval of misrepresentation. Women were more likely than men to disapprove of these tactics.

General Discussion

Across two studies empathy discouraged ethically marginal negotiation behavior, such as lies and bribes, but perspective taking did not. People with a greater tendency to feel empathy for others were more likely to disapprove of threatening to make an opponent look weak, lying about

the nature and progress of negotiations, bribing people with expensive gifts to obtain information, and manipulating positive and negative emotions to strategically gain a negotiating advantage. People with a greater tendency to consider the perspective of others were no more likely to disapprove of these ethically questionable strategies than those not inclined to "put themselves in others' shoes."

Study 2 yielded important findings concerning guilt proneness. Guilt proneness is a trait that leads individuals to anticipate feeling bad about their personal transgressions and motivates them to engage in approach-oriented behaviors focused on repairing the consequences of their misdeeds (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2009). Guilt-prone individuals disapproved of making false promises and misrepresenting the nature and progress of negotiations. These finding suggests that guilt-prone people are especially likely to disapprove of negotiation strategies that involve lying to others. Interestingly, empathy was not significantly related to disapproval of false promises in Study 2, but was significantly related to disapproval of tactics that require the negotiator to personally deceive others. Consider the subtle difference between misrepresentation and false promises. Misrepresentation involves knowingly lying to a person's face (e.g., "Intentionally misrepresent information to your opponent in order to strengthen your negotiating arguments or position"). Negotiators who misrepresent themselves risk being exposed as liars. With false promises, however, the statements made during the negotiation do not become lies until well into the future (e.g., "In return for concessions from your opponent now, offer to make future concessions which you know you will not follow through on."). Thus, false promises cannot be exposed as sins until time has passed. And, even if a negotiator's false promises were to be exposed later, he or she could always claim that the commitments were true at the time at which they were made. Thus, the risks of interpersonal

consequences are much less with false promises than with misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, attacking an opponent's network, and feigning emotional displays. The comparatively private nature of the sin of false promises suggests the interesting possibility that private ethical breaches are more likely to be deterred by anticipated guilt, while ethical breaches with clear interpersonal consequences are more likely to be deterred by empathy. This is not to say that empathy is unrelated to disapproval of false promises—indeed, the bivariate correlation was significant in both studies. Instead, what the guilt and empathy findings indicate is that private offenses are more sensitive to guilt proneness while offenses with clear interpersonal consequences are more sensitive to empathy.

The compatibility of the empathy and perspective taking results from Study 1 and Study 2 is encouraging and lends confidence to the reliability of the current findings. Not only were the participants in these studies from different universities in different areas of the country, they also differed in terms of their age, level of education, prior work history, and, most notably, their prior bargaining and negotiation experience. Still, it should be kept in mind that these studies were correlational and did not investigate actual negotiation behavior. Future research should experimentally manipulate empathy and perspective taking and compare how these processes affect ethical decision making in actual bargaining and negotiation contexts, both inside and outside the laboratory. Future research should also continue to explore how moral emotions, such as guilt and shame, relate to ethical negotiation behavior. Perhaps unethical bargaining can be prevented by making negotiators aware of the guilty feelings they are likely to experience if they choose to lie or make false promises.

Although these studies contrasted empathy with perspective taking, these processes are, in fact, complementary and can be used in conjunction with one another. Perspective taking

helps negotiators enlarge the pie and ensure they get good-sized slices (Galinsky et al., 2008; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Empathy helps negotiators steer clear of ethical traps that might prevent them from enjoying the slices of the pie they receive. A skilled negotiator may be able to use empathy and perspective taking in combination to ethically create and claim value.

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Table 1

Study 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of the SINS II and IRI subscales in an undergraduate student sample

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Traditional Competitive Bargaining	4.76	1.26	(.80)								
2. Attack Opponent's Network	2.90	1.10	.20*	(.70)							
3. False Promises	2.99	1.13	.10*	.63*	(.76)						
4. Misrepresentation	3.42	1.07	.37*	.63*	.64*	(.76)					
5. Inappropriate Information Gathering	3.17	1.27	.26*	.63*	.51*	.55*	(.75)				
6. Strategic Manipulation of Positive Emotion	4.13	1.30	.60*	.36*	.33*	.55*	.44*	(.83)			
7. Strategic Manipulation of Negative Emotion	4.09	1.08	.67*	.44*	.36*	.55*	.44*	.69*	(.86)		
8. Empathy	3.73	.63	-.04	-.36*	-.29*	-.31*	-.32*	-.19*	-.21*	(.73)	
9. Perspective Taking	3.31	.64	-.06	-.22*	-.17*	-.19*	-.15*	-.16*	-.18*	.43*	(.75)

Note. N = 379. The SINS II scale ranged from 1 (*very inappropriate)* to 7 (*very appropriate).* The IRI scale ranged from 1 (*does not describe me at all*) to 5 (*describes me very well*). Reliabilities are presented on the diagonal of the correlation matrix and bivariate correlations are presented in the lower triangle.
*$p < .05$

Table 2

Study 1: Multiple regressions of the SINS II subscales on Empathy, Perspective Taking, and Gender

	Traditional Competitive Bargaining	Attack Opponent's Network	False Promises	Misrepresent.	Inappropriate Information Gathering	Strategic Manip. of Positive Emotion	Strategic Manip. of Negative Emotion
Empathy	.02	**-.30***	**-.25***	**-.27***	**-.27***	**-.14***	**-.15***
Perspective Taking	-.05	-.08	-.06	-.07	-.02	-.10†	-.11†
Gender	**-.15***	**-.12***	-.01	-.05	**-.19***	-.04	-.08
	R^2 = .03	R^2 = .15	R^2 = .08	R^2 = .10	R^2 = .14	R^2 = .05	R^2 = .06

Note. N = 379. Standardized regression coefficients (βs) are presented. Significant effects are shown in bold.

*$p < .05$, † $p < .10$

Table 3

Study 2: Reliabilities and bivariate correlations of the SINS II, IRI, & TOSCA-3 subscales in an MBA sample

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Traditional Competitive Bargaining	5.58	.98	(.52)										
2. Attack Opponent's Network	2.46	1.18	.14	(.79)									
3. False Promises	2.11	.90	.16*	.26*	(.71)								
4. Misrepresentation	3.32	1.18	.22*	.32*	.48*	(.73)							
5. Inappropriate Information Gathering	2.78	1.27	.10	.48*	.30*	.36*	(.68)						
6. Strategic Manipulation of Positive Emotion	5.23	1.13	.35*	.21*	.25*	.35*	.27*	(.80)					
7. Strategic Manipulation of Negative Emotion	4.85	1.22	.56*	.33*	.23*	.34*	.21*	.49*	(.91)				
8. Empathy	3.65	.62	-.10	-.18*	-.20*	-.32*	-.33*	-.23*	-.21*	(.75)			
9. Perspective Taking	3.48	.69	.05	.00	-.04	-.07	-.07	-.12	-.04	.20*	(.84)		
10. Guilt	3.88	.45	.01	-.12	-.28*	-.23*	-.15	-.09	-.14	.40*	.25*	(.71)	
11. Shame	2.56	.54	-.07	.05	.08	.10	.03	.09	-.03	.13	-.07	.27*	(.75)

Note. N = 172. The SINS II ranged from 1 (*very inappropriate)* to 7 (*very appropriate).* The IRI ranged from 1 (*does not describe me at all*) to 5 (*describes me very well*). The TOSCA-3 ranged from 1 (*not at all likely*) to 5 (*very likely*). Reliabilities are presented on the diagonal of the correlation matrix and bivariate correlations are presented in the lower triangle.

*$p < .05$

Table 4

Study 2: Multiple regressions of SINS II subscales on Empathy, Perspective Taking, Guilt Proneness, Shame Proneness, & Gender

	Traditional Competitive Bargaining	Attack Opponent's Network	False Promises	Misrepresent.	Inappropriate Information Gathering	Strategic Manip. of Positive Emotion	Strategic Manip. of Negative Emotion
Empathy	-.12	-.14†	-.10	**-.26***	**-.29***	**-.24***	**-.18***
Perspective Taking	.06	.06	.07	.04	.00	-.06	.02
Guilt	.06	-.08	**-.29***	**-.17***	-.01	-.02	-.06
Shame	-.06	.11	**.18***	**.20***	.10	.11	.02
Gender	-.07	**-.17***	-.10	-.14†	**-.30***	.06	-.08
	R^2 = .03	R^2 = .07	R^2 = .13	R^2 = .17	R^2 = .20	R^2 = .08	R^2 = .05

Note. N = 172. Standardized regression coefficients (βs) are presented. Significant effects are shown in bold.

*p < .05, † p < .10

Footnote

[i] The data from Study 1 were collected as part of a larger study designed to validate a new measure of Guilt And Shame Proneness—the GASP (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2009)