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CIVIL WARS IN THE SOUTHWEST BORDERLANDS:

CULTURES IN CONFLICT, 1861-1867

by

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DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of the
Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences
of Carnegie Mellon University
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Abstract:

Civil Wars in the Southwest Borderlands: Cultures in Conflict, 1861-1867

From 1861 to 1867 the diverse peoples—Indian, Hispano, and Anglo—of the Southwest borderlands struggled for survival and dominance in civil wars, quite apart from the Civil War of the Southern rebellion that raged in the eastern United States. Successful adaptation to the changing conditions in the borderlands required accommodation, compromise, and alliances as much as it did violent confrontation, martial prowess, and the capacity to wage war. The warrior cultures of each of the antagonistic groups bore many similarities, but each brought to the conflict its traditional means of fighting and adapted to the evolving political and social landscape. The martial traditions—tactics, logistics, weapons, martial customs, treatment of enemy captives—of the communities in conflict in order to demonstrate how the preparation and practice of warfare by the different ethnic groups set in motion actions that resulted in conflict and played a significant role in the causes and outcomes of the wars for the borderlands. At the beginning of the Civil War, Navajos, Apaches, and Comanches held the reins of power in the borderlands while sedentary, agrarian Indian communities, Hispanos, and Anglos struggled to maintain strongholds in fortified villages, outposts, and mining settlements. By 1867, the last of the volunteer soldiers of the Civil War era had mustered out of service, and Benito Juárez's Republicans had driven out the French, executed Emperor Maximilian, and reclaimed Mexico. In the border states of Chihuahua and

Sonora, Mexican Republican troops began relocating tribes and reestablishing settlements devastated by Apache raiders. In the newly-configured U.S. territories of Arizona and New Mexico, slavery as an economic and social system began to collapse, and a new social, political, and economic order arose, with Anglos and Hispanos at the top of the hierarchy and the raiding tribes at the bottom. The federal government exerted control over reservation-restricted Indians and defined new territorial boundaries. International relations had also changed. A more defined and restricted border between Mexico and the United States emerged from the war-torn borderlands while Hispano and Anglo citizens uneasily shared a new American political and economic model for survival in the Southwest.

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INTRODUCTION

From 1861 to 1867 the diverse peoples—Indian, Hispano, and Anglo—of the Southwest borderlands struggled for survival and dominance in civil wars, quite apart from the Civil War of the Southern rebellion that raged in the eastern United States. Successful adaptation to the changing conditions in the borderlands required accommodation, compromise, and alliances as much as it did violent confrontation, martial prowess, and the capacity to wage war. The warrior cultures of each of the antagonistic groups bore many similarities, but each brought to the conflict its traditional means of fighting and adapted to the evolving political and social landscape. At the beginning of the Civil War, Navajos, Apaches, and Comanches held the reins of power in the borderlands while sedentary, agrarian Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos struggled to maintain strongholds in fortified communities, outposts, and mining settlements. By 1867, the last of the volunteer soldiers of the Civil War era had mustered out of service, and Benito Juárez's Republicans had ousted the French, executed Emperor Maximilian, and reclaimed Mexico. In the border states of Chihuahua and Sonora, Mexican Republican troops began relocating Indian people and reestablishing settlements devastated by Apache raiders. In the newly-configured U.S. territories of Arizona and New Mexico, slavery as an economic and social system began to collapse, and a new social, political, and economic order arose, with Anglos and Hispanos at the top of the hierarchy and the raiding Apaches and Navajos at the bottom. The federal government exerted control over reservation-restricted Indians and defined new territorial boundaries. International relations had also changed. A more defined and restricted border between

Mexico and the United States emerged from the war-torn borderlands while Hispano and Anglo citizens uneasily shared a new American political and economic model for survival in the Southwest.[1]

This study promises to make several closely interconnected contributions to scholarship. First, I will argue that multiple civil wars were fought by distinct cultural groups in the Southwest borderlands concurrent with and connected to the American Civil War. While other scholars have addressed the Union and Confederate conflict in the Southwest, none has focused on the importance of the Civil War as the spark that ignited a powder keg of civil wars related to pre-existing inter-ethnic tensions in the borderlands. This study reveals that civil wars are most likely to occur when two, or more, ethnically or culturally distinct peoples occupy the same space and struggle for survival and dominance in order to ensure preservation of community and cultural identity. The dominant or militarily-stronger party generally describes the conflict as "civil war" while the insurgent faction identifies it as an international or interethnic struggle. In addition, the civil wars of the borderlands pitted family members against one another because the antagonists were often related by blood as a result of years of captive-taking, adoption, slavery, and intermarriage.[2] In the borderlands during the 1860s, these conflicts resulted

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[1] Testimony found in Indian Depredation Claims demonstrates that the withdrawal of federal troops at the beginning of the Civil War and their subsequent distraction fighting Confederates created a situation that led to increased stock raiding by Apaches and Navajos and then to open war. For examples see NARA, RG 123, Case Files, 4097 Chavez, 6845 Kitchen, 4101 Montoya, 4048 Ortero, 5947 Padilla, 6253 Peeples, NARA, RG 75 Claim 6141 Pino.

[2] James F. Brooks' *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) carefully and quantitatively examined the cultural interaction and institutionalized slavery based on raiding and trading Indian and Hispano captives. New Mexico Hispanos often masked slave raids as attempts to recover livestock taken by Indians, but the real object was captives to be used as laborers or concubines. The roots of this system are found in Iberian slave practices in which the enslaved would gradually shed their status as war captives to become full, though subordinate, family members. Brooks' groundbreaking work also demonstrates that the raid and reprisal system was not unilateral.

in new military, political, and social hierarchies. Second, I will show that a culturally-rooted sense of martial manhood animated or exacerbated the wars in the Southwest.[3] The warring peoples all shared aspects of this philosophy, but they also differed in the ways they manifested it in their warrior traditions and modes of fighting. I will expand on the idea advanced by other borderlands scholars that there existed a fundamental difference between "raiding" for gain and status and "warfare" for revenge and honor.[4] And, finally, I will examine in detail the warrior traditions—tactics, logistics, weapons, martial customs, treatment of enemy captives—of the communities in conflict in order to demonstrate how the preparation and practice of warfare by the different ethnic groups set in motion actions that resulted in conflict and played a significant role in the causes and outcomes of the wars for the borderlands.

War reveals much about human nature—our loves and hates, beliefs and superstitions, and our penchant and capacity for violence.[5] Only in recent years, however,

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[3]Amy Greenberg's *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) addresses the Anglo-American filibustering phenomenon that reached its peak that same year, 1857, arguing that economic stress and a form of "martial masculinity" led ambitious young men such as William Walker to seek opportunity and empire south of the United States border while becoming a "race hero" to his Anglo American countrymen. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood*, 12-14, 42, 168-69.

[4]In the 1930s, ethnographer Grenville Goodwin lived and worked with Apaches in Arizona to better understand the underlying causes of the violent conflict of the 1860s. This work remained inaccessible to historians until 1971 when anthropologist Keith Basso published Goodwin's field notes and extraordinary insights in *Western Apache Raiding and Warfare* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971). Key among the conclusions is that Apaches made a sharp distinction between "raiding" for property and "warring" for revenge (*gegodza*). Clifton Kroeber and Bernard Fontana (*Massacre on the Gila: An Account of the Last Major Battle Between American Indians, With Reflections on the Origin of War,* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986) attribute the origin of war between Indian peoples of the Southwest Borderlands to be the result of a shift in subsistence strategies and the transfer of the burden of agriculture and food production to women, giving rise to a male tendency to make war in order to demonstrate their masculinity and essential service to their families and communities. The rise of this martial culture led to conflict with neighboring tribes.

[5]See Peter Novick's, *That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the American Historical Profession (*New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 74-82, 234-38, 354-59 for a survey of Civil War historiography to 1980 as well as Francis G. Couvares, *et al*. *Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2009), 339-64, for more recent scholarship.

with the advent of Social History, Western History and, more specifically, new Southwest Borderlands studies, have scholars attempted to understand the Civil War's full impact and multicultural dimensions. Employing interdisciplinary, micro-historical, and narrative approaches, they are beginning to look westward—far from "the seat of the rebellion"—and are advancing a broader understanding of the conflict. In the Southwest borderlands of the 1860s, violent conflict resulted from each community's desire for economic survival, security and cultural preservation.[6]

As the Civil War raged in the eastern United States, Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples fought other civil wars along the United States-Mexican border in the Far West from 1861 to 1867. Building on the work of Borderlands and Western History scholars and employing little-known and some previously unused Indian Depredation Claim

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Eminent historians in this field include James Ford Rhodes (*History of the United States*, New York: Macmillan Company, 1909), Charles Beard (*The Rise of American Civilization,* New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), W.E.B. DuBois (*Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880,* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "The Causes of the Civil War: A Note on Historical Sentimentalism," *Partisan Review* XVI (October, 1949): 968-81; Alan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, 8 Vols., (New York: Scribner, 1947), and Eric Foner (*Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[6] Alvin Josephy's *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) provided a sweeping narrative of the Civil War in the far western states and territories by focusing attention on the war's impact on the native populations of the trans-Mississippi West. Richard White wrote in "*It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": a History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) that, "the Civil War is critically important in this history of western origins…it created the conditions in which the West arose." European domination was not a forgone conclusion in encounters with powerful American Indian empires and tribal domains. Whether motivated by their quests for empire, cultural supremacy, or defending their homeland, Indian people demonstrated political savvy, military might, and the ability to accommodate and compromise when necessary as a survival strategy. While Roger Nichols's *Warrior Nations: The United States and Indian Peoples* (Norman: Oklahoma Press, 2013) examines violence between Indians and Anglo Americans that devolved to the point of "an all-out race war," Gary Anderson (*Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005) argues that the actions of white American "exterminationists" in Texas resulted in "deliberate ethnic cleansing" of Indian peoples. Karl Jacoby takes a decidedly micro-historical turn with his *Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), exploring in detail the motives for the Camp Grant, Arizona, massacre of Apache people in the aftermath of the Civil War from a multicultural—Indian, Hispano, Anglo—perspective. Jacoby follows the plight of Apache slaves distributed among Tucson's Hispano citizens who desired the women and children as household servants and domestic laborers. Captivity and slavery did, in fact, play a significant role in conflict in the Southwest borderlands.

records discovered at the National Archives as well as military and government documents, newspapers, ethnographies, museum collections, and other primary source materials, this work will examine the types of warfare engaged in by the diverse peoples of the Southwest. It will also attempt to reveal the role this violence played in the civil wars spawned or exacerbated by the American Civil War and how the resulting conflicts led to a shift in the delicate balance of power in the Southwest borderlands. These conflicts reflected the martial and warrior traditions, slavery practices, cultures, and survival strategies of each group and, ultimately, led to a new social hierarchy in the region.

The American Civil War created conditions that triggered or expanded violent conflict between peoples of different communities (nations, races, ethnicities) and led to multiple concurrent civil wars in the Southwest borderlands between 1861 and 1867. Before the Civil War, there existed inter-cultural tension and a hostile but interdependent raid and reprisal relationship between the Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples. This conflict was most often characterized by raiding and captive-taking but rarely "war to the death" resulting in the total domination or extermination of an enemy. The Navajos and Apaches, who often outnumbered their Hispano, Anglo, and agrarian Indian adversaries, were at the top of the power hierarchy in the territories when the war began. The initial withdrawal of U.S. regular troops in 1861 led to a power vacuum that Apache and Navajo warriors rushed to fill. The subsequent invasion of the territories by Anglos—Union and Confederate—resulted in alliances among Anglo soldiers, Hispanos, and sedentary Indians allowing them, collectively, to wage a relentless war on the raiding Navajos and

Apaches.[7] The wars north of the border also re-inflamed a smoldering civil war in Mexico and enabled European intervention that vastly enlarged the conflict and brought it to a new level of violence.

This work is intended to be at once a microhistory of the American Civil War in the borderlands and an examination of warrior traditions in civil wars. My goal is to build on the work of Edward Spicer, David Weber, Alfred Kroeber, Bernard Fontana, James F. Brooks, Amy Greenberg, and other Borderlands scholars. Focusing on the violent clash of cultures, this work attempts to incorporate transnational aspects of the U.S.-Mexican borderlands during the Civil War years, concentrating on the American Southwest. Particular emphasis is focused on New Mexico and Arizona territories (the latter carved out of the former in 1863) and portions of California, Texas, and the Mexican border states of Sonora and Chihuahua. The history of nations, states, and ethnic communities is transnational but cannot be confined to borders established by governments and drawn on maps. In the borderlands, human populations interacted across borders, sometimes in spite of them and at times because of them. Where others have explored captivity and slavery as conceptual frameworks, I will look more closely at warfare and violence as

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[7] For consistency with quoted primary sources, I will use the following names for Yuman and Uto-Aztecan speaking Quechans (Yumas), Mojaves, Chemehuevis, Maricopas (*Piipaash*), Pimas (*Akimel O'odham*), Papagos (*Tohono O'odham*). In recent years historians have adopted new names and orthography for many Athabaskan-speaking bands, usually to reflect the preference of present-day members for the traditional spoken names for their people, rather than names adopted by Spanish and English-speaking newcomers: Navajo (*Diné*), Western Apaches (*Nnee*, including the Aravaipas), Chiricahua Apaches (including the allied Bedonkohe, Chokonen, Chihenne, and Nednhi, aka *Bidánku, Chukunende, Chíhénde and Ndé ndaí*), and Eastern Apaches (including Jicarilla, Mescalero, and Lipan). It was their traditional Pueblo Indian adversaries who first used the name "Apache," the Zuni word ('a·paču 'Navajos') for enemies. Juan de Oñate, Spanish Governor of New Mexico, used it as early as 1598. In Oñate's time no distinction was drawn between Apaches and Navajos. The agrarian Pueblo Indians of northern New Mexico were culturally and linguistically diverse. By the 1860s, many Pueblo communities (Ácoma, Cohiti, Hopi, Isleta, Jemez, Kewa, Laguna, Nambe, Ohkay, Picuris, Pojoaque, San Felipe, San Ildefonso, Sandia, Santa Ana, Santa Clara, Tesuque, Taos, Zia, and Zuni) had been culturally and linguistically influenced by New Mexico's Spanish-speaking population.

organizing themes. In the tradition of earlier borderlands historians, I have adopted a chronological narrative approach which, when possible, presents illustrative material and detailed analysis on a micro level. I will also attempt to incorporate archaeological, anthropological, ethnographic, and documentary sources to chronicle the Southwestern borderlands during the Civil War years while at the same time searching for large lessons in small worlds. Believing, as Brooks, Jacoby, and other Borderlands historians, that there is significance in microcosm often lost in grand historical theories, the details really are important. The story of the civil wars in the borderlands is necessarily complicated because it involves so many distinct participant communities and cultures. Neither can the idiosyncratic behavior exhibited by self-interested individuals be overlooked. The micro-historical approach is the best way to understand the complex and nuanced history of the peoples of the Southwest Borderlands during this turbulent period.[8]

A shared understanding of the terms used to describe the relationships among and between peoples and communities of the borderlands during the Civil War era is essential if my arguments are to make sense. Toward this end, I have appended a glossary of terms intended to reflect recent scholarship in Borderlands history and definitions of obscure and archaic words as well as my own interpretations of sometimes controversial ideas. For the purpose of this study I will define *raid* (an extension of hunting traditions based on resource acquisition for survival), *war* (socially or politically motivated violence), *civil war* (war within a polity or region considered unified by one or both antagonists), *revolution/rebellion* (civil war resulting from ideological change or desire to maintain traditionally held values, depending on the perspective of the antagonists), *nation* (a

[8] See James F. Brooks, Christopher R. N. DeCorse, and John Walton, Eds., *Small Worlds*: *Method, Meaning & Narrative in Microhistory* (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2008).

community with geographic boundaries imagined and defined by one or more peoples), *ethnic group* (a linguistically and culturally related group that is inclined to cooperate especially when faced with external threats), and *community* (a real or imagined group of people with common interests) and demonstrate the cultural imperatives behind these meaning-freighted terms. The Spanish/Mexicans/Americans declared and defined their "imagined communities" (nations) in the Southwest without the consent of the other peoples encompassed within the boundaries. By the 1860s, more than 300 years after the Spanish *entrada*, the descendants of the Euro-Americans considered Indian resistance a rebellion while many of the native groups characterized it as a war against outside invaders—an international war. The warfare waged by the Yuman-speaking Colorado River people against the Yuman-speaking Maricopas and allied Uto-Aztecan Pimas was at once a civil war and a transnational conflict. Similarly, the United States-Anglo-Hispano alliance *vs* Apache and the Navajo *vs* Apache (both pastoral/raiding/Athabaskan peoples) conflicts might be considered civil wars and international struggles. The socially constructed ideas of race and ethnicity are also fundamental to understanding the civil wars of the Southwest. For these controversial terms I will rely on the definitions advanced by Paul Spickard and Eric Meeks, both of whom believe that race is often used to refer to "others" while ethnicity is generally a group's self-definition. Even though these ideas are artificial historical or social constructs, race and ethnicity matter in understanding the civil wars of the Southwest borderlands because the people involved in the struggles believed these distinctions to be important. The relationships between the ethnic groups of the Southwest today are still colored by these differences in perception

of what constitutes a community, a nation, and a people. It is hoped that this study will help us better understand the roots of these differing and often conflicting perceptions.[9]

A wide array of United States and Mexican primary sources including military records, newspapers, census reports, and manuscript collections will be employed to complement a largely un-researched body of government documents, the Indian Depredation Claims, housed with related United States Court of Claims records at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. U.S. military records are especially rich in information relating to the peoples—Indian, Hispano, and Anglo—of the territories. Officers' reports (found in NARA RG 75, Letters Sent & Received, Post Returns, Ordnance Returns, and Records of Courts Martial) and Records of Continental Commands (including General, Special, and Post Orders) provide insights into peoples the government considered enemies and allies, detailing strengths, weakness, motivations, and methods of warfare. Rich collections of well-organized Mexican archival material relating to the period of the War of the Reform and French Intervention were found in Mexico City at the *Centro de Estudios de Historia de México CARSO*, and *Centro Cultural, Archivo Histórico de APAN*.

Newspaper accounts submitted by soldier correspondents and other eye-witnesses are also valuable sources of uncensored observations and candid information about the activities of combatants, civil and military, in the borderlands. Though newspapers from

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[9] Eric V. Meeks, *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 4-5, 241-42. Meeks expresses a debt of gratitude to Jean and John Comaroff's *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) which he credits for first articulating this distinction between race and ethnicity. Meeks argues that Yaqui and O'odham people still fight for unrestricted U.S.-Mexico border-crossing. European-model nations "imagined" boundaries that split Indian homelands and families. Paul Spickard, *Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and Identity* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 18-19.

Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and California, as well as periodicals from Mexican states and the Imperial government of Maximilian, must be carefully evaluated for their editorial agendas, many articles are simply verbatim reprints of private correspondence from soldiers and citizen participants of the territorial wars. These accounts complement the letters and diaries, including those of U.S. Volunteer troops and Confederates serving in the territories as well as those of Anglo and Hispano civilians living in or traveling through the territories.

Continuing in the tradition of Borderlands studies, anthropological materials, including archaeological reports of forts, camps, villages, massacre and battle sites located at the University of Arizona, National Anthropological Archives, and other state and local repositories, will also be employed. Ethnographic accounts recorded in the form of oral histories of Navajo, Apache, Pima, Pueblo, and Papago people are essential to the balanced study of this subject. The best of these sources, done by Smithsonian and other ethnographers in the late nineteenth century, relate directly to matters of raiding and warfare and delve into the motivations for inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict. Museum collections, including those of the New Mexico Historical Society, Arizona Historical Society, the Smithsonian Institution, as well as the National Museums of Mexico, especially the *Museo del Virreinato,* the *Museo Nacional de Historia*, and the *Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones* have been surveyed for ethnographic materials, art, and artifacts that shed light on the technologies, traditions, and modes of warfare employed by the antagonists.

The Indian Depredation Claims in RG 75 and RG 123 at the National Archives are an especially valuable and largely untapped resource. These records contain eye-

witness testimony, rich in detail, describing attacks, stock raids, captivity, and other types of conflict that, when combined with other primary source accounts and materials, provide new insights into the civil wars in the American Southwest.[10] Researchers will find more than ten thousand depredation claim cases filed between 1796 and 1920, many still bundled and securely tied with their original red tape. Of these claims, more than six hundred relate to Arizona and New Mexico during the period 1861-67. The case files contain depositions, testimony, cross-examinations, and other evidence—a wealth of information detailing the nature of raids and warfare in the Southwest that may shed light on questions about the groups initiating the attacks; the number, extent, and violence of depredations over time; and the patterns of conflict and tactics employed. When examined with other primary sources, the testimonies of Indian, Hispano, and Anglo antagonists present a complex yet compelling picture of the culturally distinct methods of conflict, accommodation, cooperation, and other survival strategies employed by the peoples of the Southwest during the Civil War years.[11]

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[10] See Appendix C for examples of questions that can be examined using Depredation Claims and correlated with other documented events.

[11] Depredation Case Files, NARA, RG 123; Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, NARA RG 75. Taken alone, these documents do not represent a complete record of conflict during the Civil War. The claims report losses of civilian property to Indians considered to be at peace with and under the protection of the U.S. government. Army reports and War Department records, Office of Indian Affairs reports, newspaper accounts, reminiscences (letters, diaries, oral interviews, memoirs), and church and cemetery records must be consulted to complete the picture.

Chapter 1

People, War, and Power in the Southwest Borderlands

Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos struggled for power during the decade of the 1860s in the area now known as the Southwest borderlands of the United States. Each group brought to the struggle its own ideas of war. While there were significant differences in the way they sought power through violence, there were also many similarities. All demonstrated a heritage of martial masculinity in which men spent an inordinate amount of time developing warrior traditions, weapons, strategies, and tactics that would give them an advantage over rival communities while demonstrating their value to the women and other members of their society. The male warriors' sense of worth was inextricably tied to the way they were viewed by their societies. For men, social status and the acquisition of mates depended on their ability to dominate or exert power over others inhabiting or passing through the territory they considered their domain. Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos all shared an understanding of conquest by force of arms, yet the rules of war differed for each group and the strategies and tactics employed varied. The antagonists all had elaborate war rituals, costumes, and weaponry calculated to achieve tactical and morale advantage while awing their enemies. All of the groups that struggled for power and dominance in the borderlands believed in some form of vengeance warfare and understood the concept of captivity and slavery. The peoples who came into conflict in the borderlands of the 1860s all shared a belief in an afterlife and all had religious and spiritual traditions that guided their behavior in the corporeal world.

Though each band had its distinctive characteristics, the indigenous Indian peoples of the Southwest felt a deep connection to the land they inhabited. Whether they

adopted sedentary, semi-nomadic, or nomadic-pastoral survival strategies, they differed significantly from their Hispano and Anglo counterparts in their ideas of land ownership. The Indian warriors especially valued independent initiative and action and only followed chiefs or war leaders in whom they had confidence. These positions were not hereditary. When it came to war, leaders changed often and individual warriors or bands followed their own course. Leaders influenced followers or led by example rather than demanding compliance. This tendency made cooperative strategic operations against enemies difficult to plan and execute. However, groups of like-minded men banded together in warrior societies which socialized and fought together. Their weapons varied depending on the men's physical abilities, the environment, and the motives for violent conflict. The pedestrian Yumans fought in close combat with war clubs while the mounted warriors of the Southern Plains employed lances and other weapons suited for fighting on horseback. Apaches mastered surprise, ambush, and fighting-retreat tactics—rarely attacking head-on in the open—loosing arrows and slung stones with amazing skill. The indigenous people quickly adapted to weapons and war materials introduced by Hispano and Anglo newcomers. Most Indians of the borderlands recognized sharp distinctions between "raiding" and "warfare." The raid for enemy property was an extension of time-honored hunting and gathering traditions while war was motivated by revenge for losses or offences suffered at the hands of enemies. Women and children captives were an essential feature of the raid-war complex. The women were generally taken for wives and the male children desired to replace losses resulting from war and natural attrition. Raiding and warfare were often seasonal activities, closely related to the availability of food and forage.

Hispano warriors exhibited a merging of Indian and European martial traditions. Hierarchical and, often, hereditary leaders exerted control over soldiers, whether regulars or militia, and civilian combatants. Officers and leaders generally came from upper classes and fighting men from the *mestizaje*, whether assimilated or subject Indian peoples. Internecine fighting characterized this period of the 1860s, and political and class rivalries often hampered concerted or strategic action against enemies. Individual courage and honor were highly valued and the *vergüenza* or shame that attached to cowardly misconduct was abhorred. Their weapons and tactics reflected the mixture of ethnicities seen in the men themselves. Lances and short swords were often the weapons of choice for mounted warriors while footmen employed a wide variety of arms depending on terrain and availability. Over time, firearms became increasingly important. Slavery and peonage were deeply rooted in the Hispano tradition and captive-taking often became the primary motive for raiding and cause of retaliatory warfare. Women captives were desired as *criadas* (servants) and boys as herders; these were quickly assimilated into the Hispanos' sedentary agricultural or pastoral settlements. Raids, punitive expeditions, and campaigns related to the growing seasons but were not entirely dependent on them.

Anglos brought a highly militarized society to the borderlands. They were by no means a homogeneous group—Texas rebels, for example, differed culturally and temperamentally from unionist Californians, Coloradans, other territorial citizens, and regular army soldiers. Among the Anglos were small numbers of African Americans who, in the late 1860s, fought with regular U.S. Army units and were, from the Indians' point of view, at first contact, virtually indistinguishable from their white counterparts in

terms of tactics and martial culture. The Indian peoples of the Southern Plains referred to them as "black whitemen," and by the end of the decade they were called "Buffalo Soldiers."[1] In general, the combative Americans exhibited European values of strategic warfare and adhered to highly stylized tactics that evolved from the Napoleonic tradition. The soldiers organized themselves around an officer corps composed largely of trained professionals. A rigidly hierarchical system of leadership left little room for independent action, though volunteer troops often demonstrated a willingness to break new ground in warfare that regulars failed to exploit. The concepts of "total war" and "war of extermination" introduced by the Anglos escalated the violence in the borderlands to new levels of lethality. Combined with industrial mass production of sophisticated firearms and logistical technologies, the Anglos sustained campaigns and operations on tactical and strategic levels during all seasons of the year and in all conditions. Captive-taking—"prisoners of war"—was generally seen as a temporary war measure, never the *raison d'être* for fighting. Evolving attitudes toward race and slavery became the root cause of

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[1]There is little research on how blacks' earlier warrior traditions might have influenced warfare in the Southwest. African Americans accounted for less than 1% of the population of the Southwest when the Civil War began. Indian peoples of the borderlands had limited contact with black people, but when first encountered during the fur trade era and through the 1860s, Cheyennes referred to them as "black whitemen" (*mok-ta-veho*) because they exhibited most of the usual characteristics of the whites (they wore hats, had heels on their shoes, spoke the same language, and generally behaved like whites), the only noticeable difference was the color of their skin. George Bent remembered, "my father [William Bent] had a slave at the fort, a very black Negro, and as the Cheyennes had seen few if any Negroes before, they thought this slave was very wonderful. They called him the black whiteman." George Bent to George Hyde, Aug. 10, 1910 and Feb. 5, 1913, Bent Letters, Coe Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale. See also: Jean Afton, David Halaas, and Andrew Masich, *Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a Ledgerbook History of Coups and Combat* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997), 108-09. The term Buffalo Soldier is of obscure origin, but the earliest usage may be attributed to Comanches, referring to the buffalo-like hair of troopers of the black Tenth U.S. Cavalry in Texas in the late 1860s. See: William H. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 27; William E. and Betty S. Alt, *Black Soldiers*, *White Wars*: *Black* Warriors from Antiquity (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002), 56-8; Quintard Taylor, *In Search of the Racial Frontier: African Americans in the American West, 1528-1990* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 167-77. African cultural survivals as viewed by indigenous people (as wel as blacks themselves) in the borderlands is a promising area of research virtually unexplored by scholars at present.

cultural difference and internecine conflict; loyalties, North or South, were generally determined by state of origin. Led by military men, the Anglos sought to subdue other peoples by armed force and then regulate all aspects of civil life.

Indigenous Peoples and the Spanish

Hundreds of years prior to the arrival of Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century, people descended from ice age migrants, who had come to North America 20,000 years earlier, settled along the tributaries of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers of the arid Southwest.[2] The Indian peoples and cultures that evolved in the Americas were by no means a monolithic group, but, rather, diverse bands with distinct languages, survival strategies, traditions, and customs.[3] By the time Europeans arrived in the Americas, Yuman and Uto-Aztecan speaking peoples lived in permanent villages along rivers or fortified stone and adobe structures atop high mesas and subsisted by means of intensive agriculture supplemented by hunting and foraging.[4] Pressured by Comanche,

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[2] There are no truly "native" peoples in the Southwest borderlands—no humans originated in North America—all came from somewhere else since the great ice sheets that covered the continent began retreating 20-30,000 years ago. Most of the diverse peoples inhabiting the region by the 1860s began their migration to the Southwest at the same time as the arrival of Spanish conquistadors in the middle of the sixteenth century. Tom D. Dillehay, *The Settlement of the Americas: A New Prehistory* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), passim.

[3] The terms "tradition" and "custom" are often used interchangeably, but anthropologists and sociologists, and some historians detect subtle distinctions. Eric Hobsbawm and others see custom as the actions derived from long-term conventions and traditions as the trappings or physical manifestations of the customs. Using British judges and barristers as an illustration, the people customarily argue and pass judgment while the robes and wigs they wear are traditional. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2-3; among the Uto-Aztecan Pueblo peoples are several groups of Tanoan-speakers.

[4]In an attempt to lessen confusion, I have adopted the following names for Yuman and Uto-Aztecan speaking tribes: Quechans (Yumas), Mojaves, Chemehuevis (*Nüwüwü)*, Maricopas (*Piipash*), Pimas (*Akimel O'odham*), Papagos (*Tohono O'odham*), and Ópatas. Yavapais were divided into four geographical bands that considered themselves separate peoples: the *Đo:lkabaya*, or Western Yavapai, the Yavbe', or Northwestern Yavapai, the Guwevkabaya, or Southeastern Yavapai, and *Wi:pukba*, or Northeastern Yavapai and Verde Valley Yavapai. The *Mađqwadabaya* or "Desert People" were another Yavapai band believed to have mixed with the Mojave and Quechan people and no longer exist as a separate people. The Yavapai have much in common with their linguistic relatives to the north, the Havasupai and the Hualapai. Though closely related to the Mojaves, the Yavapai were often mistaken as Apache by Anglo settlers,

Kiowa, Arapaho, and Cheyenne peoples of the central and southern plains,[5] Athabaskan-speaking Navajos and Apaches migrated into the region from the north and east as the Spanish *entrada* began from the south.[6]

By the early eighteenth century, the Navajo clans sheltered in the deep canyons of the upper Colorado River, growing crops and hunting, while diverse Apache bands subsisted primarily by foraging, hunting, and seasonally cultivating crops along the mountain rivers and high desert streams to the south. These people became adept at supplementing their supplies by raiding the more sedentary agrarian groups in search of food, captives, and other useful or fungible commodities. Over the next hundred years, this tradition of raiding increasingly targeted the Spanish arrivals who lived in small, isolated villages and possessed herds of domesticated animals—cattle, sheep, goats, and horses.

The horses introduced by the Spanish radically changed the survival strategies and lifestyles of the first peoples of the Southwest. The availability of these easily-domesticated animals revolutionized transportation and band mobility on the Southern

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variously being referred to as "Mohave-Apache," "Yuma-Apache," or "Tonto-Apache." These names are generally, though not universally, preferred by present-day tribal members: Navajo (*Diné*), Western Apaches (*Nnee)*, including the Aravaipas (*Tsé Binesti'é*), Chiricahua Apaches (including *Bidánku, Chukunende, Chíhénde and Ndé ndaí* bands), and Eastern Apaches (including Mescalero, Jicarilla, and Lipans). The agrarian Pueblo Indians of northern New Mexico were culturally and linguistically diverse, including Uto-Aztecan, Keresan, Tanoan, Tewa, and Zuñi speaking peoples. By the time of the Civil War, many of the twenty Pueblo groups (e.g. Ácoma, Isleta, Jemez, Laguna, and Taos) in Arizona and New Mexico had been heavily influenced or partially assimilated by the Spanish and Mexicans.

[5] The Comanches (*Nuмuпuu)* split from the Shoshones soon after acquiring horses from Pueblo Indians, who had captured many animals from the Spanish during the revolt centered in northern New Mexico in 1680. The Comanche language is Uto-Aztecan. The Kiowas speak a Tanoan language as do some of the Pueblo Indians. The Cheyenne (*Tsistsistas*) language has Algonquian roots. These people migrated from the Great Lakes region after acquiring horses through trade with Comanches about 1750.

[6] Linguists have identified seven distinct Southwestern Athabaskan (sometimes called Apachean) dialects: Navajo, Western Apache, Chiricahua, Mescalero, Jicarilla, Lipan, and Kiowa-Apache. http://www.everyculture.com/multi/A-Br/Apaches.html#ixzz2ycXHrKg2

Plains, where true horse cultures evolved within only a few generations of the animal's introduction. The peoples of the Plains began to follow the buffalo herds as they migrated across the vast grasslands. Prior to the adoption of the horse, hunters on foot found it difficult to kill the powerful American bison and, when successful, transport the hundreds of pounds of perishable meat. Horses enabled the hunters to ride alongside a running buffalo and slay it with a lance or arrows then pack meat, hide, and other useful parts of the animal back to a village. In time, the Comanches and other Plains Indians learned to move their villages with the wide-ranging herds, carrying buffalo hide tipis, camp equipment, and children on pole-drag travois pulled by ponies bred for their stamina.

The mobility of the villages greatly expanded the reach of the horse peoples and increasingly brought them into conflict with others. Employing many of the same skills used in buffalo hunting, the Comanches and Kiowas became expert mounted fighters. Wars of conquest and retaliation escalated as did raiding for captives and profit. The Plains warriors drove most of the neighboring Apache bands from the open grasslands of the Staked Plains (*Llano Estacado*) to the mountains and deserts to the south and west. More than thirty related and cooperating Comanche and Kiowa bands kept the Arapahos and Cheyennes well to the north toward the Arkansas River and away from the southern herds. The people inhabiting the northernmost Mexican outposts and Indian Pueblos feared and paid tribute to the warriors of the Plains and did not stray far from the protection of settlements on the Rio Grande.

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the influence of the ever-expanding Comanche empire rippled westward toward the Rio Grande. By trade and raid the river and mountain peoples of the Southwest also adopted horses, but these animals

did not affect them as profoundly as they had the nomadic Plains people. The sedentary peoples remained in their villages close to dependable crops, foraging ranges, and hunting grounds. The semi-nomadic Athabaskan Navajos and Apaches, however, lived in seasonal rancherías and increasingly relied on horses for hunting and for raiding neighboring groups, sometimes even venturing onto the Plains and ranging deep into Mexico. Their horse herds remained relatively small, when compared to the Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes, and the animals sometimes served as a supplementary food source, an unthinkable dietary taboo for the horse people of the Plains.[7] Still, even in the Southwest borderlands, horses began to take hold as the principal medium of wealth and economic exchange.[8]

Spain's northern frontier in New Mexico lay far from the seat of government in Mexico City. The 1600-mile-journey on the *Camino Real*, either on foot or by ox-drawn *carreta,* from the capital to Santa Fe and the *províncias internas* (interior provinces) might take two to three months, if all went well. The far flung *presidios* and settlements suffered attacks by Indian raiders as well as internal strife in the form of uprisings by conquered *indios bárbaros* (barbarous Indians) and, occasionally, even the captive *indios mansos* (tame Indians). The bloody Pueblo revolt of 1680 left hundreds of Spanish settlers dead and thousands captured or displaced. The Spanish regained their northernmost settlements after nearly two decades of *reconquista* (reconquest) and many concessions to the Pueblo peoples, including guarantees of greater tolerance for

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[7] Clifton Kroeber and Bernard Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila: An Account of the Last Major Battle Between American Indians, With Reflections on the Origin of War* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 63-5.

[8]See: Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), for an excellent survey of the near continuous skirmishing and reprisals that characterized the Hispano-Indian conflict in the Southwest prior to the Civil War.

traditional ways and local autonomy. In 1751, nearly fifteen thousand Pimas attempted to throw off the Spanish yoke in a loosely coordinated uprising that left hundreds dead in Sonora. New Spain's viceroy, Carlos Francisco de Croix, eventually forgave the Pimas and expelled the Jesuit missionaries in 1767 for abusing their native charges. But the seed of rebellion had taken root, and in 1781 the Quechan uprising at Yuma Crossing destroyed the Spanish garrison and missions on the lower Colorado, effectively closing the royal road connecting Mexico City to California and ending Spanish influence in that portion of *Pimería Alta* (upper Pima territory).[9]

When the Mexican War of Independence from Spain erupted in 1810 with the rallying cry of Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla at Dolores, near Guanajuato in central Mexico, many Hispanos in the already militarized northern settlements embraced the call to arms and the promise of a new and more responsive regime. Pueblo peoples, Comanches, Apaches, and Navajos (whom the Spanish called *Apaches del Navahu*) had to choose sides as well, and the civil war in New Spain resulted in fighting that saw loyalties tested and changed.[10]

By 1821, more than a decade of fighting had depleted the Spanish treasury and made monarch Ferdinand VII vulnerable to a European coup. The conservative Mexican *criollos* (Mexico-born Spaniards) led by Augustín Iturbide united with Hidalgo's radical *mestizo* (mixed Spanish and Indian blood) forces, who had borne the brunt of the fierce

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[9] Mark Santiago, *Massacre at the Yuma Crossing; Spanish Relations with the Quechans, 1779-1782.* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 170-75 and passim; Roberto Mario Salmón, "A Marginal Man: Luis of Saric and the Pima Revolt of 1751". *The Americas* (July 1988), 45 (1) 61–77. For better understanding the complex relationships between the people (*vecinos*) of frontier Hispano communities and *indios bárbaros and mansos*, see also: Omar Valerio-Jiménez, *River of Hope: Forging Identity and Nation in the Rio Grande Borderlands*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 50.

[10] DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts,* 10, 15-16; for a summary of the Spanish losses on the Northern Frontier see 11-12.

guerrilla war waged against the Spanish, with the understanding that, if successful, the rebellion would guarantee independence from Spain; equal rights for *criollos* and *peninsulares* (Spanish-born) alike; recognition of the Roman Catholic Church, with all of its privileges, as the official religion; and the establishment of a new monarchy headed by a suitable European royal. This *Plan de Iguala* became the centerpiece of the Treaty of Córdoba which brought the war to a close in August 1821 and led eventually to Iturbide's installation as emperor of Mexico.

United States of Mexico

Conditions did not improve, however, for the Mexicans of the northern frontier. In 1824, the people of Mexico dissolved Iturbide's empire and adopted a new constitution which defined the nation as a federal republic with nineteen states and five territories. The United States of Mexico (*Estados Unidos de Mexico*) abolished slavery, recognized Roman Catholicism as the state religion, and elected its first president. The northern territories of Alta California and Nuevo Mexico and the newly-created state of Texas (*Coahuila y Tejas*) with its capital in Saltillo, hundreds of miles from the former Texas capital (*San Antonio de Bexar*), constituted the borderlands with the United States. Mexico's bankrupt and distracted central government and war-weary military focused little attention on the distant outposts in Sonora, Chihuahua, California, New Mexico, and Texas. In need of a buffer against raiding Comanches and Apaches, the Mexican government invited enterprising Americans to occupy the Indian frontier. It seemed a logical solution to the unstable borderlands situation. The settlers were encouraged to create their own citizen *milicias* (militias) for protection against established groups considered hostile. Soon the people of the sparsely populated frontier, with its liberalized

immigration policies and independent armed forces, began to think and fend for themselves.

Mexican officials saw to it that the newly-arrived Anglos took oaths of allegiance to the republic and the Catholic Church, and for a time it seemed as though the borderlands buffer strategy was working. But both Anglos and Hispanos in the north resented taxation without the benefits of military protection and full political participation. By 1830, Americans settlers outnumbered the Hispano residents in Texas. To address this ethnic imbalance, Mexico's president, Anastásio Bustamante, prohibited further immigration from the United States into the borderlands, though American citizens were allowed to settle in other parts of Mexico. Furthermore, the Mexican government rescinded the property tax law, intended to exempt immigrants from paying taxes for ten years, and increased tariffs on goods shipped from the United States. Bustamante also ordered all Texas settlers to comply with the federal prohibition against slavery or face military intervention. The American settlers from Tennessee, Kentucky, and other Southern states found ways to circumvent or simply ignore the new laws.

As significant numbers of Americans began settling Texas, the horse-rich and militarily powerful Comanches had become the undisputed masters of the Southern Plains. By 1835, more than 45,000 Comanches lived in *Coahuila y Tejas*, compared to thirty thousand Anglos and only 7,800 Hispano *Tejanos*. While both the Mexicans and Comanches held captives as slaves, the Americans also brought in bondage approximately five thousand enslaved Africans and African Americans (born in the

United States) to Texas.[11] The Anglo Texans from the Kentucky and Tennessee were a fiercely independent people descended from Scots-Irish immigrants that evolved on the American frontier a warlike nature founded on a base of Celtic martial traditions. Quick to resort to violence, dueling for honor and killing for revenge were common practices. The Anglo and Hispano Texans developed a violent competition with the Comanches. Their struggle for dominance on the Southern Plains was characterized by brutal attacks and retaliatory raids that left hundreds dead on both sides and firmly established fierce warrior cultures in the Hispano, Anglo, and Indian communities of the borderlands.[12]

Rebellion once again ignited and spread in the northern states of Mexico, with the heart of the conflict clearly centered in Texas, fueled by Anglos with a sense of entitlement and destiny that bordered on religious fervor. General Sam Houston's Texian forces, composed of both Anglos and Hispanos disaffected by the constitutional changes as well as the lack of communication and support from the central government of Mexico, battled General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna's well-equipped but poorly led army. After a year of fighting resulting in pitched battles, guerilla attacks, and massacres—committed by both sides—Houston forced the surrender of Santa Anna's army at San Jacinto, and on May 14, 1836, the captured general signed under duress the

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[11] Martha Manchaca, *Recovering History, Constructing Race: The Indian, Black, and White Roots of Mexican Americans* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 201, 172; Alwyn Barr, *Black Texans: A History of African Americans in Texas, 1528–1995*, 2nd Ed., (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 17.

[12] Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 202-16. Hämäläinen's work compels scholars to reexamine indigenous imperialism as seen in Comanchería where the Comanche Empire stopped European conquest in its tracks on the Texas plains.

Treaties of Velasco, bringing the war to a close. The independent Republic of Texas became a reality, at least in the imaginations of the Anglo Americans.[13]

The mere existence of the Republic of Texas galled Mexican pride and remained a source of *vergüenza* (shame) for President Santa Anna, who struggled to maintain his power and prestige after his ignominious defeat and surrender. Mexico's Congress never ratified the treaties and did not recognize the independent Texas republic. To save face, the Mexican president made it clear to his people that Texas should be restored, and armed clashes along the new border continued incessantly after the signing of the 1836 treaties. The Texans took the offensive twice, in 1841 and 1843, intent on the conquest of New Mexico and capitalizing on its lucrative trading opportunities. These invasions were twice repelled before the armed battalions of Texas rangers could reach Santa Fe.[14] By mid-decade, full-scale war erupted anew. In 1845 the United States annexed the Republic of Texas as the Union's twenty-eighth state, following heated congressional debate between Democrats and Whigs over the morality and necessity of conflict with Mexico, that further exposed the growing sectional schism between slave and free states and foreshadowed civil war. President James K. Polk then deliberately provoked Mexico, ostensibly over the international boundary line, and the war came. Many Americans saw Polk's military action and declaration of war as a usurpation of congressional authority,

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[13] Santa Anna's army killed all of the Alamo's 145 defenders, who had refused to surrender even after the Mexicans warned that they would not be shown quarter if they continued to resist. Following the assault, the few survivors were executed. Some scholars consider the Alamo an overwhelming tactical victory for Santa Anna, but his action at Goliad the following week can only be interpreted as a massacre—some 350 Texans were executed after surrendering. Houston's subsequent rout of Santa Anna's army at San Jacinto ended in a massacre as well (630 Mexicans died, while the Texans lost only nine killed); though not under orders, many of the enraged Texans showed no quarter as they shouted "Remember the Alamo!" and cut down enemy soldiers attempting to surrender.

[14] Stephen G. Hyslop, *Bound for Santa Fe: The Road to New Mexico and the American Conquest, 1806-1848* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), *275-83, 289-99.*

but the president's vision of Manifest Destiny coupled with a general belief in Anglo-Saxon racial superiority captured sufficient votes in Congress and the popular imagination. The U.S. Senate formally declared war against Mexico on May 13, 1846, and the struggle for Texas and northern Mexico resumed.

Mexico's northern frontier experienced unprecedented violence during the 1846-48 conflict with the United States, but the New Mexico settlements survived the war relatively unscathed. New Mexicans had developed a mutually beneficial relationship with American trappers and traders in the decade prior to the war. Governor Manuel Armijo, who had twice repelled the Texans' attempts to take Santa Fe, marched an army of some three thousand volunteers to confront Stephen Watts Kearny's 1600-man Army of the West. Kearny, an experienced frontier regular, had earned a reputation as a disciplinarian and the best long-distance marching field officer in the Army following an unequaled 2,000-mile tramp along the Platte to South Pass just a year earlier. Now his command of U.S. Dragoons and Missouri Volunteers marched steadily down the Santa Fe Trail, approaching the New Mexican capital from the northeast through Raton Pass in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. Armijo positioned his men in the narrow Apache Canyon at Glorieta Pass, just twelve miles from New Mexico's capital. But after negotiating with the Americans, Armijo disbanded his army without firing a shot, much to the dismay of his subordinates. As he approached Santa Fe, Kearny warmed to the role of benevolent conqueror. He attempted to assure the New Mexicans that the all-powerful U.S. government would intercede on their behalf and could be depended upon for protection, as he proclaimed:

> From the Mexican government you have never received protection. The Apaches and Navajoes come down from the mountains and carry off your sheep, and even

> your women, whenever they please. My government will correct all this. It will keep off the Indians, protect you and your persons and property; and I repeat again, will protect you in your religion. [15]

Once he entered Santa Fe on August 19, 1846, Kearny played up the belief that Armijo and other government officials had betrayed the people and boasted that the Americans had taken possession of New Mexico "without firing a gun or spilling a single drop of blood." Though spared bloodshed and suffering, many Hispanos and Pueblo Indians loyal to the old Mexican regime found the occupation of Santa Fe and Taos shameful. Most New Mexicans, however, accepted the Americans and their promises of respect for religious beliefs and protection against Indian raiders. The Anglos and Hispanos had much to learn about one another. After Kearny read his proclamation at the Palace of the Governors, he demanded that Mexican officers look him in the eye as they swore oaths of allegiance to the United States, the American little comprehending that their bowed heads and downcast eyes were not signs of sullen resistance but, rather, obeisance to their new governor.[16]

South of the Rio Grande and in the border states of Chihuahua and Sonora, Mexican citizens and Indians suffered much more violence as an indirect result of the war. Mexico's central government had further reduced its already depleted northern garrisons in an effort to rally enough soldiers to combat invading American armies, which converged on Mexico City by land and sea. Taking advantage of the power

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[15] "Proclamation of S.W. Kearny, Brigadier General of the U.S. Army," issued at Las Vegas on August 15, 1846 in William H. Emory, *Lieutenant Emory Reports,* ed. Ross Calvin (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1951), 49-50; another proclamation dated August 22, 1846, substitutes Eutaws (Utes) for Apaches but otherwise conveys the same assurances ("henceforth look to me for protection") while proclaiming that the Territory of New Mexico has been taken by and annexed to the United States. Original copy of Kearny's "Proclamation," handwritten in Spanish, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson.

[16] William A. Keleher, *Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846–1868* (Santa Fe: Rydal, 1952), 7, 16, 18-19, 34; David J. Weber, *Foreigners in Their Native Land: Historical Roots of the Mexican Americans*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), 161.

vacuum on the northern frontier, Comanche and Apache warriors boldly attacked the vulnerable settlements and brought devastation that depopulated entire communities and turned once productive farms into deserts. Survivors sought shelter in the southern cities and rural pueblos or joined "friendly tribes." Some hardy souls fled northward across the Colorado River to Alta California or up the Rio Grande to the relatively secure New Mexico settlements. [17]

The American public may have considered the conquest of the Southwest borderlands to be an inevitable chapter in the republic's Manifest Destiny, but during the summer of 1846 the undertaking was no sure thing in the minds of the military men charged with the task. Under the direction of John C. Frémont, with his Bear Flag army of frontiersmen, and Commodore Robert Stockton's Pacific naval squadron, the conquest of California seemed almost too easy. Mexican forces at Monterey, San Diego, and Los Angeles either surrendered or simply disbanded in the face of the American invaders, but although California had quickly fallen, an angry resistance movement simmered. Before the conquest was fairly settled, the famed mountain man Christopher "Kit" Carson set out on a sixty-day ride to Washington bearing dispatches containing news of the victory for President Polk.

Carson had been instrumental in safely guiding the celebrated "Pathfinder" Frémont's thinly disguised "exploring party" to the Pacific and then served as chief scout and lieutenant in the California *coup de main*. Frémont believed Carson deserved the honor of personally delivering the news of the conquest, and now leading a party of fifteen trappers and Delaware Indian scouts, Carson headed his mule eastward along the

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[17] DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, 194-96, 198-99.

Gila and across the Sonoran desert. The party rode 850 hard miles through the lands of the Quechans, Pimas, Papagos, Chiricahuas, and Mescalero Apaches until finally reaching the Rio Grande settlements. There at a river ford called Valverde they chanced upon General Kearny's column of three hundred U.S. Dragoons, the vanguard of the Army of the West, en route to California. Kearny had already led his command more than a thousand miles and occupied Santa Fe and other New Mexican pueblos without firing a shot, but as he set out across the unmapped and arid borderlands, he could only hope the rest of the journey to California would go as well. His luck held. In 1846 Carson was, arguably, the most experienced and gifted Anglo scout in the West—the best man imaginable for the task at hand.[18]

Though Carson had been continuously in the saddle for weeks and was then only a few days south of Taos, his wife, and family, whom he had not seen in more than a year, Kearny somehow prevailed upon him to turn about and re-cross the Sonoran desert. With only one hundred picked troopers, the general would continue to California, mop up any pockets of Mexican insurgents, and secure the extensive Pacific empire. Carson dutifully led Kearny's dragoons down through the Rio Grande villages then westward past the Santa Rita Copper Mines and Cooke's Canyon through Chiricahua Apache country. On the headwaters of the Gila they met with and received assurances of friendship from the Chiricahua chief Mangas Coloradas, the best-known headman among

[18] Kit Carson, *Kit Carson's Autobiography* , ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 108-10; David Remley, *Kit Carson: The Life of an American Border Man* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 166. To Carson's later distress he learned that his wife, Josefa Jaramillo, had miraculously survived the Taos uprising in January at Charles Bent's side along with her sister, Ignacia Bent, the governor's wife.

the southern Apache bands, before pushing on and taking possession of the old pueblo of Tucson on the Santa Cruz River.[19]

Following the Gila to the Colorado River, which the command forded near the Quechan villages at Yuma Crossing, the expedition met virtually no resistance on the hard ride across the thousand-mile breadth of Mexico's northern frontier. But the exhausting desert march took its toll on men and animals. The soldiers now wore only ragged remnants of their blue wool uniforms, once gaily trimmed with brass buttons and gaudy yellow lace, and rode broken-down mules and jaded horses toward San Diego. Still, Kearny believed his confident Americans with their sabers, pistols, breech-loading carbines, and mountain howitzers more than a match for any force the Mexicans could muster. He was wrong. At San Pasqual on December 6, 1846, the dragoons fought for their lives against *caballeros* commanded by Captain Andrés Pico. Expert with lariat (*la reata*) and lance, Pico's men felt honor-bound to resist the arrogant Anglos. Shouting "*viva California*," the Mexicans at first yielded to the charging Americans, but once the Anglos had been sucked into the chase, the Californios wheeled about. The Mexicans literally rode circles around the dazed dragoons and, darting through the broken ranks, lanced twenty-one men to death. None of the soldiers in the leading formation, including Kearny, escaped without a wound. Only Kearny's defensive delaying tactics and the timely arrival of reinforcements from Commodore Stockton's naval contingent on the coast saved the Americans from annihilation.[20]

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[19] Mangas was related by birth and marriage to both the Chihenne and Bedonkohe bands of the Chiricahua Apaches. Edwin Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas, Chief of the Chiricahuas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 141-44.

[20]Arthur Woodward "Lances at San Pasqual," *California Historical Society Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Mar., 1947, 32; Kearny's dragoons carried the Army's most-advanced firearm, the Hall breechloader, the

The Mexican settlements Carson and Kearny passed through en route to California had suffered fewer Indian raids than the states to the south because the people of the northern frontier had long since established a tense but mutually beneficial trade relationship with many of the Apache, Navajo, and Comanche bands that dominated the military power hierarchy of the borderlands. The headman of these powerful groups even made regular trade missions to Santa Fe or went there to accept tribute payments, made willingly by the New Mexicans, in exchange for peace promises. Comanche, Navajo, and Apache raiders had stripped the other *províncias internas* (Mexico's northern provinces) in the years following Mexico's 1821 War of Independence, the civil war that permanently separated the nation from Spain. The losses in horses alone numbered in the hundreds of thousands while Mexicans captured or killed in attacks could be counted in the thousands. But while Comanche and Apache warriors raided nearly to the Gulf of Mexico and the Sonora and Chihuahua frontier had been significantly depopulated, as the result of a strategy of conciliatory accommodations, the New Mexico settlements on the Santa Cruz, Rio Grande, and Pecos rivers emerged comparatively unscathed.[21]

Santa Fe had fallen to the Americans without bloodshed, but one last gasp of resistance shattered the fragile peace. Though Governor Armijo's abdication surrendered New Mexico, many Hispanos and Pueblo Indians seethed with shame over the betrayal and chafed under the new Anglo regime. In March 1847, the Pueblo people of Taos and Mexican loyalists rose up and went on a killing rampage reminiscent of Pueblo revolts

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first U.S. military arm designed to use a percussion ignition, however, the men complained that the cold and rain-dampened gunpowder made the weapons difficult to load and fire at San Pasqual. Pico's *Californios* cut and thrust with their swords (*espadas*) and used their *reatas* to good effect, lassoing the dragoons and dragging them from their saddles. Stephen G. Hyslop, *Contest for California; From Spanish Colonization to the American Conquest* (Norman, Oklahoma: Arthur H. Clark Company, 2012), 391-93.

[21] DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts,* 214-16, 270-73, 297.

more than one hundred years before. Charles Bent, the American Governor of New Mexico, fell victim in the rebellion's first rush. A coalition of trappers, traders, and soldiers ruthlessly crushed the insurrection and soon re-established American control, at the cost of many Pueblo lives. Though the enraged rebels scalped then killed and decapitated Bent and other government officials, the governor's New Mexican wife, Ignacia Jaramillo, and his immediate family and servants had been spared. The vengeful Americans were not so generous. Within weeks of the uprising, authorities rounded up known leaders of the rebellion and other suspects and, by spring, had tried and hanged or otherwise executed more than twenty men, both Mexicans and Pueblo Indians.[22]

In the summer of 1847, 1600 miles to the south, General Winfield Scott's American army battered its way from Vera Cruz to Mexico City in a series of bloody battles. The American force of 8,500 regulars and volunteers faced off against a Mexican army of 12,000 under the command of President Antonio López de Santa Anna.[23] The Mexicans fought bravely in disciplined, Napoleonic style that won the admiration of their American foes. But Scott out-generaled Santa Anna, and after the fall of Chapultepec Castle in the heart of the capital city, the Mexican government was forced to capitulate. On February 2, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo concluded the U.S.-Mexican War and detailed the surrender terms, including the withdrawal of occupying U.S. troops, new

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[22] Charles Bent had gone west with his brothers William and George, teaming up with partner Cerán St.Vrain and trapper Kit Carson. The enterprising brothers established good working relations with Arapahos, Cheyennes, Comanches, and Kiowas as well as the New Mexicans, and built a Rocky Mountain trapping-and-trading empire that included a string of tributary forts that fed the Santa Fe Trail trade from St Louis through Bent's Fort on the Arkansas River to Santa Fe. David Halaas and Andrew Masich, *Halfbreed: The Remarkable True Story of George Bent* (Cambridge: DaCapo Press, 2004), 48-9. For the only eyewitness account of the Taos rebels see: Lewis H. Garrard. *Wah-to-yah and the Taos Trail; or Prairie Travel and Scalp Dances, with a Look at Los Rancheros from Muleback and the Rocky Mountain Camp-fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955).

[23] Gen. Scott chose the same path—from Vera Cruz on the coast, through the mountains at Puebla, and on to Mexico City—taken by Hernán Cortés' Spanish conquistadores nearly 300 years earlier.

international boundaries, payments for surrendered territory, and guarantees for the rights of Mexicans who chose to remain north of the new borderline. Most of the Mexican people, imbued with a growing sense of national pride since establishing their independence from Spain less than a generation before, had fiercely resisted the American invasion. The terrible battles fought to capture Mexico City resulted in proportionately higher casualties than any other American war. Effective partisan resistance by diehard Mexican *guerrilleros* had severed unprotected supply and communication lines and killed many straggling or incautious soldiers. But the conflict had been a disaster for the Mexicans, most of whom believed the surrender to the Americans and the cession of territory in exchange for $15 million and payment of debts owed Americans brought only national dishonor and individual shame on its leaders.

United States and Territories of the Southwest

According to the terms of the treaty, the United States acquired from Mexico most of the region North Americans came to know as the Southwest—including all or portions of the present-day states of California, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas,[24] Utah, and Wyoming. Including the lands the U.S. later acquired in the Gadsden Purchase of 1854, Mexico ceded nearly one million square miles in all—the greatest land-grab in American history. For the people of Mexico, especially the laboring classes who had suffered most of the 16,000 dead resulting from the war, the sense of *vergüenza* ran deep. Americans had been sharply divided on the blatantly imperialistic war. Young Congressman Abraham Lincoln had opposed it, as did many regular Army officers,

[24] While it can be argued that the acquisition of Texas in 1845 was a consensual annexation between two nations, the Republic of Texas and the U.S., all of the dealings with Republic of Mexico were characterized by coercive political and military tactics that left that nation little choice in the cession of nearly half of its territory—915,000 square miles—to its more powerful northern neighbor between 1845 and 1854.

including Ulysses S. Grant, who said, "I do not think there was ever a more wicked war than that waged by the United States on Mexico." The Americans attempted to ease their collective conscience by offering to pay for property taken by conquest, though they offered no compensation for death and suffering.[25]

In the borderlands, many Mexicans saw that the treaty also addressed the problem of cross-border raiding, especially by Comanches, Kiowas, and Apaches, that had left the northern Mexican states financially ruined and partially abandoned. North of the new international border, the Americans tried to understand the implications of their new acquisition. Henry Clay's Compromise of 1850 created New Mexico Territory and preserved the Union for another decade. Texas grudgingly surrendered its tenuous claim to New Mexico in exchange for the federal government's assumption of its enormous war debts. The future of chattel slavery in New Mexico and Utah would be determined by popular sovereignty.

By the early 1850s, small numbers of Anglo Americans began entering the recently re-defined borderlands. The new arrivals soon realized that with the territorial acquisition came the legacy of generations of interethnic tension and conflict. Article eleven of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo stipulated that responsibility for

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[25] Amy Greenberg, *A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 2012), 3 and passim. This tradition of compensation for property loss but not for human suffering would become official U.S. government policy in the years following the wars for the borderlands, codified in the legislation authorizing the payment of depredation and war claims following the Civil War. See: Larry Skogen's *Indian Depredation Claims, 1796-1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996) for an overview of the evolution federal government's thinking regarding compensation for property losses in order to maintain peace between American peoples. The Anglo-Celtic legal tradition recognizes the concept of "solatium," a form of compensation for emotional rather than physical or financial harm. In Scots Law, reparations can be awarded for pain and suffering in personal injury cases (although it can also be awarded in other types of cases)—similar, but not identical, to the English Law concept of general damages. Scots Law damages are divided into pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, rather than general and special damages. In the Apachean tradition, compensation for pain and suffering often meant taking a life for a life (*gegodza*)—in some cases, torture might be administered as well—but a captive substitute for a lost family member or property might satisfy the blood debt.

controlling the "savage tribes" that raided northern Mexico along the newly defined border would be the responsibility of the United States. The governors of Chihuahua and Sonora offered American and Mexican mercenary scalp hunters cash bounties for Apache scalps in an effort to stop the incessant raiding. These efforts, however, only served to stimulate increasingly violent interaction and perpetuate a cycle of revenge attacks in the borderlands.[26]

The Franklin Pierce administration accepted the challenge of managing the vast new territory and lost little time setting in motion the machinery of government. Initially, the Americans made little attempt to disrupt the existing economy with its raid and retaliation cycle. It soon became apparent, however, that the economic system then in place was entirely incompatible with American-style capitalism reliant on intensive resource extraction, commerce, and settlement. With little understanding of the Indian cultures of the borderlands, government agents and Army officers attempted to identify tribal headmen with whom to treat. Formal treaties were executed, all of which were predicated on the idea that the Indians were subordinate to the U.S. government. Through treaty, trade, and a small but active military force, the Anglos at first maintained relatively good relations with both the Indian and Hispano people of the Southwest borderlands.

In 1856, Mexican presidial soldiers abandoned the last of their adobe forts and rode south from Tucson and other outposts on the northern frontier as companies of U.S. Dragoons arrived to establish an American military presence. But peace eluded the

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[26] See: Lance Blythe, *Chiricahuas and Janos: Communities of Violence in the Southwestern Borderlands, 1680-1880* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), passim; DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, *xiii*, *xv, xix* and passim.

borderlands. During the 1850s, Anglo-American mercenaries known as "filibusters," piratical freebooters, invaded Mexico and other countries to the south in search of wealth and empire. North of the border, in the desert Southwest, other Anglos, sanctioned by the U.S. government, improved the Indian-trapper-miner-immigrant trail from Texas across southern New Mexico, including what was already becoming known as Arizona, to establish the San Antonio–San Diego Mail Line to California. The "Jackass" Mail, as it was dubbed by all who saw the rickety mule-drawn mud wagons, opened an essential overland communication link for the Americans. On September 1, 1857, mail company employees traveling from Texas to California along this southern route chanced upon an epic Indian battle—the last of its kind—at the confluence of the Gila and Santa Cruz Rivers, eighty miles north of Tucson.[27]

The spirit of martial masculinity that animated Indian men of the borderlands was not unique; similar notions of racial/ethnic identity and superiority were then concurrently evolving in Anglo America. These were, in fact, age-old ideas. It so happens that when human societies in competitive environments reach a comfort level with their food source acquisition strategies and have more time to spend in less essential pursuits, men are driven to expand their territorial domain through military conquest. By identifying those outside one's ethnic group as "others"—those who appear different, speak another language, and possess foreign traditions and technologies—communities form common bonds predicated on the willingness to protect what is known and loved through the use or threat of violence.[28] This phenomenon is a fundamental and almost

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[27]Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila*, 12.
[28] Blythe, *Chiricahua and Janos,* 5-7; For an Apache perspective on preservation of race, see Daklugie's reminiscence in Eve Ball's *Indeh; An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 19.

universal cause of war, and is especially pronounced in the "middle ground" between cultures, that region sometimes known as the borderlands. When people cannot manage their misunderstandings and cultural accommodation fails, the points of contact become flash points for violence.[29]

The Southwest borderlands on the eve of the American Civil war became a stage upon which the roles of manhood and violence would be played out with deadly consequences. The "massacre on the Gila," as the 1857 Quechan-Maricopa-Pima war became known to outsiders, was one of the last great Indian battles to take place in the Southwest without direct interference from Hispano and Anglo newcomers. As the fighting men from allied groups approached from the north, one hundred or more Quechan warriors, on sandaled-feet, traveled swiftly across the burning desert pavement more than one hundred and fifty miles, to attack the Maricopa and Pima farms and villages clustered along the life-giving waters of the Gila River. The attackers carried traditional weapons including short mesquite-wood war clubs (*kelyaxwai*); willow bows with long-shafted cane arrows tipped with stone, glass, or iron; and knives of metal or fire-hardened wood. Their rawhide shields could deflect an arrow or turn a lance thrust. With guidance from shamans, they painted their bodies for the spiritual protection and supernatural power they would need to defeat their foes. The Quechan men had confidence in their war leaders, which included the most notable men. The *kwoxot*, the group's moral leader, had dreamed of victory and when he examined the enemy scalps

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[29] Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila*, 165-74; Amy Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14 and passim; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), *xxv-xxvi*; see also Stephen Aron, "Frontiers, Borderlands, Wests," in *American History Now*, Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 270-71; Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: Verso, 1991), 5-8.

taken in past battles, which were entrusted to his care, he heard a mystical war cry—an omen of success.

The Quechan men hoped a surprise attack at dawn would allow them to close quickly and fight hand-to-hand, believing that the superior size, strength, and fighting ability of their warriors would win the day. The Maricopas and Pimas were usually similarly armed, when prepared for battle, but on this day they were unaware of their enemies' approach until alerted by the smoke of the burning houses and the cries of the women could be heard. The Quechans' allies—Cocopas, Mojaves, Chemehuevis, Yavapais, and Western Apaches (Tontos)—left the killing field after the warriors overran and destroyed the first two Maricopa villages, satisfied with the spoils swept up in the initial attack. But the Quechans stayed to finish the job, intent on the total conquest of their foes. The Pimas, many on horseback, rallied swiftly and descended on the attackers, who retreated to a hillside to make their stand. The Quechans now found themselves surrounded and greatly outnumbered, and the enraged Pimas loosed their arrows and then rushed in to club and stab the Quechan warriors, who were killed to a man.[30]

The battle between the semi-sedentary Colorado River Yumans—Quechans, Cocopas, Mojaves, Chemehuevis—with their allies, the Yavapais and Tonto Apaches, against the agrarian Maricopas and Pimas was a microcosmic reflection of American

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[30] Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila*, 35, 45-50, 58, 68, 79, 80-8. The Quechans' allies included the Yuman Mojaves, Chemehuevis, and Cocopas (whose loyalty the Mojaves and some Quechans questioned) as well as Yavapais and the Western Apache people then known to Hispanos and Anglos as Tontos (*Dilzhe'e*), though some today find this Spanish word meaning "foolish" offensive. The Spanish most likely were influenced by the other people encountered before meeting the Tontos. The Chiricahua and other Apache groups referred to the Tontos as *binii?e'dine'*, the "wild or crazy people" or "people whose tongue we do not understand." The Maricopa (*Piipash*) and Pimas (*Akmiel O'odham*—"Pima" or "Pimo" is believed to have been derived from a Uto-Aztecan phrase *pi 'añi mac* or *pi mac*, meaning "I don't know," which neighboring groups may have used in response to Spanish queries) may have had some of their Papago (*Tohono O'odham*) allies present as well. William C. Sturtevant, *Handbook of North American Indians*, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978) 13:488.

expansionism. Both the battle between Indian peoples on the Gila and the Manifest-Destiny-fueled-filibustering south of the Mexican border resulted from martial masculinity run amok.[31] The Quechans had established stable communities on the banks of the Colorado River, which provided abundant, fish, game, and seasonal floods to water crops. As women performed most of the agricultural work, which provided the bulk of the food needed to support the people, the role of men as hunter-providers became less relevant. [32] By the middle of the nineteenth century, the men increasingly focused their energies on warrior traditions, rituals, and war preparations aimed at enemies, real and imagined. A man's sense of self-worth became inextricably entwined with his role as a warrior and protector of the community. The Quechans, however, had few external threats.

Having established truces and treaties with the Mexicans and then the Americans, who were now ensconced at Fort Yuma, it seems the Quechans had run out of enemies—a situation which threated the warriors' self-esteem, masculinity, and status within their own nation. The Quechans' devotion to martial virtues and their capacity for war, however, had never been greater—the people were strong and their weapons and warriors were at a high state of readiness. The war launched against the neighboring Maricopas

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[31] Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood*, 12-14 and passim. Greenberg explores the social and economic origins of what she has termed "martial manhood," a root cause of the filibustering expeditions launched from the U.S. into Latin America between 1848 and 1860. Martial manhood celebrates bravery, physical strength, and the ability to dominate both men and women. "Martial men," Greenberg writes, "believed that the masculine qualities of strength, aggression, and even violence, better defined a true man than did the firm and upright manliness of restrained men."

[32] The decreasing importance of men's labor is well documented by anthropologists, see Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila*, passim; for an Anglo soldier's perspective see: Samuel Carson, [4th Infantry, C.V.], "The Martial Experiences of the California Volunteers." *The Overland Monthly,* May 1886.

(who had split off from the Colorado groups a century earlier)[33] and their peaceful Pima allies could not be justified as a defensive action, though the warriors' bellicose rhetoric presented the strike as pre-emptive. The Quechan offensive, presented as a defensive measure, was merely a pretense intended to demonstrate the worth of the men to their families and communities. The Quechan attack was not just a raid intent on booty, like most confrontations between Indians in the borderlands, but war intended to destroy or totally dominate their perceived enemy.[34]

Ambitious Anglo men of the post Mexican-American war period also possessed a desire to demonstrate their value to society and acted on the impulse by raising mercenary armies to invade neighboring peoples in search of empire and glory. Among the best known and most disruptive to peace and harmony in the Southwest borderlands were the filibustering efforts of William Walker and Henry A. Crabb. In the late 1840s the Tennessee-born Walker studied medicine and law in Philadelphia and then practiced for a time in New Orleans, where the diminutive 5'2" young man earned a reputation as a cold-blooded duelist. He then emigrated to California where, as a newspaper editor, he promoted the idea that the nation's Manifest Destiny would lead it to expand to its "natural frontiers" in Latin America. His charismatic personality, the audacity of his scheme to establish an American Republic of Sonora in 1853, and his later conquest of Nicaragua—which he ruled briefly in 1856-7—made Walker a much-admired "man of destiny." He inspired a generation of young military-minded Americans who had missed

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[33] By 1857, the Maricopas (*Piipash*) comprised at least four separate tribes—*Halchidoma, Kohuana, Kaveltcadom, Halyikwamai*—that had been driven from their Colorado River homes by the more powerful Quechans and Mojaves in the late eighteenth century. Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila,* 23, 34.
[34] Kroeber and Fontana, *Massacre on the Gila*, 35-9, 151, 165.

out on the military glory of the Mexican-American War.[35] His fiery rhetoric rallied young men from factories and fields, North and South, drawn to his idealized views of manhood and Anglo-American racial superiority.[36]

Henry A. Crabb, a former California state senator who had failed in his 1856 re-election bid, sought filibustering success in Mexico where Walker had failed.[37] Crabb's Mexican wife and brother-in-law helped connect him with Sonora's liberal reform governor Ignacio Pesqueira, who was then engaged in a power struggle with conservative, pro-church governor Manuél Gándara. With promised support from Pesqueira, who initially believed he would need American help to defeat Gándara and beat back Apache raiders from the north, Crabb raised an army of adventurous young men who set out, ostensibly, to "free" and then "colonize" Sonora. In truth the filibusters intended to create an independent republic which would eventually be admitted, as had Texas, to the growing union of the United States. His actions, Crabb declared, were consistent with "natural law" even if they did not conform to international law.[38] The little "army" of one hundred well-armed men, officered by a number of prominently-placed California legislators, marshaled at what became known as Filibusters Camp on

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[35] Walker finally met his death in Honduras in 1860 at the muzzles of a firing squad assembled by a coalition of Central American armies. John E. Norvell, "How Tennessee Adventurer William Walker became Dictator of Nicaragua in 1857; The Norvell family origins of The Grey Eyed Man of Destiny," *Middle Tennessee Journal of Genealogy & History* Volume XXV, Number 4, Spring, 2012.
[36] Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood*, 15, 42, 168; Rufus Kaydiana, "Henry A. Crabb—A Tragedy of the Sonora Frontier," *The Pacific Historical Review*, IX (June, 1940), 183-84, 187.
[37] Diana Lindsay, ed. "Henry A. Crabb, Filibuster, and the *San Diego Herald*," *The Journal of San Diego History*, Winter 1973, Volume 19, Number 1, 1-2.
[38] U.S. Congress, *Execution of Colonel Crabb and Associates*, Message from the President of the United States, House of Representatives, 35th Congress, First Session, Exec Doc 64, 1858, 31, 33, 40, 44, 63; *Alta California* (San Francisco), May 14, 1857; and *Sacramento Daily Union*, May 14, 1857.

the Gila River, between Fort Yuma and the Pima Villages, before marching south through Tucson and into Sonora.[39]

Crabb's *filibusteros* represented Mexico's worst nightmare come true—armed *norte americanos* set on conquering still more of the already diminished nation. When Sonoran officials divined the true nature of the invasion and rallied their countrymen with cries of "liberty or death" and "death to filibusters," Crabb disingenuously wrote to the Prefect of Altar that his party was simply exploring mining opportunities and was armed to the teeth only because of the threat of attack from the "savage" Apaches. "I learn with surprise," he complained, that the Mexicans who invited him to Sonora now want to "exterminate me and my companions."[40] Pesqueira himself issued orders to resist the barbarian invaders by any means necessary. "Free Sonorians," he wrote, "to arms all of you!"

By the time Crabb's command reached the town of Caborca, Pesqueira's Reform Army, comprising Mexicans and Papago Indians (*Tohono O'odham*), had already defeated Gándara's conservatives and so turned its attention to the invading Americans. Mexican pride demanded the blood of the now-despised *yanquis,* whose appetite for empire seemed insatiable. When the smoke of battle cleared, all of the Americans had been killed or executed, and nearly twice that number of Mexicans lay dead. A one-

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[39] *Execution of Colonel Crabb and Associates*, *Message from the President of the United States*, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 35th Congress, First Session, Exec Doc 64, 1858, Charles E. Evans affidavit, September 27, 1857, 64-8; Filibuster Camp was located on the Gila 35 miles east of Fort Yuma and 140 miles west of the Pima Villages. Special Order 15, Hdqrs. Column from California, June 16, 1862, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [OR], 50(1):138–42; General Order 6, Hdqrs. Dist. of Southern Calif., May 7, 1862, ibid., 1056.

[40] Henry A. Crabb to Jose Maria Redondo, Prefect of Altar, March 26, 1857, *Execution of Colonel Crabb and Associates*, *Message from the President of the United States*, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 35th Congress, First Session, Exec Doc 64, 1858, 31.

hundred-man firing squad riddled Crabb with musket balls then placed his saber-severed head in a jar of alcohol for preservation and transport to Mexico City.[41]

American envoys and government officials had no illusions about Crabb's real mission. Though the illegal escapade embarrassed the consular officials and the administration, American public opinion generally agreed with the filibuster's premise that enterprising Anglos could make better use of the undeveloped borderlands than the Mexicans could. But what really united American support for the filibusters and indignation toward the Mexicans were the fantastic reports of the summary execution of Crabb's party. Congress debated and newspapers reported that the Mexicans had shown a savage side unworthy of a modern nation. The Americans, they said, however misguided, had died nobly, even heroically, and that the cowardly men detailed to the Mexican firing squads could not even bring themselves to look their victims in the face. The captured Americans were tied embracing their posts, facing away from their executioners and shot in the back. Coming closely on the heels of the Mexican-American War and the cession of nearly half of Mexico's national territory, the Crabb affair served to cement the mistrust that had come to characterize relations between to the two countries.[42]

In the time since the beginning of the Spanish *entrada* three centuries earlier, the people of Mexico had merged physically and culturally. The *mestizo* population (*las castas*), collectively and individually, had developed a love-hate relationship with their

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[41] Ignacio Pesqueira, Substitute Governor, to the People of Sonora, March 30, 1857, 33, *Execution of Colonel Crabb and Associates*, *Message from the President of the United States*, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 35th Congress, First Session, Exec Doc 64, 1858, 31; see also: John Forsyth to Juan Antonio de la Fuente, May 30, 1857, 39-44, 63-8, 74; Thomas E. Farish, *History of Arizona* (San Francisco: Filmer Bothers Electrotype, 1915-18), 1:327-9.

[42] *Execution of Colonel Crabb and Associates*, *Message from the President of the United States*, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 35th Congress, First Session, Exec Doc 64, 1858, Charles E. Evans affidavit, September 27, 1857, 63-74.

own heritage. In a highly stratified society whose caste-like system placed Spanish-descended whites at the top and dark skinned Indians and Africans at the bottom, the indigenous people at once embraced and resisted the culture of the Spanish invaders. Yet the new culture that emerged from this union of peoples from the old world and new blended religion, art, language, and traditions so seamlessly it seemed difficult to imagine that it had not always been so. Mexico's warrior traditions were no exception. [43]

Spanish notions of war and honor often complemented native ideas. So too, Iberian captive-taking and slave practices seemed compatible with those that evolved in the Americas.[44] In Mexico the people used horses of Spanish descent for work and war. The European idea of heavy cavalry, which emerged in the era of armored knights, quickly transformed in the New World into light cavalry. Fast-moving *compãnias volantes* (flying companies) far better suited the broken terrain, vast distances, and hit-and-run tactics of Indian adversaries. Light-weight lances became the weapon of choice for Mexican horse soldiers, who also carried carbines (*escopetas*) and short swords (*espadas anchas*) as secondary armament. With the *espada* came a code of honor. Whether arsenal-made or hand-forged by local smiths, the blades of the swords often bore the bold inscription, "*No me saques sin razón, ni me envaines sin honor"* (Do not draw me without reason nor sheathe me without honor). Some presidial troops even

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[43] Latin American scholars caution against using word "caste" because, in some contexts (e.g. Hindu India), it implies a rigidly hierarchical system while in the *casta* (the word from which caste was derived) system evident in 19th century Central America, *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood) was not the sole determiner of social status. As the mestizo population increased exponentially in the late colonial period, social ranking, though still based largely on physiognomy, became much more fluid. See Matthew Restall, *The Black Middle; Africans, Mayas, and Spaniards in Colonial Yucatan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 90-1, and Peter Bakewell. *A History of Latin America c.1450 to the Present*, *Second Edition* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 173, 303-4.

[44] James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 364.

preferred bows and arrows as more reliable and faster to load and shoot than the notoriously unreliable flintlock firearms then available on the frontier. Like their Indian adversaries, Hispanos viewed wars of conquest and revenge as fundamentally different from raids for slaves and booty. And, as with the natives, Mexican frontiersmen usually preferred peaceful trade to violence as a survival strategy in the middle ground of the borderlands.[45]

While the Mexican government had a standing professional army of full-time fighting men, most frontier settlements were protected by undermanned and undersupplied presidial garrisons. Many of the soldiers at these fortified settlements resorted to native customs in matters of dress and armament, the men often spending more time attending to farms and families than military duties. The militia companies (*milicias*) were even more like their Indian adversaries in that these men were part-time fighters, not professional soldiers, and only responded to the call of duty in emergencies. Like Indian warriors, Mexican soldiers—whether regular or militia—who demonstrated ability in war improved their chances for advancement, wealth, and marriage.

By the 1860s, the ethnically-mixed Spanish-speaking Hispano population of the borderlands had developed reciprocal and even symbiotic trade and raid relationships with many of the Indians on both sides of the border that had once been Mexico's northern frontier. Though often avowed enemies, these peoples on the fringes of national and ethnic group boundaries had come to depend on one another. The Hispanos sought livestock, the basis of the regional economy, and captive women and children for slaves

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[45] Over time, Mexican *espadas anchas* became shorter and heavier, evolving into a machete-like, all-purpose weapon and tool. A common variant of the engraved inscription is, "*No me saques sin razón, ni me guardes sin honor.*" Numerous inscribed specimens may be found in museum collections, including the Arizona Historical Society, New Mexico History Museum, and *Museo de Historia Mexicana*.

(*criadas*) and concubines. The Indians of the Southwest also captured animals, crops, manufactured goods, and people, especially male children to replace losses resulting from war, raiding, and other high-risk activities. [46]

Pressured by the Kiowa and Comanche mounted warriors of the Southern Plains, the Apaches and Navajos had, in turn, pressed the Puebloans and the Hispanos, now well-established on the Rio Grande on the north-south axis of central New Mexico. The Hispanic frontier expanded—in search of grazing, farming, and mineral lands—then recoiled from the warriors that dominated the Plains and Comanchería. The New Mexicans, in turn, pressured the Western Apaches. These bands increasingly found opportunities for profitable raiding south of the Mexican border in Chihuahua and Sonora. The Gila River Pimas and related Santa Cruz River Papagos also found themselves at odds with the westering Apaches while at the same time suspiciously watching the Colorado River Yuman tribes—especially the Quechans, Mojaves, and Chemehuevis—whose 1857 offensive had unambiguously demonstrated their desire to assert hegemony over the agrarian Uto-Aztecan Pimas and Papagos (*Akimel* and *Tohono O'odham* peoples) and their exiled Yuman-speaking allies, the Maricopas (Piipash). South of the border, Mexicans and their allied tribes among the lower Pimas, Papagos, and Ópatas looked both northward, to protect against Apache raiders and American *filibusteros*, and southward, wary of the growing civil unrest from Mexican conservatives who in desperation turned to Europe in search of allies to combat Benito Juárez's liberal government.

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[46] See Brooks's *Captives & Cousins* for the best overview of the reciprocal raiding traditions of the peoples of the Southwest prior to the Civil War.

In the borderlands of the 1860s, ethnocentrism was endemic. The condition was not peculiar to any one people, but lay at the root of all intercultural relations. Each ethnic group feared, misunderstood, and imagined the worst of the other. The semi-nomadic Apacheans despised the sedentary Hispano farmers, thinking them weak, unmanly, and easy prey for stock raiders. The Anglos they saw as fiendishly clever with their weapons and contraptions but domineering and relentlessly acquisitive, especially when it came to gold and land. The Hispanos viewed the raiders as godless savages, fearsome and cruel in war, and suitable only for enslavement while the Anglos were arrogant, greedy, and rapacious in their quest for wealth and empire. The Anglos generally categorized the Indians as uncivilized, some would even say subhuman, and without any legitimate claim to the land that they had neither the genius nor industry to cultivate or exploit to its full potential. The Hispanos were also seen as indolent and superstitious, bereft of enterprise and little better than the Indians in taking advantage of the resources in the western wilds that Providence had lain before them. It seemed manifest to the Anglos that it was their destiny to control the peoples and real estate of the American West. At the same time, each group believed in its innate superiority and its inherent right, granted by the highest authority, to control the borderlands.[47]

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[47] For a clear expression of the race-based argument for Manifest Destiny and Anglo hegemony over the indigenous peoples of the Southwest, see: San Francisco *Daily Alta California*, July 4, 1864, in which a correspondent of the *Santa Fe Gazette* opines that from Atlantic to Pacific the country should be populated "with a thriving, resolute, intelligent people" and "the Great Republic [should] be knitted [with rails] into one complete whole, and become homogeneous in interests as in blood." For a view of "white mythologies" and racism in the U.S. Army of the borderlands, see also: Janne Lahti, *Cultural Construction of Empire: The U.S. Army in Arizona and New Mexico* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 4, 9, 69. For the Mexican viewpoint in regard to "savage" Apaches thwarting progress and mineral exploitation, see: "The Apaches—Eighty Murders in One Week," *Alta*, September 15, 1853, reprinted from the August 22, 1853, edition of *El Nacionál*, the government newspaper in the Sonoran capital, Ures. The article succinctly captures the sentiment of Mexicans in the borderlands: "The Apaches! The Apaches are the cancerous sore which threatens the State with death—the enemy which exhausts our

The ethnic rivalries, competition for resources, and deeply-rooted warrior traditions of the peoples of the borderlands would result in violent conflict and significantly change the alliances and power hierarchy in the Southwest borderlands. In 1861, the Southwest borderlands seemed a powder keg of competing communities—nations, tribes, and bands. Representing less than three percent of the total population, the Anglo-Americans were not yet present in sufficient numbers to make a significant impact on the existing economic or social order. Hispano-Indian trading and raiding for animals, captives, and goods continued much as before. The recently re-drawn Mexican-American boundary remained ill-defined and permeable, allowing virtually unrestricted passage by Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos. This would all change with the coming of the American Civil War. Southern Americans sought westward expansion for the extension of their peculiar brand of chattel slavery and to exploit the region's mineral wealth. Similarly, the northern states saw the Southwest as not only a source of wealth but as a vital year-round, east-west transportation corridor and buffer against both Southern slavery extension and a potentially hostile Mexico, gripped in civil unrest and invaded by European princes in search of empires. [48]

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blood and destroys our power, and deprives us of hope for the future." For Chiricahua Apache warrior Daklugie's viewpoint on race and Apache superiority over other peoples, see Ball, *Indeh*, 19, 23, 81.

[48] The U.S. government did not consistently enumerate Indians until after 1870. Extrapolating from later census data and combining reports from Indian agents, the aggregated population of Arizona and New Mexico in 1861is estimated to have been about 140,000: Indians 60,000, Hispanos 78,000, Anglos (including military) 3,000, and African Americans 100. These numbers do not reflect the influence of the nomadic peoples (e.g. Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahos, Utes, Paiutes, Lipans, Cocopas, Lower Pimas, Papagos, etc.) that lived primarily outside or on the periphery of the territorial boundaries. *U.S. Census*, 1850, 1860, 1870; U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1867* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1861-67); San Francisco *Daily Alta California*, May 6, 1866.

The Civil War Power Vacuum

The American Civil War upset the balance of power in the Southwest borderlands bringing Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples together in a violent struggle for survival and dominance. Like a rapidly receding sea before the onrush of a violent tidal wave, the Civil War at first created a great power vacuum. The retreating federal presence left the Southwest temporarily exposed, inviting opportunistic raiding and conquest, but the return of government forces overwhelmed the borderlands with irresistible waves of military might. The national conflict in the United States had far-reaching effects north and south of the border, spawning or exacerbating civil wars among the diverse peoples of Arizona, New Mexico, and Mexico itself. These conflicts led to struggles for power and dominance that redefined peoples ethnically and nationally and, ultimately, led to new political and social hierarchies in the region**.** The warrior traditions of the warring peoples played a significant role in the violence, alliances, and outcomes of the conflicts that followed.

Immediately following Abraham Lincoln's election in the presidential contest of 1860, southern states began seceding from the union of United States established less than three-quarters of a century before. This national crisis quickly rippled westward to the Territory of New Mexico, then comprising the present-day states of Arizona, New Mexico, and southern Nevada. Once Confederate guns opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor on April 12, 1861, federal troops abandoned most of the far-flung western forts and began consolidating on the Pacific coast and along the Rio Grande in the eastern portion of New Mexico in anticipation of a rebel invasion from Texas. [49] At

[49] The rebels sought the mineral wealth of the territories, political recognition from Mexico, and geographic

the same time, Mexico's internal standoff between conservative and liberal factions erupted into full-blown civil war as European powers, emboldened by American weakness resulting from the Southern secession crisis, converged on Vera Cruz in defiance of the now unenforceable Monroe Doctrine. The disruption of U.S. authority in its southwestern territories as well as its international influence in Mexican affairs pushed the peoples of the borderlands into violent confrontation.[50]

Prior to the American Civil War, the ethnically-related Navajos and Apaches were the dominant military powers in the borderlands north and south of the New Mexico territorial boundary with old Mexico. William Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, admitted that the Indians now, "possess the balance of power in New Mexico."[51] Together, the Apacheans and allied groups numbered more than 40,000 people. Though they shared a common linguistic heritage, the pastoral and semi-nomadic Navajos and Apaches now exhibited distinctly different cultures, and often found themselves at odds with one another and also with the Hispanos and Anglo newcomers who shared the land and competed for its resources. An uneasy peace, characterized by intermittent raiding activity but far short of total war, prevailed while U.S. government authority remained intact, but the American rebellion that began in the East triggered a largely unanticipated and irrepressible response in the Southwest borderlands. The temporary withdrawal of federal troops following the opening shots of the Civil War destabilized the region leaving overland trails, forts, mines, settlements, herds, and villages unguarded against

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integrity that would provide the Confederate states with a link to the Pacific. See L. Boyd Finch, *Confederate Pathway to the Pacific: Major Sherod Hunter and Arizona Territory, C.S.A.* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1996), passim.

[50] Spanish, British, and French naval forces entered Veracruz in December, 1861, ostensibly to collect debts since Juárez had suspended interest payments on do the Mexico's fiscal crisis. Henry Jarvis Raymond, "The history of foreign intervention in Mexico," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1867).

[51] *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1862*, 388.

Navajo and Apache raiders. At the same time, rebelling Confederates from Texas and New Mexico took advantage of vulnerable federal outposts and other targets of opportunity. [52]

The pre-war regular U.S. Army constituted a small but professional military establishment charged with protecting the nation against external as well as domestic threats. Considering that the fifteen thousand man force numbered only a quarter as many men as the U.S. Postal service had at its disposal, the magnitude of the assignment was absurdly large. The seacoasts and international borders the soldiers guarded exceeded sixteen thousand miles in length, and the hundreds of forts and stations they manned from Atlantic to Pacific often held only skeleton garrisons or corporals' guards barely sufficient to protect the government property in their charge. The War Department did station most of the active regiments of dragoons, mounted rifles, cavalry, and infantry in the Far West, but the general staff deployed these fragmented units as company-sized (one hundred man) detachments incapable of large-scale campaigning. The troops dutifully garrisoned forts in the territories and confined their operations to policing main-traveled roads, making occasional forays against Indian raiders, and attempting to maintain peace between the natives and the Hispano and Anglo settlers, emigrants, miners, mail carriers, and wagon freighters.

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[52]The total Hispano population of New Mexico Territory, including some "civilized" Pueblo Indians and other assimilated tribes, enumerated in the *Eighth and Ninth U.S. Census* (1860 and 1870), was about 80,000. Semi-nomadic and nomadic on the periphery of the Territory had a direct impact on the peoples of New Mexico. The 20,000 members of the dispersed Comanche empire dominated the Southern Plains of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico for more than a century, by raids and attacks against Apache and Pueblo villages east of the Rio Grande and on Hispano and Anglo traders on the Santa Fe Trail. See: Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, for the best account of the far-reaching influence of the Comanche empire north and south of the border with Mexico.

In February 1861, as Lincoln made his way to Washington to be inaugurated president of the United States, seven Confederate States had already seceded from the Union, and the fragile peace that existed in the Southwest borderlands began to unravel. In 1858 the improved Butterfield Overland Mail Company stage line had replaced the old "Jackass" Mail as the government mail contractor on the southern route. The stations that dotted the tortuous trail from St. Louis to San Francisco provided horse-drawn stagecoach teams and drivers with water, forage, and food at 20-mile intervals along the entire route. The Anglo station men were hardy and resourceful, but largely dependent on the good will of the Indian people who allowed passage of wagons through their territory and provided wood, hay, and other subsistence as Mail Company contractors. The U.S. government viewed the Indians not as citizens but as "wards" and as "domestic dependent nations," whose land was subject to federal control, though not bound by state or territorial laws.[53] Indian people, however, saw things quite differently.

The Chiricahua Apaches under the Chokonen chief Cochise and his father-in-law Mangas Coloradas's Chihenne and Bedonkohe bands controlled much of the borderlands through which the southern overland trail passed. Though these Apaches continued their traditional raids on Hispanos on both sides of the border, they maintained relatively friendly relations with the Anglos. The Chiricahuas did occasionally take possession of stray or unguarded stock as payment for the use of their land, but they did not, as a rule, kill or take Anglo captives. On January 27, 1861, however, unidentified Apaches raided

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[53] A series of three Supreme Court decisions, rendered under chief justice John Marshall between 1821 and 1832, now known as the Marshall Trilogy, clarified the constitutional basis for the federal government's relationship with Indian tribes. Marshall's decision in the Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia (1831) ruled that "they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Patrick Macklem, "Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples." *Stanford Law Review* 45: 1311 (1993).

John Ward's ranch near the Mexican border at Sonoita, Arizona, to steal horses. The warriors also made off with the rancher's ten-year-old Mexican stepson, Félix. The Anglos alerted the garrison commander at Fort Buchanan who immediately detailed troops to set out after the raiders. But instead of following the fresh trail, twenty-four-year-old Lieutenant George Bascom, assuming the nearby Chiricahuas had taken the boy, led his infantry company directly to Cochise's *ranchería* near the stage station in Apache Pass, hoping to head off the raiders.[54]

The young lieutenant was determined to retrieve the captive boy and decided that a firm hand would be needed with the brazen Apaches. When Cochise came to the soldiers' camp to parley on February 3, Bascom made prisoners of the chief, his brother, and other family members. Cochise used his knife to slash the canvas of an army tent and make his escape, but Lieutenant Bascom adamantly refused to release the other prisoners until the Chiricahuas surrendered the Ward boy. But neither Cochise's nor Mangas's people had been involved in the raid on Ward's ranch, supposed now to have been committed by the Tonto Apaches living in the White Mountains to the northwest of the Chiricahuas' territory. Despite the well-intentioned efforts of the stage station keeper to interpret and correct the misunderstanding, negotiations broke down, and the Apaches responded to the seizure of their people by taking the station-keeper prisoner and waylaying overland travelers in an attempt to find enough Anglo captives to trade for the Apache men, women, and children still held by Bascom.

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[54] Lt. George N. Bascom graduated from West Point in 1858, 26th out of a class of 27. He was killed on the Rio Grande at the Battle of Valverde on Feb. 21, 1862, just a year after the infamous "Bascom Affair" at Apache Pass. Established in 1863, Fort Bascom, New Mexico was named in his honor. Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the U.S. Army, 1789–1903*. 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903) 2:14.

Cochise's band, now joined by Mangas's people, tortured and killed all Hispanos captured, but the Chiricahuas still hoped an exchange or ransom of Anglo prisoners might be possible. After further unsuccessful negotiations and a standoff lasting more than a week, the Apaches ran off most of the soldiers' and stage station's stock, and the exasperated Cochise tortured and killed the Anglo captives, including the erstwhile peace-making station keeper. The chief's Chokonen followers decamped for Sonora, across the Mexican border, where he knew the Americans would not follow. Bascom had also been reinforced, and the soldiers in the Pass were now commanded by First Lieutenant Isaiah Moore, First Mounted Rifles, who wasted no time in ordering the hanging of Cochise's brother and other male relatives while releasing the captive women and children. The Apache corpses swung from a tall tree, suspended high enough to keep them from scavenging coyotes, on the very spot in the pass where the executed Anglo men had just been buried. The Anglos generally demonstrated a profound ignorance of their Indian enemies, but these soldiers understood enough to know that the Apaches would not dare to retrieve their kin or disturb the graves for fear of contact with the spirits of the dead. Bascom and Moore did not realize it at the time, but they had turned what had started as a stock raid into a war that would claim hundreds of lives.[55]

The incident at Apache Pass changed the relationship between the united bands of Chiricahua Apaches and the Anglos. While Mangas's bands went north into the mountains at the headwaters of the Gila, Cochise's people crossed the border to Fronteras, Sonora. There Mexican officials warily eyed the Apaches and provided them

[55] While Bascom is usually credited with starting the war with the Chokonens and some of the other Chiricahua Apaches, it was Moore's act of hanging the captives that led to warfare and heightened violence between this band and some of their allies during the 1860s.

with rations, a course of action which the Hispanos had come to learn was safer and less costly than fighting. They knew these Apaches well—as traders of stock and goods raided from the north and as fierce foes who often captured Mexican animals and people to trade on the American side of the border. Though Cochise's people were now safe in Mexico, the blood feud that Bascom's actions triggered compelled the Chohokens to re-cross the border to attack any and all Anglos traveling the overland route or working isolated ranches and mines. The *gegodza* could only be satisfied by taking a captive or a life. Ideally, Cochise would kill Bascom, but the death of any Anglo, regardless of culpability, would help satisfy the blood debt.

On August 1, 1861, fifty-year-old Felix Grundy Ake's party made its way eastward through the narrow defile of Cooke's Canyon, New Mexico, midway between Tucson and the Rio Grande. He had packed everything he owned or held dear—merchandise, gold, and his wife and five children—into covered wagons and a spring buggy that followed several small herds of horses, cattle, sheep, and goats along the rough road through the heart of Chiricahua Apache country. Around the fire at their camp on the Mimbres River the night before the men of the party talked of the dangers. This group of experienced frontiersmen included mountain man Mose Carson (Kit's brother), Mexican *vaqueros*, and several Arizona ranchers who, like Ake, were heading east to escape Apache raiders seeking revenge for the Bascom affair and emboldened by the departure of U.S. troops withdrawn to fight the Civil War in the East. Ake was determined to press on, but soon regretted his decision when one of the advance riders reported the discovery of scalped and mutilated corpses. Within minutes of this sobering news, gunshots echoed from the high ground overlooking the pass, followed by a rain of

arrows. Nearly 200 Apache warriors of different bands led by Mangas Coloradas and Cochise closed the trap on the Ake caravan with deadly efficiency, shooting the lead mules and emerging from concealment to pick off outriders at the head and rear of the column. Ake and two others took a defensive position on a high hillside, but when flanking Apaches killed his companions, he scrambled down the rocky slope to the corralled wagons where women and children frantically loaded weapons or huddled out of sight as arrows and bullets thudded into the wagon boxes and dead draft animals. After three hours the fighting degenerated into intermittent sniping, and Ake's survivors realized that their herds had been driven off and only a handful of watchful warriors remained. Mose Carson, who had distinguished himself in the fight, helped load Ake's family along with the wounded herdsmen and other travelers into two stripped-down wagons. He rounded up enough horses and mules to make a run for Pinos Altos, one of the few remaining mining settlements, where a rebel cavalry company had recently arrived to claim Arizona Territory for the Confederacy.

As Ake's exhausted survivors lamented their losses and counted their blessings at Pinos Altos, back at the pass the Apaches scalped their dead enemies and carried off their own killed and wounded. Women and children arrived to help pack the bounty of food, clothing, tools, and weapons on captured mules and horses. But before the Apaches left the scene of carnage, they burned the rolling stock and slashed, smashed, and destroyed everything—wagon covers, furniture, dishes, cast iron skillets—abandoned by the whites.

Nothing of value remained. This coordinated attack was more than a stock raid—this was war.[56]

The attacks continued into the summer of 1861, when the most amazing thing happened. Just as the warfare intensified, Dr. Michael Steck, the Apaches' government appointed Indian agent headed east and did not return. Even more surprising to Cochise and Mangas, Anglo settlers and miners began pulling out, abandoning their ranches and camps. The Butterfield Overland Mail shuttered its stage stations and ceased operation. Then occurred, from the Apache point of view, the most extraordinary development of all. Beginning in early July, the United States troops at Forts Davis, McLane, Buchanan, Breckenridge and other military posts—from Texas to California—packed up their supplies and set ablaze everything their overburdened wagons could not carry. The eastbound soldiers from Buchanan and Breckenridge stopped for nothing, and in their panicked retreat even burned their wagonloads of supplies rather than delay, even a day, their march to the Rio Grande. The Chiricahuas had not imagined this unexpected outcome of their brief war against the Americans. It appeared to the Apaches that their attacks and terror tactics had resulted in a signal victory. The whites, it seemed, had little stomach for war.[57]

From the Anglo perspective, the situation was very different. The secession of rebellious Southern states, from Virginia to Texas, resulted in the capture of U.S. forts and property, and the onset of civil war quickly changed military priorities in the Far

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[56] This reconstruction of the attack on the Ake party in Cooke's Canyon New Mexico, August 1, 1861 is based on detailed depositions and testimony found in Felix Grundy Ake *vs.* U.S. and Apaches, Case 3112, RG 123, NARA, as well as an eye witness account by Ake's son, Jeff, in James B. O'Neil's, *They Die But Once: The Story of a Tejano*. (New York: Knight Publications, 1935), 38-48; U.S. Census 1860, New Mexico, Sonoita Creek, Felix G. Ake & family, 30; additional information from the Apache perspective may be found in Sweeney's, *Mangas Coloradas,* 416-22.

[57] *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861,* 732.

West. Federal troops boarded transport ships from California to return to the "seat of the rebellion" or consolidated on the Rio Grande in anticipation of Confederate attack from Texas or Mexico. The U.S. Postal Service moved its operations to the central overland route to avoid hostile interference from rebels. Reports from the territories indicated that, "Navajo Indians obstruct the route from Albuquerque to Los Angeles, now important as the only one on which the daily mail from the states can be carried, that of the north being blocked up with snow; that of the south being in possession of the Rebels at its eastern end and on the Rio Grande." Indian agents in New Mexico attempted to reassure their Apache and Navajo wards, but feared the withdrawal of troops combined with war that had begun with Cochise's people in Apache Pass might well lead to a general uprising. Major Isaac Lynde, Seventh U.S. Infantry reported from Fort Fillmore that, "the Apaches have commenced operations in our immediate vicinity" resulting in lost stock and dead herders. He complained that he had not sufficient troops to deal with the problem while addressing the Confederate threat. Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commanding in New Mexico, confirmed that in addition to Mescalero raiders, Navajo, Ute, Kiowa, and Comanche "marauders" had increased their attacks. To make matters worse, in the absence of federal control, Hispano New Mexicans had increased their raiding of peaceful Navajo bands, ramping up the hostilities between those peoples. Elsewhere in the borderlands, from Fort Mojave on the Colorado River to Fort Davis, Texas, Indians observed in wonder the departure of U.S. troops and the abandonment of government property. Unwilling to let supplies and munitions fall into enemy hands,

regular Federal troops in Arizona destroyed everything they could not haul away and then marched for the strong points on the Rio Grande in New Mexico.[58]

Federal officials feared that the Apacheans were now undertaking a war of extermination aimed at the "white race" and that a combination with the warriors of the Southern Plains would give the "red race" the upper hand in such a struggle. They believed that the balance of power in the region had begun to tip. In the absence of federal authority, Apaches and Navajos increased their forays against traditional adversaries, Indian and Hispano, as well as the more recent Anglo arrivals, in search of livestock, merchandise, and captives. The raiders shut down road networks, severed communications, and drove Hispanos and Anglos, along with their Papago, Pima, Maricopa, and Pueblo Indian allies, to take refuge in fortified towns and villages, setting off civil wars in the Southwestern territorial borderlands. This expansion of traditional raiding activities prompted an aggressive response first by Confederates and then by U.S. forces with their allied Anglo and Hispano territorial citizens. Sedentary nations also joined the government's campaign against their traditional enemies, and Mexican citizens and soldiers contributed to the concerted effort against the raiding groups.[59]

South of the United States-Mexico border, another civil war further unsettled political, economic, and social affairs in the borderlands. Moreover, cross-border raiding, requests for political asylum, clandestine support of Juarez's government from the U.S., and the very visible troop build-up on the border exacerbated Mexico's civil war. Some

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[58] Col. James H. Carleton, Camp Latham, Dec. 23, 1861, Richard H. Orton, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1890), 42; *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861,* 636, 732-33.
[59] Ibid., 636-46, 733; Orton, *California Men*, 42; Maj. I. Lynde to AAAG, July 21,1861, *OR*, 4:60-1; Canby, Santa Fe, to AAG, St. Louis, Dec. 1, 1861, *OR*, 4:77-8.

observers in the borderlands believed Mexico's northern states were "*de facto* independent of the central government" and that Sonora had been in a state of civil war since 1860 as Ópatas and Yaquis took sides in the struggle between Juarez's liberals and the church-backed conservatives. The American Civil War created the conditions that brought Mexico's smoldering internal conflict into full flame and made possible the external threat of European intervention.[60] In 1861, with the initial complicity of Britain and Spain, Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III) ordered French forces to invade Mexico ostensibly to collect debts from President Benito Juárez's democratic government as it struggled for survival in a civil war of its own. Mexican conservatives opposed Juárez's "ungodly constitution" with its anti-church, liberal reforms and allied themselves with Napoleon. With brazen disregard for Mexico's sovereignty and the Monroe Doctrine, the French emperor soon made it clear that he intended to re-establish an empire in the Americas while the U.S. was distracted with its internecine struggle.[61] As the French intervention in Mexico developed, Confederates from Texas and Arizona quickly mobilized and, seizing the initiative, began occupying towns and abandoned forts in Arizona and New Mexico while, at the same time, dispatching diplomats to Mexico in hope of securing international recognition.[62]

The Confederate threat in the remote Southwest borderlands became more alarming as Lincoln focused his administration's energies on raising armies and

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[60] See: Gen. Wright's report to A.A.A.G. E.D. Townsend in Washington, Oct. 31, 1861, in Orton, *California Men*, 29-31; *New York Times*, October 18, 1860, see dateline: Tubac, Wednesday, September 26, 1860, "Northern Mexico: Civil War in Sonora."

[61] Erika Pani, "Between Reform, an 'Ungodly Constitution,' and National Defense: Mexico's Civil War, 1858-67," a paper delivered at the AHA 2014 Conference, Washington, DC

[62] Capt. S. Hunter to Col. John R. Baylor, April 5, 1862, OR, 9:708; *Daily Alta*, Jan. 9, 1873. James H. Carleton's obituary reported "the Apaches and Navajoes…were then [1862] virtually rulers of Arizona and New Mexico."

suppressing the rebellion in the eastern states. The far western theater could not be ignored as Texas rebels and California Copperheads sprang into action and the balance of power in the territories began to tip in favor of emboldened Apache and Navajo raiders. The U.S. War Department concentrated regular troops on the Pacific coast, augmented by California Volunteer regiments, and on the Rio Grande with additional volunteer troops from New Mexico and Colorado territories. As the poorly-trained New Mexico territorial troops, mostly Hispano and Pueblo Indian farmers, and Anglo miners from Colorado mustered into federal service, a well-organized brigade of California Volunteers comprising cavalry, infantry, and artillery units began concentrating at Fort Yuma, with significant logistical support from Pima and Maricopa farmers, who provided vital food supplies for the soldiers and forage for their animals.[63]

In July 1861, the U.S. government called on the State of California and Colorado and New Mexico territories for volunteer troops. The army needed soldiers to suppress the rebellion brewing in southern California and protect the federal property and transcontinental mail routes in the Southwest borderlands from both secessionists and Indian raiders. Lincoln endorsed the Volunteer Employment Act the day after the Bull Run disaster of July 21. This emergency legislation specified that volunteers would be enlisted for terms of not less than six months and no longer than three years for the purpose of "suppressing rebellion." As the battlefield casualties were tolled, it became

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[63] William G. Morris, *Address Delivered Before the Society of California Volunteers* (San Francisco: Francis, Valentine & Co., 1866), 3-25. During the 19th century, the federal government recognized three types of military organizations: regulars (the professional standing army), militia (unpaid volunteers organized by each state and territory for local emergencies as determined by the respective governor), and volunteers (troops raised by the states, at the request of the President in times of national emergencies, but paid, armed, equipped, and controlled by the federal government). Henry L. Scott, *Military Dictionary,* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1864); Col. J. H. Carleton to R. Drum, December 21, 1861*, OR*, 50(2):773-80; Capt. B. Cutler to Col. J.R. West, March 31, 1862, *OR*, 50(1):970.

clear to all that the country was now engaged in civil war.[64] Later that month Congress amended the law to allow soldiers to enlist for the duration of the war. Following calls in July and August, California enrolled and mustered two regiments of cavalry and five regiments of infantry for Federal service. Two mountain-howitzer batteries, trained in Arizona, composed the California artillery complement.[65]

The more than sixteen thousand volunteers raised by the state of California for service in the West combined with more than three thousand Coloradans and nearly five thousand New Mexicans represented a military force almost twice as large as the entire U.S. Army at the time the Civil War began. These volunteer soldiers would replace the regular troops sent east, and provide a bulwark against Confederates in the West while patrolling the territories to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens and overland mail routes. California Volunteer regiments would provide the vast majority of the manpower in the Far West, serving as far north as Fort Colville, Washington Territory, and as far east as Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, while also garrisoning New Mexico posts, pursuing rebels in Texas, and even making forays from Arizona deep into French-occupied Sonora and Chihuahua, Mexico.[66] By July 1861, the War Department's abandonment of military posts in the Southwest and consolidation of forces in New Mexico under Colonel Canby, an experienced and capable regular army officer, were already under way.[67]

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[64] *Congressional Globe*, 37th Congress, 1st session, 1861, 209-19.
[65] Orton, *California Men,* 12; Arthur A. Wright, *The Civil War in the Southwest* (Denver: Big Mountain, 1964), 10.
[66] The peacetime regular army of the United States mustered approximately 15,000 men in all branches of the service. By the end of the war, California had raised eight regiments of infantry, a battalion of "Native California Cavalry," and a "Battalion of Mountaineers." When enlistment terms began to expire in 1864, state authorities organized a battalion of "Veteran Volunteers" for continued service in New Mexico and Arizona. Third and Sixth California Infantry and the unusual Battalion of Mountaineers were the only California Volunteer units that did not serve in Arizona. Orton, *California Men,* 5.
[67] I. Lynde to AAG, Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico, Aug. 7, 1861, *OR,* 4:5–6.

While the first regiments of California infantry and cavalry mobilized under the overall direction of Brigadier General George Wright, news of a Confederate invasion of New Mexico and Arizona reached the San Francisco headquarters of the U.S. Army's Department of the Pacific. On July 27, 1861, before Canby could mass his dispersed forces, Confederate Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor's companies of mounted riflemen, recruited in Texas and the territories, captured 700 regular troops of Major Isaac Lynde's command, including seven companies of his Seventh U.S. Infantry regiment, a squadron of U.S. Mounted Rifles, and a battery of twelve-pounder field howitzers, as it retreated northward from Fort Fillmore, New Mexico.[68] Just days before, the Federals had tentatively attacked Baylor's outnumbered command, which was holed-up awaiting reinforcements at the town of Mesilla. Lynde's assault was no more than a demonstration that lobbed a few howitzer rounds short of the town's adobe dwellings. The Federals returned to Fort Fillmore and torched the valuable military, subsistence, and medical stores, though the veteran soldiers somehow managed to save some of its whiskey supply. The troops and panicked civilian camp followers and contractors straggled northward toward Fort Stanton by way of San Augustine Pass, some twenty miles distant, ill-prepared for the trek through the fierce desert heat. Lynde's soldiers had insufficient water in their three-pint canteens, many of which had been filled with whiskey. Soon the men began shedding their uniforms and straggling. As the sun grew

[68] The son of a U.S. Army surgeon, Baylor was born in Paris, Kentucky but raised in Texas. Many of his men were also descended from Anglo Americans with Kentucky and Tennessee roots. See: Jerry D. Thompson, *John Robert Baylor: Texas Indian Fighter and Confederate Soldier* (Hillsboro,Texas: Hill Junior College Press, 1971).

hotter, the line of march could be easily followed by the cast-off knapsacks and weapons that littered the trail.[69]

When Baylor's small advance force of 162 mounted riflemen rode down Lynde's disorganized and dehydrated command they passed nearly two hundred soldiers collapsed from heat exhaustion on the side of the road. When Baylor caught up with Lynde's entourage and other officers near San Augustine Springs, he found the federal major confused and barely able to maintain his saddle. Realizing he was outnumbered and low on water himself, Baylor pushed the Union men to surrender immediately, but the regular officers of the mounted companies still had fight in them and urged their commander to resist. Baylor took control of the parley, staring down the junior officers and demanding to know just who was in command. Baylor's bravado won out, and Lynde conditionally surrendered without firing a single shot, believing that "honor did not demand the sacrifice of blood" after the suffering already endured by his men during the retreat. Some of the officers present protested and swore aloud, "the damned old scoundrel has surrendered us!" Fort Fillmore's post surgeon witnessed "old soldiers and strong men weep like children," and attributed Lynde's actions to cowardice, imbecility, and an inability to manage logistics, including the disposition of the inordinate number of camp followers and officers' wives that impeded the retreat and field operations. The Union men had succumbed to the desert heat, enemy bravado, and their own inept commander's loss of heart. Before submitting to Baylor's custody or parole, the men of

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[69] There is some debate over the significance of the medicinal whiskey that may have replaced water in some canteens—in any event, Lynde's troops suffered terribly from dehydration. See: John P. Wilson, "Whiskey at Fort Fillmore; A Story of the Civil War," *New Mexico Historical Review* 68 (April, 1993): 109-32.

the Seventh Infantry set ablaze their silken regimental colors rather than surrender them to the rebels.[70]

Though Lynde's regular troops wore splendid brass-buttoned uniforms and brandished burnished weapons with martial *élan* on the fort's parade ground, Baylor's motley band of Texan volunteers, indifferently attired and armed with a variety of shotguns and revolvers, were battle-hardened, combative, and confident. They knew how to survive in the desert, and most of the enlisted men and officers, including Baylor himself, had fought Comanches in military companies organized for that purpose. Only six months earlier, some of these same rangers had defeated the Noconee Comanches at Pease River, Texas, and significantly reduced raiding from that part of the powerful Comanche confederation. The aggressive and warlike Texans exhibited a unique brand of Anglo-Saxon martial masculinity that evolved from their Kentucky and Tennessee lineages and the hostile environment of the Texas borderlands, between the Comanche empire to the north and often adversarial Mexico to the south.

On August 1, 1861, Colonel Baylor proclaimed a "Territory of Arizona" for the Confederacy, marking the first time any government recognized the area (then considered western New Mexico Territory) as a separate political unit. In a proclamation dated August 1, 1861, Baylor decreed from Mesilla:

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[70] George Wythe Baylor, *John Robert Baylor: Confederate Governor of Ariz*ona, ed. Odie B. Faulk (Tucson: Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, 1966), 6; *OR* (4), 1-20, see especially the statement of Capt. Alfred Gibbs for an understanding of the dissension and frustration among Lynde's officers regarding the necessity and terms of surrender, ibid., 11-13; Baylor's report of the engagement, Sept. 21, 1861, ibid., 17-20. Abraham Lincoln personally approved that Lynde's name be stricken from the Army's rolls for abandoning his post" and "surrendering his command to an inferior force of insurgents." GO 102, Nov. 25, 1861, HQ of the Army, Lorenzo Thomas, AG, ibid., 16. The disgraced officer was not restored to the service until after the Civil War when he was placed on the "retired list of the Army" in November, 1866. Orton, *California Men*, 43.

> To the People of the Territory of Arizona:
>
> The social and political condition of Arizona being little short of general anarchy, and the people being literally destitute of law, order, and protection, the said Territory, from the date hereof, is hereby declared temporarily organized as a military government until such time as Congress may otherwise provide.
>
> I, John R. Baylor, lieutenant-colonel, commanding the Confederate Army in the Territory of Arizona, hereby take possession of the said Territory in the name and behalf of the Confederate States of America.
>
> For all the purposes herein specified, and until otherwise decreed or provided, the Territory of Arizona shall comprise all that portion of New Mexico lying south of the thirty-fourth parallel of north latitude.
>
> All offices, both civil and military, heretofore existing in this Territory, either under the laws of the late United States or the Territory of New Mexico, are hereby declared vacant, and from the date hereof shall forever cease to exist.
>
> That the people of this Territory may enjoy the full benefits of law, order, and protection, and, as far as possible, the blessings and advantages of a free government, it is hereby decreed that the laws and enactments existing in this Territory prior to the date of this proclamation, and consistent with the Constitution and laws of the Confederate States of America and the provisions of this decree, shall continue in full force and effect, without interruption, until such time as the Confederate Congress may otherwise provide.

In Richmond, Confederate president Jefferson Davis confirmed Baylor's self-proclaimed governorship.[71]

The energetic Baylor set out to secure southern New Mexico and Arizona for the Confederacy. After routing federal forces on the Rio Grande in southern New Mexico, he focused his attention on the Apache raiders that had shut down the east-west transportation corridor between Mesilla and Tucson. The allied Apache bands known as Chiricahuas had also driven off miners, ranchers, and other Hispano and Anglo settlers and traders. Finding the displaced miners of Pinos Altos and other refugees eager for

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[71] J.R. Baylor, Proclamation, August 1, 1861, *OR*, Series I, (4): 20-21.

protection and revenge, he began recruiting experienced frontiersmen which he formed into mounted companies designated "Arizona Guards" and "Arizona Rangers."[72]

Baylor brought his Texas rangers north intent on ending federal authority in the territories and equally determined to kill any and all Indians he encountered. Prior to secession, Governor Sam Houston himself had praised the past efforts of the independent ranger companies, urging them to "repel, pursue, and punish every body of Indians coming into the State."[73] Every one of Baylor's Texans had lost family and friends in the struggle for survival and dominance with the Comanches, and all of the rangers believed in "war to the knife." These men had come of age in the midst of a fierce warrior culture that valued personal daring and courage in the face of an enemy. It mattered little whether they came home with Apache or Comanche Indian scalps on their belts. Baylor vowed to do just that, believing an aggressive offensive the best strategy in dealing with the enemy warriors. He openly advocated extermination of the Apaches, and any other Indian people, whom he viewed as hostile, sub-humans. He ordered subordinates to kill Apache men whenever encountered and to enslave captives. "You will therefore use all means to persuade the Apaches or any tribe to come in for the purpose of making peace," he ordered Arizona Guards Captain Thomas Helm, "and when you get them together kill all the grown Indians and take the children prisoners and sell them to defray the expense of killing the Indians. Buy whisky and such other goods as may be necessary for the Indians and I will order vouchers given to cover the amount expended. Leave nothing undone to

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[72] Baylor, *John Robert Baylor*, 12; *OR*, I, (50)1:1108.
[73] J. W. Wilbarger, *Indian Depredations in Texas*, Austin: Hutchings Printing House, 1889, 338-9; *Indian Depredations, Hearings Before the United States Congress, House Committee on Indian Affairs* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1908), 46; For additional details on the number of Comanche raids in Texas 1860-67 see NARA, RG 75, Evidence of Indian Depredations, entry 700, boxes 1-62; Comanche attacks and raids fall off sharply in 1861 and then rise sharply again in late 1865 and continue to increase through 1867.

insure success, and have a sufficient number of men around to allow no Indian to escape." Though Comanches, Kiowas, Utes, Navajos, and Apaches typically took captives for sale or ransom to other Indian groups, or to Mexicans in Chihuahua and Sonora, there was something especially cold-blooded and calculating in Baylor's orders. Perhaps it was the bureaucratic thoroughness or the stated goal of extermination that made even hard-hearted Indian killers and slaveholders pause.[74]

Baylor's Confederate Arizona Territory stretched from the Texas line westward to Tucson, Arizona's only town of consequence between Mesilla and Arizona City, opposite Fort Yuma on the Colorado River. In August 1861, Mangas Coloradas's and Cochise's allied Chiricahua Apache bands—Bedonkohe, Chihenne, Chokonen—captured former government contractor Felix Ake's valuable wagon train near Cooke's Canyon on the main southern overland trail. Ake had determined to leave the territories when government protection disappeared. Based on previous experience, he believed his well-armed men would be enough to safeguard his family and property as they traveled east along the abandoned Butterfield Stage road. But the Apache ambush sent Ake's survivors running for their lives, while the warriors gathered stock, burned wagons, and smashed everything that could not be carried off. A company of Confederate Mounted Volunteers under Captain Thomas Mastin discovered the bodies of nine Hispano herders and six of Ake's Anglo escorts and immediately galloped off in pursuit. The Arizona Confederates, all experienced frontiersmen, intercepted the Apaches, slowed down by their plunder, and inflicted many casualties. But the Apaches did not make a run for Mexico nor did they take refuge in the mountains, as the Anglos expected. Instead they

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[74] Col. J.R. Baylor to Capt. Thomas Helm, March 20, 1862. *OR* 50(1):942.

retaliated at the Pinos Altos gold mines, killing Mastin and four other men in a close quarters fight to the death. [75]

While some of Baylor's ranger companies attempted to protect the mines and settlements from the escalating Apache attacks, Captain Sherod Hunter arrived in Tucson with about one hundred men of Company A, Second Texas Mounted Volunteers and elements of other Confederate territorial companies[76] on February 28, 1862. Colonel James Reily, the special envoy of Confederate general Henry Hopkins Sibley, now in overall command of Confederate forces in New Mexico, accompanied Hunter's command to Arizona. On March 3, 1862, Reily left Tucson with twenty men under Lieutenant James Tevis for Ures, Sonora, in an attempt to contact Governor Ignacio Pesqueira and secure Mexican recognition of the Confederate government and, if all went well, negotiate for food supplies desperately needed by the overextended Texas regiments pushing up the Rio Grande in New Mexico.[77]

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[75] Felix Grundy Ake *vs*. U.S. and Apaches, Case 3112, RG 123, NARA. For Felix Ake's son Jeff's account of the Cooke's Canyon attack see: O'Neil, *They Die But Once*.

[76] As the 6-12 month enlistments of Confederate territorial units such at the Arizona Rangers and Arizona Guards began to expire, men wishing to reenlist were merged into Hunter's company which, Baylor and Sibley hoped, would become the nucleus on an entire regiment dedicated for service in Arizona. Martin H. Hall and Sam Long *The Confederate Army of New Mexico* (Austin: Presidial, 1978), 21.

[77] The portion of the Gadsden Purchase south of the Gila River had been known since the Spanish entrada as "Arizonae," probably a Basque word meaning "the good oak tree." Donald T. Garate, *Juan Bautista de Anza: Basque Explorer in the New World, 1698–1740* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2003), 164. For other theories on the origin of Arizona, see Will C. Barnes, *Arizona Place Names,* rev. and ed. Byrd H. Granger (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1985), xv. See also L. Boyd Finch, "William Claude Jones: The Rogue Who Named Arizona." *Journal of Arizona History* 31 (Winter 1990): 405–24. From 1854, when the Senate ratified the Gadsden Purchase, to 1860, no fewer than ten bills were introduced in Congress calling for the creation of an Arizona separate from New Mexico Territory. The proponents of these bills all imagined an east-west division of New Mexico from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande. In February 1863 Abraham Lincoln finally signed into law the bill that created Arizona Territory divided on a north-south line in order to separate what was thought to be a voting block sympathetic to the Confederacy. Henry P. Walker and Don Bufkin, *Historical Atlas of Arizona* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986), 25; J.R. Baylor, "Proclamation to the People of the Territory of Arizona," Aug. 1, 1861, *OR,* 4:20–21; Sherod Hunter to Col. J. R. Baylor, April 5, 1862, ibid., 9:707–08; H. H. Sibley to Pesqueira, Fort Bliss, Texas, December 16, 1861, ibid., 50(1):668-70; Eduardo Villa, *Compendio de historia del estado de Sonora* (Mexico, D.F.: 1938), 280; Martin H. Hall, "Colonel James Reily's

After seeing Reily's diplomatic mission off, Captain Hunter's small but independent command promptly seized the initiative in Arizona. Most of his men had lived and worked in the borderlands prior to the war and were familiar with the people, places, and essential survival skills. No Union forces opposed the arrival of the rebel horse soldiers, and the settlers, it seemed, even welcomed them as a means of protection from the increasingly hostile Apaches. Attacks by Chiricahuas and other Western Apaches, as well as the eastern Mescalero bands in southern New Mexico, took their toll on civilian miners between Tucson and the Rio Grande. Emboldened by the earlier withdrawal of U.S. troops, Apache war leaders raided with impunity. They even attacked Hunter's heavily-armed rebel rangers, making no distinction between Union and Confederate whites. While Baylor and Hunter began the tasks of occupation and control of the natives considered hostile, they kept an anxious eye on the California Volunteer units already moving across the desert to Fort Yuma on the Colorado River.[78]

At the beginning of the Civil war, the raiding Navajos and Apaches, along with related Athabaskans, were together numerically superior and militarily stronger than any other peoples in the borderlands. Even though the Anglo Americans affiliated with the United States government then represented only a small minority of the inhabitants of the territories, their presence had been significant as a stabilizing influence. The federal government sought peaceful relations with the indigenous peoples believing it was morally preferable to feed and pacify its "wards" rather than fight them. At the same time the government worked to prevent cross-border Indian raiding, as well as Anglo

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Diplomatic Missions to Chihuahua and Sonora," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XXXI (July 1956), 232-42.

[78] Edwin A. Rigg to James H. Carleton, March 25, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):950–52; Carleton to Wright, March 22, 1862, *OR* (50)1:944-45.

filibustering, and attempted to limit hostile acts between Hispano, Indian, and Anglo peoples within New Mexico Territory. The disruption and violence resulting from the absence of federal authority demonstrated just how important the U.S. presence had been in steadying the balance of power and maintaining the peace.[79]

Civil wars in the Southwest borderlands pitted Anglo Americans and their Hispano and Indian allies against Confederates and Apacheans while still other conflicts, north and south of the Mexican border, led to warfare between and within ethnic groups, as well as between classes. Some of these conflicts had international dimensions as well. United States forces confronted Confederates, Apaches, Navajos, Mojaves, Yavapais, Hualapais, Comanches, Kiowas, Ópatas, and Mexican Imperial forces. Alliances were fluid and subject to change, but the principal allies of the Anglos from the U.S. included Hispano New Mexicans, Pimas, Maricopas, Papagos, Pueblos, and, occasionally, Utes, Apaches, and Juaristas from across the border in Mexico. The ethnically-related Navajos and Apaches fought one another as well as Union and Confederate Anglos, Hispanos—north and south of the border—and agrarian tribes including Pimas, Maricopas, Papagos, and Pueblos. Raids, skirmishes, and battles ranged across the border with Mexico which was embroiled in yet another civil war. Liberal laboring and middle-class Indians and Hispanos faced off against predominantly pro-church, upper class, and high caste

[79] The term "Apache" is frustratingly vague and inadequate for historians attempting to identify specific tribes and bands, but it is necessarily used here because it is often how Hispanos and Anglos referred to the semi-nomadic bands of Apachean (Southern Athabaskan) speakers they encountered in Arizona and New Mexico in the 1860s. The U.S. and C.S. soldiers applied "Apache" to Chiricahuas, Mescaleros, Jicarillas, Lipans, Western Apaches, Plains Apaches, and even Yavapais. If their identities were known with certainty, it would be more appropriate to refer to specific bands. The Chiricahuas, for example, comprised the Bidánku, Chíhénde, Chukunende, and Ndé ndaí bands. Yet it is nearly impossible to identify Apache bands with any sort of precision based on contemporary accounts, so period terminology has been retained in most cases to avoid confusing the issue with speculative identifications.

conservatives and their Indian and Hispano allies as well as European imperialists from France and Austria.

Chapter 2 The Civil War Power Vacuum

Anglo-American Unionists from California, Colorado and New Mexico along with their Hispano and Indian allies faced off against Confederates from Texas and New Mexico. Though the Anglos were linked by language, shared history, and many traditions, their approaches to war in the borderlands differed significantly. The military men of both groups were above-average physical specimens and risk-takers, characteristics of peoples who survive voluntary migrations under adverse conditions. While all of the Anglos believed in the manifest destiny of their "race" to control the borderlands and its Indian and Hispano inhabitants, the Southern men were steeped in a culture of martial masculinity that advocated the taking of the territories by force. Their strategies and tactics were influenced by European traditions, especially the art of war as practiced by Napoleon. The logistics required by this type of warfare, combined with the unique conditions, terrain and alliances in the borderlands, necessitated special preparations and new modes of combat.

The Northern men generally displayed a more restrained form of the Anglo cultural ideal of manhood that allowed for conquest of enemies and "inferiors" in a seemingly more humane way. The Union men forged strategic alliances and made logistics their priority, bringing sophisticated technology to bear whenever possible in order to achieve a military advantage over their adversaries. They also sought to win the support of the citizenry and understood the importance of the territories' civil government, infrastructure, and economies. The Union men also kept a close watch on affairs in Mexico and struggled to maintain neutrality and avoid foreign intervention. The Confederates demonstrated considerable bravado yet neglected supply lines and relations

with the Hispano community. They also took an aggressive posture in response to Indian raiders while investing little energy in establishing alliances with sedentary nations.

Union Martial Manpower, Logistics, and Mobilization

In August 1861 President Lincoln and his senior officers at the War Department debated the practicability of a column from California striking the Confederates in Texas by way of Mexico. Brigadier General Edwin V. Sumner, then commanding the Department of the Pacific, sought and received cooperation from Mexican officials and began planning such an operation. U.S. troops would land at Guaymas or Mazatlán on the Gulf of California, march overland across the states of Sonora and Chihuahua, and strike the rebels along the border in west Texas if not in Mexico itself. Reports of Confederate-sanctioned filibustering with designs on Sonora and the port of Guaymas caused Sonora's anxious Governor Pesqueira to work willingly with U.S. military officials in California to intercept the Texans and eliminate this serious threat to Mexican sovereignty. Civil unrest in southern California, however, diverted the first of the new California regiments. Federal authorities feared, with some justification, that some twenty thousand Confederate sympathizers would collaborate with disloyal Hispanos—still embittered by the hostile Anglo takeover twelve years earlier—and instigate civil war in the southern counties. Quick and decisive action led to the roundup of agitators and quashed open rebellion by December, just as the alarming news of Confederate victories in New Mexico and a rebel invasion of Arizona reached the Pacific coast. The War Department dropped the idea of protecting far-western ports and territories by preemptively attacking west Texas by way of Mexico. The command of the Department of the Pacific devolved upon Colonel George Wright, commander of the Ninth U.S. Infantry—the only regular

regiment remaining on the west coast—when General-in-Chief George B. McClellan recalled Sumner to the East.[1] Wright realized it was too late for this course of action and proposed to invade the territories more directly with a force of California troops that would cross the Colorado River at Yuma and proceed to New Mexico along the Gila River on the old Butterfield Overland Mail route. McClellan, in a rare moment of decisiveness, approved the operation.[2]

Wright's promotion to Brigadier-General quickly came through, and he selected forty-seven-year-old James Henry Carleton, colonel of the First California Infantry and formerly major of the First U.S. Dragoons, to lead the column into Arizona. Wright wanted an aggressive field commander to find and strike the Confederates as quickly as possible. He knew Carleton to be a tough and efficient officer—a protégé of the hard-marching Stephen Watts Kearny—with many years of frontier experience. After more than twenty years in the saddle and considerable time as a Commissary of Subsistence, Carleton had earned a reputation as both an uncompromising disciplinarian and a stickler for detail. Lean, sharp-featured, and ramrod straight, subordinates believed his steel gray eyes commanded obedience. At the same time he was well-read, articulate, and possessed an artistic bent which he satisfied through creative and historical writing, and natural history and botanical explorations. As a youth and as a frontier officer before the war he

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[1] Wright to E. D. Townsend, AAAG, Oct. 31, 1861 and GO 28, HQ Dept. of the Pacific, Oct. 21, 1861, Richard H. Orton, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1890), 19, 23.

[2] Sumner expressed his fear that the presence of an organized Confederate force in California would "inevitably inaugurate civil war here immediately." Sumner to A.A.A.G. Townsend, Sept. 7, 1861 in Orton, *California Men*, 24; Ibid., 28-32; George Wright to Lorenzo Thomas, Dec. 9, 1861, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [OR],, 50(1):752–53; although Wright preferred Yuma as the base of operations for the recapture of the Southwest territories, he also believed that the capture of the Mexican port of Guaymas was important, both to deny the rebels and as a supply depot on the Gulf of California. Orton, *California Men*, 29-31.

corresponded with naturalist John J. Audubon. Carleton focused his inquiring nature on the study of America's "aboriginal peoples" and consulted the novelist Charles Dickens on the subject. As a military man, however, Carleton was a no-nonsense, by-the-book regular, always anticipating essential logistical needs when organizing, equipping, and deploying troops. Wright developed the plan for the Arizona expedition only after the War Department rejected as politically dangerous the idea of attacking the Confederates in Texas by way of the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua. The leadership in Washington had originally intended that Carleton command the soldiers assigned to guard the overland mail on the central route through Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming territories—he had led his dragoons over this country following the Mormon War of 1857—but rescinded these orders when the Confederate threat in the Southwest became imminent.[3]

A thrust from southern California across Arizona and New Mexico to the Rio Grande would serve several purposes: It would block a junction of Texas and California secessionists, reopen the southern overland mail route, provide garrisons for abandoned posts, and furnish protection to the citizens of the territories and the northern states of Mexico. Many of the new Hispano and Anglo inhabitants were miners taking advantage of the tremendous mineral wealth—gold and silver—long evident since Spanish times as well as new deposits discovered in Colorado, New Mexico and, most recently, Arizona. The Californians would also be in a position to fall upon the flank and rear of Sibley's Texans, who seemed invincible as they captured or pushed past federal forts while

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[3] Carleton modeled much of his behavior on his mentor, Kearny, under whom he served as Commissary on the much admired South Pass Expedition of 1845. For the most thorough biography of Carleton, see: Aurora Hunt, *James Henry Carleton; Frontier Dragoon* (Glendale: Arthur H. Clarke, 1958*),* 57, 82-92 and passim.

marching up the Rio Grande toward Santa Fe and the Colorado goldfields. Wright advised McClellan that, "under the command of Colonel Carleton, an officer of great experience, indefatigable and active, the expedition must be successful."[4]

Carleton's force included ten companies of his own regiment, the First California Infantry; five companies of the First California Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Edward E. Eyre; and Light Battery A, Third U.S. Artillery. First Lieutenant John B. Shinn commanded the battery, which consisted of four bronze field pieces (six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder field howitzers) manned by regulars. Wright assigned Captain John C. Cremony's Company B, Second California Cavalry to Carleton's contingent before the column set out across the desert. Later Colonel George W. Bowie's ten companies of the Fifth California Infantry and two improvised mountain-howitzer batteries, commanded by Lieutenants Jeremiah Phelan and William A. Thompson, joined Carleton's command, bringing the total force to 2,350 men. Before the war's end some six thousand additional California soldiers would follow this advance column.[5]

Experienced regular-army officers raised and trained the regiments bound for Arizona. Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, formerly captain of Company K, First U.S. Dragoons, drilled the First California Cavalry into a well-trained and disciplined battalion. But by the time the Californians marched for the territory in late 1861, Davis and many of the other regular officers had gone east to fight, and civilian appointees led the volunteers. The men benefited greatly from the training provided by their original

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[4] Report of James M. McNulty, Oct. 1863, *OR,* 50(1):137; Wright to Thomas, ibid., 752–53; Even the hard-bitten regular Gen. Edwin V. Sumner found the "great and unaccountable success [of the Confederates] in Arizona and New Mexico" cause for alarm and moved to take precautions in the event that they did indeed reach the Pacific coast—an eventuality that seemed possible in the first year of the war. Sumner to E.D. Townsend, AAAG, Sept. 7, 1861, Orton, *California Men*, 24.

[5] Richard C. Drum, AAG, to Carleton, Dec. 19, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):772 and passim; George H. Pettis, *The California Column* (Santa Fe: Historical Society, 1908), 11, 8.

cadre of officers, and these professionals agreed that no finer material for soldiers could be found anywhere. The first men to spring to the call were Anglo Americans recruited from every part of California. More than half of the state's Anglo population was of military age, and these men flocked to enlistment centers at forts and camps.

These volunteer soldiers represented a true cross section of California's Anglo male population. They were a hardy lot, used to working outdoors in the harshest conditions imaginable. Most of them labored in the mines and goldfields of the mother lode country of northern California when the war broke out. In the 1850s they had rushed to California from every state in the Union and many European countries. They were risk-takers and tended to be bigger and stronger than their stay-at-home eastern counterparts. Army quartermasters discovered that their coat, trouser, hat, and shoe sizes were considerably larger than those required of their counterparts in the Army of the Potomac. As was the case with most voluntary migrations, these men exhibited not only above average stature but intelligence and self-reliance, as well. As youthful Argonauts, most had undertaken the difficult journey to California—by land or sea—and then survived the rough-and-ready miner's life. Other occupations appearing on the regimental descriptive lists include laborer, farmer, mechanic, printer, and seaman. The men ranged in age from eighteen to forty-five, and most had some formal education.[6]

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[6] Aurora Hunt, *Army of the Pacific* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1951), 24; Constance Wynn Altshuler, *Cavalry Yellow and Infantry Blue: Army Officers in Arizona between 1851 and 1886* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1991), 94; Orton, *California Men,* 68, 87; The Forty-niners, and those who followed, exhibited the characteristics of many populations that voluntarily migrate, including greater height, weight, and intelligence as well as the more difficult to quantify trait of risk-taking. A number of studies demonstrate this, including examinations of Mexican migrants to the U.S. in the mid-20th century. F. S. Hulse, "Migration and Cultural Selection in Human Genetics," Special volume, *The Anthropologist* (Delhi, India: University of Delhi, 1969), 1–21; for comparisons of "migrantes" and "sedentes," see: Marcus S. Goldstein, *Demographic and bodily changes in descendants of Mexican immigrants, with comparable data on parents and children in Mexico* (Austin: Institute of Latin-American Studies, the

The men enlisted for a variety of reasons, from a patriotic desire to preserve the Union to the lure of three regular meals a day. Others found the pay of eleven dollars a month a compelling inducement. In the ranks there was little talk of the slavery issue, but occasionally tempers flared between proslavery and antislavery men. Whether or not they approved of slavery, the majority of Californians agreed that the Union must be preserved. Native Californians, "Californios" descended from Spanish and Mexican pioneers, adopted a wait-and-see attitude as the sectional strife between North and South escalated. Most of the Hispanos felt that this was not their war, yet.

In many ways the California Volunteers proved to be superior to the soldiers of the regular army who preceded them in the Southwest borderlands. Although well officered, mostly-illiterate immigrants and Americans from the lowest rung of the socioeconomic ladder filled the regular ranks. Alcoholism, a thirty-three percent desertion rate, malingering, and a host of social diseases crippled the strength and effectiveness of the standing army. The regulars lacked the diverse talents of the volunteers, who viewed military service as a temporary break from their civilian occupations. The volunteers were literate, even literary, and quickly adapted to new people, environments, and challenges, while the regulars looked to their officers and the

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University of Texas, 1943) passim; Francis Lord, *They Fought for the Union* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1960), 227. A survey of "Descriptive Lists" for California regiments shows that the height of the average western soldier was more than an inch taller than his eastern counterpart. Quartermaster records indicate that the hat, coat, and shoe sizes were also larger. Lieutenant Colonel George H. Crosman, commanding the Philadelphia Depot, noted: "The tariff for boots and bootees has been in operation for twenty years, with slight variations, but I have discovered that it does not suit the men of the West and those of the East equally well. In the western departments larger sizes are needed than in the East. The men are generally larger and have larger feet in the West." *OR,* 19(2):505. See: California Volunteer Descriptive Lists and Clothing Accounts, RG 95, NARA.

security of military routine. All things considered, the Californians seemed ideally suited for the arduous service they would face in the border territories.[7]

Although the newly-formed California regiments lost most of their regular officers, who transferred to eastern units before departing for the territories, able and experienced volunteer officers quickly took their places. Virtually all of the men awarded a major's commission or higher, including Joseph R. West, Edwin A. Rigg, Clarence E. Bennett, and Edward Eyre, had served in California's large and active militia during the 1850s. Others had seen service in volunteer regiments during the Mexican-American War. Oscar M. Brown, William P. Calloway, Charles W. Lewis, John Martin, and Edmond D. Shirland could all claim war experience.[8]

California governor John Downey confirmed commissions for a number of outstanding officer candidates who had served as enlisted men in the regular army before the war. William McCleave served as Carleton's first sergeant in Company K, First U.S. Dragoons, during the decade preceding the Civil War, and Carleton pushed for his old friend's appointment to command Company A, First California Cavalry. McCleave had left the service in 1860 to oversee the army's experimental camel herd at Fort Tejon, California. Now he jumped at the chance to serve as an officer under Carleton. Similarly, Emil Fritz received a commission to captain Company B, First California Cavalry. Fritz had previous military training in Germany before arriving in California in 1849 (he

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[7] Orton, *California Men*, 5; Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 12–18; Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1866–189.* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 23–24.

[8] Dello G. Dayton, "California Militia, 1850–66." Ph.D. dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1959), 398; California had the third largest militia prior to the Civil War, exceeded only by New York and Illinois, Henry L. Scott, *Military Dictionary,* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1864), 419; Constance Wynn Altshuler, *Chains of Command: Arizona and the Army, 1856–1875* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1981), 24.

succeeded McCleave as first sergeant of Company K, First Dragoons in October 1860). Second Lieutenant James Barrett of Company A, First California Cavalry, also served beside McCleave and Fritz as a corporal in the First Dragoons before the war. Chauncey Wellman, a first sergeant in the First U.S. Cavalry before the war, also won a California Volunteer commission. Cavalry commands were the most sought after in the patriotic rush that followed the opening of hostilities. Carleton made certain that these plum commissions went to men of proven ability.[9]

Although the governor approved all commissions, a military board, established early in the war, reviewed all officer candidates as a safeguard against unqualified appointments. Anglo frontiersmen often chose volunteer officers as much for their imposing appearance as their military competency. Early in the Civil War, California companies elected their officers. The men generally chose officers of proven ability but considered other factors, such as fairness and likeability, as well. Oftentimes they had little opportunity to size up their leaders, other than their physical appearance and stature. The amateur soldiers looked for a leader with a "military bearing" who could command respect. The elected officers were often physically imposing and usually well above average height.[10] Later in the war many veteran volunteers with demonstrated aptitude

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[9] Even the rigid Carleton could be swayed by political favoritism and friendship. Nathaniel J. Pishon, who was related by marriage and a former sergeant in the First Dragoons, landed the captaincy of Company D, First Cavalry CV after the Pacific Department ordered that unit to accompany the Arizona expedition. Carleton kept his relationship quiet but later confided to McCleave that he had secured Pishon's appointment. Carleton to William McCleave, Mar. 15, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):931–32; Andrew Wallace, "Fort Whipple in the Days of the Empire," *The Smoke Signal* 26 (Fall 1972), 114; Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 94; Altshuler, *Cavalry Yellow,* 209. Robert N. Mullin, ed. *Maurice Garland Fulton's History of the Lincoln County War* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968), 46.

[10] This holds true for Anglo volunteers from California, Colorado, and Texas. Colorado Volunteer officers John P. Slough and John M. Chivington were 6'3" and 6'4" respectively. William L. Rynerson, who entered the California Volunteers as a sergeant and mustered out a Lt. Colonel, stood well over 6'6" (Slough called him a "seven foot son of a bitch" the night before Rynerson shot him to death). Texas officers John R. Baylor and John S. Shropshire measured 6'3" and 6'5". None of these officers still served

were promoted from the ranks. A soldier in the First California Infantry lamented, "there has been about 15 or 16 sergeants in our column promoted to Second Lieut. Our sergeant went among the rest." The volunteer army, more so than the regular army, recognized and rewarded ability.[11]

Demands and Supplies

U.S. Army regulations made no special provisions for the volunteer soldiers destined for service in Arizona and New Mexico. The army expected these troops to be organized, uniformed, armed, and equipped the same as the regular regiments they replaced. In practice, however, the availability of matériel, the personal preferences of officers and men, the anticipated enemy, and the desert environment influenced the formation and outfitting of the California regiments. Most of the regular troops returning to the East in 1861 deposited their arms and equipage at government arsenals and forts in California. Ordnance officers inspected and quickly reissued serviceable equipment to the newly formed California regiments. Large stocks of unused weapons and accoutrements, some obsolescent, were issued in the rush to arm the new soldiers, and armorers and

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with their original commands when the rebellion ended in 1865. For height and weight comparisons see: Regimental Descriptive Lists, RG 94, NARA; Jesse S. Haire Journals 1859-1897, Ohio Historical Society; Aurora Hunt, *Kirby Benedict, Frontier Federal Judge: an Account of Legal and Judicial Development in the Southwest, 1853-1874 ...* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, 1961), 193; for description of Colorado troops: Joseph Pratt Allyne, *West By Southwest; Letters of Joseph Pratt Allyne, A Traveler Along the Santa Fe Trail, 1863*), ed. David K. Strate (Dodge City: Kansas Heritage Center, 1984), 84.

[11] Dello G. Dayton, "California Militia, 1850–66." Ph.D. dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1959), 400–01; Wallace, "Fort Whipple," 114; Altshuler, *Chains of Command,* 24. Late in the war enlisted men competed fiercely for commissions. Cpl. Aaron Cory Hitchcock, First California Cavalry, wrote home asking "if you can fit in a word for me with the Governor in any shape I shall by much obliged. The Lieutenant Governor has promised me his influence for a position when ever an opportunity offers. . . . I would rather not let any person know that I have any promise or that I want anything for the reason that there are a great many old volunteers that think they are first on the list and if they know of any one attempting to get promoted they will throw everything in the way that they can." C. A. Hitchcock to W. M. Smyth [brother-in-law], Oct. 7, 1863, Aaron Cory Hitchcock Letters, Joanne Grace Private Collection (copies in author's possession).

artificers at Benicia Arsenal near San Francisco repaired unserviceable equipment as fast as possible.[12]

Carleton early on realized that logistics would be the key to success in the arid Southwest. As a former Commissary of Subsistence on Kearny's 1845 Oregon Trail Expedition to South Pass, a grueling ninety-nine day march across two thousand miles of parched mountains and plains, Carleton recognized that the winner of the war in the borderlands would be the one that controlled the food and water supplies. The campaign in the desert would be successful only if the men could be sheltered, fed, and properly equipped at all times of the year and in any conditions and be sustained in the field the longest. In 1856, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis had charged Carleton with compiling recent studies by McClellan and others on European tactics and lessons from the Crimean War. Carleton's definitive work on the *Battle of Buena Vista*, which prominently featured the successes of Davis's own Mississippi troops, convinced the Secretary that he was the perfect man to write a new manual on cavalry, the arm most in need of reorganization in order to combat Indian raiders in the vast new western territories.[13]

The first mounted volunteers to answer the call to arms in California received the weapons turned over by the regulars. These included Sharps carbines, Colt revolving "Dragoon" pistols, and heavy cavalry sabers. Only the most expert horsemen and

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[12] George Wright to Thomas, Dec. 9, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):752–53.

[13] Gen. Sumner supported Carleton's appointment to command the expedition; the General, an experienced campaigner, revealed his concerns about marching large bodies of troops across the desert, noting he had outfitted "Kearny's command of one hundred men on the Rio Grande in the fall of 1846. I gave him the best of everything in the regiment, and yet when he arrived on this coast this small force was completely broken down and unable to contend successfully with the Californians who attacked him." Sumner to A.A.A.G. Townsend, September 7, 1861, in Orton, *California Men*, 24; Hunt, *James H. Carleton*, 165-70.

noncommissioned officers received the sabers when supplies ran low.[14] Anxious about the arms issued to his mounted troops, Carleton knew from experience that uniformity of armament would be critical when it came to supplying ammunition in the field. His ordnance officers would have a hard time keeping track of and supplying ammunition for two different models of Sharps carbines as well as muzzle-loading rifle cartridges. After more regulars left for the East and the workers at Benicia repaired unserviceable weapons, all of the horsemen with Carleton's column, and most of the subsequent California cavalry companies serving in Arizona, received the Sharps carbines.[15]

This short-barreled carbine shot true at ranges up to one hundred yards. A trained trooper could load a combustible linen cartridge into the open breech, aim, and fire every ten seconds. By comparison, an infantryman with a muzzle-loading rifle musket could fire only three rounds per minute. The carbine, designed for use on horseback, attached to a snap hook on a broad leather strap slung across the trooper's chest. Cavalry officers generally preferred the short and easily-managed carbines, considering the long rifles or muskets too unwieldy for mounted service.[16]

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[14] Sharps' breech-loading .52-caliber Model 1853 carbines were replaced by the New Model 1859 Sharps as supplies became available; the heavy 1840 pattern saber and the old Model 1847 .44-caliber Colt "Dragoon" revolver were initially issued. When the supply of carbines ran out, ordnance officers issued "3rd class" Common Rifles of the 1817 pattern, recently altered from flintlock to the new percussion system. While most of the cavalry with the California Column carried M1853 Sharps carbines, the units that followed were also issued the "straight breech" 1859 and 1863 models. The longer paper cartridges designed for the earlier "slant breech" model would function in the later models (with some difficulties related to powder spillage and misfires) which employed a shorter, linen cartridge. Ordnance Returns, California Volunteers, 1861-66, NARA; J. McAllister to Drum, Nov. 20, 1861, Benicia Arsenal Letters Sent, 1861–63, p. 65, RG 156, NARA; Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):775. Even after Carleton took up his duties as department commander in New Mexico, subsequent commanders of the California Volunteers in Arizona followed his carefully crafted guidelines.

[15] Ordnance Returns, California Cavalry, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, 1861–65, RG 156.

[16] Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):775; Ordnance testing in the 1850s demonstrated that the Sharps carbine was very accurate at 150 yards and that the new .58 caliber rifle muskets were effective at twice that distance in the hands of experienced shooters. For a summary of these tests see: Berkeley R.

Carleton understood the need to balance firepower with the capacity of the horses and men to carry the weapons. Accordingly he requested that the commander of Benicia Arsenal provide his cavalry with the lightweight Colt Navy revolver instead of the heavy, four-and-a-half-pound .44-caliber Dragoon pistol. Although the Navy was only .36 caliber and its smaller powder charge and bullet rendered it effective only at close range, Carleton preferred it because of the weight savings in the weapon itself and the ammunition. His soldiers would wear the gun in a flapped-scabbard on the saber belt rather than strapped to the saddle in pommel holsters as regulations prescribed for the heavier pistol. Despite Carleton's insistence, some of the Second California Cavalry companies had to carry the heavy Dragoon pistol when supplies of the Navy revolver ran out.[17]

The Navy revolver also had a reputation for being a natural pointer and therefore more accurate, a decided advantage, considering that most of the volunteers were not accomplished pistol shots and little ammunition could be spared for practice. To load their pistols, the men inserted powder and ball into the front of each of the revolving cylinder's six chambers and compressed the charge by cranking a loading lever. Then six thimble-shaped copper percussion caps had to be pinched onto the nipples, which automatically aligned under the hammer when the pistol was cocked. The whole

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Lewis, *Small Arms and Ammunition in the United States Service, 1776-1865* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1968), 101-05.

[17] Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):775.

operation took about five minutes—too time consuming to be done in combat—so most soldiers packed pistol cartridges in their pockets or saddlebags.[18]

Carleton preferred the heavy 1840 cavalry saber to the newer and lighter 1860 pattern for the mounted troops. All of his experience had been with the old pattern, and he felt that if the soldiers kept their sabers razor sharp, the heavier blades could more easily cut through the clothing of enemy cavalrymen and inflict serious casualties in close-quarter fighting. Cold steel, he contended, would win out against the pistol in a melee.[19]

Infantry regiments designated for service in Arizona carried .58-caliber rifle muskets of the 1855 model. These single-shot muzzleloaders fired expanding lead bullets, a deadly innovation developed a decade earlier by Captain Claude Minié of the French army. A paper cylinder contained the bullet and powder until the soldier tore open the tail of the cartridge with his teeth and rammed the contents down the gun barrel in a nine-step process that took twenty to thirty seconds to complete. Hoping to shave a few seconds off the loading time, the army adopted the Maynard patent tape-priming system, but experience had taught Carleton that the exploding paper caps misfired after being exposed to moisture. He ordered his troops to use the tried-and-true fulminated copper percussion caps in place of the unreliable Maynard primers.[20]

Each infantryman carried an eighteen-inch triangular steel socket bayonet for his rifle musket, but as the first volunteers were being equipped, a shortage of the proper

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[18] Late in the war some of the horse soldiers would receive cartridge boxes for their pistol ammunition, but when Carleton's Arizona expedition set out, he did not deem this item essential. Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):775.
[19] Carleton to West, May 2, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1045.
[20] Carleton to R. W. Kirkham, Apr. 11, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1000. Later regiments received Model 1861 or 1863 rifle muskets, which no longer employed the unreliable Maynard tape system.

leather scabbards for this weapon caused supply officers to issue the shorter and wider 1842 pattern scabbards. The loose fit resulted in bayonets being dropped and lost on the march. Increased production of scabbards at Benicia Arsenal corrected the shortage, but only after many heated exchanges between the Ordnance Department and frustrated volunteer officers.[21]

Selected men from infantry regiments and unassigned recruits received training in the use of the four bronze twelve-pounder mountain howitzers that constituted the volunteer portion of the California artillery complement. Adopted by the army in 1841, these cannons weighed only five hundred pounds each when fully assembled and could be broken down into two or three loads and packed on mules. Where the desert roads and trails permitted, the little mountain guns could be mounted on wide-axled "prairie carriages" and pulled by horses or mules. Some of the infantrymen-turned-cannoneers retained their rifle muskets, unwilling to enter hostile country without some means of self-defense. These raw volunteer crews contrasted sharply with Captain Shinn's polished regulars of Battery A, Third U.S. Artillery, with their two full-sized twelve-pounder field howitzers and two six-pounder guns, which weighed four times more than the little mountain howitzers.[22]

Newly commissioned California infantry officers eagerly sought to complete their personal equipage, only to discover that arsenal workers could not supply sufficient quantities of the standard 1850 pattern sword, with its ornate blade and brass mounted scabbard, prescribed by army regulations. The disappointed officers needed something to

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[21] McAllister to Carleton, Sept. 10, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):616.
[22] Carleton to Canby, May 3, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):95; Carleton to Rigg, Mar. 25, 1862, ibid., 950–51; *Ordnance Manual for the Use of the Officers of the United States Army.* 3rd edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1861*,* 20, 74.

serve as a symbol of rank and command, so the ordnance officer in charge at Benicia granted them permission to purchase the model 1840 light artillery saber and belt normally issued to enlisted men of this mounted branch of the service. This brass-hilted horseman's sword, with its dangerous-looking curved blade, came complete with a polished steel scabbard and only cost $5.50, which could be deducted from the purchaser's uniform allowance. Many officers who were not presented swords by friends or civic organizations or could not afford to buy swords from private dealers took advantage of this bargain.[23]

Carleton wanted to ensure that civilian teamsters could defend themselves in case of attack by Confederates or Apaches. They received the heavy Dragoon revolver, deemed unsuitable for cavalry, and the 1849 pattern riflemen's sheath knives that had been stored for years at Benicia. The teamsters also brought along obsolescent Mississippi Rifles for use in an emergency. This muzzle-loading weapon, adopted in 1841 and made famous by Jefferson Davis's Mississippi troops during the war with Mexico, was not as long as the infantry rifle musket. It fired a .54-caliber ball, though government arsenals had reamed and re-rifled many of these older weapons in order to use the standard .58-caliber Minié cartridge.[24]

To lighten the wagons drawn by overburdened mules, the troops were ordered to carry much of the ammunition needed for their weapons. For this purpose the depots in California issued two types of leather cartridge boxes. The foot soldiers received large

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[23] McAllister to H. M. Judah, Oct. 3, 1861, Benicia Arsenal Letters Sent, 41, RG 156.
[24] Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):777; Ordnance Returns, California Cavalry, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, RG 156. In 1865, when many Sharps carbines became unserviceable through hard use, ordnance officers issued Mississippi Rifles to cavalry companies in Arizona. Single-shot Maynard carbines, designed to use brass cartridges, replaced these obsolete rifles in 1866.

boxes with removable tin compartments holding forty paper cartridges. The men wore these boxes suspended from broad leather shoulder belts. Each cavalryman had a shorter box, worn on the saber belt, containing a wooden block bored through with twenty holes that snugly held the paper or linen cartridges used in the carbines. Both foot and horse soldiers received small leather pouches, which held the percussion caps needed to fire the carbines, pistols, and muskets they carried.[25]

Although the Californians received both dress and fatigue uniforms while on the West Coast, Carleton ordered them to bring only their fatigue uniforms to Arizona. Utility won out over looks, and unnecessary items were left behind or packed into escort wagons, two of which followed each company. Carleton itemized every article his soldiers would wear or carry on the march across the Sonoran Desert of southern Arizona and New Mexico.[26]

The brigade commander had no use for ornamentation and instructed the men to wear the regulation 1858 pattern black felt uniform hat—a flat-crowned, broad-brimmed affair—without the brass trimmings that designated branch of service, regiment, and

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[25] Ordnance Returns, California Cavalry, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, RG 156.

[26] Carleton prescribed what each man would carry on the march:

I. Each soldier will carry one greatcoat, one blanket, one forage cap, one woolen shirt, one pair of drawers, one pair of stockings, one towel, two handkerchiefs, one fine [louse comb] and one coarse comb, one sewing kit, one piece of soap, one toothbrush.

II. Each soldier will wear his uniform hat without trimmings, one blouse, one pair trousers, one pair stockings, one woolen shirt, one pair drawers, and may wear a cravat in lieu of the leather [neck] stock.

III. Each soldier, whether of cavalry or infantry, will have one canteen, one haversack, and one tin cup. In his haversack he will carry one fork, spoon, and plate. He will wear a good sheath knife.

IV. Each company, whether of cavalry or infantry, will have only enough mess pans and camp kettles (in nests) for absolute requirements; also a few short-handed frying pans, some large tin pans in which to mix bread, one or two strong coffee-mills, a 6-gallon keg for vinegar [to prevent scurvy], a few pounds of black-grained pepper, four axes, four camp hatchets, six spades, six shovels.

V. Officers will not take mess-chests, or trunks, or mattresses on the march. It is suggested that each mess of officers of not less than three be provided with two champagne baskets covered with painted canvas for their mess furniture. These can be packed upon a mule. Their necessary clothing can be carried in a small hand-valise, or pair of saddlebags.

GO 3, HQ Dist. of Southern Calif., Feb. 11, 1862, *OR,* 50(2):858–59.

company. Carleton also deleted the prescribed black ostrich plume (one for enlisted men, two for officers) and directed that soldiers wear the hat brim folded down rather than looped up on the side according to regulation. The old dragoon knew that his men would need their hats for protection from the burning desert sun.[27]

The wool fatigue uniform consisted of a loose-fitting sack coat of dark blue wool, sky blue kersey trousers, and a forage cap. Undergarments were also woolen, though occasionally the men drew cotton drawers. The burgeoning California wool industry provided much of the raw material for the army clothing produced by contractors, who augmented their work force with inmates from the military prison on Alcatraz Island. Shipments from eastern manufacturers filled shortages, but especially in the later years of the war, overworked or corrupt government inspectors approved much shoddy clothing produced in New York contractors' sweatshops.[28]

Carleton paid particular attention to the men's shoes. He ordered that ankle-high "bootees" be made with sewn rather than pegged soles. The wooden pegs, he knew, had a tendency to shrink in the hot desert sands. When the pegs fell out, the sole detached and the soldier went barefoot. "Once their feet come to the hot ground," he wrote his chief supply officer, "they will suffer immeasurably." Mounted men had the option of drawing calf-high boots as protection against chafing stirrup straps and the rough chaparral instead of the low-cut bootee. In practice, however, most soldiers accepted whatever the quartermaster had available, pegged or sewn, boots or bootees.[29]

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[27] Ibid.
[28] Wright to Thomas, Oct. 21, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):668; Clothing Account Books of CV Regiments, 1861–66, California State Library, Sacramento; *Alta,* 1863.
[29] Carleton to Drum, May 10, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1060; Carleton to Drum, May 24, 1862, in Orton, *Record of California Men*, 50-1; An inspection report from Capt. A. W. Evans at Ft. West from June 1863 indicates

Carleton required both cavalrymen and infantrymen to carry "Green River" sheath knives. Experience had taught him that this versatile tool would be indispensable in the field. Before leaving California, church and temperance organizations provided some volunteer regiments with "butcher knives" and other necessities such as sewing kits, toothbrushes, and shoe blacking.[30]

Horses and horse equipment would prove vital to successful operations in Arizona. Although the army tried to procure fifteen-and-one-half-hand "American" or Morgan horses, most volunteers found themselves astride smaller "California" horses of Spanish stock. The California mounts were famed for their endurance but could not carry the weight larger horses bore. Several companies of the First California Cavalry reluctantly relinquished their American horses, turned in by the regulars, for use with the artillery batteries and freight wagons. The Americans also prized mules for their strength and endurance in the harsh western environment, and the Army had come to rely on them rather than horses to carry the 225-pound mountain howitzer barrels on their backs. Mules ate less than horses and, even more importantly, were less susceptible to dehydration. Carleton saw to it that mules did most of the heavy hauling required by the freight trains that would follow his command across the desert. During the war, the Army's mules would outnumber horses nearly two to one in the Southwest borderlands.[31]

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that while most of the shoes and boots on hand were of good quality with sewn soles, he had discovered several boxes "of a very inferior quality of pegged, the shoes being filled in with wood under the soles. These shoes were found to stand but a very short wear." Jerry D. Thompson, ed. *New Mexico Territory During the Civil War; Wallen and Evans Inspection Reports, 1862-186* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008). 162.

[30] *Downieville (California) Sierra Democrat,* Nov. 30, 1861; GO 3, Hdqrs. Dist. of Southern Calif., Feb. 11, 1862, *OR,* 50(2):858. For riflemen's knives issued to teamsters, see James S. Hutchins, "The United States Mounted Rifleman's Knife." *Man at Arms* 13 (March/April 1991): 10–21, 20–21.

[31] Carleton to Thomas, Dec. 19, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):777; Memorandum of supplies needed for 1600 Men, *OR*, (50)1, 778-80; the Anglos and to a lesser degree Hispanos developed a sophisticated animal husbandry

Cavalry regiments received three types of saddles. The "Grimsley" dragoon saddle, adopted in 1847, was too wide and flat in design to fit the small California horses; these saddles went back to the arsenal for reissue to the artillery. The volunteers soon learned an ill-fitting saddle would gall and ruin a good horse, so a new pattern, inspired by a popular Mexican style, went into production. The San Francisco firm of Main and Winchester, as well as some smaller contractors, manufactured these "California," or "Ranger," saddles in large numbers. This distinctive western saddle had a horn, like a stock saddle; Mexican hooded stirrups (*tapaderas*); and a leather saddle cover, called a *mochila.* The Californians also used the relatively new 1859 McClellan saddle. With its spare, rawhided wooden seat, the McClellan proved to be an acceptable alternative for use with the narrow-backed California horses.[32]

Mounted soldiers received wool saddle blankets and bridles, either the old dragoon style or the new 1859 pattern. Picket pins and lariats, hobbles or side lines—all designed to secure horses while camped—completed the trooper's horse equipment. The horsemen carried leather-reinforced canvas nosebags for feeding their mounts measured rations of grain. Carleton ordered seamless burlap gunny bags, capable of holding one hundred pounds of barley, manufactured expressly for the march to Fort Yuma. He directed officers to make certain the men soaked the grain in water before feeding in order to maintain the animals' strength and hydration during the difficult desert march.[33]

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culture that systematically crossed Jack Asses with horses to produce sterile mules. Old mule skinners quipped that this hardy hybrid had, "neither pride of ancestry nor hope of posterity."

[32] McAllister to Carleton, Sept. 10, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):616; Drum to McAllister, Sept. 9, 1861, Dept. of the Pacific Letters Sent, 381, RG 393, NARA; Carleton to H. K. Craig, Oct. 18, 1861, First California Infantry Letter Book, RG 94, NARA.

[33] Carleton, "Memorandum B," *OR,* 50(1):780.

Carleton appeared to be obsessed with horseshoes and nails—after all, "for the want of a nail" the expedition might be lost. He required that only hand-forged iron horseshoes be taken on the expedition. Machine-made steel shoes, he believed, would require too much hand fitting on his "quick thrust" into Arizona. Each soldier carried in his saddlebags two spare shoes, with nails, ready to set, and farriers prepared special steel-toed mule shoes in anticipation of Arizona's rocky terrain.[34] While Carleton's attention to these details may have seemed obsessive to some, the shod hooves of the soldiers' horses can be viewed as a metaphor for the Anglo philosophy of war and conquest. Indians did not nail iron shoes to the hooves of their mounts—only Anglos and some Hispanos felt the need to alter nature and modify their animals' feet in this way.

The U.S. Army bred big horses and mules to carry heavy loads—from heavily-armed soldiers to packed cannons—while the Indians traveled and fought as light cavalry. Before going into battle warriors often stripped off their saddles and other impedimenta to reduce the burden on their animals and ensure swiftness, which they prized over strength. Anglos expected their often-overburdened animals to traverse terrain, including rocky mountain trails and lava beds, which unshod horses could not travel without splitting hooves or incurring other crippling injuries. Indians would make rawhide moccasins for horses suffering from cuts, bruises, or split hooves, but this was

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[34] Most of the Californians would have been familiar with the doggerel verse popularized by Benjamin Franklin in *Poor Richard's Almanack:*
For the want of a nail the shoe was lost
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost
For the want of a horse the rider was lost
For the want of a rider the battle was lost
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost—
And all for the want of a horse-shoe nail.
Benjamin Franklin, *Poor Richard's Almanack* (Philadelphia: B. Franklin, 1758); Carleton to Drum, Dec. 17, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):769.

not intended as a preventative treatment and did not enable their animals to carry heavier burdens. The Anglos and Indian people of the borderlands had fundamentally different approaches toward nature and survival. The semi-nomadic Indians carried little in the way of camp equipage and learned to live off the land while the Anglos soldiers packed everything they needed to survive in the desert.[35]

Carleton would not risk a repeat of Lynde's disgraceful surrender of his dehydrated command and made certain that all of the officers under his command understood that water was their first priority. Little space could be spared in the company wagons for creature comforts, and every enlisted man would have to carry fifty to sixty pounds of clothing, arms, supplies, and equipage. Each hundred-man company was issued only two tipi-shaped Sibley tents for hospital use.[36] Always, water was the most important cargo. Each company wagon packed two six-gallon water kegs from which the men could re-fill their three-pint tin canteens. "Have the men drink heartily before setting out on a march," Carleton ordered, "and husband their canteens of water." Theoretically the company wagon carried enough water to enable one hundred men to travel eighty miles—a real possibility if a well were found poisoned or dry. Before leaving Fort Yuma, coopers fashioned huge six-hundred-gallon rolling water tanks to supply Carleton's

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[35] Morris Edward Opler, *An Apache Life-way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 396; Grenville Goodwin, *Western Apache Raiding & Warfare*, ed. Keith Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), 32, 301; Apache rawhide horse shoes see: Juan Analla Depredation claim testimony (p. 12), Case 5426, RG 123, NARA; Colorado Volunteer, Jesse Haire described how Plains warriors removed horse and mule shoes from captured animals; Haire, Journals, Ft. Lyon, Oct.1, 1864. See also: David Halaas and Andrew Masich, "'You Could Hear the Drums for Miles'; A Cheyenne Ledgerbook History," Colorado Heritage, Autumn, 1996, 4-5; for Plains warrior traditions see also: Jean Afton, David Halaas, and Andrew Masich, *Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a Ledgerbook History of Coups and Combat* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997). See also: Andrew E. Masich, "Cheyennes and Horses: A Transportation Revolution on the Great Plains," *History News* 52 (Autumn 1997): 10-13.

[36] The tipi-inspired army tent and its conical sheet iron stove were patented in 1856 by Henry Hopkins Sibley, commander of the Confederate Army of New Mexico. Carleton discovered the utility of the Sibley Tent on the Utah expedition of 1857-8. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, 142.

column. The expedition could not wait for zinc lining material from San Francisco, so the enterprising soldiers stripped the tin linings from arms and ammunition boxes and soldered them together to make the tanks watertight.[37]

Advance units of the expedition began the difficult march from Southern California's Camp Wright, at Oak Grove, and Camp Latham, at Wilmington, to Fort Yuma on the California side of the Colorado River in late October 1861. One of Carleton's ablest subordinates, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. West, commanded the 180-mile tramp across the desolate basin and sandy dunes of the Colorado Desert. West carefully planned the movement, requisitioning supplies for men and animals and deploying advanced guards to clean out wells and collect the precious water. He staggered the departure of his command—no more than one hundred men moved at a time—to avoid overtaxing the capacities of the wells. The dry desert, however, was not the only obstacle in the path of the Californians.[38]

There seemed to be no happy medium when it came to water during the winter of 1861. Rains drenched southern California and the lower Colorado River region. Roads became mud bogs, making the movement of men and supplies virtually impossible. Soon after West's command reached the Colorado, the river overflowed its banks. Torrents of

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[37] Carleton to George Bowie, Apr. 28, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1036–37; Benjamin C. Cutler to Rigg, Mar. 15, 1862, ibid., 930; Rigg to Carleton, Feb. 14, 1862, ibid., 866; Carleton to West, Oct. 22, 1861, ibid., 672. Weight (in pounds) of equipment carried by a California infantryman, under arms, in heavy marching order: clothing: 0.25 hat (without trimmings other than worsted cord), 2.50 blouse (lined), 2.50 trousers, 4.00 bootees, 1.00 drawers (2), 1.00 shirts (2 woolen), 0.50 stockings (2 pairs), 0.05 cravat, 5.25 greatcoat, 0.25 forage cap; arms and accoutrements: 9.25 1855 rifle musket, 0.50 musket sling, 0.75 bayonet, 0.75 bayonet scabbard, 1.74 waist belt and plate, 4.00 cartridge box with shoulder belt and plates, 3.20 forty cartridges (.58-caliber elongated ball), 0.50 percussion cap box (with caps); other equipment: 2.00 knapsack, 5.25 blanket, 0.50 haversack, 5.25 ten days' rations, 4.00 canteen (w/3 pints water), 0.25 plate, 0.50 cup, 0.20 fork and spoon, 0.25 towel, 0.05 handkerchiefs (2), 0.05 combs (2, fine and coarse), 0.20 sewing kit, 0.20 soap, 0.05 toothbrush, 1.00 sheath knife. Total: 57.75 pounds. Only items specifically mentioned in orders or known to have been carried by California Column companies are included.
[38] McNulty's Report, *OR,* 50(1):138.

muddy water swept a new channel around Fort Yuma, making it an island, and washed away tons of stockpiled supplies. Despite these conditions, by February, 1862, ocean-going vessels and river steamers had delivered all of the expedition's supplies, now safely stored on high ground at Fort Yuma.[39]

Situated on a bluff overlooking the confluence of the Gila and Colorado rivers, Fort Yuma guarded that strategic crossing on the southern overland route. Carleton remained in southern California to expedite the movement of troops and supplies. Expresses left his headquarters nearly every day carried by cameleers Hi Jolly (Hadji Ali) or Greek George, both of whom had come to America with the camels imported by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in 1857. Although the War Department had discontinued the camel experiment, Carleton relied on the animals and their able handlers for the frequent desert crossings. The colonel sent detailed instructions for the proper placement of field and siege artillery to command all river and land approaches to Fort Yuma. His men sank, or brought within range of the guns, the ferries at the crossings above and below the fort. Carleton ordered his officers to watch the steamboat men for signs of treachery. No one would be allowed to cross the river in either direction without the knowledge and approval of the Army.[40]

Carleton insisted that the officers "Drill, drill, drill, until your men become perfect as soldiers, as skirmishers, as marksmen." When the first California infantry companies arrived at Fort Yuma, Major Edwin Rigg began drilling the men in earnest. They loaded their muskets with blanks and practiced firing by company and battalion—by rank, by

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[39] Ibid.; Rigg to Carleton, Jan. 23, 1862, ibid., 815–18. Rigg wrote in exasperation, "I have the honor to report to you that Fort Yuma is now an island." For flood details, see *Alta,* Feb. 17, Mar. 5, 1862.
[40] Carleton to Joseph R. West, Oct. 22, Nov. 5, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):672, 704–5.

file, and in double-ranked "line-of-battle," all at once in crashing volleys. Late into the night the officers memorized the pages of William Hardee's infantry tactics and the mounted officers the drill commands from the old cavalry manual. Carleton forwarded additional instructions to Rigg. Each night, after taps, the officers were to recite passages by rote. Every morning they would drill their companies in compact linear formations, then in the afternoon, dispersed as skirmishers.[41]

Carleton left little to chance. He knew that the arid land could be as fierce a foe as any rebel legion or Indian adversary the California men might encounter. Superior logistics would conquer the desert and win the war. Winning the war meant keeping the peace with the citizens and the indigenous peoples on both sides of the border and seeking out strategic alliances whenever possible. Carleton's confidence in his men and his own abilities was bolstered by a staunch Yankee patriotism and the conviction that God was not only on his side but that he himself was a tool in the republic's manifest destiny that would transform and civilize the Southwest borderlands.

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[41] Carleton to Rigg, Nov. 4, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):700; Rigg to Carleton, Feb. 15, 1862, ibid., 870; Carleton to E. E. Eyre, Oct. 26, 1861, ibid., 681; Though Carleton was an old friend and collaborator of Philip St. George Cooke, the latter's new book of cavalry tactics, published in November, 1861, was not yet available when the California Volunteers departed for the territories. Inspection reports for the first quarter of 1863 indicate that the First Cavalry, CV, was still using the old manual. Thompson, *New Mexico Territory During the Civil War,* 158-9.

Chapter 3 Anglo Invasion and War

The war between Union and Confederate forces in the Southwest borderlands reflected the martial traditions of the Anglo antagonists. It also triggered multiple, concurrent, and frequently inter-ethnic civil wars as a result of the power vacuum created by the federal government's preoccupation with its rebellious southern states. The distinctive warrior and martial traditions of the combatants dictated the nature and outcome of the conflicts, but in all cases, alliances, accommodation, and compromises characterized the survival strategies of each cultural community. The conflict between the warring Anglo factions, Union and Confederate, reflected their common European heritage and especially the Napoleonic martial tradition. Battles and skirmishes in the borderlands of the 1860s began as traditional confrontations of massed armies but soon devolved into broken small unit actions and guerilla warfare necessitated by both the environment and the warrior traditions of the indigenous peoples. The Union men better managed logistics and alliances, while the Confederates excelled in the boldness of their attacks and martial ardor that, in many instances, carried the day. Though the rebel Anglos often succeeded tactically, their victories were not sustainable, allowing the Union men and their allies to prevail strategically.[1]

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[1] While civil wars are as old as human societies, scholars still dispute the definition and causes of civil war. Most agree, however, that civil war is violent conflict between parties, factions, or inhabitants of communities within the same nation or living in the same geographic region. Such deadly violence usually occurs within a polity or region considered unified by one or both antagonists. For perspectives on the problem of identifying and defining civil wars, see: Edward Wong, "A Matter of Definition: What Makes a Civil War, and Who Declares It So?" *New York Times* November 26, 2006; much debate centers on whether ethnicity or economics is the primary cause of civil war, see: Mats Berdal and David Malone, *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 2000), passim; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On economic causes of civil war," 563–73; "Greed and grievance in civil war" *Oxford Economic Papers*, (56) 4, (2004), 563–95. Some scholars have attempted to quantify the point at which civil unrest or an uprising becomes "civil war"—death tolls of 100 to 1000 are often

Arizona Invasion

In March 1862, as Carleton consolidated his forces at Fort Yuma, scouts rode toward Tucson to learn the strength of the enemy there. Rumors filtered back that Confederate cavalry would soon be riding down the Gila in force. Both Carleton and Rigg had spies in Tucson. These men traveled via Sonora to avoid suspicion and carried a secret code, the key to which Rigg kept safely locked at Fort Yuma. Writing under the pseudonym of George Peters, Peter Brady, the former post interpreter at Fort Mojave, sent Rigg information concerning the rebels. One of Carleton's agents, Frederick C. Buckner, made the five-hundred-mile round trip from Yuma to Tucson in twenty-two days. He returned with a letter from merchant Solomon Warner reporting that attacks by Apache bands around Tucson grew bolder and more frequent with each passing day and that "protection . . . would be favourably received here from any quarter."

Rigg worried even more about the rumors of rebel raiders. He particularly feared for the safety of Ammi White, a loyal Union man who operated a flour mill at the Pima Villages along the Gila River, about ninety miles northwest of Tucson. White had stockpiled fifteen hundred sacks of wheat at his mill for the subsistence of the California troops. The major also fretted about the piles of hay that volunteer parties from Fort Yuma had cut and stacked along the Gila River, knowing full well that lack of forage for

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cited as the threshold indicating civil war. Though scholars do not agree on the definition or causes of civil wars, most agree that civil wars since 1945 have resulted in more than 20 million deaths and have replaced international war as the most common type of conflict in the world today. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds., *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005), 2-8.

horses and mules would stall Carleton's supply trains and doom the expedition from the start.[2]

Captain McCleave took action to deal with these concerns. His dragoon service with Carleton before the war had earned him the commander's fullest confidence; over the years the two men had become close personal friends. Early in March, McCleave's Company A, First California Cavalry rode to Fort Yuma in two sections. The captain must have breathed a sigh of relief upon seeing the adobe fort perched on the Colorado River bluffs, realizing that his men had made the first leg of the desert crossing without incident. Eager to leave Yuma behind, McCleave did not wait for the second detachment of his California Cavalry company to catch up. He crossed the river and started up the north bank of the Gila with an escort of only nine men, heading for the Pima Villages and White's Mill. The riders urged their horses on as they rode through the dense cottonwood stands along the sandy Gila bottoms, but the party moved with greater caution as it neared the villages of the Maricopa and Pima Indians. These industrious farmers posed no threat, however, in fact they were the best allies the soldiers had in combating their common enemy—Apaches. Some miles back, near Burke's Station, the Californians had paused to stare at the desiccated body of an Apache warrior bristling with Pima arrows and hanging by a horsehair rope from the limb of a mesquite tree—a warning to enemy raiders.[3]

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[2] Carleton to Rigg, Feb. 9, 1862, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [*OR*], 50(1):854; Rigg to Carleton, Mar. 27, 1862, ibid., 958; Rigg to Carleton, Feb. 14, 1862, ibid., 865; P. R. Brady to Rigg, Mar. 4, 1862, ibid., 911–12; Francis Brady, "Portrait of a Pioneer, Peter R. Brady, 1825–1902." *Journal of Arizona History* 16 (Summer 1975): 171–94171–94; S. Warner to F. Hinton, Jan. 31, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):867.
[3] Julius C. Hall, "In the Wild West: Arizona at the Outbreak of the Rebellion. . . . Campaigning across the Arid Plains in 1862." *National Tribune,* October 20, 1887; George H. Pettis to Annie (wife), April 30,

Perhaps the captain was too eager and not nearly cautious enough. He had galloped ahead with his small force to see whether he could locate a civilian scout, John W. Jones, who had possibly holed-up at Ammi White's flour mill near the Pima Villages. Weeks before, Carleton had ordered Jones to ride unescorted from Yuma to spy on the rebels in Tucson. Not having heard from him, McCleave feared Jones had run into trouble.[4] At midnight, the captain halted to water and rest his horses at the Butterfield stage station known as the Tanks, just 20 miles short of White's Mill. Behind his back the boys had taken to calling him "Uncle Billy," but he was confident they would do anything he asked, and more.[5] On March 6, determined to press on in search of the missing scout, he allowed six troopers to stay behind at the Tanks to eat and sleep while he continued on with three others. Four hours later, as McCleave and his companions spurred their tired horses into the corral at White's Mill, a startled sentinel shouted a challenge from the darkness. "We're Americans," McCleave called out in his distinctive Irish brogue.[6]

McCleave—Carleton's most trusted officer—had unwittingly ridden into a trap. The resourceful Confederate captain Sherod Hunter had scouts of his own, and they

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1862, George H. Pettis Papers, Western Americana Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven; J. Ross Browne
, *Adventures in the Apache Country*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1869), 99-102.

[4] Rigg to Carleton, March 20, 1862, 940, *OR*, 50(1); S. Hunter to J.R. Baylor, April 5, 1862, *OR*, 9:707-08.

[5] James B. Whittemore's "Report to the Society of California Volunteers," April 25, 1895, William McCleave Papers, Bancroft Library, Univ. of California, Berkley

[6] *Alta*, June 23, 1862; Carleton to Henry W. Halleck, Nov. 14, 1862, *OR,* 50(2):222–23; Rigg to Carleton, Mar. 20, Mar. 30, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):939–40, 965–66. Fort Yuma may have brought back painful memories for McCleave: Elizabeth, his bride of only a year, had died there three years earlier as he and the First Dragoons rode from Fort Buchanan, Arizona, to California. Constance Wynn Altshuler, *Cavalry Yellow and Infantry Blue: Army Officers in Arizona between 1851 and 1886* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1991), 209.

learned that the California troops were crossing the Colorado and marching up the Gila. Soon after Colonel Reily left on his mission to Sonora, Hunter rode to the Pima Villages, took White prisoner, and disabled the mill. Hunter did not have enough wagons to haul off all of the captured wheat, so he distributed it to the Pimas, from whom it originally came, figuring he would need all the friends he could get as the Californians approached. When McCleave brazenly rode up to White's house and pounded on the door, one of Hunter's men greeted him. None of the Confederates lounging about the house wore recognizable uniforms. After his hosts put him at ease, McCleave introduced himself to Hunter, who represented himself as White. After gleaning what intelligence he could from the unwary officer, Hunter suddenly revealed his true identity as his men leveled cocked revolvers on the astonished captain. His honor wounded but otherwise unhurt, McCleave was outraged by the rebel captain's brazen deception and grabbed for his pistol, but Hunter threatened: "If you make a single motion I'll blow your brains out. You are in my power—surrender immediately."[7] The Californian gave up without further resistance, and within a matter of hours the Confederates surprised his six men waiting at the Tanks. The rebels had won the first encounter in Arizona, much to McCleave's humiliation and Carleton's disbelief.[8]

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[7] *Alta*, June 8, 23, 29, 1862; Hunter to Baylor, April 5, 1862, *OR* 9:708; Rigg to Carleton March 30th 1862, *OR* 50(1):965-66; *Sacramento Daily Union*, May 23, 1862.

[8] Hunter to Baylor, Apr. 5, 1862, *OR,* 9:708; Rigg to Carleton, Mar. 30, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):965–66; There is considerable confusion over how many men were captured with McCleave. After the war McCleave himself remembered 9 (1894) and 10 (1897); Maj. E.A. Rigg and Col. Carleton reported 8 men taken with McCleave, plus the Miller, Ammi. Sherod Hunter reported 9 men captured with McCleave; the San Francisco *Daily Alta California* reported 9 and 10 in addition to McCleave. See L. Boyd Finch, *Confederate Pathway to the Pacific: Major Sherod Hunter and Arizona Territory, C.S.A.* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1996), 129. For variations on the composition of the nine-man squad, see *Alta,* June 8, 23, 29, 1862. William McCleave, "Recollections of a California Volunteer," Mc Cleave Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Carleton to Halleck, Nov. 14, 1862, *OR* 50(2):222-23.

Hunter followed up this initial success by sending a platoon of his mounted rangers down the Gila to burn the forage stockpiled by government contractors along the route. He understood that he could defeat his enemies more easily and without combat by denying them subsistence for the mules that pulled the wagons that fed the troops. Meeting no opposition, they successfully fired the haystacks at six stations. On March 29 at Stanwix Station, some eighty miles east of Fort Yuma, the Confederates encountered two California vedettes. The rebel riders shot first, hitting Private William Semmilrogge of Company A, First California Cavalry in the shoulder. The wounded man and his comrade rode for help without returning fire, and Hunter's men wheeled and rode for Tucson after realizing that they had encountered the advance guard of Carleton's column.[9]

Although the forward units had suffered at the hands of the Arizona Confederates, the Californians at Fort Yuma eagerly awaited an opportunity to prove themselves in battle. While the soldiers anxiously anticipated skirmishes with rebels and possibly Indians, their company commanders worried about logistics and the difficulties of getting their men across the Arizona desert. The march would tax them all to the limits of endurance.

On the morning of March 22, 1862, the men of Captain William P. Calloway's Company I, First California Infantry saw the distant Gila Mountain peaks silhouetted against the cloudless blue sky as they marched in column, four abreast, down the winding road from the Fort Yuma bluffs to the ferry crossing at the narrows below. Regimental musicians shrilled and beat their fife-and-drum version of "The Girl I Left Behind Me," a

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[9] Hunter to Baylor, Apr. 5, 1862; Rigg to Carleton, Apr. 12, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):978–79.

lilting Irish tune traditionally played when a command left a military station for the field. The formidable Colorado rushed a muddy torrent as officers herded their men onto the ferry, taking care to balance the load to prevent capsizing. Equipped in heavy marching order, with full packs and weapons, a tumble into the water would mean certain death. The flatboat yawed across the river as the ferrymen hauled on the stout hemp rope lowered from the high masts planted at the landings. Everyone involved in the expedition—soldiers, surgeons, teamsters, contractors—thrilled at the day's activity, understanding that the crossing into Arizona meant their war was about to begin in earnest.[10]

When he learned that Hunter's Confederates had captured Captain McCleave, Carleton appointed Captain Calloway to command the advance into Arizona. This vanguard totaled 272 men and included Calloway's own company of foot soldiers and Captain McCleave's and Pishon's companies, A and D respectively, of the First Cavalry. Young Lieutenant James Barrett commanded McCleave's men now, and Second Lieutenant Jeremiah Phelan drilled a detachment of unattached recruits until they could service the two mule-packed mountain howitzers the Californians dubbed the "Jackass Battery."

Hoping to mislead Confederate spies, Carleton announced that his Arizona invasion aimed to chastise the Western Apache the Anglos knew as Tontos.[11] He

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[10] James P. Newcomb, May 15, 1862, *Diary*, James P. Newcomb Papers, Journals, and Diaries, 1857–71, Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin ; Richard H. Orton, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1890), 333.

[11] See: Grenville Goodwin, *The Social Organization of theWestern Apache* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1942). The Tonto Apaches (*Dilzhe'eh*) is one of the groups of Western Apache people. Tonto also refers to their dialect, one of the three dialects of Western Apache (a Southern Athabaskan language). The Chiricahuas living to the south called them *Ben-et-dine* or binii?e'dine' ("brainless people" or "people without minds," "wild," "crazy," "those who you don't understand"). The neighboring Western Apache

instructed the advance guard, "When you leave Fort Yuma, you are to say you go and campaign against the Tontos." It was true that Western Apache bands (Tontos and Aravaipas as well as neighboring Yavapais) had stepped up their attacks on overland travelers and the farms of the Pimas and Maricopas along the Gila River, but Carleton had no intention of allowing these native people to distract him from his primary mission—the destruction of rebel forces in the territories. In fact Calloway and all company commanders received specific instructions *not* to engage any Indians encountered on the road to Tucson. Confused and frustrated soldiers held their fire when they stumbled upon war-painted warriors. Fearing Carleton's wrath more than the Indians, the troops gave the Indians an opportunity to fire first. A solider correspondent wrote of one such encounter between an Apache warrior and Private David Carver, a member of Carleton's escort, near Grinnel's Ranch along the Gila River:

> Just as he reached the river, an Apache sprang from the bushes, gun in hand, and the muzzle directed full upon Carver, who, fortunately, saw him at the same moment, and brought his Colt to bear upon the savage. The latter stood ready for a few seconds, Carver likewise, both with weapons leveled and both, doubtless, anxious to fire; But the Indian seemed to think the odds too great, at the short distance between them, some twelve feet, and Carver had positive orders not to fire first. The savage, who was in his full panoply of war paint, then dropped his muzzle and said, "How de do?" "How do you do?" replied Carver. "You Captain?"
> asked the Indian. "No," answered Carver, "Are you a Chief?" "No," growled the ring-streaked and spotted Apache, and without further parley he plunged into the river and swam across, bearing his gun up out of the water as he went. The temptation
> to shoot was a sore one for Carver, but he would not disobey his orders.[12]

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name for them was *Koun'nde* ("wild rough people"), from which the Spanish derived their use of *Tonto* ("loose," "foolish"). The related but enemy Navajo to the north called both, the Tonto Apache and their allies, the Yavapai, *Dilzh'í' diné'i'* ("People with high-pitched voices"). Goodwin divided the Tontos into two groups: the Northern Tonto and Southern Tonto, though many Western Apaches reject such classification, preferring identification based on bands and clans.

[12] *Alta,* June 11, 1862.

Sam Hughes, a Tucson citizen traveling with the column, thought Carleton's policy absurd. Hughes refused to respect the ceasefire with regard to Apaches and bet the colonel a new pair of boots that the natives would run off at least one-third of the command's horses before they reached Tucson. But Carleton was nobody's fool. His "Tonto campaign" was only intended to confuse the Confederates in Arizona and New Mexico as his column marched toward the Rio Grande.[13]

The colonel kept his own counsel and demanded the same of others. From the time he accepted command of the Arizona expedition, he attempted to mask the movements and intentions of his troops. He strictly forbade soldiers to correspond with newspapers. To ensure secrecy, he wrote messages to Fort Yuma in code or occasionally in Greek. He even sent some dispatches on tissue paper for easy concealment and, if necessary, destruction. Trusted couriers, including the camel rider Greek George and expressman John W. Jones, often carried fake correspondence in addition to genuine dispatches. If captured, the messenger would be expected to eat the real thing and turn the phony papers over to the enemy. Carleton intended to deceive the Confederates for as long as possible about his expedition's true purpose, hoping to surprise them in Tucson or pitch into Sibley's rear somewhere along the Rio Grande.[14]

Calloway's advance troops prepared well for the long desert trek to Tucson. The march across the sandy scrub and dunes of the Mojave Desert to Fort Yuma, where some soldiers had been waiting and acclimating for as long as five months, served to toughen the volunteers for the still-more-arduous journey ahead. Both officers and enlisted men benefited from the first leg of the desert expedition and the experience of living in the

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[13] Frank C. Lockwood, *Life in Old Tucson, 1854–1864* (Tucson: Tucson Civic Committee, 1943), 212-13.
[14] Carleton to Joseph R. West, Oct. 22, Nov. 4, Nov. 5, 1861, *OR* 50(1), 672, 698-99, 704-05.

arid environs of Fort Yuma while the command slowly grew one company at a time. Carleton's command began the march across Arizona using the same survival skills learned while crossing the Colorado Desert. Small parties went out to fill water tanks and cut hay at the abandoned stage stations in advance of the column. It made sense to follow the old Butterfield Overland Mail route so that soldiers and draft animals could take advantage of the wells at the way stations. The rough wagon road followed the Gila trail across the Sonoran desert of southern Arizona. Annual rainfall averaged only five or ten inches in this region, yet the soldiers discovered an amazing variety of life. Scorpions and rattlesnakes taught them to watch their steps and shake out their bedrolls; coyotes dogged their trail in search of scraps; and antelope fell to their rifle muskets. The Californians began to appreciate the desert flora too—barrel cacti with fishhook thorns, prickly pears topped with colorful flowers, and the occasional giant saguaros. The men marched with knapsacks and carried ten days' rations in their haversacks. Company commanders made certain their wagons had full water kegs and sufficient forage to travel without having to resupply at one of the stations.

Carleton hoped that Calloway's command would move rapidly up the Gila, surprise Hunter's company at Tucson, and recapture McCleave and his party. The advance companies moved along cautiously with civilian scouts, including half-Indian mountain man Powell Weaver and expressman Jones in the lead. When the two vedettes from McCleave's Company A ran into Hunter's rangers at Stanwix Station, Captain

Pishon gave chase with his cavalry, but the well-mounted rebels made good their escape.[15]

On April 12, 1862, Calloway's command reached the Pima Villages, where the stage road left the Gila to follow the broad valley of the Santa Cruz River into Tucson. The Pimas gladly resold the wheat given back to them by Hunter. The Indians traded for bolts of "manta," a cotton cloth that had become their principal medium of exchange, and handkerchiefs that Carleton had wisely ordered taken along. Here Calloway learned of a Confederate outpost in Picacho Pass, about forty-five miles northwest of Tucson. Picacho, a volcanic plug of red rock rising nearly a thousand feet from the flat Santa Cruz valley, stood alone at the end of a range of rugged mountains.[16] Just west of the peak, the river sank beneath its sandy bed, leaving only a dry wash to mark its path to the Gila. A ten-man rebel picket post guarded the pass, while Hunter sent Lieutenant Jack Swilling, with another detachment, east to Mesilla to escort Ammi White and Captain McCleave to Confederate authorities at the Rio Grande.[17]

Originally ordered to push on to Tucson by way of abandoned Fort Breckenridge, Calloway diverted his whole command to Picacho instead. If he could capture the rebel outpost there, the shorter stage road to Tucson would give him a better chance of rescuing the hapless McCleave. On April 15 he instructed Lieutenants Barrett and Baldwin each to take twelve mounted men around the rebel position in an attempt to cut off the escape to

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[15] West to Carleton, Nov. 4, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):698–99; Rigg to Carleton, Mar. 25, 1862, ibid., 950–52. The Tennessee-born, half-Cherokee Powell Weaver was known to Spanish-speaking Arizonans as Paulino. Others called him Pauline. He apparently answered to all of these variants with good humor. Weaver died June 21, 1867, and was buried at Camp Lincoln with full military honors in recognition for his service as a scout and as an influential intermediary with Indian peoples. *Arizona Miner*, July 13, 1867.

[16] Stephen M. Richard, Jon E. Spencer, Charles A. Ferguson, and P. A. Pearthree. *Geologic Map of the Picacho Mountains and Picacho Peak, Pinal County, Southern Arizona.* Arizona Geological Survey Open-File Report 99-18 September (1999), 5-6.

[17] Hunter to Baylor, Apr. 5, 1862, *OR,* 9:707–8.

Tucson. But the two units failed to link up, and Barrett's unsupported detachment engaged Captain Hunter's picket, a sergeant and nine privates, in the chaparral near the base of "Picacho Mountain."[18]

Barrett's men, taking the shorter route, had gotten themselves into position long before Baldwin's platoon arrived at the rendezvous point south of the peak. Calloway took the precaution of assigning John W. Jones to accompany young Barrett. Jones knew the country and possessed survival skills honed by numerous close calls in Apache territory. He sensed danger and urged caution. But Lieutenant Barrett pressed on, without dismounting his men, until he discovered the rebel pickets playing cards and resting in a small clearing not far from the old Butterfield stage station. Before Jones could prevent it, the excited lieutenant fired his pistol into the air and called upon the Confederates to surrender. A volley from the chaparral knocked four of the Californians from their saddles. The Union men then charged into the thicket, capturing three of the rebels, who had thrown down their arms. Barrett had just finished tying one of the prisoners when a bullet struck him in the neck, breaking it and killing him instantly. The fighting continued for more than an hour, but when the smoke cleared, two of Barrett's men lay dead or dying and three others wounded. The Confederates suffered no losses other than the three prisoners taken early in the fight.[19]

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[18] Report of the Battle of Picacho Pass, Sherod Hunter Jacket, Compiled Service Records of Confederate Soldiers, Microcopy 323, Roll 182, NARA, cited in L. Boyd Finch, "Sherod Hunter and the Confederates in Arizona," *Journal of Arizona History* 10 (August 1969): 139–206, 203.

[19] *Sacramento Union,* May 23, 1862. The rebel rangers fired at close range and with deadly accuracy. Barrett and his men were all shot in the head or upper body. Two men, Cpl. James Botsford and Pvt. Peter Glann, suffered gunshot wounds to their left shoulders. Botsford soon returned to duty and earned his sergeant stripes, while Glann never fully recovered; he was discharged at Camp Drum for disability on January 6, 1863. Pvt. William C. Tobin was a lucky man. A bullet had smashed into the brass crossed sabers pinned to the front of his uniform hat, then raked across the top of his head, resulting in an ugly wound. Tobin convalesced at Forts Barrett and Yuma before being discharged for disability on January 6,

By late afternoon Calloway's entire command reached the scene of the skirmish, too late to overtake Hunter's well-mounted rangers, now well on their way to Tucson. Lieutenant Phelan selected some high ground and unpacked his howitzers to protect the column against a counterattack, but the rebel prisoners confirmed that the pickets were unsupported and that McCleave was no longer in Tucson. This news added to the despondency of the Californians, who had been bested once again by the Confederates. Dark and early the following morning, Private William S. Leonard succumbed to an agonizing neck wound that had left him moaning throughout the night. Now the only sounds were the howling coyotes and the metallic clank and scrape of picks and shovels on the rocky earth. Calloway's men rolled their dead comrades in their blankets and buried them alongside the stage road where they had fallen. In the moonlight the burial detail used crackerbox boards to mark the cactus-covered mounds of earth and stone.[20]

Unnerved by the ordeal and worried his supplies would not be sufficient if the rebels in Tucson held their ground, Calloway ordered his men to retreat to the Pima Villages, nearly forty miles distant, against the wishes of his subordinates and much to the consternation of the men.[21] Old Powell Weaver, disgusted by the inept handling of the

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1863. George H. Pettis to Annie [wife], Apr. 30, 1862, Pettis Papers.; Orton, *California Men,* 69, 90, 98, 107, 109, 120.

[20] The grave markers read: "Lieut. Jas Barrett, 1st Cav. Cal. Vols, Killed in action, April 15th 1862, aged 28 years; Geo. Johnson, Co. A 1st Cav. Cal. Vols Killed April 15th 1862, aged 25 years; W. S. Leonard, Co. D 1st Cav. Cal. Vols died of wounds April 16, 1862"; from Newcomb, *Diary*, Oct. 19, 1862; Hall, "Wild West,"; "William S. Leonard," Hayden Arizona Pioneer Biography Files, ASU.

[21] Orton, *California Men,* 47; Col. J. H. Carleton to Col. J. R. West, May 3, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1048–49. The best account of the skirmish at Picacho may be found in Finch, *Confederate Pathway,* 139–148. All who passed the graves of the fallen California cavalrymen paid homage. See "Mr. Greeley's letters from Arizona," *Alta,* Mar. 15, 1864; and *Calaveras (California) Chronicle,* July 1, 1865. In June 1862 Carleton and Captain Shinn noted that the graves were on the left of the road to Tucson near a mesquite thicket and dry *chalcos* (water holes) on the right of the road. He recorded the distance as 13.9 miles from Blue Water Station, south of the Pima Villages, and 1 mile from Picacho Station. J. H. Carleton, SO 15, June 15, 1862, Hdqrs. Column from California, *OR*, 50(1):142; *Alta,* Mar. 15, 1864. Privates Johnson and Leonard were reinterred at the post cemetery in Tucson but were moved again when Fort Lowell was relocated northeast

affair, took leave of the outfit at White's Mill, remarking as he rode west to prospect on the Colorado, "If you fellers can't find the road from here to Tucson, you can go to hell!"[22] Two weeks later, when Colonel West arrived at the Pima Villages with the second contingent of the expedition, he found that Calloway's men had already dug in. West ordered the construction of a more substantial earthen fortification and named it in honor of Lieutenant Barrett. From Fort Yuma, Carleton attempted to boost morale by remembering those who had fallen "in defense of the colors." He ordered that "until the end of the war [the names Johnson and Leonard] be called at every stated roll-call of their respective companies, and a comrade shall always respond, 'He died for his country!'" Carleton later designated Camp Barrett a sub depot, the only source of supply between Yuma and Tucson. On the march the men ate jerked beef, pemmican, and hardtack while the horses and draft animals fed on barley soaked in water and the native grama and galleta grasses that grew wild along the Gila. With the exception of their encounters with rebels, both men and animals had come through the first leg of the journey in good shape.[23]

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of the growing town in 1884. When the post was deactivated in 1892, the remains were dug up yet again and moved to the national cemetery in San Francisco. Barrett's remains were never reinterred. The army tried to locate next of kin, but his only known relative, Ellen Brady of Albany, New York, never claimed the body, and it remained in the mesquite thicket near Picacho until all traces of the grave were lost. In 1928 the Arizona Historical Society and the Southern Pacific Railroad erected a fifteen-foot stone obelisk in the railroad right of way between the tracks and the peak on a spot a railroad signal superintendent believed to be Barrett's burial site. The original bronze plaque on the monument was stolen, prompting the Arizona State Parks Department to move the marker nearer to the entrance of Picacho Peak State Park in 1975. E. E. Eyre to R. C. Drum, May 14, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):120; *Arizona Daily Star,* Apr. 27, 1959; Edith C. Tomkins Manuscript, Small Collection, John Spring Papers, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; Aurora Hunt, *James Henry Carleton; Frontier Dragoon* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clarke, 1958), 214; *Oakland Tribune,* Apr. 16, 1961; J.C. Hall, a member of the "Jackass Battery," reported that when traveling west the graves were on the *right* side of the railroad tracks. Hall, "Wild West."

[22] George Oakes Reminiscence, Arizona Historical Society.

[23] GO 8, Hdqrs. Dist. of Southern Calif., May 10, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1061.

Confederate Borderlands

On April 15, 1862, the very day that Lieutenant James Barrett died in Picacho Pass, Brigadier-General Henry Hopkins Sibley's Confederate Army of New Mexico fought its final battle. In May and June, while the California Column regrouped in Tucson and began the big push to the Rio Grande, General E. R. S. Canby's Union forces in New Mexico were slowly pushing General Sibley's Texans south following a stunning Confederate reversal at Glorieta Pass on the road to Fort Union, just east of Santa Fe.[24] The defeat of the Confederates, who appeared so close to capturing Fort Union's supply depot and conquering New Mexico, seemed all the more remarkable because of the rebels' nearly unbroken chain of victories, beginning with Lt. Colonel Baylor's capture of Lynde's U.S. regular troops as they retreated northward from Fort Fillmore in the summer of 1861. Once Sibley, a West Point-educated career soldier, had taken over as commander of the Confederate Army of New Mexico, however, a change came over the invading Texans. With a brigade comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery operating in desert country with hostile inhabitants everything became more complicated and the margin for error greatly diminished. There was no doubting the aggressiveness and spirit of the Texans, but their commander's inattention to logistical details doomed the expedition from the start.

While Baylor went through the motions of governing Confederate Arizona—a territory in name only—from his capital of Mesilla with almost no resources of any kind, Sibley arrived with orders from Richmond to commandeer all of the rebel manpower in

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[24] Orton, *California Men,* 44–45; the best account of the service of the Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico will be found in Flint Whitlock's, *Distant Bugles, Distant Drums: The Union Response to the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006).
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the territories and push up the Rio Grande with a force of more than 2500 men. In truth, the roles of the two officers might have been better reversed. A Louisiana native, Sibley had exhibited courage with the Second Dragoons in the war with Mexico, but in 1861, he was still only a captain with the honorary rank of brevet major. He had been decorated for his war service in Mexico and demonstrated physical endurance and fitness for command in his younger days. But now his career seems to have stalled, and he felt the need to boast of his accomplishments, which included several patented inventions adopted by the Army, believing that his regular army superiors, with whom he often quarreled, had not appropriately recognized his talent. It was well known in the small fraternity of the frontier army that Sibley drank heavily.

Stationed at Fort Union and other posts in remote New Mexico, he had been passed over in rank, and as the Southern states began seceding from the Union, the War department seemed to have no good use for him.[25] As with other regular Army officers, including North Carolina born department commander William W. Loring, he was imbued with a martial spirit nurtured by his native South and felt compelled to fight for the side that would best appreciate his military skills. He resigned his commission on May 13, 1861, and traveled to Richmond and convinced Jefferson Davis that with his intimate knowledge of U.S. Army posts and resources in the Southwest, he could conquer not only New Mexico and Arizona but the Colorado goldfields, Chihuahua and Sonora and, eventually, California. Intelligent and loquacious, he talked his way into a brigadier's commission and received permission to recruit 3500 men and equip them

[25] Though the holder of U.S. patents since 1856, Sibley did not request Confederate patents for his innovative tipi-shaped tent, fly, and stove which he hoped would aid the war effort. New Orleans *Picayune*, July 16, 1861; Jerry D. Thompson, *Henry Hopkins Sibley, Confederate General of the West* (Natchitoches, LA: Northwestern State University Press, 1987), 102-07.

from captured supplies gleaned from abandoned U.S. posts and depots in Texas. Adding new territory to the Confederacy was not a priority for Davis, but Sibley's quest for empire could further the administration's goal of foreign recognition. Though a long-shot, this course provided undeniable opportunities for acquiring much-needed wealth, and at the very least, a campaign in the Southwest would tie up U.S. regular troops and worry the Lincoln administration. The extent of Sibley's grand plan was likely not known by even the Confederate high command, though his subordinates heard him speak of it and they appeared to be convinced that it could be carried out. Talking rather than fighting, however, was Sibley's real talent; perhaps he would have been better suited as a diplomatic emissary to Mexico or as a territorial governor rather than a military strategist and field commander.[26]

Baylor, on the other hand was a hard-charging field commander with little talent for public relations. In his first months as governor he had already shot to death the editor of Mesilla's pro-Southern newspaper; invaded Mexico in pursuit of Mescalero Apache raiders, whom he successfully tracked and killed within sight of the town of Carretas, Chihuahua; and drawn the attention and ire of Confederate officials in Richmond.[27] Jefferson Davis thought Baylor a political liability and found his Indian extermination

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[26] Martin H. Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign.* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960), 23, 38, 85; Jerry D. Thompson, *Westward the Texans: The Civil War Journal of Private William Randolph Howell* (El Paso: Texas Western, 1990), 2-3; Thompson, *Henry Hopkins Sibley*, 209.

[27] Baylor shot Robert P. Kelley, one of Mesilla's leading citizens and editor of the *Mesilla Times*. Martin H. Hall, "The Mesilla Times; A Journal of Confederate Arizona," Arizona and the West, v.5, no. 4 (Winter, 1963), 337. Sibley and his aids despised Baylor and made sure the Confederate high command saw Baylor's extermination orders. Thompson, *Henry Hopkins Sibley*, 314-16; Baylor personally led the dogged pursuit of Apache raiders (there is uncertainty over whether they were Chiricahuas or Mescaleros) who had run off more than 100 horses and mules from Mesilla. The showdown may have occurred at Corralitos on the northeastern flank of the Sierra Madres. Thompson, *Henry Hopkins Sibley*, 315; Edwin Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas, Chief of the Chiricahuas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 426-7; Edwin R. Sweeney, *Cochise:Chiricahua Apache Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 194.

policy uncivilized and morally repugnant. These character defects cost the Texan his commission and governorship, and he spent the rest of the war trying to restore his reputation and his field command. In Baylor's view, all of the controversies that dogged him involved honor and revenge. The editor had impugned his manhood by suggesting that Baylor had lost his nerve in holding Arizona Territory against the federal legions approaching from north and west. The Apaches had killed his men and other Anglos, and, in Baylor's brand of frontier justice, the only fitting penalty for such crimes could be death. He hated Sibley for usurping his authority in Confederate Arizona and fueled his determination to go to Richmond to regain his honor. Baylor was a model of unrestrained martial manhood—brave, bold, and quick to action—he lived by the "code duello," as did most of his Texan countrymen with frontier roots in Kentucky and Tennessee. His own family viewed him as a crusader of old, and it is likely that he held the same opinion.[28]

Sibley had neither Baylor's energy nor his vengeful streak, but the more restrained commander did have other subordinates cut from Baylor's same bolt. Most of the officers of the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Texas Mounted Volunteers had military experience in either the regular Army, volunteer service in Mexico, as Indian-fighting rangers, or as filibusters. Because of the animosity between Sibley and Baylor, Major

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[28]George Wythe Baylor, *John Robert Baylor: Confederate Governor of Ariz*ona, ed. Odie B. Faulk (Tucson: Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, 1966), 13-16, 33, 35-6. He used political influence to get to Davis and others, sending an Apache shield adorned with the "fair tresses" of a murdered white woman. *OR*, (15) 914-18; Jerry D. Thompson, *Colonel John Robert Baylor: Texas Indian Fighter and Confederate Soldier* (Hillsboro,Texas: Hill Junior College Press, 1971), 76-7; Donald S. Frazier, *Blood & Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest* (College Station: Texas A. & M. University Press, 1995), 190-91. By March 1865, Baylor had succeeded in securing a colonel's commission and permission to raise a regiment of mounted volunteers for the recapture of Arizona. This was, of course, a pipe dream at this point in the war and had he been successful in securing 1000 men, arms, horses, and supplies, his efforts would have only been a temporary diversion as the Confederacy collapsed. Still the appointed provided Baylor with a measure of vindication. Baylor fits the 19th century model of the unrestrained martial male as defined by Amy Greenberg in *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-14.

Charles Pyron led Baylor's Second Texas Mounted Volunteers in the Confederate Army of New Mexico. Numbered among Sibley's other regimental and battalion commanders were, William "Dirty Shirt" Scurry (Fourth TMV), Tom Green (Fifth TMV), and John Sutton (Seventh TMV). All were fighters, and their young soldiers from Texas and the territories were eager to face the Union regulars and New Mexico militiamen whom, Sibley had convinced them, were demoralized and would not put up much resistance. As the brigade commander, Sibley appointed the officers above the rank of captain, but the enlisted men elected their own company non-commissioned and commissioned officers. The enlisted Anglo and Hispano Texans were young (average age was only 23), and they were joined by a handful of enslaved African Americans, who were brought along to serve the officers.

Most of the Texans boasted of fighting for "independence" as had their fathers at the Alamo and San Jacinto. But it was clear from their letters home that the root cause of their hatred for the Union cause was directed at Abraham Lincoln and the abolitionist cause that they believed he represented. The young Texans did not believe in racial equality for African Americans and condemned race mixing, "miscegenation," as an abomination. They referred to the soldiers in U.S. service not as "federals," or "Union men," but rather as "Abolitionists" or, simply, "Abs." While these sentiments were widespread in the ranks, many of the young men that enlisted in the spring and summer of 1861were simply caught up in the war hysteria and desire for adventure fueled by the culture of martial manhood.[29]

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[29] Don E. Alberts, Ed., *Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil War Journal of A. B. Peticolas* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 10, 43, and passim. Prior to enlisting, many young Texans were members of the Knights of the Golden Circle, an organization that advocated the conquest of Mexico,

Morale was high, but *esprit de corps* could take the Confederate Army of New Mexico only so far. Shortages of food and clothing already plagued Sibley's command, but he assured the men that Colonel James Reily's mission to Chihuahua and Sonora would soon begin the flow of food and other needed supplies from Mexico. Mounted volunteers brought their own horses and equipment to the service, but the arduous journey to New Mexico had taken its toll, and remounts were in especially short supply. The arms from captured government arsenals in Texas had been distributed to other troops before Sibley's men could muster in San Antonio. Many of his young soldiers contented themselves with double barreled shotguns, squirrel rifles, and antiquated muskets. Three companies of the Fifth Texas Mounted Volunteers were issued nine-foot lances captured from the Mexicans more than ten years earlier. Revolving pistols and bowie knives usually rounded out the typical soldier's armament. The rebels also secured an assortment of bronze field pieces and mountain howitzers, distributed among the regiments but under the overall command of the able artillerist, Major Trevanion T. Teel.[30]

Anglo Confederates vs Union Hispanos and Anglos

Preparing to face the Texans, Colonel E.R.S. Canby mustered a mixed force of 1200 regulars—cavalry, infantry, and artillery—as well as 2500 of New Mexico's Hispano militiamen and soldiers of the newly-raised regiments of U.S. volunteers. The mostly Hispano New Mexico Volunteers, officered by regulars and experienced

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Central America, and portions of South America and the Caribbean in order to establish a slave empire. See: Jerry D. Thompson, *From Desert to Bayou: The Civil War Journal and Sketches of Morgan Wolfe Merrick* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1991), *iv*.

[30]Martin H. Hall and Sam Long *The Confederate Army of New Mexico* (Austin: Presidial, 1978),, 13-23; Trevanion T. Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign: Its Objects and the Causes of its Failure," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Vol. 2 (New York: Yoseloff & Co., 1956), 700.

frontiersmen like Kit Carson, fell directly under Canby's control while the militiamen reported to Henry Connelly, New Mexico's Territorial governor. Added to this army were Captain Paddy Graydon's Independent Spy Company, composed of Anglo and Hispano recruits from New Mexico, and the men of Captain Theodore Dodd's independent company of Colorado Volunteers, who early responded to Connelly's and Canby's desperate pleas for assistance. The "Pikes Peakers" represented the first of an entire regiment recruited from the Rocky Mountain mining camps that now prepared to march from Denver City, more than six hundred miles north. In all, Canby had 3800 men at his disposal, well-armed and equipped but representing the full range of soldiery, from undisciplined and inexperienced recruits and militia to seasoned professionals and combat veterans. Not seen on Canby's muster roll but equally important to his command were the dry desert—inhospitably stingy with water and food—and the Territory's native Hispano civilian and sedentary Indian population.[31]

The New Mexicans feared and despised the Texans who had twice before in living memory invaded their homeland and arrogantly taken what they wanted. This time, the people would make it a point to deny sustenance and hinder the invaders whenever possible. Uncertain of the cause of the strife now evident between the Anglos, New Mexico's Hispanos did not rush to join the militia companies that originally formed to fight Indian raiders or the U.S. volunteer units called up to augment the regular army. The presence of the Texans, who were generally believed to be a distinctly different people

[31] In his official report of the Battle of Valverde, Canby described his troops as consisting of "five companies of the Fifth, three of the Seventh, and three of the Tenth Infantry, two companies of the First and five of the Third Cavalry, McRae's battery (G of the Second and I of the Third Cavalry), and a company of Colorado volunteers. The New Mexican troops consisted of the First Regiment (Carson's), seven companies of the Second, seven of the Third, one of the Fourth, two of the Fifth, Graydon's Spy Company, and about 1,000 hastily-collected and unorganized militia, making on the morning of [February] 21st an aggregate present of 3,810." *OR*, 9, 488.

than the Anglos originating in the other states, on their native soil, however, convinced many New Mexicans to set down their farm implements and corral their herds of sheep and goats to defend their homes, families, property, and honor from the hated *Tejanos*.

Canby saw to it that Kit Carson received a colonel's commission and, so empowered, he helped raise an entire regiment of New Mexico Volunteers. In all, four more regiments of infantry and additional companies of New Mexico cavalry would eventually be hurriedly recruited and rushed into service. Though uniformed and armed with the best equipment the U.S. Army had to offer, the Hispano soldiers received little or no training. Their field officers were largely regular army men, like Colonel Gabriel Paul, a career officer and hero of the Mexican-American War, assigned to head the Fourth New Mexico Volunteer Infantry. The company officers were a mixed bag of Hispanos and Anglos, with varying degrees of military experience. Carson's men received the best training and were considered the most disciplined of the New Mexico troops, but the colonel himself was not entirely certain that he himself was fit for command. But, casting about, he could see few others better qualified. He had married into a well-known New Mexican family, was politically connected, and was known and respected by Hispanos and Indians across the territory. Carson spoke English with a drawl heavily inflected with frontierisms, was fluent in Spanish, and had mastered half a dozen Indian tongues as well; but to his embarrassment, he could neither read nor write a word in any language. Still, he was a proven fighter, his name was known even to the Texans, and he enjoyed the trust of leaders and subordinates alike.[32]

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[32] See John Taylor, *Bloody Valverde: A Civil War Battle on the Rio Grande, February 21, 1862*. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), 130-31, for an excellent breakdown of the New Mexico Volunteers' order of battle and officer corps.

Sibley's campaign strategy was as simple as it was bold—he would march his brigade from Fort Bliss to Mesilla and up the Rio Grande, sweeping aside all armed resistance and capturing government forts and supply depots as he went. Fort Craig in southern New Mexico represented the first great prize, for with the munitions and food supplies stored there he could advance to the territorial capital and then on to Fort Union, strategically situated on the Santa Fe Trail only one hundred miles south of the Colorado border. This major supply depot would be critical in order for this army to successfully push on to Denver and the Rocky Mountain gold mines. By February 1862, Canby had rallied all of his available manpower at Fort Craig, perched on the high ground overlooking the west bank of the Rio Grande. He strengthened the fort with adobe and stone and built new earthworks capable of accommodating his growing force, which far exceeded in number even the most optimistic estimates of the engineer officers who laid out the post in 1853, and prepared to receive the enemy.

Due to his uncertainty over the abilities of his hastily-assembled command, especially his un-tried Hispano regiments, Canby assumed a defensive posture and remained cautiously entrenched at Fort Craig as Sibley's army approached. On February 16, 1862, the rebels demonstrated south of the fort, just out of artillery range, but could not lure the Union men from their secure defenses. Whipped by snow and sand storms, Confederate Colonel Tom Green proposed to countermarch seven miles south to Paraje, cross the river, and then skirt around the fort by taking the waterless trail along the high mesa east of the Rio Grande to the Valverde fords located some six miles upstream. The maneuver forced Canby to meet the threat. Allowing the Confederates to bypass the fort would not only sever his supply line but allow Sibley freedom to attack the now

weakened garrisons at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Fort Union, the last bastion on the road to Colorado.[33]

On February 20, 1862, Canby's scouts detected the withdrawal of the Confederates arrayed south of the fort who made a show of battle with flags flying and regimental bands playing Dixie to cover the movement of the main body. Graydon's Spy Company harassed the rebels, and Graydon himself procured two mules, loaded them with 24-pounder howitzer shells, and attempted to run them into the night encampment of the Fourth Texas. The plan at first appeared to backfire when, after the fuses were lit, the mules dutifully followed the Union men rather than running away through the rebel camp. But though the shells exploded harmlessly (save for the hapless mules) between the lines, nearly two hundred frightened and thirsty Texas mules and horses decamped for the Rio Grande where Canby's men found them watering in the morning. Though Graydon's suicide mules may not have had the desired effect, the result was devastating to Lieutenant Colonel William Scurry's Fourth Regiment. The loss of the draft animals forced the Texans to abandon or destroy thirty supply wagons and much of their precious contents.[34]

Now aware of the threating flanking movement, Canby sent a battalion to contest the three upstream fords at Valverde by throwing a line of battle across the river, hoping to deny Sibley's thirsty rebel vanguard access to the water. Just south of the fords on the east side of the river, the Mesa del Contadero stretched three miles long and two miles

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[33] See Alvin Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 63-8, for an excellent recapitulation of the New Mexico campaign.

[34] Estimates of the Confederate horses and mules lost range from 162-300. See: Canby's Report, March 1, 1862, *OR,* 9: 489; Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis, *Bloody Trails Along the Rio Grande—A Day-by-Day Diary of Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis*, ed. Nolie Mumey (Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 1958), 75; Sibley reported only 100 mules lost through "careless herding." Sibley to S. Cooper, *OR*, 9:508.

wide, looming more than 300 feet over the valley. This massive basaltic obstacle anchored the right flank of Canby's line of infantry and cavalry, mostly New Mexico Volunteers and Militia, and two improvised batteries of artillery manned by regulars.[35] Confined to an ambulance as a result of illness, drunkenness, or both, Sibley relinquished command to Colonel Green and others who aggressively met the Union men arrayed in the cottonwood thickets on the east bank, as artillery and infantry reinforcements rushed upriver the six miles from Fort Craig.

Valverde: Napoleonic Maneuver and Dash

The contest at Valverde on February 21, 1862, would prove to be the pivotal battle of the Civil War in the Southwest. Though numerically evenly matched, the Union men had fewer but longer-range artillery pieces—including twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers—opposing the rebels' mountain howitzers. Canby's small arms—.54 caliber Mississippi Rifles, .58 caliber model 1855 rifle muskets, and .69 caliber U.S. muskets of several models—also outdistanced the Texans' shotguns, carbines, revolvers, and lances. The rebels made up for the ordnance deficiencies with an inordinate belief in their own invincibility that appeared to give them a moral advantage that, in the end, carried the day. The most memorable events of the bloody action included a mounted charge on the Union left flank by two of the Fifth Texas lancer companies led by Captain Willis Lang. Their red pennons, each bearing a lone white star, snapping from the steel blades of their nine-foot lances, the rebels seemed irresistible as their charging horses bore down on oddly uniformed soldiers they took to be New Mexican militiamen. Dressed in dark blue frock coats and trousers, as were the other newly-outfitted

[35] Canby's Report, March 1, 1862, *OR*, 9: 488.

volunteers, the flank company was in fact Captain Dodd's determined Colorado Volunteers who formed square, the classic foot-soldier-defense in the face of a mounted charge. With bayonets fixed the Pikes Peakers fired two volleys from their muskets loaded with buck-and-ball, mortally wounding Lang and slaughtering the Texans. The few lancers that actually reached the Coloradans were lifted from their saddles with bayoneted muskets. None of the horses survived the attack, and the men who were spared crawled back through the sand to the cover of river embankments.[36]

The Confederates set the tempo of the battle and Canby's men maneuvered in response with charges and countercharges. The artillery fire from Hall's 24-pounders and McRae's battery of 12-pounder field howitzers firing shell and spherical case shot disabled several of the rebel guns commanded by Major Teel. The Union gunners set the time fuses on their shells to burst the explosive balls directly over the dismounted Texans that sheltered in the sand hills and behind the banks of an old and now dry Rio Grande River channel. The battle lines stretched nearly a mile, and the commanders found it difficult to coordinate the separated wings of their forces due to visual obstructions presented by the bend of the channel, broken ground, and cottonwood bosques. Even mounted couriers moved slowly through the soft sand and scrub of the riverbanks. Canby shifted Carson's regiment and some of the regulars to support his right. He worried about Captain Hall's battery on the extreme right of his overextended flank. All afternoon, Captain Hall and Major Thomas Duncan had been attempting to creep toward the old dry

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[36]Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 62-3; William Clark Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War: The New Mexico Campaign in 1862* (Denver: State Historical and Natural History Society of Colorado, 1906), 64. Nine days after the battle, an African American slave brought Lang his pistol and the Captain shot himself, ending his suffering. Taylor, *Bloody Valverde*, 69-70.

river bed at the foot of the mesa hoping for a chance to wheel their guns to enfilade the Texans hunkered behind the sandy banks and possibly capture the supply train parked nearby, behind the Confederate left. Canby's shift could not have come at a less opportune time.[37]

Colonel Green had had enough of the artillery barrage emanating from McRae's battery in the center of the Union line. Late in the afternoon of February 21, he ordered Lt. Colonel Scurry to lead Major Pyron, Major Lockridge, and Lt. Colonel Sutton in a charge intended to capture the guns. If the daring move succeeded, the demoralized enemy would be swept from the field and the Confederates could push on to the river. Bugles signaled the attack, and nearly a thousand rebels in a semi-circular line stretching almost a half mile charged from their positions across the 800 yards of sandy bottoms straight for McRae's four twelve-pounder field howitzers and two six-pounder guns. At long range the charging men went to ground when they saw the muzzle flashes of the cannons, but as their line converged within one hundred yards of the battery they could no longer duck or dodge the hail of iron balls and lead bullets directed at them. Charged with double canister loads, the scattershot from the Union guns blasted holes in the closed ranks of the onrushing Texans. Sutton had a leg shot off, but Lockridge reached one of the cannons shouting "this is mine!" A fierce filibuster famous for his braggadocio, Lockridge's men knew of his well-publicized boast to make his wife a "shimmy" from Fort Craig's colors. Now he seemed determined to make good on the

[37] Lt. Col. Scurry's Report, Feb. 22, 1862, *OR*, 9:513-15; Major Raguet's Report, ibid. 516-18.

promise or die trying. But Lockridge fell dead alongside McRae himself, both men touching the heated bronze barrel of a howitzer.[38]

The Texans had held their fire until they were within a stone's throw of the battery, then they let loose with their double-barreled shotguns and revolvers. Colonel Green reported that "never were doubled-barreled shot-guns and rifles used to better effect." A hand-to-hand struggle ensued with clubbed guns and rammers, pistols, sabers, and bowie knives. Desperate and suicidal artillerymen threw lit fuses or fired pistols into the limber chests filled with ammunition and blew them up. The Union line collapsed and the panicked soldiers, volunteers and regulars alike, broke and ran for the river and the cover of the banks and trees on the far side. The rebels attempted to turn the six captured guns around but due either to inexperience or lack of ammunition did little damage to the retreating enemy.[39]

The Confederates clearly achieved a tactical victory, though both sides were appalled by the slaughter and agreed to a two day truce to collect the dead and succor the wounded. The hate and violence seemed to break like a fever, and the burial details acted with uncommon compassion, considering the ferocity of the fighting just hours before. "The field was covered with blood, horses, torn and dismembered limbs, and heads separated from their bodies," observed New Mexican Captain Rafael Chacón following his duty with a burial detail. Chacón also expressed his belief that in the presence of the

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[38] Samuel Lockridge filibustered in Nicaragua with William Walker before the two hotheads fought and parted company. Jerry D. Thompson, *The Civil War in the Southwest: Recollections of the Sibley Brigade* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 200), 153.
[39] Green's Report, February 22, 1862, *OR*, 9: 520; Canby's Report, March 1, 1862, *OR*, 9: 491.

dead "chivalry and courtesy" seemed to reign among the antagonists.[40] Just before nightfall on the evening of the battle, Major Charles Wesche's detachment of the Second New Mexico Militia discovered the train abandoned earlier by the Confederates for want of draft animals. The Hispano soldiers tightly corralled the rolling stock and baggage around the ammunition wagons and put them all to the torch—the sound of exploding shells, cooking-off in the intense heat, echoed against the mesas and lava rock canyons as darkness settled on the Rio Grande.[41]

The day-long struggle had been a set-piece, Napoleonic battle of maneuver and dash that left more than five hundred men dead and wounded—nearly half of them Confederates.[42] Sibley had bypassed the fort but had not captured its vital supplies or whipped Canby's army, which now posed a threat to the rebel army's rear. Sibley sent Scurry with a surrender demand, but Canby, with his army secure within the fort's bastions and earthworks, was in no mood to treat with the Texans. Fort Craig was now a gigantic hospital, confused and congested by disorganized militiamen and other soldiers still exhausted and shocked by the bloodbath at the river. The Union men had lost six officers killed or mortally wounded, including Captain George Bascom of Apache Pass fame and Captain Alexander McRae, the much-admired North Carolinian, who died trying to save his battery. Having lost six of his eight artillery pieces at Valverde, Canby

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[40] Jaqueline D. Meketa, ed., *Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafaél Chacón* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 170-71.
[41] Taylor, *Bloody Valverde*, 84, 103.
[42] See Taylor's summary of casualties in *Bloody Valverde*, 132-44.

set his men to fabricating and mounting intimidating, but harmless, "Quaker guns" from painted logs and awaited an attack that never came.[43]

The Battle of Valverde set a new benchmark for violent conflict in the Southwest borderlands. More than five thousand Anglo and Hispano soldiers had faced off, and more than ten percent had been killed or wounded. Some companies suffered casualty rates of seventy percent. More than half of McRae's battery men were killed on the field defending their guns. Artillery fire resulted in casualties at up to one thousand yards, but most of the killing had been done at close range with cannon-fired canister balls and bullets from small arms. Some men had been stabbed with bayonets, swords, or bowie knives in hand-to-hand combat. Frontal assaults over open ground and flank attacks without cover characterized the Napoleonic movements employed by both sides. And both the Union and Confederate Anglo troops manfully sacrificed themselves—for glory, honor, and country. The big mountaineers from Colorado, unwilling to back down in the hand-to-hand fighting, had distinguished themselves. For some Southerners, including the filibustering Lockridge and Sibley himself, the New Mexico campaign was just a step toward a larger Confederate empire that would encompass the American West and Northern Mexico as well. But when the day of battle actually came, most of the Anglo soldiers set aside patriotic motives. As with most other Civil War era soldiers in the East, they fought for their comrades and to avoid the shame and lasting stigma of cowardice.

The Hispano soldiers had generally acquitted themselves well, especially Carson's First Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers. They obeyed orders, fired disciplined

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[43] Sibley to Canby, Feb. 22, 1862, *OR*, 9: 632; McRae epitomized the ideals of Anglo martial masculinity; Canby reported that the brave, "Captain McRae died, as he had lived, an example of the best and highest qualities that a man can possess." Canby's Report, March 1, 1862, *OR*, 9: 489-92; Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers*, 68.

volleys, and maneuvered under enemy small arms and artillery fire. The same could not be said of all the New Mexican native troops, especially the hastily recruited and poorly-officered militia, many of whom remained at the fort or never made it into action at the fords. It is doubtful that any troops so organized and led would have done better. The untried Hispano soldiers had little notion of the formal warfare practiced by the Anglos. Although the New Mexicans were descended from Spanish colonists who had fought in massed ranks with muskets, generations had come and gone since that type of war had been seen in the borderlands. The Indians and Hispanos fought differently now, as "irregulars" or "guerrilleros." They learned to attack by stealth, with decoys in ambush, or in open order as skirmishers. Often a raid or counterattack in pursuit of raiders became a running fight, more akin to a mounted fox hunt. In this sort of combat, personal risk was minimized—it was better to survive to fight another day than to charge headlong into almost certain death or enemies of unknown strength.

There was also the issue of motivation. The New Mexicans rallied to the U.S. flag not for national patriotic reasons but because joining the army seemed in their best interest at the time. They bore no great love for the Americans who had so recently moved into to their country and were now fighting a "Revolution." Most joined after the harvest and before planting season. Some were lured by the promise of good food, clothing, and pay. Others saw joining the Anglo army as an opportunity to acquire weapons with which to fight traditional Apache and Navajo enemies. Many of the New Mexican enlistees had not heard of and would not have known what a "Confederate" was—but they knew Texans. Some remembered the previous Texan invasions and believed that any army that fought *Tejano* marauders was the right army to join. But

when the bullets started kicking up the sand, shells burst overhead, and bloodied comrades fell by their side, all of the inducements and rationales seemed insignificant. *Vergüenza*—the shame of dishonor—certainly motivated some to stay and fight, but for many returning home to farms and families seemed the more prudent choice.[44]

As the smoke of battle cleared so did the fog that befuddled General Sibley. He emerged from his ambulance to resume command, though never again on a battlefield, having lost much of the esteem formerly evinced by officers and men. With officers killed or wounded, Sibley now had gaps in his command structure. Samuel Lockridge, John Sutton, Marinus van den Heuvel, and Willis Lang were dead or dying, and Tom Green, Henry Raguet, Trevanion Teel and others were wounded and out of action. The Confederates were now burdened with their wounded, a situation made worse by the shortage of wagons and draft animals. Sibley had little choice but to head north toward Albuquerque. The Confederates captured Colonel Nicolás Pino's 200-man militia force at Socorro and established a brigade hospital. Sibley's advance riders, hoping to forage and capture enemy supplies, found uncooperative New Mexicans and burned or stripped government depots. Anglo Southern sympathizers bluffed a company of New Mexico militiamen into surrendering at Cubero, west of Albuquerque, capturing a small cache of

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[44] The New Mexicans that joined the Union army had little idea of the larger Civil War or its causes. The Battle of Valverde, however, became an event so memorable that it served as a temporal marker—people remembered their own history by whether it occurred before or after Valverde or when the Texans came. For examples and additional Hispanic soldiers' experience see: "Revolution" in Casimorio Lujan y Sandoval testimony in Altagracia Garcia Zamora v. Navajos Case 1363, RG 123, NARA; Valverde see Jose Gallegos y Rivali, Case 5453, RG 123, NARA; "Confederate" in Jose Abran Candelario testimony in Vicente Lujan v. Navajos, Case 5456, RG 123, NARA. There is a great body of scholarship related to why soldiers fought the Civil War. For a sampling of literature relevant to the Civil War in the borderlands see: James M. McPherson's *For Cause and Comrades; Why Men Fought in the Civil War* and *What They Fought For, 1861-1865*(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) ; Charles D. Grear, *Why Texans Fought in the Civil War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010); Thompson, *Westward the Texans*; Taylor, *Bloody Valverde*; Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*; Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); and Meketa, *Legacy of Honor*.

medical supplies, arms, and ammunition but no provender. A frustrated U.S. inspector general excoriated the Hispano soldiers as "worse than worthless; they are really aids to the enemy who catch them, take away their arms, and tell them to go home." Canby, only slightly more politic, "disembarrassed" himself of most of his militia and some of the New Mexico volunteers, whom he believed had let him down at Valverde. Carson's men had performed well enough, but others had indeed fled when the fighting began, though by the end of March a desertion amnesty had restored most of the volunteer companies to nearly full strength.[45]

Logistics were not Sibley's forte and would, in the end, prove to be his downfall. Attempting to live off the land, he slowly moved his command north through Pueblo Indian and Hispano settlements, his two columns converging near Santa Fe. The Confederates stole what food they could from the locals, even ransacking Governor Connelly's home as well as the Albuquerque property of Colonel Carleton, whose troops were then en route to Fort Yuma. With the exception of these private stocks and stores, Sibley's army found little to eat. They subsisted primarily on the dwindling herd of underfed beef cattle that had sustained them since leaving Fort Bliss. Just as Captain Herbert Enos fired the government stores stockpiled at Albuquerque before retreating north to Fort Union, other Union men stripped Santa Fe of government supplies. Pyron's companies of the Second Texas (Baylor's old Arizona Volunteers) reached the capital first, on March 10, led by men of the spy company officially enrolled as The Brigands but

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[45] Captain Gurdin Chapin, AIG, to Halleck, Feb. 28,1862, *OR*, 9:634-5; Canby to Adjutant General of the Army, February 23, 1862, *OR*, 9:633; an Anglo correspondent from Maxwell's Ranch on the Cimarron in Mora County wrote on March 11, 1862 that "The Mexicans are not to be depended upon. They run as soon as they see the enemy, and many go before." However exaggerated and biased, this became the prevailing sentiment among Army officers and Anglo New Mexicans in the early 1860s. New York *Times*, April 13, 1862.

known to most of the Texans as the "Santa Fe Gamblers." Three days later, Pyron ran the Confederate stars and bars up the flagstaff at the Palace of the Governors. Proud of their victories and the achievement of surviving the almost 1,000-mile trek from San Antonio to Santa Fe, the rebels were still confident, though most realized the campaign had taken a toll. The men were hungry, ragged, and footsore—as many of the Mounted Volunteers were now, of necessity, infantrymen. Just when it seemed as though the invasion was losing momentum and would peter out, an unlucky U.S. supply train from the East bound for Fort Craig fell into Confederate hands east of Albuquerque. This bounty combined with supplies, greedily rescued from the flames by the people of Albuquerque, and other commissary stores confiscated from New Mexicans, Sibley once again entertained hope that a quick thrust to Fort Union might be successful. [46]

By late March, Canby's command of New Mexico Volunteers and regulars was still hunkered down at Fort Craig with the intention of cutting off Sibley's supplies from the south and harassing, if possible, the Confederate rear while Fort Union awaited reinforcements. Holding New Mexico would not be easy for the Union commander as the Confederates moved northward unopposed and Apache and Navajo attacks increased daily. He also discovered that not all of the New Mexicans had chosen sides. Hispanos, including natives of Sandia Pueblo, attacked Captain Herbert Enos's party as it moved north to destroy supplies ahead of the rebels and link up with the federal forces at Fort Union. Enos reported that he feared Albuquerque's citizens who were bent on plundering government stores and had threatened his command. Hispano deserters attacked his

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[46] Capt. Herbert Enos's Report, March 11, 1862, *OR*, 9: 527-8; Capt. A.S. Sutton's Report, March 19, 1862, *OR*, 9: 528-9; *New York Times*, Fort Union, Mar. 20, 1862 and April 13, 1862; Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*, 75.

wagon train and made off with three wagons and part of the mule herd. Still other "Mexican robbers" attacked an army train near Galisteo, fifteen miles from Santa Fe, capturing six more wagons and their teams. The remnants of Lt. Colonel Manuél Chaves's Second New Mexico Volunteers deserted en masse at Santa Fe as Major Donaldson attempted to destroy government stores that could not be transported to Fort Union. Some local Hispanos salvaged the stores left behind and gleefully watched Governor Connelly and his entourage, representatives and symbols of American occupation, flee the capital with Donaldson's troops. The Governor wrote his superiors in Washington that, "the militia have all dispersed, and have gone to preparing their lands for the coming harvest, and this is by far the best use that can be made of them." The Hispano-Anglo divide was beginning to show, and it seemed that civil war had indeed erupted in New Mexico.[47]

The Civil War had brought out the discontent that had been brewing ever since the American takeover of New Mexico in 1846. Long-time Hispano adversaries of the United States now made known their support for the Confederates on the theory that "my enemy's enemy is my friend." Rafael and Manuel Armijo and other New Mexico "*ricos*" pledged allegiance to the rebels and made available $200,000 worth of warehoused supplies in Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Sibley welcomed their "protests of sympathy for our cause," but he also recognized that "politically they have no distinct sentiment or opinion on the vital question at issue." He wrote his superiors in Richmond that for most New Mexicans, "power and interest alone control the expression of their sympathies." Sibley also noted in his report that Navajo raiders had in the last year driven off hundreds

[47] Enos to Donaldson, March 11, 1862, *OR*, 9:528; Donaldson to Paul, March 11, 1862, *OR*, 9: 527; Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, *OR*, 9: 645.

of thousands of sheep and that the best way to win the support of the Hispanos was to institute policy that would "encourage private enterprises against that tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the enslaving of them."[48]

From his Albuquerque headquarters, Sibley directed three Confederate columns under Pyron, Scurry, and Green moving slowly toward Fort Union. Pyron's men, joined by Major John S. Shropshire's battalion, gathered information about the strength of the Union garrison, especially the rumors of reinforcements from Colorado, and by March 25 began moving east on the Santa Fe Trail. Pyron's line of march took him through pine-forested canyon country, where the trail separated the Sangre De Cristo Mountains to the north from Glorieta Mesa on the south. The columns under Scurry and Green were to by-pass this pinch point, taking a more direct route toward the fort, and hoped to join forces on the trail somewhere east of Apache Canyon and Glorieta Pass. The arrival of Colonel John P. Slough and the 950 men of the First Colorado Regiment at Fort Union on March 11 dashed Confederate hopes of an easy victory and re-supply in northern New Mexico.

In a little more than two weeks' time Slough's Pikes Peakers had walked and run more than 500 miles along the eastern flank of the Rocky Mountains through freezing rain and snow-choked passes—a feat that amazed both the War Department and the rebels—in order to reinforce Fort Union before Sibley's army arrived. The last leg of the journey had seen the hardy miners march more than fifty miles in a day. As with the California Volunteers then making their way across the Arizona desert, the Coloradans were physically bigger than their regular army counterparts and possessed of a risk-taking nature typical of the migrants that had headed west in search of gold and adventure.

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[48] Sibley to S. Cooper, AIG, May 4, 1862, *OR*, 9:511-12.

Colonel Gabriel Paul's delight in the unprecedented march and timely arrival of the Coloradans quickly dissipated as he learned that Colonel Slough's volunteer commission pre-dated his own.[49]

John Slough, a Denver lawyer without military experience but possessed of enormous ambition, chose to assume command of all the troops at Fort Union, volunteers and regulars alike, and leave Colonel Paul, the West Point professional, holding the fort, just as he had at Fort Craig during the Battle of Valverde just weeks before. On March 22, eleven days after the grueling trek, Slough had the Fort Union quartermaster outfit the Coloradans in new uniforms and ordnance officers issue the men new rifle muskets, equipment, and ammunition from the fort's well-stocked stores. Canby's cautious instructions to Paul had been to wait for reinforcements and not give up the fort. The orders were vague enough, however, to allow for someone with an active imagination to interpret them in a way that allowed independent action, if the fort could be protected. Slough's imagination, combined with his lawyerly training, was indeed equal to the task, and he determined to meet the enemy in the narrow passes of the Santa Fe Trail some eighty-five miles southwest of the fort. Colonel Paul dashed off dispatches to Washington requesting a promotion to brigadier-general to avoid such "mortification" in the future and to absolve himself of blame should Slough's impetuous movement prove disastrous.

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[49] Arizona Territorial Justice Joseph Pratt Allyn on October 26, 1863 as he made his way to Arizona from Missouri via the Santa Fe Trail wrote that, "The Colorado troops are certainly the finest troops physically I have seen, and their courage and endurance have been tested by a campaign as grand for distance marched as the famous on of Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks, and battles the most bloody in proportion to the number of men engaged of this war; and yet whose very names are unknown to eastern ones. It is difficult for you to realize the grandeur of our empire and the magnitude of this war. You cherish the battle standards inscribed with names utterly forgotten if not unknown here. Kansas and Missouri hold dearest the achievements of the army of the frontier, and a list of engagements I never heard of. Here on the plains you meet soldiers bronzed by the tropic sun and powder grime of battles on the frontiers of Chihuahua." Joseph Pratt Allyne, *West By Southwest; Letters of Joseph Pratt Allyne, A Traveler Along the Santa Fe Trail, 1863*, ed. David K. Strate (Dodge City: Kansas Heritage Center, 1984), 84.

Glorieta Pass: Broken Terrain, Logistics, and Morale

On March 26, Slough's lead battalion of cavalry and infantry under the command of Major John Milton Chivington met Major Pyron's advance astride the trail with two 6-pounders. A Methodist-minister-turned-soldier, well over six feet tall and powerfully built, Chivington inspired confidence in his men. He had gained a reputation for never backing down from a fight when he preached a sermon while wearing lion skins and armed with a brace of Colt's revolvers. When Colorado's Governor Gilpin offered him the chaplaincy of the volunteer regiment, he turned it down in favor of what he called "a fighting commission." Surprised by the number and aggressiveness of the Colorado command, the overmatched Confederates retreated fighting. Chivington's mountaineers climbed the rocky heights of narrow Apache Canyon and repeatedly flanked the rebels who were finally driven off by a charge led by Captain John Ford's mounted company of Colorado Volunteers. Throughout the affray, the towering, barrel-chested Chivington could be seen waving his pistols, bellowing commands, and conspicuously exposing himself to enemy fire, a fact not lost on his men or the Texans. In fact, when Colonel Scurry and the reinforcements from Galisteo arrived at Johnson's Ranch at the west end of Apache Canyon that evening, his men got an earful from Pyron's survivors, who had lost twenty-five percent of their number in killed, wounded, or captured, to the "Devils from Pikes Peak" and their larger-than-life leader.[50]

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[50] For excellent recapitulations of the Apache Canyon fight and impressions of the Texans, see: Don E. Alberts, *The Battle of Glorieta: Union Victory in the West* (1998; reprint, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 64-7; and Thomas S. Edrington and John Taylor, *The Battle of Glorieta Pass: A Gettysburg in the West, March 26–28, 1862* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998) , 41-51.

Chivington agreed to a truce to collect dead and wounded, mostly rebels, and then fell back to join Slough and the rest of the command at Kozlowski's Ranch, some thirteen miles to the east on the Santa Fe Trail. Both sides expected action on March 27, but none came as the opposing forces regrouped and felt out the enemy. On the morning of March 28, however, both aggressive commanders made preparations to attack. Scurry moved his 1300-man force comprising elements of the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Texas eastward on the trail, pulling three pieces of field artillery, two twelve-pounder howitzers and one six-pounder. Slough made the risky decision to split his 1300-man command in the face of the enemy and attempt a daring flank attack by crossing the rough terrain of the uncharted Glorieta Mesa hoping to hit the rebels in the rear near Johnson's ranch. Major Chivington led the 530-man flanking battalion, composed of regulars of the Fifth Infantry and Third Cavalry, Colorado Volunteers, and a detachment of the Fourth New Mexico Volunteers. Lt. Colonel Manuél Chaves, of the Second New Mexico Volunteers, had no command, even though he outranked Chivington. But Chaves agreed to guide the raiders across the broken Mesa. Before the war, Chaves had been a Santa Fe trader and knew the country well. The men respected Chaves as an Indian fighter who had seen combat during the Mexican-American war and had served with his volunteer regiment at Valverde.

Slough moved his eight hundred men, cavalry and infantry, warily down the trail while towing two batteries of artillery behind, one under Captain John Ritter, two twelve-pounder howitzers and two twelve-pounder guns, and a battery of four twelve-pounder mountain howitzers under Lieutenant Ira Claflin. By late morning, the mixed battalion of regulars and volunteers relaxed, filled canteens, and lounged behind the adobe walls of

Pigeon's Ranch, a way station with reliable water that straddled the trail. Chivington had commandeered this place as a field hospital following the Apache Canyon fight two days earlier. Scouting the Union encampment, The Brigands alerted Scurry who immediately unlimbered his artillery on a rise in the road a mile west of Pigeon's Ranch and prepared to attack. Slough sallied out to meet the Confederates as soon as the first shell burst. He established his two batteries across the road and up the slopes of a hill just south of the ranch and detailed flanking parties to take the high ground on either side of the valley, as Chivington had done at Apache Canyon. The rebels were too strong, however, and their overlapping lines enfiladed the Coloradans on the left and pushed back those on the ridge north of the road as well. The incessant artillery fire echoed in the valley like rolling thunder and clouds of pure white gunpowder smoke filled the gullies and lingered in the tops of the pine trees that shaded the pass known as Glorieta. But after three hours of fighting, two of the three Confederate guns were silenced by Colorado sharpshooters posted on a rocky prominence. The Union infantrymen were armed with long-range rifle muskets, which could easily strike man-sized targets at two hundred yards. Though many of the Coloradans had never fired their newly-issued weapons before this battle, they learned quickly. Many of the rebels had been re-armed with captured rifle muskets since Valverde, but others still carried their double-barreled shotguns, useful only at close range.[51] Accurate counter-battery fire from the Union guns may have disabled the third gun which also ceased firing, but Scurry pressed the attack, sending Majors Shropshire and Pyron up the hill occupied by Claflin's mountain guns and personally leading a

[51] Thirty-two Confederate bodies discovered in a burial trench near Pigeon's Ranch on 1987 revealed that some of the Texans carried in their pockets buckshot and slug loads for their shotguns. Don Alberts to Masich, personal communication, May 21, 1998. Alberts was the consulting historian on the excavation of the Confederate graves.

frontal assault aimed directly at the adobe wall in the center of the Union line. But the Coloradans and regulars held. Shropshire fell near the crest of the hill with a bullet in his brain, and Scurry was bloodied by Minié balls that brushed his cheeks and riddled his uniform. Volleys of musketry from the Union men sheltering behind the adobes cut down the charging Texans before they could reach the wall. By five o'clock both sides were spent, and during the lull, Slough determined to withdraw five miles to Kozlowski's Ranch. Scurry's men were in no condition to continue the fight and sent a white flag after the retreating Federals requesting a truce until noon the next day.

Just as the fighting at Pigeon's Ranch reached its fiercest, Chivington's men were scaling down the far side of Glorieta Mesa and descending on the corralled Confederate supply train, watched over by an unsuspecting corporal's guard lounging near a loaded six-pounder gun. The surprise was complete, however, and the raiders swiftly torched the eighty wagons and slaughtered or ran off hundreds of horses and mules. The devastation finished, Chivington disabled the field piece and, with rebel prisoners and re-captured federals in tow, used ropes and belts to climb back up the two-hundred-foot bluff to the mesa top. The twelve miles across the roadless pine and cedar-forested mesa in complete darkness took all night, but when Chivington revealed the success of his exploit to Slough at Kozlowski's, the somber mood in the Union camp quickly cheered. The magnitude of the victory at Glorieta Pass became clear over the next few days when it was discovered that the Confederates had hastily buried their dead, abandoned their wounded at Pigeon's Ranch, and decamped for Santa Fe. Without blankets, food,

medicine or ammunition, the rebels dragged themselves to Santa Fe a defeated army, whether or not they chose to believe it.[52]

Lt. Colonel Scurry issued a congratulatory order to the bloodied Texans: "Soldiers—You have added another victory to the long list of triumphs won by the Confederate armies."[53] But the men of his wounded and exhausted command now sheltering in every available adobe building in the New Mexican capital felt little like victors. As Sibley attempted to make sense of the battle and his available options, Canby finally sallied forth from Fort Craig on April 1, 1862, sending Carson to re-garrison Fort Union and taking his regulars to link up with Slough's command.[54] However, the command was no longer Slough's. Believing that he would be censured for disobeying orders and unnecessarily jeopardizing Fort Union, he resigned and straightaway headed east to explain himself to superiors. In truth, the Colonel had been engaged in a leadership power struggle with Major Chivington for the affection and loyalty of the men ever since the march from Denver. Chivington supporters even threatened the Colonel Slough's life, and during the fighting at Pigeon's Ranch some of the Coloradans directed a volley at him that nearly killed him. Unnerved by the whole ordeal and seeing that the men clearly preferred the charismatic Chivington, Slough felt he had no choice but to get out while he still had a chance. The Colorado Volunteers' Lieutenant Colonel, Samuel Tappan, a newspaper man from a noted New England abolitionist family, actually ranked

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[52] Though historians continue to debate many of the details (including the slaughter of the Confederate livestock) of Chivington's daring flank attack, excellent accounts may be found in Alberts, *Rebels on the Rio Grande*; Alberts, *The Battle of Glorieta*; Edrington and Taylor, *The Battle of Glorieta Pass*; and Whitlock, *Distant Bugles, Distant Drums.*

[53] Alberts, *Rebels on the Rio Grande*, 90.

[54] By all accounts, Louisa Canby, Colonel Canby's wife, and other Union officers' wives who had stayed behind in Santa Fe, tended the Confederate wounded, saved lives, and earned the admiration of friends and foes alike. *Santa Fe Gazette,* May 21, 1862.

Major Chivington, but he too saw the writing on the wall and decided to follow rather than confront the pugnacious preacher.

Now, Sibley's command headed south in two columns, on either side of the Rio Grande, the men driven by the remote chance that they might yet capture Fort Craig's commissary and ordnance stores, the only hope for reviving Confederate fortunes. Canby consolidated his own forces and had a chance to size up the Coloradans and their newly-promoted Colonel Chivington. The calm, cautious, and calculating Canby and the bombastic, bellicose, fearless Chivington were polar opposites, and the differences began to show almost immediately. Grumbling and dissent in the Union ranks began as Canby's pursuit of the rebels slowly progressed. In an Albuquerque corral on the night of April 11, Trevanion T. Teel surreptitiously buried eight of his mountain howitzers for want of ammunition to shoot and draft animals to pull the guns. The New Mexican farms and pueblos provided little relief for the retreating men who had boldly stripped the countryside on their way north. Looking to administer the *coup de grâce* to the wounded but still dangerous Confederate Army of New Mexico, Chivington recommended a rush at Peralta before the rebels could unite their divided columns. Canby held back and missed the opportunity, much to the Coloradans' disgust. Long range artillery firing and ineffectual exchanges of musketry characterized the final battle of the Civil war in New Mexico. The battle at Peralta, April 15, 1862, had spent the last of Sibley's ammunition; still Canby contented himself with herding the Texans south and picking off straggling men, horses, and wagons as the rebels grew weaker and more disorganized by the day.

Colonel William Steele, Seventh Texas Cavalry, commanding the remnants of Sibley's army as it retreated, found the Texans' pitiable state of supply forced him to

commandeer rolling stock and food from the New Mexican villages. "This occasioned so much ill-feeling on the part of the Mexicans [sic]" Steele reported to Richmond, "that in many cases armed resistance was offered to foraging parties acting under my orders, and in the various skirmishes which took place one captain and several men of my regiment were killed by them. Besides this, the troops with me were so disgusted with the campaign and so anxious to return to Texas that in one or two instances they were on the point of mutiny, and threatened to take the matter in their own hands unless they were speedily marched back to San Antonio." In the burning summer heat, the starving and half naked Confederates stumbled and dragged themselves through El Paso and across the parched desert to San Antonio.[55]

Canby's caution proved the right decision in the end. The goal of saving the Territory for the Union and stopping the Confederate threat in the borderlands and the Pacific had been achieved—and with less loss of life than a more aggressive course would have offered. The Confederates blustered that they had won every battle but had lost the campaign in New Mexico. Their pride would not allow them to admit that that were beaten before they began by the resistance of the people who resented their invasion, by the desert that could and did take their lives, and by their own logistical unpreparedness. Sibley was unfavorably compared to Baylor, who may not have been any better prepared but who acted decisively and struck his enemies quickly and won victories before his logistical inadequacy was realized. The editor of the *Santa Fe Gazette*

[55]Col. William Steele to Gen. S. Cooper, AIG, Richmond, July 12, 1862, *OR*, 50 (2), 22.

called him "the fast man of Arizona." Trevanion T. Teel summed up Sibley's weakness, saying their leader "was too prone to let the morrow take care of itself." [56]

Carleton's California Column

In contrast to the Confederates in New Mexico, Surgeon James McNulty, the acting medical director of the California Column, attributed the excellent condition of these troops to good planning and the fact that the men composing the column were "inured to mountain life in California, pioneers and miners; self-reliant and enduring; men equal to any emergency, if guided by a firm hand and a clear head." Carleton marched his men at night, starting at four or five in the afternoon and ending before dawn the next day. The sandy roads and choking alkali dust made the march almost unbearable at times, but the men did endure and pressed on.[57] In fact they were in good spirits, despite McCleave's capture and the dismal Picacho affair. Most of the soldiers believed that the expedition had been handled well, and they were proud of their remarkable record of marches from Los Angeles to Tucson—nearly six hundred miles—averaging about twenty miles a day.[58]

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[56] *Santa Fe Gazette*, August 17, 1861; see also: Teel, "Sibley's New Mexican Campaign."

[57] McNulty's Report, *OR,* 50(1):136; John C. Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches* (New York: A. Roman, 1868), 181. One soldier wrote from Tucson on July 7, 1862, that every man lost from eight to ten pounds on the march, but aside from some fevers, the California Volunteers enjoyed remarkably good health. See: *San Francisco Evening Bulletin,* July 30, 1862. A soldier correspondent with the First Infantry, CV, noted that before each day's march, "the Colonel orders out the sick, sore and sorry, in front of each company, and a man must be either clearly broken down or tell a very plausible story" in order earn himself a wagon ride. San Francisco *Evening Bulletin*, Oct. 29, 1861.

[58] *Camps/Miles:* Camp Latham (Los Angeles) /18, Reed's Ranch/15, Chino/18, Temescal/17, Laguna Grande/13, Temecula/21, Giftaler's/13.5, Camp Wright (Warner's Ranch, San Diego)/25, San Felipe/13, Vallecito/17, Carrizo Creek/16.5, Sackett's Well/17.5, Indian Wells/15, New River Station/15, Alamo Station/14, Salt or Seven Wells/18, Pilot Knob/25, Fort Yuma, Colorado River/10, Gila City/17.5, Mission Camp/11.5, Filibuster Camp/6, Antelope Peak/9.25, Mohawk Station/13, Texas Hill/11, Lagoon Camp/5, Grinnel's Ranch/11.25, Grassy Camp/3, Burkes Station/6.5, Oatman Flat/11.25, Kenyon Station/13.5, Shady Camp/10, Gila Bend/4, Desert Station/22, The Tanks, 7.5, Maricopa Wells/11.25, Pima Villages/11.25, Sacaton Station/12, Oneida Station/11, Blue Water Station/10, Barrett's Grave/13.9, Picacho Station/1, Point of Mountain/25, Tucson/15. SO 15, Hdqrs. Column from California, June 16,

Carleton made certain that the officers made meticulous notes of all they observed, paying special attention to water (alkalinity, depth of wells, time it took for the wells to naturally replenish), grass, shade, game, and the condition of the road. He also required them to carefully record distances. Shinn's artillery battery had an odometer attached to one of the caissons that measured distances to the nearest hundredth of a mile. Infantry officers relied on the tried-and-true method of pace counting. A reliable soldier in each company was assigned the unenviable task of counting each step and reporting to the first sergeant at every halt. Of course the man had to have a regular stride and measured pace of twenty-eight inches from heel to heel. A knotted string helped him keep track of his count, but he had to forgo socializing on the march or doing anything that might break his concentration.[59]

The marching men seemed unaware that their route through the low desert country along the Gila to Tucson's Santa Catalina Mountains rose nearly a mile in elevation. The climb was gradual, nearly imperceptible, but the teamsters needed to urge their tired draft animals on and occasionally double-teamed the heavily-loaded wagons over steep grades. Some observant soldiers noted the altitude change and its effect on the native flora—from creosote, sage, and prickly pear cactus in the Colorado lowlands to the mesquite, paloverde, and saguaros of the high desert.[60]

1862, *OR,* 50(1):138–42; GO 6, Hdqrs. Dist. of Southern Calif., May 7, 1862, ibid., 1056; J. R. West to B. C. Cutler, Fort Yuma, Nov. 7, 1861, ibid., 709–14.

[59]Henry L. Scott, *Military Dictionary,* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1864), 451; Alexander Bowman, *Diary of Corporal A. Bowman, Pace-counter, Co. B., 5th Infantry, California Volunteers*, University of Arizona Library Special Collections, Tucson; One soldier wrote home that when marching in "route step" the men were able to "crack our jokes and sing our songs, and thus enliven the way." Officers had to ensure that rival companies (e.g. "city boys" vs "mountaineers") did not quicken the pace in order to demonstrate their marching prowess. San Francisco *Evening Bulletin*, Oct. 29, 1861.

[60] Yuma is just above sea level, and the road from Fort Breckinridge to Tucson passes along the base of the Santa Catalina Mountains, nearly a mile high; McNulty's Report, *OR,* 50(1):140

By the time the Californians regrouped and began the final push from the Pima Villages to Tucson on May 14, there was little chance they might overtake Hunter's men. From the rebel prisoners taken at Picacho Carleton had learned that McCleave and Ammi White had been sent to the Rio Grande escorted by Lieutenant Jack Swilling. McCleave had given up an opportunity to be paroled because he refused to swear that he would not take up arms against the Confederacy. Knowing that it would now be impossible to rescue his friend, Carleton resumed his methodical preparations for subsisting his troops. Before leaving Fort Yuma he ordered Colonel West to secure Tucson and establish a supply line to Sonora, Mexico, as soon as possible. Carleton impressed upon his subordinates that on this campaign logistics mattered more than fighting. He wrote to Sonora's liberal Republican governor, Ignacio Pesqueira, urging him to make supplies available to the California troops. As a gesture of goodwill, Carleton removed his earlier immigration ban on Mexicans who desired to cross the border to work in the rich new mines on the lower Colorado River.

Across the border in Mexico, Governor Pesqueira had his hands full. He fought Apaches who, it seemed, crossed the line with impunity, devastating unprotected Sonoran settlements. He also battled his conservative political rival, former governor and long-time *caudillo*, Manuel Gándara, who had allied himself with Ópata, lower Pima, Papago, and Yaqui villagers. Pesqueira hoped that the increased American military presence might deter the Apache raiders and relieve some of the burden of garrisoning the border

posts as a French army closed in on Mexico City. Given the internal and external threats, he had little choice but to accept Carleton's professions of friendship.[61]

Carleton saw Tucson as the key to Arizona, and his plan for its capture left nothing to chance. In accordance with orders West did not take the Picacho route to Tucson but instead traveled the longer Fort Breckenridge trail by way of the Gila and San Pedro rivers.[62] The Picacho affair had been an embarrassment, and Carleton would not risk another failure. He cautioned West not to make any move against the town unless the chances for success were nearly all in his favor. Carleton counseled his subordinate to keep his sabers very sharp and not underrate the Confederates. The commander drew on his Mexican War experiences and offered advice on how to take the town if Hunter's men decided to fight it out from entrenchments or forted up in loop-holed adobes. As the California soldiers closed on Tucson, Carleton's old confidence returned, and he warned West that Colonel Bowie's Fifth California Infantry, following close behind but not considered part of the original column, "must have equal chances" for glory with the First Infantry.[63]

On May 20, 1862, Captain Emil Fritz's Company B, First California Cavalry, with drawn pistols at the ready, spurred their mounts into sleepy Tucson. One platoon entered from the east and another from the north, meeting without incident in the town's plaza, once the center of the Spanish presidio. Actually there was one embarrassing

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[61] Carleton to Pesqueira, Tucson, July 12, 1862, *OR* 50 (2), 17-18; Rudolph F. Acuña. "Ignacio Pesqueira: Sonoran Caudillo," *Arizona and the West,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1970), pp. 157-59. Jack Autrey Dabbs, *The French Army in Mexico, 1861-1867* (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1963), 99-100; Percy F. Martin, *Maximilian in Mexico* (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1914), 206; Armand de Castagny to Francois-Achille Bazaine, Mazatlán, February 16, 1865, in Genaro Garcia and Carlos Pereyra. *Colección de Documentos lneditos*, 35 Volumes (Mexico, D.F. 1905-1911), Segunda Parte, Tomo XXIV, 228-35**.**.
[62] McNulty's Report, *OR,* 50(1):140; S. Hunter to J. R. Baylor, April 5, 1862, *OR,* 9:707–08; E. A. Rigg to J. H. Carleton, Mar. 30, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):965–66.
[63] Carleton to West, May 2, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1047.

incident. As Fritz's men galloped through the dusty streets, they saw what appeared to be gun barrels projecting from the rooftops. According to Lieutenant George H. Pettis, Company K, First California Infantry, "Captain Fritz and his gallant troops, as they rode through the vacant streets of Tucson, threw themselves over on the sides of their horses when they saw the long water spouts [*canales*] protruding from the *casas* . . . pointing in their direction." The California cavalrymen quickly regained their composure and secured the town. The following day the infantry marched down the narrow streets with flags snapping and fifes and drums echoing "Yankee Doodle" off the adobe buildings that crowded the pueblo. The Californians stacked arms in the plaza and slapped the dust from their blue uniforms. From sympathetic locals they learned that all but a handful of Hunter's men had evacuated a week earlier. Only five hundred people remained in town, a third of the former population, along with a surprisingly large number of cats and dogs.[64]

By the end of May, Colonel West had re-garrisoned Fort Breckenridge, which he renamed Fort Stanford in honor of Leland Stanford, the new governor of California, and Fort Buchanan, forty-five miles southeast of Tucson. But West soon abandoned these posts—the regulars had destroyed the buildings when they withdrew in 1861—for occupying forts had no place in Carleton's strategy to reach the Rio Grande and the real war in New Mexico.[65]

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[64] George H. Pettis, *The California Column* (Santa Fe: Historical Society, 1908), 11; *Tucson Arizona Citizen,* May 19, 1883, Sept. 27, 1884. Lieutenant Pettis contends that the *canales* that frightened Fritz's men became a standing joke with the California Column. Bowman, *Diary*, May 21, 1862, University of Arizona Library. The Californians surprised Lt. James Tevis and a few Confederate sentinels who rode out from the opposite end of town. Finch, *Confederate Pathway,* 153; Lt. George H. Pettis to Annie (wife), May 26, 1862, Pettis Papers.

[65] Carleton to Drum, Tucson, June 10, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1128–29.

On June 6 Carleton himself arrived in Tucson. Lieutenant Shinn's four-gun battery boomed an impressive salute as the commander's entourage rode into the dusty adobe pueblo. Apparently Carleton arranged for Shinn to arrive early in order to perform such a ceremony by ordering his own escort to make a fatiguing detour that enabled the artillery contingent to travel straight through. Undeniably the normally straight-laced Carleton had a flair for the dramatic. Just before leaving Fort Yuma on May 15, he issued General Orders No. 1, which declared that his expedition would hereafter be known officially as the "Column from California." Although unorthodox, the name caught on immediately with the men, and soon all official correspondence reflected the change or clipped it to the more manageable "California Column."[66]

After Arizona City, on the banks of the Colorado River across from Fort Yuma, Tucson was the largest permanent settlement in the territory. The people remaining in the town were a resilient lot—undeterred by Apache raids or the rebel occupation. Most had been born Mexican citizens, but the 1854 Gadsden Purchase had made Americans of them. The Hispanos seemed not to mind being recast as Americanos as long as the new government allowed them to practice their religion, tend their flocks, and till their fields. Some of the Mexican American population profited as merchants and freighters. Others offered important services such as blacksmithing, essential for the maintenance of army rolling stock. Captive Apaches toiled alongside the Tucsonans, just as many Mexican American captives had been adopted into Apache families. Pima, Maricopa, and Papago Indians could be found in the town as well. Some worked as farmers, teamsters, scouts, or domestic servants.

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[66] *Alta,* June 10, 1862; GO 1, Hdqrs. Column from California, May 15, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1075.

Tucson's Anglo inhabitants, though a minority, dominated the political and economic life of the community. They were mostly young and middle-aged men—outnumbering the women five to one—who had emigrated from the "States" to seek fortunes as miners, tradesmen, and entrepreneurs. Some subsisted by gambling or some other illicit trade, and more than a few were fugitives from justice.[67]

Colonel Carleton had been feeling sorry for himself as he became aware that in other commands officers junior to him had received promotions, but shortly before reaching Tucson news arrived that President Lincoln had confirmed his appointment as brigadier general of volunteers. With renewed confidence and authority, though unsure if he could yet claim his new rank on official documents, Colonel Carleton provisionally proclaimed Arizona a separate territory on June 8, 1862: "The Congress of the United States has set apart a portion of New Mexico, and organized it into a Territory complete by itself. This is known as the Territory of Arizona. It comprises within its limits all the country eastward from the Colorado River, which is now occupied by the forces of the United States, known as the 'Column from California.'" As military Governor of the new territory he quickly imposed martial law in Tucson.[68] He immediately established a supply depot that could support the other posts in the territory as well as the column that would continue to New Mexico. While the rear guard filed into town, Governor Carleton

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[67]U.S. Senate. *Federal Census—Territory of New Mexico and Territory of Arizona, [1860, 1864,1870],* 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965. S. Doc. 13. Carleton's proclamation may be found in *OR,* 50(1):96–97. The United States acquired present Arizona north of the Gila River with the Mexican Cession of 1848. Gadsden's treaty, which included Tucson and the land south of the Gila, was amended and ratified by the Senate in June 1854—though this new territory was not occupied by U.S. troops until November 1856. See C.L. Sonnichsen, *Tucson: The Life and Times of an American City* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 40.

[68] *OR,* 50(1):96–97; From Dept. of the Pacific Headquarters, Gen. Wright "approved and confirmed" Carleton's actions and rank as "Brigadier-General of Volunteers" on June 28, 1862, Orton, *California Men,* 56. Congress and President Lincoln ratified Carleton's action by officially establishing Arizona as a U.S. territory on February 24, 1863.

set about rectifying matters in Arizona. "A number of notorious characters were arrested . . . and sent to Fort Yuma. Order sprang from disorder, and in a short time a den of thieves was converted into a peaceful village." Such was the glowing account of Carleton's reign as related by Surgeon McNulty. Not everyone, however, was as well pleased with the new military government.[69]

Carleton sent a detachment under Colonel Eyre to arrest Sylvester Mowry, an ex–army officer, mining entrepreneur, and avowed Confederate sympathizer, at his Patagonia Mine south of Tucson near the Mexican border. Eyre brought Mowry and the occupants of the mine back to Tucson. A military commission tried the men and sent them in shackles to Fort Yuma for incarceration. Carleton extended his heavy-handed style of government to Tucson's gambling-hall and saloon owners by imposing a monthly one-hundred-dollar tax on all tables used for Monte or games of chance. He ordered that the tax revenue raised be used to benefit the sick and injured members of the California Column. He also instituted a military pass system that monitored all citizens entering or leaving town. Although many Southern sympathizers had decamped with Sherod Hunter, Carleton would not tolerate any saboteurs or rebel spies.[70] Before leaving California, Carleton revealed his no-nonsense side when he warned Eyre that he should be prepared to disobey a writ of habeas corpus, and "if any person fires into your camp, hang him."[71]

He directed that until the territorial government could organize civil courts, martial law would prevail. Regulations for army courts-martial pertained to all public

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[69] Carleton to E. R. S. Canby, June 15, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):96–97; McNulty's Report, ibid., 142.
[70] Orton, *California Men,* 44–45; SO 142, Sept. 10, 1863, Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, Special, General and Post Orders, 1861–66, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, RG 393, NARA; E. E. Eyre to Benjamin C. Cutler, acting AAG, Column from California, June 16, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):1142–43; Proclamation, Executive Dept., Ariz. Terr., by Order of General Carleton, June 17, 1862, *OR,* 9:693.
[71] Carleton to Eyre, November 4, 1861, *OR* 50 (1):700-01.

trials. A commission of not more than five and no fewer than three officers presided over the court. Only when the territorial government could establish civil courts would appeals be granted. A number of Tucson desperados, no doubt, breathed a sigh of relief when Carleton added, "no execution shall follow conviction" without orders from the president.[72]

Carleton had initially made public his intention to campaign against Western Apache raiders, though this ruse quickly gave way as his primary objective of linking up with the Union forces in New Mexico and driving the rebels back to Texas became obvious. While the struggle for New Mexico raged, Carleton tried repeatedly to communicate with Canby. On June 15, he dispatched three expressmen in an attempt to reach Canby's command on the Rio Grande. John W. Jones; Sergeant William Wheeling of Company F, First Infantry; and a Mexican guide named Chavez left Tucson and rode their mules hard for three days until a large party of Chiricahuas attacked them just east of Apache Pass. Jones alone escaped with his life, but Confederate troops at another El Picacho, about six miles from Mesilla, captured him before he reached Canby. Incredibly, although imprisoned, Jones somehow managed to get word to Canby that the California Column was on its way. Carleton's passion for secrecy paid off. The expressman surrendered his false dispatch—intended for Confederate consumption in case of capture—and smuggled the tissue paper version to Canby.[73]

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[72] Carleton to Canby, June 15, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):97.

[73] "Jones call[ed] to the sergeant to mount his mule, as flight was their only chance. Jones mounted and put spurs to his mule; but the sergeant never followed. Jones ran the gauntlet for several miles, with Indians running alongside him, and shooting at him. He shot three of his pursuers, who gradually dwindled down to one Indian, who brushed by him on a swift horse, and wheeled and took deliberate aim at Jones, cutting the rim of his hat with the ball. Jones drew up and fired at him. They then parted, the Indian exclaiming, "*Mucho wano* [*bueno*] *mula, bravo Americano.*" [You have a good mule, brave American.] The Indians dogged Jones for sixty miles, and then gave him up." *Alta*, August 10, 1862; Carleton included Jones's

By June 21 the Californians began to move forward to the Rio Grande. Colonel Eyre pressed on with two companies of the First Cavalry on a "forced reconnaissance." This command met with no Confederate resistance, but it did encounter Cochise's Chiricahua Apaches, with whom Eyre had been admonished to "avoid collision." The advance companies encamped in Apache Pass, the narrow defile through the Chiricahua Mountains midway between Tucson and Mesilla. The Californians had ridden into the heart of Cochise's domain, hoping to treat with the chief while showing good faith by offering to share food and tobacco. Eyre little understood the enmity forged just the year before when the inexperienced Lieutenant Bascom hanged Chiricahua prisoners thought to be responsible for crimes actually committed by Coyotero Apaches from the White Mountains to the north. Cochise's own family members had been among those executed in the Bascom affair, and the Chiricahua leader still burned with a desire to settle his blood debt with the Americans.[74]

While Eyre offered a gift of pemmican and attempted to parley, Chiricahua warriors killed, stripped, and mutilated three of Captain Fritz's Company B troopers who strayed from the command after watering their horses. Furious that Eyre would not allow him to avenge the slaughtered men, Fritz threw down his saber and carbine and openly argued with his superior. The offending Chiricahuas could still be seen on the adjoining hills just out of rifle range. But Eyre was determined the incident would not delay him. He tightened camp security and allowed the enraged Fritz to calm down. The Apaches fired a volley into the soldiers' camp that night, but the advance continued without

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testimony in his own report of the expedition's march, noting that the Chiricahuas shouted "now let's have a race" when the chase began. Jones's statement, July 22, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):119–20.

[74] Mulligan, R.A. "Apache Pass and Old Fort Bowie." *The Smoke Signal* 11 (Spring 1965), 5–10; Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas,* 391–412; and *Cochise,* 142–60.

further trouble. The pass had proven itself the bane of more than one expedition. At Dragoon Springs, just west of the pass, Sherod Hunter had lost four of his rangers and fifty-five animals as they retreated eastward from the California Column weeks earlier. The graves of the Union and Confederate dead now ominously marked the trail near the abandoned stage station.[75]

Just a month after Eyre's skirmish, the Apaches ambushed Captain Thomas L. Roberts's command in the pass. This fight resulted in the largest armed conflict ever to take place between U.S. troops and the Apaches in Arizona. On July 15, 1862, Roberts's command, which included a company of infantry, a detachment of cavalry, and Lieutenant Thompson's two mountain howitzers manned by infantrymen, met several hundred Chiricahua Apaches under the joint leadership of Cochise and Mangas Coloradas. The soldiers suffered two men killed and two seriously wounded after a four-hour fight for the spring in the pass. Only the effective deployment of the artillery saved the command. With but brief respite beside the cool water of the spring, the men of the strung-out California Column continued on toward the Rio Grande.[76]

The Anglo soldiers reduced the danger of Apache attack in the pass after Major Theodore A. Coult and a company of the Fifth California Infantry established a post there on Carleton's orders. Placing military posts in the heart of enemy country would become standard operating procedure for the U.S. troops in the territories during the Civil War years. Coult named this strategic post Fort Bowie in honor of the regiment's colonel, George W. Bowie. Carleton also began to reorganize the command and communication

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[75] Carleton to Eyre, June 17, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):98; McChristian, Douglas C., and Larry L. Ludwig, "Eyewitness to the Bascom Affair: An Account by Sergeant Daniel Robinson, Seventh Infantry." *Journal of Arizona History* 42 (Autumn 2001): 277–300.
[76] Report of Thomas L. Roberts, July 19, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):128–29.

network by creating the District of Western Arizona with headquarters at Tucson. He entrusted Major David Fergusson, chief commissary of the California Column, with the command of the district which encompassed the region between Fort Yuma and Fort Bowie and provided for the protection of travelers, settlers, and miners. A detachment of Californians was already on the way to relieve the civilians at the Pinos Altos mines in southwestern New Mexico, where Apaches had killed so many of the miners that their families and others faced death by starvation.[77]

Carleton authorized a military mail, or "vedette service," to run from Tucson to Los Angeles, since Apache raiders and the rebel threat had shut down the Butterfield Overland Mail on the southern route in 1861. The U.S. mail contractor now ran stage coaches and Pony Express riders on the safer central route along the Platte River and across the high plains. Carleton recruited "first-rate men" and the best riders in the California Column for his elite corps of vedettes, and soon reestablished deliveries on the southern route. To lessen the fatigue of the horses and ensure the mail would get through, the general sought out small men with a good deal of grit. These mail carriers rode long distances, often without escorts, relying on their own survival instincts and the endurance of their picked animals to carry them safely through ambushes and an unforgiving desert. Although Carleton appealed to Postmaster General Montgomery Blair to restore regular mail service along the route, the U.S. Postal Service did not resume full operations until after the war. Arizona territorial governor John N. Goodwin later expressed appreciation to the Californians in his report to the first legislature, stating, "We have been indebted to

[77] Carleton to West, Aug. 6, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):105; Shirland to West, August 10, 1862, OR 50(1):105-6.

the courtesy of the military authorities for the means of communication between the principal points in the territory and the mail routes in New Mexico and California."[78]

By August 1862, the California Column had reached the Rio Grande, with Carleton's men hot on the rebels' heels picking up the sick and wounded abandoned at the post hospitals in New Mexico and Texas and stragglers found along the trail. While awaiting the arrival of Chivington's Coloradans to continue the pursuit of the retreating Texans, Lt. Colonel Eyre's advance recovered the much-relieved Captain McCleave and his captured men in a tearful reunion near Fort Thorn. Almost immediately, Carleton succeeded Canby as commander of the Department of New Mexico. The War Department also saw fit to retain Carleton as commander of the California Column, which had previously reported to General Wright's Department of the Pacific. Although supplies continued to pour into the depot at Tucson along the Yuma route, Carleton now commanded the whole operation from his headquarters at Santa Fe.[79]

In September Carleton re-defined the District of Arizona as stretching from the Colorado River to the Rio Grande. The District of Western Arizona, now commanded by Major Coult, became a sub district, supporting the frontline troops then in pursuit of Sibley's retreating Texans. Carleton's change in command and the reorganization of the existing districts resulted in considerable confusion over departmental jurisdiction and the District of Western Arizona. Coult found himself in a decidedly difficult position,

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[78] Carleton to Coult, May 20, 1862. *OR* 50(1), 1082-3; Carleton to Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair, Santa Fe, October 18, 1862, OR, 50(2):181-2; ibid. May 2, 1863, OR 50(2): 419-20; GO 11, Order of Brigadier General Carleton, July 21, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):92; GO 9, Order of Brigadier General Carleton, May 15, 1862, OR, 50(1):1075; John N. Goodwin, Report to the First Arizona Territorial Legislature, Prescott, Sept. 1864, cited in Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 133–34.

[79] Carleton to Wright, March 7, 1864, *OR*, 50(2):783-4; Eyre to Cutler, July 8, 1862, *OR* 50(1):124-6. McCleave's highly developed sense of honor forbade him from accepting his pay ($582.50) for the period he had been a captive of the rebels. Altshuler, *Cavalry Yellow*, 209.

receiving conflicting orders from the Department of the Pacific and the Department of New Mexico. Washington finally resolved the problem by officially attaching the District of Western Arizona to Carleton's department in January 1863.[80]

Although the California Column had skirmished with rebel pickets and fought Apaches in Arizona, Carleton's men encountered no serious opposition from the Confederates retreating from New Mexico. The half-starved and footsore rebels stole what provisions they could from the increasingly hostile locals; buried or abandoned all of their artillery, with the exception of McRae's "Valverde Battery"; and dodged the converging Union forces. Sibley's survivors then set out across the waterless hundred-mile-desert known as the Jornada del Muerto (Journey of the Dead) for Texas, leaving more than seven hundred of their comrades behind, either dead or captured. Nearly half of these casualties had fallen victim to malnutrition, disease, or exposure to the elements. Sibley had been defeated by his inability to resupply his troops in the southwestern desert and the cautious but relentless pressure from Canby's troops from the north and Carleton's command from the west.[81]

Jefferson Davis's confidence in Sibley's scheme for a Confederate empire in the Far West was likely never very high. The Confederates dedicated little financial support or manpower to the project, though the invasion of New Mexico and Arizona did serve to divert significant federal resources that may have relieved pressure in other more vital theaters. Davis's administration had been intrigued by the possibility of securing foreign recognition; the stress and uncertainty presented by Mexico's warring political factions

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[80] Pettis, *California Column,* 18–19; Orton, *California Men,* 669–70.
[81] Sibley was forced to abandon all of his sick and wounded men in hospitals at Santa Fe, Albuquerque, Socorro, and Franklin. Sibley to S. Cooper, AIG, May 4, 1862, *OR*, 9:511.

and foreign intervention might have provided the opportunity to make a deal resulting in formal diplomatic relations. The Confederate high command viewed tactical offensive operations into Northern territory as opportunities to influence public opinion, North and South, and serve the Confederacy's overarching "let us alone" political strategy. But for Sibley and the Texans the invasion had been a quest for empire, pure and simple, premised on the racist belief that the Hispanos and Indians inhabiting the territories were incapable of developing the country. It was a continuation of previous land grabs that had begun prior to the Mexican-American War. The invaders sought to extend their empire all the way to the Colorado gold mines and ultimately impose Texas-style Manifest Destiny on the northern states of Mexico, including the port of Guaymas, and possibly establishing permanent dominion over California. Sibley now realized that his dream of empire was lost and harbored an "irreconcilable detestation of the country and the people." He summed up his disillusionment at the outcome of the campaign in his final report: "New Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest."[82]

As the California troops occupied abandoned forts in New Mexico and Texas they dutifully ran the U.S. colors up the flag poles—if only for a day—before chasing the Texas rebels all the way back to San Antonio. Carleton wrote with pride and sentimentality to superiors and reflected on the arduous journey his men had completed: "I send you a set of colors which have been borne by this Column. They were hoisted by Colonel West on Forts Breckenridge and Buchanan, and over Tucson, Ariz.; by Colonel

[82] Sibley made a point of reminding the Confederate high command that the "entire campaign has been prosecuted without a dollar from the quartermaster's department" and that his men were better armed and equipped than when the expedition began. Sibley to S. Cooper, AIG, May 4, 1862, *OR*, 9:511-12.

Eyre over Forts Thorn, Fillmore, and over Mesilla, N. Mex., and over Fort Bliss, in Texas, and thus again have those places been consecrated to our beloved country." General in Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in response from Washington on October 13, 1862, that the desert trek of the California Column was "one of the most creditable marches on record. I only wish our Army here had the mobility and endurance of the California troops." Though the Texas rebels were on the run, the volunteer soldiers remaining in the borderlands had only begun the task of wresting the territories from the indigenous peoples who were engaged in civil wars of their own.[83]

[83] Carleton to R.C. Drum, Sept. 20, 1862 in Orton, *California Men*, 64-7; Henry W. Halleck, Oct. 13, 1862, quoted in Hunt, *James Henry Carleton,* 236. Though the Californians controlled Forts Bliss, Quitman and Davis in West Texas, some of the California soldiers rode all the way to San Antonio, escorting wounded rebels.

Chapter 4 *Indian and Hispano Wars*

By 1863, the borderlands were embroiled in civil war. The Colorado River tribes still eyed the Pimas and Maricopas suspiciously, but due to the strong Anglo-American military presence, there was now little armed conflict between the tribes. South of the border, the French intervention in Mexico's civil war had escalated and Mexico City had fallen to the conservatives, driving Juaristas to the northern Mexican states or across the international boundary into the United States. Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa-Apaches fought Utes, Jicarilla Apaches, and Hispanos for survival and dominance on New Mexico's eastern border, and Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors, pressed by hordes of westering white settlers on the Plains and in Colorado, pushed southward across the Santa Fe Trail and into the Southern Plains, which were fast becoming a flashpoint for violent interaction. But New Mexico and the newly created Arizona territories became the main arenas for conflict spawned by the disruption and militarization resulting from the American Civil War. Anglos introduced the idea of total war, and Navajo and Apache warriors found themselves locked in war-to-the-death against an unprecedented Anglo-Hispano-Indian alliance that would change everything.

Apacheans: Navajos and Mescaleros

As warfare intensified between Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos in the territories, the U.S. War Department expanded Carleton's authority to include all of New Mexico as well as Arizona. He wasted little time in launching expeditions against the Navajos and Apaches, especially the Mescaleros, in southern New Mexico and eastern Arizona. Groups of warriors from these groups, operating independently, accounted for nearly ninety percent of the raids and attacks reported by citizens, soldiers, and Indians

considered "in amity" with the U.S. government. Amity really had little to do with peace. It was a term of art in American diplomacy that simply meant that "the tribes" with treaties, which supposedly guaranteed amicable and beneficial relations, were the responsibility of the government which would hold them accountable in the event of hostile acts against citizens or other groups resulting in the loss of property. In the borderlands during the 1860s, these "depredations" numbered in the hundreds, ten times more than in the antebellum years. The Navajo and Apache raiders targeted the livestock of the Indians as well as the herds of the Hispanos. The raiders also waylaid the wagon trains of Anglo merchants and even occasionally swept through mining camps and towns. In most cases, the attackers avoided armed conflict with their enemies, focusing their energies instead on driving off as many animals as they could.[1]

Between 1867 and 1893, the U.S. Court of Claims received more than six hundred depredation claims for civilian property taken by Indians in Arizona and New Mexico during the years 1861 to 1867. There were, of course, many more attacks for which claims were not filed. Military operations were not included, nor were killings that did not also involve the loss of property.[2] Only the claims involving property loss and meeting the strict guidelines for reporting were allowed. Still, the depredation claims

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[1] NARA, RG 123, Records of the U.S. Court of Claims, Indian Depredation Case Records; RG 75 Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, 1835-1896. After 1834, depredation claimants had to prove, by means of a treaty or other evidence, that the tribe responsible for the loss was "in amity with" the U.S. at the time of the crime. Records for the years prior to the Civil War indicate not only were there fewer attacks, but the number of deaths per attack was also lower, revealing that the nature of war had also changed. See also Larry Skogen, *Indian Depredation Claims, 1796-1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), passim.

[2] A chronological list of military actions with Indians, with a tabular statement showing that in 1863-4 alone there were 143 encounters resulting in 604 Indians killed, 227 wounded, and 8,793 captured; officers and men killed: 24 and 50 wounded. U.S. Congress, *Condition of the Indian Tribes: Joint Special Committee Report: Appointed Under Joint Resolution of March 3, 1865. J.R. Doolittle* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1867), 93, 247-57.

provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence of the raiding and warfare that swept the borderlands of the 1860s. Some eighty percent of these claims were filed by Hispano farmers, ranchers, and businessmen residing in New Mexico. Claimants attributed seventy-two percent of these depredations to Navajo raiders and twenty-six percent to Apaches. In nearly every case, the claimant lost livestock: horses, mules, donkeys, cattle, sheep, and goats. In addition, claimants lost "provisions" (14%), firearms (11%), camp equipage (17%), and other goods (15%).

In most cases, the raiders armed themselves with a combination of bows and arrows, lances, and guns. While the warriors often brandished their weapons, only nine percent of the cases indicated they were fired or wielded with intent to do bodily harm. More often than not firearms were discharged to frighten off herders or to drive cattle. One raid in ten resulted in human casualties; of these, seventy percent were killed, twenty percent wounded, and ten percent captured. As the civil wars in the borderlands dragged on, however, the incidence of deadly attacks increased. [3]

The Apaches and Navajos were linguistically and culturally related. After years of intermarriage and the exchange of captives, they were also related by blood. The diverse Apache bands were at once trading partners and adversaries, competing for the same territory and resources, which often included the livestock of the sedentary agrarian Indians, Hispanos, and, by the 1860s, Anglos who came to the borderlands in search of gold and empire.

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[3] Depredation Case Files, NARA, RG 123; Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, NARA RG 75. This percentage may not represent an accurate proportion of all deaths resulting from fighting during this period. There were many attacks and combats that were not reported as depredations but were recorded in military, church, newspaper, correspondence, oral, and other sources. The purpose of making a depredation claim was to petition for compensation for property lost. The record of killings and wounds resulting from attacks is incidental, since the government disallowed compensation for death, injury, and suffering.

The semi-sedentary Navajos and semi-nomadic Apaches had much in common, but there were also significant cultural differences. The Apaches' supreme being (*Ussen*) contrasted with Navajo deities, but both groups believed in an afterlife, in spiritual helpers in nature, and in spirits of the departed. The "happy place," where people went when then died, existed under the ground, within the womb of mother earth. In the afterlife, the dead had a corporeal presence and enjoyed all of the pleasures of the present world: love and children, family and friends, food and frolic, and hunting and raiding. Portals to this underworld remained well hidden from the living but were easily seen or revealed when death came. Once through the portal, mortals fell into the underworld, tumbling down an enormous cone of sand. Try as the recently-deceased might, the soft sand gave way underfoot, and it was nearly impossible to scramble back up the slope and through the portal to the mortal world. The names of the dead were only rarely spoken for fear that by so doing their ghosts would be called and disturbed.

Among Indian people, usually comprised of clans or related families, incest taboos were strong, and men generally married outside of their family group. Warriors who had proven themselves as good raiders and who possessed surplus horses and other stock could seek a wife. A married man would live with his wife's group and pledge to support her family, beginning with generous gifts of food and stock. Generosity was a virtue much admired by all of the Apacheans. No man could aspire to a leadership position as a chief or band headman without demonstrating his ability and willingness to provide for people who were hungry or less fortunate. Chiefs were men of proven ability in war. They tended to be big and strong. Chiricahua Chief Mangas Coloradas was said to be 6'5" tall and his son in law, Cochise, stood well over six feet, exceptionally tall for an

Apache. Mescalero Chief Santana, the son of a chief, was also unusually tall.[4] Theoretically, leadership was not hereditary, but boys raised by chiefly fathers learned much about leadership, and the people generally saw these young men of good families as potential candidates for chiefs and headmen. When the time came, leaders would be recognized by the people, rather than elected in a formal sense.[5]

The Navajos had acquired and adopted much from the Hispanicized Pueblo. Semi-sedentary, Navajo hogans were more substantial and less mobile than the simple brush and grass wickiups of the Apaches. With regular crops and orchards and large flocks of sheep, goats, cattle, and horses acquired after centuries of interaction with European immigrants, the Navajos accumulated considerable wealth and developed a rich tradition of weaving colorful and intricately designed blankets from the yarn that they spun from sheared sheep wool. Their ceramic and basketry traditions were also more sophisticated than those of the neighboring Apache tribes. The Navajo clans gathered around chiefs and *ricos*, wealthy men with many sheep and large followings.

The Apaches lived a more Spartan and raid-dependent way of life. The boys trained as warriors from a very young age, and by the time they had seen fourteen

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[4] Mangas is frequently reported to have stood 6'5" tall, but one eye witness among the California Vols. described him as, "Six feet four inches in his moccasins." Gwyther [Co. K, 1st Infantry], "Our Scout to Black Canyon." Of the Apacheans, the mountain dwelling peoples were generally shorter in stature than their buffalo-hunting Kiowa-Apache cousins of the Plains. The Cheyennes were the tallest and generally thought to be the most impressive, physically of the Southern Plains tribes. The Colorado River Yumans were known for their stature and strength. Mojave Chief Iretaba stood well over six feet, and the Quechan's best-known chief, Pascual, was unusually tall, standing between 6'3" and 6'7". *Daily Alta*, May 23, 1859; Pauline Pascual, descendant of Chief Pascual, personal communication, Feb. 14, 1985.

[5] Eve Ball, *Indeh; An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 9, 23, 56-7; for a brief overview of Navajo leadership, religious, marriage, and death customs see Capt. H. B. Bristol's testimony in: Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 357-58. Descended from Chief Barranquito, Santana and his brothers/cousins (Apache kinship does not differentiate the terms brother and cousin), Cadete and Roman all became chiefs. C.L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 142. The peoples of the Plains and most other American Indians all shared the value of generosity, especially toward those in need.

summers they accompanied men on stock raids. On a raid, the "novices" did the drudgery of the camp, performing any task asked of them, from wood gathering to food preparation and horse care. They were required to use novice words reserved for them and performed rituals to ensure the success of the raid. Water was sipped only through a reed straw which they carried with them, along with a special stick to be used for scratching any itch. They could not risk touching blood, even their own, without jeopardizing the mission and the lives of companions. During the first four raids, the boys were not to engage the enemy or directly steal stock, but they performed important support roles, holding horses or guarding supplies and captives. They spoke as little as possible, made no noise, and learned much.

By the time they were in their late teens, most Apache and Navajo youths could join a raiding party as a full-fledged member. They had become warriors, aspiring to return from a raid rich in horses, stock, booty, and perhaps even captives. The latter might be traded, as other livestock, or turned over to families who had lost fathers or sons in combat. The captive then might be killed or adopted depending on the emotional state and need of the family that had suffered the loss. Though the Apaches and Navajos both feared displeasing the spirits of the dead—never speaking their names and burning the home and possessions of dead family member or friend—they did take enemy scalps to pray and dance over. In taking an enemy scalp a warrior demonstrated his dominance over his foe, but great care had to be taken in the ritual handling of such a powerful and potentially dangerous talisman. If a raiding or war party suffered dead of its own, enemy scalps would be immediately discarded—there could be no joy in dancing and celebrating.

When the raid was successful, the scalp dance offered the band a rare social opportunity. Upon returning to the village, the warriors painted themselves as they had been in battle and reenacted their brave deeds in pantomime. As the people sang, the dancing men would brandish or fire their weapons whenever their names were called out by the singers. Bonfires lit the village during night-long celebration; food was shared and captured goods were distributed, married women made much of their warrior husbands, and the strict prohibitions against contact between young unmarried men and women were temporarily relaxed. While the drumming and dancing continued, young people stood cloaked in blankets and whispered of love. It was a joyous time and young men dreamed of being honored and feted at such events, which became powerful incentives for continued raiding.[6]

This warrior spirit fueled the culture of martial manhood that had long since become a way of life for the Apacheans of the borderlands. The Navajos fought their traditional Ute, Jicarilla, Mescalero, and Western Apache enemies, but they also stood guard against the bold incursions of the powerful Comanches and their allies the Kiowas and Plains Apaches. Apache warriors raided deep into Mexico, whose people they despised, and against traditional enemies, Hispano and Indian, north of the border as well. The mines, ranches, unguarded herds in pasturage, and even well-populated settlements attracted young warriors in search of wealth and honor. The corrals of the New Mexicans, Pueblo Indians, O'odham farmers (Pimas and Papagos), and Mexican villages of Chihuahua and Sonora were the easiest targets presented to the raiders, though

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[6]Morris Edward Opler, *An Apache Life-way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 350-54.

increasingly, the Anglo wagons loaded with supplies and trade goods traveling to Santa Fe and military forts and camps tempted the warriors.

As the wars between the whites threw the borderlands into chaos in the 1860s, the Apacheans stepped up their raiding activities and endemic warfare of the borderlands. When herders, freighters, or miners resisted or attempted pursuit of raiders, the encounters would, inevitably, turn deadly; and as soldiers responded to calls for help from citizens, Indian casualties mounted and retaliatory attacks increased. There developed a vicious cycle of raid, response, and reprisal. Among the Indian raiders, band members would be expected to avenge the death of a relative. The soldiers, too, recognized an unofficial code of honor requiring vengeance. However, the U.S. government officially forbade soldiers and citizens from seeking "personal satisfaction or revenge," preferring that monetary restitution be made to aggrieved parties making formal claims of lost property. Property could be commoditized, but the law made no compensation provisions for loss of life or pain and suffering. Faced with these conflicting ideologies and escalating violence, Carleton and the other army officers commanding troops in the territories believed that only swift retribution and, in some cases, extermination would stop the continuing raids and attacks.[7]

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[7] The compensation system instituted by the federal government was intended to discourage citizens and subject peoples from seeking revenge. Claimants in Indian Depredation claims submitted to the U.S. government were required to swear "I have never sought any private revenge or redress against said Indians on account of said depredations." See, for example, Trinidad Romero de Jaramillo, Claim 5977, RG 75, NARA; John H. Dixon *vs*. United States and Tonto Apaches, Case 7958 , RG 123, NARA; Skogen, *Indian Depredation Claims, xv,* 141; Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 336; Grenville Goodwin, *Western Apache Raiding & Warfare*, ed. Keith Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), 16; see also *U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, Chronological List of Actions &c, with the Indians from January 15, 1837 to January, 1891*. (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1891).

Whether the warriors were raiding for enemy property or waging war, Anglos and Hispanos expressed both wonder and terror at the phantom-like stealth of the Apacheans. New Mexican vaqueros and herders believed that Apache raiding and war parties often deceived those tracking them by walking in the same moccasin tracks. It was said that fifty or even one hundred warriors traveling in this way could appear to be only a handful of men until an ambush in overwhelming strength revealed the truth to the unsuspecting pursuers. Though this perception may have exaggerated the stealth of the Apacheans, the warriors did exhibit exceptional skills as raiders. They traveled as lightly as possible, living off the land and supplies captured from their enemies. [8]

Navajo and Apache stock raiders usually traveled on foot to ensure surprise.[9] A horse raiding party set out with little more than their weapons, water gourds, pemmican or other dried food, and horsehair ropes or rawhide *reatas* with which to catch and bridle captured animals. Even their footsteps differed from those of the Anglos. The white soldiers wore heavy leather brogans with built-up layers of hard leather on the heels. Sometimes the army shoe came equipped with iron heel plates or hobnails that allowed the wearer to walk with heavy loads by planting the heel first, even on rock-hard ground. Indian men wore moccasins of uniform-sole-thickness. Mounted men preferred thin buckskin, while for walking moccasins they used thick buffalo or cattle hide. This sort of footgear allowed the wearer to walk more flat-footed, planting the ball of the foot first. The footprint indicated toes pointing straight ahead or even slightly inward, "pigeon-

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[8]Charles F. Lummis, *The Land of Poco Tiempo* (New York: Charles Scribners, 1893), 118-19.
[9]Horse raiders often traveled on foot for stealth, carrying only the most minimal equipment—a braided horsehair rope or rawhide *reata* was sufficient to fashion a war bridle by putting a loop around the horse's lower jaw. For an example of a Navajo horse raid see: Carleton to Maj. Joseph Smith, Commanding Ft. Stanton, Nov. 15, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 143.

toed," unlike the whites whose tracks could easily be discerned as the heel always pressed deeper and the toe of the shoe angled outward.[10]

Warriors determined to take enemy scalps in a war of revenge employed the same equipment, skills, and tactics used in successful raiding. When traveling mounted, they carried lances as well as bows. The Apaches and other indigenous peoples adapted a variety of weapons from metal scrap and weapons captured from or traded by whites. Arrow points were commonly fashioned from barrel hoop iron, and lance blades were made from broken swords and bayonets. As firearms became more readily available, these weapons either supplemented or replaced traditional arms. By the 1860s, Chiricahua Apaches favored revolving pistols for close combat, but also carried a wide variety of indigenous and captured Anglo and Hispano arms. Ammunition resupply for firearms was a constant problem. Even when gunpowder could be secured or salvaged from captured cartridges of different calibers, finding the right-sized lead bullet presented real challenges. Some warriors hammered lead or even copper slugs to the right size. Loading bullets that were too large or too small could jam or otherwise disable a gun and even cause explosions that might injure the shooter. At best, the mismatched ammunition would cause the gun to shoot wildly or inconsistently, reducing effectiveness in either case. The inability to secure needed supplies of weapons and ammunition reflected the

[10] Juan Analla testified that Apache trails could easily be distinguished from those of white men—Apache moccasins and the "raw hide horse shoes." He also believed Apache warriors when traveling often walked in the footprints of the man ahead to deceive enemies. Juan Analla, Case 5426 RG 123, NARA. Chiricahua and Western Apache moccasins were made with a distinctive toe guard of tough hide and were much narrower than moccasins worn by New Mexican Hispanos and Pueblo Indians. See especially testimony by Jojola and Porfírio Pajilla in: Ciriaco Jojola v. Apaches, Case 2932, RG 123, NARA.

logistical disadvantage faced by the Apacheans when faced with sustained and concerted campaigning by the Anglos, Hispanos, and their Indian allies.[11]

The Navajos were the most numerous and influential nation of Indians inhabiting the mountainous Southwestern territories in the 1860s. The endemic raiding and killing had increased following a series of confrontations near Fort Defiance, in the heart of Navajo country. Army posts were usually named for deserving officers or presidents, but here the name clearly reflected the adversarial approach the Anglo officers adopted in their relations with the Navajos. In 1858, Major William T. H. Brooks touched off vengeance warfare after he had Chief Manuelito's stock killed for grazing too close to the fort. One of Manuelito's *ladrones* retaliated by shooting an arrow into the Brooks' servant's back just feet from the officer's front door. Jim, an enslaved African American, died soon after, causing the infuriated Brooks to demand that Manuelito deliver up the killer. After much wrangling the Navajo's presented the body of the "killer," which turned out to be that of a captive New Mexican. Angered by the deception, the Army officers prepared to press the issue by bringing Manuelito to justice.[12]

Neither side wanted to lose face, and the young men on both sides seemed to be spoiling for a fight. Though they had the most to lose if it came to war, the wealthy Navajo headmen, including Manuelito, Barboncito, and Herrero decided a bold show of strength might cause the Anglos to back down and determined to attack Fort Defiance

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[11] Capt. James Whitlock to Capt. C. A. Smith, April 13, 1864, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [*OR*], 50(2), 829; Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 311, 340-41, 386-90; Apache-fired bullets recovered in archaeological excavations at Fort Bowie are evidence of mismatched ammunition. See: Robert M. Herskovitz, *Fort Bowie Material Culture* (Anthropological Papers of the University of Arizona, No. 31, Tucson, 1978),52-3.

[12] For Maj. Brooks' interpretation of the start of hostilities between the Anglos and Navajos see: W. T. H. Brook's reply to the Doolittle "circular" in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 491.

itself. Ganado Mucho and others counseled against this act of aggression, another headman, opposed the plan. The Navajos invited other nations of the region, including their traditional enemies among the Utes, Jicarilla Apaches, and Pueblos to join them, but few rallied to their cause.[13] On April 30, 1860, nearly a thousand warriors stormed the fort, but the forewarned soldiers beat off the attack with artillery and musket fire. Many warriors were killed, and the rest retreated to their strongholds in the Chuska Mountains and canyons. Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, commanding in New Mexico, pursued them but the Indians eluded him in the many hiding places of Canyon de Chelly.

By 1861, Canby was making preparations for a campaign against the group in an effort to put a halt to the stock and slave raiding that he and most Anglo Americans viewed as the principal obstacle peaceful relations and prosperity in the Territory. Canby proposed to the War Department that the Navajos be chastised and, once humbled, settled on a closely-guarded reservation on their traditional lands. This master plan was put on indefinite hold when the Civil War forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops. For the Pueblo Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos in New Mexico, the retreat of the soldiers could not have come at a worse time. Navajo raiders detected the weakness and exploited it in an unprecedented wave of stock raids along the Rio Grande settlements.

The Apacheans excelled in the type of hit-and-run warfare that characterized the ramped-up raiding that followed the initial withdrawal of federal forces in the territories. Ambush and surprise would always be preferred to an open encounter. Decoy traps that sucked an enemy into a box canyon or waiting warriors were always preferred. Retreats

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[13] It is not surprising that the Utes and Jicarillas did not support the Navajos, their traditional enemies. Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530–1888* (1889; reprint, Albuquerque: Horn and Wallace, 1962), 660-67.

rarely meant just running away; these were opportunities to regroup and counterattack when the enemy least suspected it. And the warriors would never head straight back to a base camp or *ranchería*, but would divide into smaller parties, covering the tracks that they did not want followed, and by circuitous routes find their way home undetected. The Anglos considered Apache caution and risk aversion as cowardly behavior. Apache stealth translated as sneak attacks. Such tactics frustrated the military men who cried foul and demanded that their enemies offer them a fair fight—in broad daylight, face-to-face.[14]

In October 1862, under General Carleton's direction, Colonel Kit Carson launched a relentless campaign against the Mescalero Apaches and Navajos that eventually destroyed their ability to wage war as well as significantly diminishing their fighting spirit—or at least their willingness to initiate raids and attacks. Carleton's campaign was no mere police action intended to put a stop to stock raids. The General gave Carson and other field commanders orders to kill all adult male Indians they encountered, if believed to be members of "hostile" tribes. No quarter would be given until chiefs or headmen sued for peace. Women and children would be spared if possible, but often the army turned these prisoners of war over to Hispano or Indian allies as slaves for their use or sale, along with other captured plunder. From Fort Stanton on the Pecos, Fort Defiance, Arizona, and Fort Wingate, in northwestern New Mexico, California and New Mexico troops marched to strike the Indians. The General found in Kit Carson a man who not only expertly coordinated the efforts of the raw volunteer troops but also

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[14] Grenville Goodwin, ed., *Myths and Tales of the White Mountain Apache* (1939, reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994), 9; Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 345-46; see also: Goodwin and Basso, *Western Apache Raiding*, 16 and passim.

understood the ruthless brand of warfare required to subdue the raiding "tribesmen." Carleton's orders were thorough and touched with menace:

> If the Indians send in a flag and desire to treat for peace, say to the bearer that when the people of New Mexico were attacked by the Texans, the Mescaleros broke their treaty of peace, and murdered innocent people, and ran off their stock; that now our hands are untied, and you have been sent to punish them for their treachery and their crimes; that you have no power to make peace; that you are there to kill them wherever you can find them; that if they beg for peace, their chiefs and twenty of their principal men must come to Santa Fe to have a talk here; but tell them fairly and frankly that you will keep after their people and slay them until you receive orders to desist from these headquarters; that this making of treaties for them to break whenever they have an interest in breaking them will not be done any more;…that we believe if we kill some of their men in fair, open war, they will be apt to remember that it will be better for them to remain at peace than to be at war.

Knowing that Carson might recoil from the harshness of the measures employed in bringing the Mescaleros to terms, Carleton explained that he believed "that this severity, in the long run, will be the most humane course that could be pursued toward these Indians."[15]

Through the winter of 1862-63, Carson waged a war of attrition against first the Mescaleros, who soon sued for peace, and then the Navajos, who had successfully

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[15] Gen. J.H. Carleton to Col. Christopher Carson, Oct. 12, 1862, in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 100. Carleton ordered, "All Indian men of that tribe [Mescalero] are to be killed whenever and wherever you can find them." In 1862 Confederate Col. John R. Baylor lost his command and governorship of Arizona when Jefferson Davis learned of his Indian extermination policy which called for the killing of adult Apaches, by poison or other means, and capturing the children who were to be sold into slavery in Mexico or New Mexico to defray the expenses of the campaign. Baylor falsely represented this scheme to subordinates as the official policy of the Confederate Congress: "The Congress of the Confederate States has passed a law declaring extermination to all hostile Indians. You will therefore use all means to persuade the Apaches or any tribe to come in for the purpose of making peace, and when you get them together kill all the grown Indians and take the children prisoners and sell them to defray the expense of killing the Indians. Buy whisky and such other goods as may be necessary for the Indians and I will order vouchers given to cover the amount expended. Leave nothing undone to insure success, and have a sufficient number of men around to allow no Indian to escape." Col. J.R. Baylor to Capt. Thomas Helm, March 20, 1862. *OR* 50(1):942. For Baylor's point of view regarding Indian extermination, see: George Wythe Baylor, *John Robert Baylor: Confederate Governor of Ariz*ona, ed. Odie B. Faulk (Tucson: Arizona Pioneers' Historical Society, 1966), 14-15, 32.

defended their canyonland strongholds for two hundred years against attacks, in turn, by Spanish, Mexican, and regular U.S. soldiers. This war was different, however. Now the Anglo and Hispano troops had the advantage of the War Department's vast logistical network, as broad as the continent itself, which provided them with food, clothing, weapons, and transportation. During the Civil War, the federal government fielded more soldiers than ever before, and these troops could launch their attacks at any time of year, even in the dead of winter when Indian ponies were low in flesh and the people subsisted on meager supplies of dried foods and lean mutton. The tactics had changed too. These soldiers were not poorly-trained local militia, but U.S. volunteers led by experienced regular officers and seasoned frontiersmen, who were not content to retaliate against raiders by stealing stray livestock and taking captives for slaves. These soldiers laid in wait for Apaches harvesting *maguey*, their dietary staple, and burned crops. The troops captured or killed entire herds and destroyed stored provisions, forcing the majority of the beleaguered nations to surrender. [16]

The Mescaleros gave up first. Carson's men herded hundreds of Apache men, women and children to Fort Stanton. Some chiefs, including an elderly headman named Manuelito (Mescalero) and Jose Largo, held out longer but then finally agreed to come in and meet with Carleton and Carson. Before these Mescaleros could reach Santa Fe, they were intercepted by Paddy Graydon's freewheeling Spy Company. On October 12, 1862, while displaying a flag of truce or the pretense of peace negotiations, Graydon and his Hispano soldiers opened fire on the Apaches, killing eleven, including the two chiefs. Carson and Carleton both expressed extreme displeasure with this turn of events and

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[16] Carleton to West, March 16, 1863 in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes* (1867), 105-6.

made Graydon's men turn over the stock they captured and return the animals to the survivors of the massacre, who were then escorted to their new reservation on the Pecos.

It is likely that disciplinary action would have been severe for Graydon, but the situation spiraled out of control before any kind of military justice could be served. Dr. John M. Whitlock, a California Volunteer surgeon, openly criticized Graydon's conduct and the murder of the peace-seeking Mescaleros. The Santa Fe *Gazette* published Whitlock's remarks and a duel ensued which left Graydon mortally wounded and the doctor, the apparent victor of the shootout, himself shot to pieces by Graydon's loyal New Mexico troopers. Carson very nearly had the New Mexicans summarily executed on the spot, but cooler heads prevailed and the perpetrators were locked up—only to escape with the complicity of their Hispano jailers. The California men went after doctor's killers—Hispanos and Anglos—who were eventually brought to justice.[17]

The Mescaleros may have surrendered but many did not easily submit to confinement at Fort Sumner. Raiding parties of ten to thirty warriors swept through the Rio Grande settlements in search of cattle—and captives to herd their stock in mountain hideaways. In February and March of 1863, the warriors rounded up hundreds of cattle from the pastures surrounding the small villages near Socorro. In broad daylight they rode in and split into two groups—one to capture or kill the herders and the other to drive the stock toward the western mountains, away from forts and populated areas. In this attack, seven warriors rode down Francisco Baca and shot him to death with his own

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[17] Edwin Legrand Sabin, *Kit Carson Days, 1809-1868: Adventures in the Path of Empire, Volume 2* (New York: Press of the Pioneers, 1935), 704-6; Tom Dunlay, *Kit Carson and the Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 244-46; Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches*, 112; for the best summary of the Whitlock-Graydon affair, see: Jaqueline D. Meketa, ed., *Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafaél Chacón* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 269-73.

pistol then killed another herder and took thirteen-year-old Eulogio Sais captive. A hastily-organized pursuit followed the raiders' trail. Sais deliberately dropped his shoes and black-handled knife along the trail to let would-be rescuers know which way he had been taken, but, in fact, the trail was not hard to follow. The warriors shot with arrows or lanced the cows and calves that could not keep pace with the fast-moving raiders and left the dying animals along the road. This tactic served two purposes, both terrorizing the followers and denying them any hope of retrieving their abandoned stock—or the captive boy—alive. Julian Salazar remembered that, "the road was strewn with the bodies of dead cows killed by the Indians. We saw before night that following the Indians was a dangerous and useless work." As night fell and without any sign of military relief, the rescue party gave up the chase, fearing to enter the canyons that offered the Mescaleros perfect ambush opportunities. The stolen cattle allowed some of the reservation holdouts to survive in the mountains for months and even years until starvation and relentless military pressure finally brought them in. [18]

The Navajos fared no better than the Mescaleros in the all-out campaign that left them no safe refuge and little choice but to capitulate to Carson. Carleton pitted likely allies against the Navajos, ordering Carson to take Zuni headmen hostage and warn the people that if they harbored Navajo raiders or captured stock the soldiers would destroy the Zuni village "as sure as the sun shines." This punishment would be also be meted out if Carleton even suspected the Zunis of stealing stock from "white men, or injur[ing] the

[18] Young Sais lived with his captors and worked as herder for six months in the Mimbres and San Andreas Mountains. His description of life with the renegade Mescaleros offers insight into their existence while raiding and on the run. Eventually, Sais escaped and returned home after. See Sais's testimony in Jose Antonio Baca y Pino v. Apaches , Case 2931, RG 123, NARA.

person of a white man."[19] With Ute guides in the lead, Carson's volunteer soldiers invaded the Navajo strongholds once thought to be impenetrable by troops. "The Utes," Carson said, "are very brave, and fine shots, fine trailers, and uncommonly energetic in the field." He believed that the Navajos' dread of their traditional enemies would make the Utes worth twice their number of white soldiers. In a closely coordinated campaign, Carson's columns closed off both the east and west portals to the Navajo canyon complex. The towering stone Fortress Rock in the heart of Canyon de Chelly offered only temporary refuge for the besieged Navajo clans of Barboncito and Manuelito. The soldiers even considered damming streams to shut off life-giving water while fields of corn and wheat burned and herds of horses, cattle, sheep, and goats were driven away. The troops discovered food caches, tore them open, and scattered the contents. So thorough was the destruction that the pots and baskets were destroyed to prevent the Navajos from re-filling them in preparation for the coming winter.[20]

By the time the first snow began to fall, the poorest of the Navajo people were beginning to starve. The Army's adjutant general reported Carleton's campaign of "humane severity" to be an unqualified success. "The Navajos" he wrote, "soon found that they had no place of security from such determined adversaries, and being pressed on every hand by unexampled rigor, the spirit of the tribe was soon broken." In contrast, the morale of Carson's men soared as their campaigning had the desired effect. They now

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[19] Carleton to Carson, Sept. 19, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 137. This hostage strategy continued during the Civil War years. Both Zuni and Hopi headmen were targeted on the suspicion of harboring Navajos. Cyrus H. De Forrest to Capt. Asa B. Carey, May 3, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 183.

[20] At Carson's urging, Carleton requested permission to recruit 100 Utes to be used against the Navajos in their canyonland strongholds. Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, June 17, 1863, Doolitte, *Condition of the Indian Tribes* (1867), 114; Hampton Sides, *Blood and Thunder: The Epic Story of Kit Carson and the American West* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 423.

sang as they rode: "Johnny Navajo, O Johnny Navajo. We'll first chastise, then civilize, bold Johnny Navajo!"[21]

Of the nearly fifteen thousand Navajo men, women, and children living in Arizona and New Mexico, nine thousand surrendered or were captured and placed on the newly established Bosque Redondo reservation on the Pecos River. Carleton instructed Carson to hold the *ricos* back and to send in the *pelados* (poorer class) of Navajos first. The stock-rich *ricos*, he reasoned, could subsist on their own sheep herds and were less inclined to fight while "among the poor are nearly or quite all the *ladrones* (thieves) and murderers, so that we have already in our hands the bad men of the tribe." There were some hold-outs. Navajo chief Manuelito's band moved into unmapped Arizona, far to the northwest, but nearly all of the other chiefs surrendered with their families, flocks, and herds. [22]

By the end of 1863 most of the Navajos had made the 250-mile "Long Walk" to Fort Sumner on the Pecos. During the forced march the people walked or rode 12 to 15 miles a day with whatever belongings they could carry. The arduous trek took weeks and many of the elderly and weak died along the trail. The Navajos knew this as the "fearing time" and the people feared nothing more than the hated *nacajalleses*, Pueblo and

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[21] Other verses of the song include praise for Carleton and Carson:
Here's health to Gen'l Carleton that wise and brave hero
His arrival was a blessing great, to speed New Mexico;
May he win unfading laurels and sorrow never know
And live to see the country free from Johnny Navajo. [refrain]
Here's a health to Col. Carson whose swift and crushing blow
Brought terror to the Savage, and reduced the Navajo,
May promotion raise him to the stars and may his country show
She holds him as the conqueror of Johnny Navajo.
Santa Fe *Gazette*, December 8, 1863.

[22] Martin Saez & Son *vs.* the Navajo and the United States. Case 2597, RG 123, NARA; Gen. J.H. Carleton to Col. Christopher Carson, Oct. 12, 1862 and April 8, 1864, in Doolitte, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 100, 174; Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, March 12, 1864, ibid., 166.

Hispano raiders who traded in Indian slaves and who now found the children and helpless women easy prey. Carson urged the commanders of the forts along to the route to provide the hungry travelers with, "a sufficiency to eat," believing that, "we must convince them of the kind intentions of the Government towards them, otherwise I fear that they will lose confidence in our promises, and desert."[23]

By 1864, the Mescaleros of New Mexico and most of the Navajos, including many of the hold-outs in northeastern Arizona, had been defeated and relocated to the Pecos. In Santa Fe, Cadete[24], the Mescaleros' principal chief, delivered a moving speech directed at Carson and Carleton:

> You are stronger than we. We have fought you as long as we had rifles and powder but your weapons are better than ours. Give us like weapons and turn us loose; we will fight you again. But we are worn out; we have no more heart; we have no provisions, no means to live. Your troops are everywhere. Our springs and waterholes are either occupied or overlooked by your men. You have driven us from our last and best stronghold and we have no more heart.[25]

Carleton and Carson were feted as heroes by the Hispano and Pueblo peoples of New Mexico. The raiding Apaches, it seemed, had finally been defeated and a new day of peace and security was dawning. Carleton accepted the accolades graciously and turned his considerable energy toward now winning a sustainable peace.

Carleton believed the Navajos and linguistically related Mescalero Apaches could and should be located on one reservation, Christianized, and trained to be full-time farmers. He little appreciated the enmity that existed between the tribes. The "hostile"

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[23] It is difficult to know how many Navajos perished on the 250-mile "Long Walk," though scholars estimate 100-150 died. Navajo tradition holds that women and children were snatched from among the refugees to be enslaved by Pueblo Indians and Hispanos as the column moved slowly southeastward past pueblos to Bosque Redondo on the Pecos. Sides, *Blood and Thunder*, 444; Bailey, *The Long Walk*, passim.
[24] Cadete (*Zhee-ah-nat-tsa*) took over as chief soon after the death of his father, Barranquito, in 1857. C.L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches*, 91.
[25] Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches*, 113; John C. Cremony, "The Apache Race," *Overland Monthly*, Vol. 1 (September, 1868), 207.

Navajos and Apaches, he earnestly believed, once settled and acculturated, would never again posed a significant threat to one another or to settlements of agrarian Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos in Arizona and New Mexico. [26] But the Navajos and Mescaleros co-existed uneasily at Bosque Redondo, continually raiding each other's stock and joining the Army in pursuit of renegades from the rival group. To make matters worse, Comanche raiders pressed ever closer to the Pecos. In large-scale dawn attacks, the warriors of the Southern Plains swooped in to drive off the remaining stock of their traditional Apachean enemies, who were now completely reliant on the Army for protection. Without arms and under orders not to stray from the Bosque Redondo reservation, the Mescaleros and Navajos were virtually helpless. The Comanches carried off women and children—for ransom, sale, or enslavement—along with the stock. The young men of the confined nations felt impotent. When their frustration with the restrictive and sedentary life of the reservation reached a breaking point, they would bolt for the hills or traditional hunting grounds, usually absconding with as many captured horses as they could drive.[27]

Pueblo Indians and Hispanos from the New Mexican settlements within a two hundred mile radius of the reservation accused the Bosque Redondo Indians of many "depredations." Cattlemen and government stock contractors cried foul as the young men of the interned nations raided the herds of their neighbors. In many cases, the captured animals were sold to Comancheros or other unscrupulous traders and wound up back in

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[26] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, March 19, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes,* 169. For details on the Navajo war and the Bosque Redondo experiment, see: Frank McNitt, *Navajo Wars: Military Campaigns, Slave Raids, and Reprisals* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1972); Gerald Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment, 1863-1868* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), passim; and Dunlay, *Kit Carson and the Indians*, 228-342.
[27] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, Dec. 23, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 151; Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo*, 88, 140-1; Sides, *Blood and Thunder*, 457.

Fort Sumner's pens and corrals, paid for with government gold or discounted greenbacks. Frustrated by these breakouts Carleton instructed Captain Joseph Updegraff at Fort Sumner that, "should any of the those Mescaleros now at Bosque Redondo attempt to escape, after their promises to me to remain quietly there, you will cause them to be shot. If they give you much trouble in this respect, seize every animal they have and have all of them sent to Fort Union, and disarm all the men, even their bows and arrows." The commanding general even sent from his Santa Fe headquarters the men of Company B, Second California Cavalry—his personal body guard—to reinforce the soldiers at Sumner.[28]

In a precedent-setting move, Carleton ordered Captain John Cremony, Company B's commander, to hire Apache warriors at two dollars a day (four times the pay of Anglo and Hispano soldiers) to track and capture Mescalero and Navajo escapees. Cremony's men spent long days in the saddle, riding down Navajos, then turning around with Navajo guides in pursuit of Mescalero raiders who bolted from the reservation. Carleton had learned from Carson that Indian auxiliaries, "would render more than double their number of troops." The effectiveness of the Mescaleros against Navajos was not lost on the General, who reported to Washington that when Navajos bolted from Bosque Redondo, the Apaches tracked down and killed twelve and one was captured, along with nearly ten thousand sheep and other stock. He was forced to admit that, "the Apaches who, one year ago, were our mortal enemies, did most all the work." The experiment with Indian scouts proved an unqualified success and would, in later years,

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[28]John C. Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches* (New York: A. Roman, 1868), 254-60; Carleton to J. Updegraff, April 10, 1863, Doolitte, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 107.

become standard operating procedure in campaigns against indigenous peoples considered by the government to be "hostile" or "renegade." [29]

Grumbling discontentment over affairs at the Bosque Redondo reservation found its way back to Carleton's Santa Fe headquarters and began to seep into his psyche. Behind his back, even once admiring soldiers derisively referred to the dismal settlement on the sulfurous Pecos as "Fair Carletonia." Banishing ineffective Indian agents from the reservation and placing the loyal McCleave in command at Fort Summer, Carleton hoped to stem the criticism and restore the confidence of the New Mexicans, who now read about Navajo "depredations" in nearly every issue of the influential Santa Fe *Gazette*. Carleton believed that harsh measures would be needed to convince the confined warriors that they must not leave the reservation, for any purpose, without a military pass. He ordered that McCleave shackle with a heavy iron ball and chain a Navajo man found off the reservation. The punishment would last for two months, during which time McCleave was to explain to the other Indians the reasons for the torture device and warn that future infractions would result in even more severe treatment.[30] At the same time, Carleton authorized a scorched earth policy for the center of the Navajo homeland in Canyon de Chelly. Captain John Thompson's First New Mexico Cavalry company destroyed corn crops and fruit orchards in the once impregnable stronghold in an effort to drive out the

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[29] Carleton had previously requested permission to recruit 100 Utes to be used against the Navajos in their canyonland strongholds. Carleton to Updegraff, August 19, 1863, ibid., 129; Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, June 17, 1863, ibid., 114, and Dec. 23, 1863.

[30] As cruel as fettering with an iron ball and chain may have been for the Navajos caught without a pass, Army regulations allowed such punishments for soldiers as well. See "legal punishments," article 895, *United States Army Regulations of 1861* [Revised 1863], 126.

last of the hold-outs and convince those already surrendered that there was nothing worth going home to.[31]

Manuelito defiantly refused to surrender his Navajo clans for internment at Bosque Redondo. In February of 1865, Herrero and other Navajo chiefs were dispatched to Zuni and Fort Wingate in attempts to talk the holdouts into giving up, assuring their kinsmen that they would be well-treated and allowed to keep their stock and any other possessions they could carry. Though many of his followers begged him to give in, Manuelito told Herrero that he had committed no crimes and could never leave his native Chuska Mountains. Herrero parted saying, "I have done all I could for your benefit; have given you the best advice; I now leave you as if your grave were already made." Carleton's interpreters and officers assigned the task of bringing in the holdouts estimated that five additional bands still remained, from Colorado Chiquito, between Zuni and the Hopi villages, to Canyon de Chelly and Pueblo, Colorado. These small family groups—just over four hundred Navajo men, women, and children living on *piñon* nuts and roots—moved constantly, wary of attack by Utes, New Mexicans, and soldiers. [32]

Although Navajos and Apaches had stolen away from the reservation in small parties on stock raids, a major breakout led by Navajo headmen Barboncito and Ganado Blanco occurred on June 16, 1865, just as Senator Doolittle's Special Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War investigating the condition of the Indians arrived to examine the state of affairs in New Mexico. The committee members were especially interested in the

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[31] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, Feb. 7, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 157; Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo*, 27, 76-7; Stephen C. Jett, ed. "The Destruction of Navajo Orchards in 1864: Captain John Thompson's Report," *Arizona and the West,* Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter, 1974), 365-378.
[32] Carleton to Steck, H.Q. Dept. of New Mexico, March 21, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 221-22. Manuelito and Ganado Mucho finally brought their destitute people to the reservation in the spring of 1866. Within weeks they were victimized by Comanche raiders, who killed Ganado Mucho's son and other herders while running off most of the Navajos' remaining stock.

Bosque Redondo experiment. Carleton panicked, calling out every able-bodied man, "Mexicans and Americans," and diverting troops from every corner of the Territory in order to stop the Navajo rush before it turned into a stampede. Within a week, Ganado Blanco and some of his followers were killed in a firefight while making a run for their ancestral homes in the Chuska Mountains. Pursuing cavalrymen rounded up the surviving renegades, with their stock and families, and returned them to Fort Sumner.[33]

Older headmen of both tribes used their influence to make the reservation economy work. Even Chief Cadete, the Mescaleros' most revered war leader, appeared resigned to his fate as a farmer. But the farming program was a disaster. Insect infestations, lack of water, and shortage of farming tools doomed the agricultural experiment. Sickness from water-borne and communicable diseases ranging from dysentery to small pox killed hundreds and demoralized the rest of the internees. When government promises of clothing did not materialize, he requested that Carleton send his people looms with which they might make clothes to hide their nakedness. These woes, combined with the social tensions caused by being forced to live as neighbors with traditional Navajo enemies while being guarded at gun-point by soldiers were too much to bear. For the adversarial tribes of Apacheans placed on the same reservation, the lure of the free life in the mountains or canyonlands was a powerful attraction.[34]

Lorenzo Labadie, the Hispano Indian agent to the Mescaleros, expressed his frustration over the fact that not all of his wards had submitted themselves to the confinement of reservation life. Many New Mexican farmers and stock raisers living in

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[33] Carleton to Maj. William H. Lewis, June 19, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 227-28; Cutler to Lewis, June 25, 1865, ibid., 228-29; Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, July 20, 1865, ibid., 230..
[34] For details of diseases and shortages that plagued the Bosque Redondo reservation from 1863 to 1868, see: Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo*, 46-68.

the lower Rio Grande Valley complained of depredations committed by Mescalero bands that hovered near or had broken free from Bosque Redondo on the Pecos. Writing from his office at Fort Sumner, Labadie answered his critics, who believed he should exert more control over his charges. "Their nomadic style of life," he opined, "changing their camp almost every week, and wandering from place to place, is ill calculated to instill in them an idea of and love for home." Labadie could not have been more wrong, for it was home that the Mescaleros sought—their home in mountains and valleys that had sheltered them for generations and from which they derived strength.[35]

On the night of November 3, 1865, the disillusioned Cadete finally escaped the hated reservation, leading many of his people determined to hunt in the mountains and raid in the old ways. Some headed for Mexico in search of their Lipan Apache cousins while others joined their Comanche enemies on the Staked Plains. Cadete himself successfully eluded pursuers for five years, hunting and hiding out, though many of his followers were destitute and near starvation.[36] Before breaking out, the unreconstructed Cadete told Captain Cremony:

> You desire our children to learn from books, and say, that because you have done so, you are able to build all those big houses, and sail over the sea, and talk to each other at any distance, and do many wonderful things; now, let me tell you what we think. You begin when you are little to work hard, and work until you are men in order to begin fresh work. You say that you work hard in order to learn how to work well. After you get to be men, then you say, the labor of life commences; then too, you build big houses, big ships, big towns, and everything else in proportion. Then, after you have got them all, you die and leave them behind. Now, we call that slavery. You are slaves from the time you begin to talk until you die; but we are free as air. We never work, but the Mexicans and others

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[35] Labadie letter dated Oct 10, 1863 found in Evidence Jose Antonio Baca y Pino v. Mescaleros, Case 2931 RG 123, NARA, 13-14. Carleton later accused Labadie of corruption and ordered him banished from Bosque Redondo, a controversial move that incurred the displeasure of the powerful Baca and Chaves families to whom the agent was related by marriage.
[36] Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo*, 84, 98-9.

> work for us. Our wants are few and easily supplied. The river, the wood, and plain yield all that we require, and we will not be slaves; nor will we send our children to your schools, where they learn only to become like yourselves.[37]

Cadete understood the new order ushered in by the Americans only too well; the Anglos aimed to make Indian people dependent on rations of flour and beef, providing them with clothing and other annuities, and once reservationized, the people would no longer yearn for the free life.

Western Apaches and Total War

To the west, other Apaches dominated central Arizona and southern New Mexico, but their struggles to hold onto their homelands and traditional ways while waging war against Indian enemies allied with Anglos and Hispanos proved nearly impossible during the turbulent 1860s. While many U.S. officials and military men thought of Apaches as a unified tribe, the various bands and local groups had their own leaders and operated quite independently, rarely cooperating for raiding or war. The Apaches included the Chiricahua bands centered in the Mimbres, Chiricahua, and Gila Mountains of southwestern New Mexico and southeastern Arizona but ranging for hundreds of miles southward into Mexico and in nearly every other direction as well. The Chiricahuas comprised the Bedonkohe, Chihenne, Chokonen, and Nednhi bands.[38]

The Western Apaches to the north and west included the Pinal, White Mountain, San Carlos, Cibecue, Tonto, Aravaipa, and other smaller bands, which ranged into central New Mexico and Arizona from the Rio Grande to the Colorado. The westernmost

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[37] Cremony, "The Apache Race," 207; Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches*, 8-9.
[38] Some Apache people and scholars today refer to the Chiricahua bands as allied tribes. Whether they are called bands (as Goodwin, Opler and other anthropologists believed) or tribes, they are independent communities sharing a common language and many other traditions.

Apacheans often interacted and intermarried with the Yuman-speaking Yavapais[39] who hunted north of the Gila River and along the Salt River all the way to the Colorado where the western bands had close ties to the Yuman speaking Mojaves, Hualapais, and Quechans. Even though they numbered in the thousands when taken as a whole, the independent and uncoordinated Western Apache tribes had little chance of successfully combating the coalition of allied warriors, civilians, and soldiers now assembled against them.

On July 1, 1852, the United States had entered into a treaty with chiefs or headmen representing "Eastern and Western Apache Tribes." Though the Anglos recognized the different tribes and bands as politically distinct, they chose for convenience to treat with all of the Apaches as a group and expected the chiefs and headmen to speak for their people, whether or not they actually had that authority. The treaty was formally approved by the Senate in March 1853, and in the minds of Anglo Americans aware of such things this sweeping agreement formally and permanently bound together the people of the United States and the "dependent domestic nation" known as Apache. The social contract proclaimed:

> Articles of a treaty made and entered into at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the first day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two, by and between Col. E.V. Sumner, U.S.A., commanding the 9th Department and in charge of the executive office of New Mexico, and acting superintendent of Indian affairs of said Territory, representing

[39] Yavapai bands comprised four separate groups: the Đo:lkabaya, or Western Yavapai, the Yavbe', or Northwestern Yavapai, the Guwevkabaya, or Southeastern Yavapai, and Wi:pukba, or Northeastern Yavapai (Verde Valley Yavapai). The Mađqwadabaya or "Desert People" may have mixed with the Mojaves and Quechans and no longer exists as a distinct band. The Yavapai share many customs and traditions with the linguistically related Havasupai and Hualapai to the north. During the 1860s, Anglos often referred to Yavapais as "Mohave-Apache," "Yuma-Apache," or "Tonto-Apache." Robert Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1848–1865* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 255; Edward Gifford, *Northeastern and Western Yavapai* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936), 249-50.

> the United States, and Cuentas, Azules, Blancito, Negrito, Capitan Simon, Captain Vuelta, and Mangus Colorado, chiefs, acting on the part of the Apache Nation of Indians, situate and living within the limits of the United States.
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> [Article 1] Said nation or tribe of Indians through their authorized Chiefs aforesaid do hereby acknowledge and declare that they are lawfully and exclusively under the laws, jurisdiction, and government of the United States of America, and to its power and authority they do hereby submit. [40]

Though they little understood the larger political implications, when the Chiricahuas banished their Indian agent, renounced their allegiance to the United States, and declared war in 1861, they were engaged in an act of aggression tantamount to civil war. The Bascom Affair had shed the first blood, but the subsequent withdrawal of federal troops from the borderlands had allowed the local conflict to erupt into full-blown civil war. The 1860s saw significant gold strikes along the lower Colorado and in central Arizona, resulting in a flood of thousands of Anglo and Hispano miners from California and Mexico. These new arrivals nearly doubled the non-Indian population and contributed to a record number of deadly encounters with Apache people in central Arizona during 1863 and 1864.[41] Apache warriors raided and attacked Anglo and Hispano civilians who, in turn, indiscriminately retaliated against Apaches and Yavapais, regardless of complicity. The attacks prompted Carleton to establish Fort Goodwin on the Gila River in the eastern part of Arizona Territory. This outpost became the base of operations for an all-out campaign against the Western Apaches.[42] California Volunteer units stationed near the Mexican border at Tubac cooperated in the effort. From April to

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[40]Treaty With The Apache, July 1, 1852, ratified Mar. 23, 1853, proclaimed Mar. 25, 1853, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/treaties/apa0598.htm#mn14; Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 15.

[41] Maj. Edward B. Willis to Capt. B. Cutler, May 27, 1864, *OR* 50(2):868-69; *OR*, 15:227-32.

[42] Col. E.A. Rigg to Capt. B.C. Cutler, Sept. 14, 1864, *OR*, 50(1):360-70.

July 1864 the number of soldiers in Arizona increased from 233 to 1,076. Carleton's plans included a coordinated campaign against the Chiricahua Apache bands. He ordered the troops to attack simultaneously from Fort Goodwin, Fort Whipple, Fort Bowie, Tubac, and Tucson, cooperating with soldiers from Fort McLane, Fort West, and other New Mexico garrisons along the Rio Grande.

In an unprecedented move to crush the warring Apaches once and for all, the General even requested the assistance of the pro-Juárez, Republican governors of Sonora and Chihuahua in an effort to cut off raiding and escape routes into Mexico. He received permission for "continuing the pursuit of hostile Apaches over the boundary line" and reciprocated the privilege by authorizing Mexican militia to "come over the line into our territory in pursuit of Apaches when, where, and as far as they please." Carleton requested that the Mexican forces stay "in hot pursuit of the Apaches of Sonora" for sixty to ninety days, until the warriors were "exterminated" or greatly "diminished." In this effort the U.S. troops found willing allies, for the people of the Mexican border states had suffered terribly from the escalation of raiding violence prompted by civil wars north and south of the international boundary.[43]

Carleton hounded his field commanders in Arizona to make certain everything was in readiness for the all-out offensive against the Western Apaches. In the spring of 1864, he rescinded his standing orders to husband ammunition and ordered "systematic

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[43] GO 12, May 1, 1864, Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico, *OR*, 34 (1):387; abstract of troop returns, *OR*, 34 (3):372; *OR*, 41 (2):495; Col. J.R. West to Sonoran Governor Ignacio Pesqueira, Jan. 30, 1863, *OR* 50(2):299-300; Carleton coordinated his attacks north of the border with Mexican pressure timed to begin on June 10, 1864. Carleton to Pesqueira, April 20, 1864, and Carleton to Governor of Chihuahua, Luis Perrazas, April 20, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 177; U.S. officers dealt only with the Republican governors of Mexico, even though the French-backed Conservatives were waging their own civil war against Pres. Benito Juárez. In July 1864 Napoleon III installed Austrian Archduke Maximilian as the puppet emperor of Mexico.

target practice to the extent of twenty rounds per man with musket and carbine and eighteen rounds with revolver" each day. For the first time, soldiers would be trained to fight as individuals, like their Indian adversaries, taking advantage of the broken desert and mountain terrain, instead of drilling on open ground in compact formations and firing volleys on command. The general was convinced that "the Apaches in Arizona are very hostile, and unless vigorous measures are pursued against them right away the miners will become panic-stricken and leave the country." Carleton believed in the strategic importance of Arizona's gold mines and urged the War Department to send him another regiment of California infantry composed of "practical miners" who would at once exterminate the hostile Indians and develop the vast mineral wealth of the territories. He even authorized his soldiers to take time off to pan for gold and carefully record the richness of their discoveries—information he shared with the War Department and promoted in the press.[44]

Yet even with the Army's offensive, the Western Apache and related Yavapai bands of central Arizona and the southern bands along the Arizona-New Mexico border continued to attack the settlers and gold rushers flocking to the mines near Lynx Creek and the rich Walker diggings, as well as travelers on the southern overland road. These groups relied heavily on hunting, gathering, and raiding for survival. They found it increasingly difficult to find game and forage as the encroaching Hispanos and Anglos

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[44] Carleton to George W. Bowie, Apr. 15, 1864, *OR*, 50(2):820. GO 8, Tucson, June 13, 1862, Dept. of the Pacific, general, Special, and Post Orders, Vol. 1, RG 393, NARA. In 1862, the California troops had been ordered to draw and preserve the loads from their muzzle-loading rifle muskets rather than wasting ammunition by firing at a target following guard duty shifts, as was the custom. Carleton to Nathaniel Pishon, June 22, 1863, in Richard H. Orton, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1890), 72; Hdqrs. dept. of New Mexico, GO 27, Oct. 23, 1863, *OR*, 50 (2):54; Fergusson to James Whitlock, April 23, 1863, ibid., 413; Carleton to Halleck, May 10, 1863, in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes* (1867), 110.

grazed their animals on hunting grounds and killed or frightened away game. The allied invaders also attacked Indian *rancherías* without discriminating between warring and peaceful bands. Many of the newly elected Arizona territorial legislators (including some former army officers), as well as most of the citizens, were admitted exterminationists. They clamored for protection from the "savages."[45] Yet as the three-year enlistments of many volunteer soldiers began to expire in late 1864, the military District of Arizona faced a critical manpower shortage. A company of New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry helped fill the vacant ranks of Fort Whipple's California garrison until reorganized companies of California Veteran Volunteers and the recently raised Arizona Volunteers, composed of Indians and Hispanos, arrived.

The fact of the matter was Carleton and the subsequent commanders overseeing military affairs in Arizona simply did not have sufficient resources to protect the growing civilian population from the many bands of Western Apaches and Yavapais in Central Arizona. Nor could they protect the Indians from vigilante-style reprisals and attacks by groups of armed citizens and their Indian allies. To make matters worse, Carleton was so eager to promote and develop the mineral resources of the territories that he made promises to mining entrepreneurs that he could not keep. On July 11, 1864, he assured George Vickroy that:

> "…as to the safety of carrying on mining operations hereafter in Arizona, I will say I have already inaugurated a campaign against the Apache Indians that will result in their complete subjugation, and should you induce friends in the East to join you in erecting a quartz-mill in the newly discovered gold regions near Fort Whipple, the enterprise will be fully protected by the military. I am well assured that building a quartz-mill there, and developing some one of the rich mines, will result in such benefit to the Government as to amply compensate for the protection given."

[45] *Arizona Miner*, October 26, 1864; Orders No. 8, HQ, Tucson, May 12, 1863, *OR* 50(2):431-32.

Vickroy did indeed find enough Philadelphia capitalists to bankroll the Walnut Grove Gold-mining Company and by September of 1865 had reached Prescott with a twenty-stamp mill and a forty-horsepower steam engine along with thirty-five miners and mechanics. The subjugation of the Apaches, however, was not as complete as the miners had been led to believe.

With game increasingly scarce, small raiding parties of Apache warriors began picking off the mining company's mules, then the beef herds, and, growing increasingly bold, attacked the the main operation at the Bully Bueno Mine, driving the men from their mill and shops. Time and again the miners called for help and for military escorts while transporting equipment and supplies, only to learn that the garrisons of soldiers were either already in the field or too understrength to be spared for guard detail at the mine. From 1865 to 1867, the Walnut Grove Company had eleven miners or herders killed and many more wounded. The surviving workers feared for their lives, and operations were repeatedly halted due to attacks that eventually resulted in work stoppage resulting from insufficient manpower, food, and equipment. It soon became evident to the mining companies that Carleton had either deliberately overestimated or badly misjudged the reach and effectiveness of his far-flung command.[46]

The newly constituted Arizona legislature and the increasingly concerned citizenry agreed that something needed to be done to protect business interests. The

[46] The first attack was reported by the Walnut Grove Mining Company wagon train while camped at Navajo Springs on August 1, 1865, while en route to Prescott. By 1867 the entire operation was idled, and in 1869 the Apaches completely burned or otherwise destroyed the mill, storehouse, sawmill, superintendent's house, boarding house, blacksmith and carpenter's shops, and stables, along with all the tools, machinery, books, papers, and supplies. The shareholders claimed that since the Territory was under martial law and Carleton "exercised supreme control," his assurances should have the weight of a guaranty. They therefore held the U.S government liable for the $292,800 in losses incurred. Walnut Grove Mining Company v. Apaches, Claim 1144, RG 75, 7397 and Case 4715, RG 123, NARA.

legislators appropriated in the annual budget more funding ($250,000) for "Apache warfare" than for any other single purpose.[47] Nearly every Anglo and Hispano in the Territory approved of arming native auxiliaries to augment the U.S. troops. The Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos had repeatedly requested arms and ammunition to combat their traditional Yavapai and Western Apache enemies. Legislators and citizens shared the opinion that the "friendly" tribes would perform well if given the opportunity. Every commander of the military District of Arizona endorsed the idea, as did a majority of rank-and-file soldiers. Army red tape, however, bogged down the implementation of the plan for nearly four years. Finally, between September and November 1865, long after the Civil War in the East had ended, the territorial legislature recruited five companies of Arizona Volunteers.

This battalion of 350 men comprised one company each of Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos, and two of Hispanos. The Army recruited many Mexican men in Bacuachi, Sonora, and other villages south of the border ravaged by incessant Apache raids. Recruiters found other willing Hispanos at the mines near Tubac in Southern Arizona and around Prescott in the central part of the territory. In practice, most of the companies were mixed with Indians, Hispanos, and a few Anglos. White officers, some of whom had until recently served as enlisted men in the ranks of the California Volunteers,

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[47] The first session of the Arizona legislature in 1864 also allocated funds for the establishment of a reservation for the Colorado River Indian tribes ($150,000) and navigation improvements on the Colorado ($150,000). Fearing the history of the Territory would be lost, along with the vanishing tribes, the legislators also incorporated the Arizona Historical Society. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico*, 539.

commanded the companies, but Mexicans, Pimas and Maricopas were included among the junior commissioned officers and non-coms.[48]

With only one-year terms of enlistment, the Arizona Volunteers' orders were simple: scout central Arizona and kill Apaches. On several occasions they cooperated successfully with the few California companies still in the field. The native troops exceeded all expectations, and when their enlistments expired on November 7, 1866, the territorial legislature and the military district commander, Colonel Clarence E. Bennett, extolled their value and urged the War Department to extend their service. Bennett even suggested that the allied warriors be allowed to keep their weapons if orders came to disband. These native Arizonans, he reasoned, were highly motivated to kill their traditional Apache enemies and carry on the war for their homes and farms, even without government assistance. But by this time federal authorities focused their energies on demobilizing the tremendous war machine created during the rebellion and ignored pleas from Arizona for enlistment extensions and new regiments.[49]

Chiricahua Apaches

During the Civil War years, the united Chiricahua bands (Bedonkohe, Chokonen, Chihenne, and Nednhi) of southeastern Arizona and western New Mexico challenged the Anglo soldiers and their Hispano and Indian allies for power and dominance in the borderlands. These resilient people, living and fighting in small groups, continued their attacks along the main east-west road connecting Tucson and Mesilla, and raiding deep

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[48] Carleton to R.H. Drum, May 24, 1862 in Orton, *California Men*, 51; Underhill, *The First Arizona Volunteer Infantry, 1865-1866*, (Tucson: Roan Horse Press, 1983), 2, 20.
[49] C. E. Bennett to Jonathan Green, May 1, 1866 in Lonnie Underhill, "First Arizona Volunteer Infantry, 1865-1866," master's thesis, University of Arizona, 1979, 15, 76; Gen. J.S. Mason to Col. R.C. Drum, May 30, 1865, *OR* 50(2):1247-48.

into Chihuahua and Sonora despite the Army's best efforts to contain them. The resistance of the Bedonkohe and Chihenne bands of Chiricahuas (known as Mimbreños and Gileños to the Anglos and Hispanos because of their proximity to the Mimbres and Gila Rivers) abated only temporarily in Arizona after the capture of their charismatic chief and war leader, Mangas Coloradas, in January 1863. California Volunteer cavalrymen deceived and then took the chief prisoner while negotiating under a flag of truce at the mining settlement of Pinos Altos near Fort West, New Mexico. The incident would prove to be another milestone on the path of bad relations between the Apaches and the Anglos.

Mangas had suffered a serious gunshot wound during the Battle of Apache Pass on July 15, 1862. While attempting to encircle Captain Thomas Roberts's California Infantry company, the chief was hit by a bullet fired from the carbine of Private John Teal, one of six cavalry escorts sent back to Dragoon Springs for reinforcements. Mangas survived the wound thanks to good treatment by a Mexican doctor in Janos, Chihuahua, who, under duress, tended the Bedonkohe leader. Repeated reprisal raids by Mangas's warriors made him the most feared Apache in the borderlands. On January 17, 1863, Jack Swilling, the former Confederate Arizona Guard now traveling with a party of gold prospectors while also working in concert with Captain E. D. Shirland's Company C, First California Cavalry, captured the Apache leader at the Pinos Altos mines. Swilling hustled his prisoner off to nearby Fort McLane some twenty miles south, just east of the Arizona–New Mexico border.

Here, General J. R. West confronted Mangas with charges of murder and theft. The general specifically referenced the "bleached bones" of travelers that littered

Cooke's Canyon on the wagon road. Mangas maintained that he had only fought in self-defense against whites who attacked his people while in search of "yellow iron."[50] The details of the chief's death will never be known with certainty, but most accounts agree that West made it known to his men that he wanted Mangas dead. The soldier guards tormented their captive with heated bayonets, and when he tried to make a run for his life, they shot him down with their rifle muskets and then emptied their pistols into his head and chest as he lay dying. An imposing figure in life, standing well over six feet tall, Mangas's bullet-riddled body became a thing of curiosity to the Californians who, with the help of surgeon David B. Sturgeon, decapitated the corpse, boiled the head, and later shipped the de-fleshed skull to New York to be interpreted by Orson Squire Fowler, a prominent phrenologist. Other Army units followed this murder with attacks on Mangas' Bedonkohe people near Pinos Altos. The Apaches, led by Victorio, Nana, and, perhaps, a young Geronimo responded with revenge raids of unrivaled boldness and ferocity.[51]

Twenty miles west, Anglo soldiers had strategically located Fort Bowie in Apache Pass, situated in the heart of Cochise's Chiricahua country. The pass was midway between Tucson and Mesilla and the springs there offered the only reliable, year-round fresh water for miles in any direction. "Around this water," Carleton reported, "the

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[50] Edwin Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas, Chief of the Chiricahuas* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 454.

[51]Daniel E. Conner, *Joseph Reddeford Walker and the Arizona Adventure*, eds. Donald Berthrong and Odessa Davenport (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 179; William A. McCleave, "Our Scout to Black Canyon" William McCleave Papers, BANC MSS, C-B 300, Bancroft Library, Univ. of California, Berkley, 7-9; Capt. Benjamin Cutler to Brig. Gen. J. R. West, Jan. 28, 1863, *OR*, 50(2): 296; Ray Charles Colton, *The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 133; Sweeney. *Mangas Coloradas,* 441-49, 457. Orton, *California Men,* 71; Conner, *Joseph Reddeford Walker,* 39–41. No charges were leveled against Mangas's murderers, and General West evaded censure for his role in the affair. *OR,* 50(2):296–97; Alvin M. Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 279–81. See also: L.E St. Hoyme, "The Skull of Mangas Coloradas," Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of Natural History Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, Manuscript 121.

Indians have been in the habit of lying in ambush, and shooting the troops and travelers as they come to drink." Since 1861, civilians and soldiers, Union and Confederate, had suffered ambush and death here at the hands of Mangas's and Cochise's warriors. Placing a fort in the middle of this trouble spot only made sense if there were enough troops to hold the place; but the garrison assigned could rarely muster sufficient strength to take the offensive against the Apaches. Protecting the fort's own livestock while attempting to safeguard overland travelers fully occupied the volunteer troops stationed there. In April 1863, a war party of nearly two hundred Apaches attacked the Fifth California Infantry company detailed to guard the pass. Outnumbered more than two to one, the soldiers managed to beat off the determined warriors after a two-hour fight.[52]

Meanwhile, Brigadier General West continued to focus his intelligence-gathering efforts on Texas and Chihuahua, fully believing that the Confederates were stockpiling supplies at Fort Davis in preparation for another thrust up the Rio Grande. Though he understood the pressure New Mexico's Hispano leaders were applying on the military governor to stop Navajo and Apache livestock thefts and killings, West disagreed with Carleton's shift of focus toward containing the hostile groups. From his Las Cruces headquarters West wrote on May 15, 1863, that "the Indians will keep. The Texans are our immediate foes. To punish the Indians will contribute nothing toward suppressing the rebellion. That is the object of this war…." He seemed obsessed with the Confederate threat and oblivious to the civil war raging all around him between Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples. But when the rebel offensive failed to materialize that summer, and the Chiricahua Apache depredations that he himself had instigated with the killing of Mangas

[52] Carleton to R.C. Drum, Santa Fe, Sept. 20, 1862, in Orton, *California Men*, 64; Colton, *Civil War in the Western Territories*, 133.

continued to take their toll on expressmen, outposts, and settlements, West finally began to change his tune. [53]

On June 21, 1863 General West authorized Major McCleave to hunt down the Chiricahua Apaches on the Mimbres River (Bedonkohe and Chihenne bands) that sought to avenge Mangas. Earlier that week about fifty warriors had killed the expressman from Fort Craig and destroyed all the mail and military dispatches he carried. At the same time the Bedonkohe men had also attacked a small party of New Mexico Volunteers on the Jornada del Muerto, east of the Rio Grande, and succeeded in killing the unit's commander, Lieutenant L. A. Bargie, mutilating his body and carrying off his head. It is likely that the warriors soon discarded the severed head as the Apache men would not have wanted to touch the grisly trophy for fear of the bad spirits and death it might bring to them.[54] The infuriated West ordered:

> This band of Mimbres River Indians must be exterminated to a man. At the earliest possible moment that the condition of your command will admit of it you will undertake this duty. Use every available man of your force; take rations sufficient for a campaign against them if necessary. Scour every foot of ground and beat up all their haunts. Do not hesitate to go yourself in person to conduct the affair, should you deem that your presence will contribute to the desired result.

The general promised whatever support he could offer in order to end the Mangas avengers' attacks and re-open the threatened inter-post express routes.[55]

By May of 1864 Carleton openly advocated civil war in the Southwest borderlands, calling for a "general uprising" of Anglo, Hispano, and Indian people

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[53] West to Bennett, Headquarters District of Arizona, May 15, 1863, *OR* 50(2), 433-34.
[54] Touching a dead person or even a body part required elaborate purification rituals and burning "ghost medicine" to ward off the spirit of the deceased. Opler, *An Apache Life-Way*, 349-50.
[55] Gen. J. R. West to Maj. William McCleave, Hart's Mill Texas, June 21, 1863, *OR* 50(2):490; For details of the attack on Lieutenant Bargie and his party see Rigg to Cutler, June 24, 1863, Dept. NM Letters Received, RG 98, NARS, 48th Senate Reps., 39th Congress, second session.

against the Apaches. The enormity of the challenge soon sank in, however, and he came to believe that even if all of the troops at his disposal in the territories actively campaigned their efforts would be insufficient to subdue the elusive Apache bands. Now he advocated total war. Carleton called on Arizona's Governor Goodwin to get "every citizen of the Territory who has a rifle to take to the field," and encouraged armed bands of self-professed "Apache hunters," like King Woolsey, to step up their activities so that when "hostile" Indians attempting to escape one group would inevitably run into another. If government-armed Papagos, Pimas and Maricopas pushed from the west and Mexican allies pressured the Apache raiders from the south—even crossing the border if necessary—there would be no escape. This "general rising of both citizens and soldiers, on both sides of the line," Carleton explained, was the only way to quell the Apache uprising that threatened to destabilize the region.[56]

Violence Escalates: Martial Cultures and War to the Knife

Midway through their three-year enlistments, the California soldiers who had so confidently marched into Arizona ready to do battle came to despise their Apache adversaries. "I abhor the idea of fighting Indians," wrote one volunteer, "let me fight an enemy that is worthy of my steel." Fantastic rumors of terrible tortures, perpetrated by a "cowardly and inhuman" foe, circulated in the ranks. Captive children, it was said, had been found nailed to spiny cacti, and Apache warriors ornamented their bridles not only

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[56] Carleton to Governor John Goodwin, April 20, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 178-79; Senate reports, 39th Congress, 2nd session, no. 156, 172, 177-79; while historians debate the definition of "total war," it appears that this call for civilian mobilization combined with evidence of genocidal attacks—massacres and the willingness to treat women and children as combatants or targets of an extermination policy—clearly constitutes total war by any definition. However, the question of genocide, a term that does not even enter the lexicon until after WWII, is more difficult to answer; there is no clear evidence that total extermination of all the men women and children of a people was ever made policy by any recognized government or tribe in the borderlands during the 1860s. Mark E. Neely, *"Was the Civil War a Total War?" Civil War History 50, No. 4 (Dec. 2004): 434-458.*

with the scalps of slain soldiers but with their severed mustachioed lips as well. Any lingering sympathy for "Lo, the poor Indian"[57] soon evaporated, and the soldiers set themselves to the task of extermination with hard hearts and grim determination. California and New Mexico newspapers printed soldiers' letters, fueling the growing race hatred and exterminationist sentiment directed toward Indians in the territories.[58]

During the Civil War years, officers in Arizona and New Mexico reported killing hundreds of "hostile" Indians, including men, women, and children, far more than at any other period in history. The Anglo soldiers from California reported losing nearly fifty officers and men in battles, skirmishes, or ambushes while traveling singly or in small parties. The Hispano New Mexico Volunteers suffered similar casualties. Carleton knew his soldiers to be better armed than his native enemies, and he placed his trust in "the gallantry of small parties against any number [of Indians]. Large parties move snail-like, are seen at once, and are avoided; generally are laughed at by these Apaches. Small parties move secretly, cover more ground, move with celerity, emulate to do better than all others, and in the end either destroy or worry the Indians into submission."[59]

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[57] Anglo soldiers in the borderlands commonly referred to native people as "Lo, the poor Indian" or simply, "Lo," a reference to the popular Alexander Pope poem, "An Essay on Man" (1734), sympathetic to the plight of Indians ("*Lo! The poor Indian*, whose untutored mind sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind.") and Horace Greeley's satirical response, "Lo, the Poor Indian," in *An Overland Journey from New York to San Francisco, in the Summer of 1859* (New York: C. M. Saxton, Barker and Co., 1860).

[58] San Francisco *Evening Bulletin*, Mar 11, 1863. The author of this letter is most likely Manson A. Mesenheimer, a saddler in Company B, Second California Cavalry. See also: "Dispatches from the California Volunteers," soldiers' letters home published in the San Francisco *Daily Alta California* in Andrew Masich, *The Civil War in Arizona: the Story of the California Volunteers, 1861-1865* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 143-331; Colorado Volunteers expressed similar sentiments: "we would rather go under fighting Sesech in the States than fighting Indians on the plains for they are the worst of the two." Jesse S. Haire Journals 1859-1897, Ohio Historical Society, Jan. 18, 1865.

[59] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, USA, Washington, Apr. 17, 1864, *OR*, 34(3):200; Saiz *vs*. Navajo, Case 2597, RG 123, NARA. See also: Gregory F. Michno, *Encyclopedia of Indian Wars: Western Battles and Skirmishes, 1850-1890* (Missoula, MT: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 2003), 367-8; Though the actual numbers cannot be known, many more members of the indigenous Apachean and other "hostile"

In reality, the Anglo soldiers rarely matched their Indian adversaries in single combat, relying instead on superior firepower and well-coordinated assaults that often targeted not just warriors but entire villages. Apache men believed they drew strength and power from the very land. They knew the welcoming desert environment that had been their home for generations and where the spirits of their ancestors still resided. Its game, flora, and water gave them life.[60] To the Anglo soldiers, this same desert landscape harbored death. Foreign and barren, it seemed devoid of water and comfort. The sun drove men mad and could kill those not prepared for its relentless power. Still, the soldiers believed themselves, man for man, better fighters than Apache warriors. One volunteer wrote: "The superiority of the Californians over the Apaches at their own style of fighting, was shown in the case of Corporal [Charles] Ellis of Company A [First Cavalry], who crawled to a rock behind which was an Indian, and, giving a short cough, the Indian raised his head to discover his course, when a bullet from Ellis's rifle dashed through his brain." The Apaches present at this fight remembered the warrior the soldiers shot in the head at long range but also recalled that the Apache men had killed three soldiers in close combat and captured and released one white man, whom they determined to be a holy man when he got down on his knees, begged for mercy, and "prayed to the sun." The warriors did not rejoice in their victory and threw away the one

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tribes of the borderlands died of starvation or disease while on the run or in captivity during this same period, 1861-67.

[60]Goodwin and Basso, *Western Apache Raiding*, 15; Charles Kaut, "Western Apache Clan and Phratry Organization," *American Anthropologist,* 58:1 (February 1956), 63-4.

scalp they had taken after they discovered the body of their dead companion behind the rock.[61]

The soldiers relied heavily on their state-of-the-art small arms, including long-range rifle muskets, breech-loading carbines, multi-shot revolving pistols, as well as mountain artillery, to successfully contend with the often numerically superior Apaches. When an army officer later questioned an Apache war leader about the Battle of Apache Pass, where nearly two hundred Chiricahuas surrounded a California Volunteer command in July 1862, he replied that the Indians would have won the battle if the soldiers had not "fired your wagons at us." The wagons were in fact twelve-pounder mountain howitzers that could throw scattershot canister loads at close range and exploding shells and shrapnel up to one thousand yards. These weapons inflicted some casualties, but the psychological effect of the artillery had an even greater impact.[62]

The Anglo soldiers' technological advantage included rolling stock which ensured essential logistical support—the key to success in desert warfare. With wheeled vehicles, the troops could travel longer distances than their enemies, field larger bodies of fighting men, and maintain offensive operations for extended periods of time in all seasons and conditions. Freight wagons, filled with ammunition and provisions, and rolling water wagons enabled the California Column to march nearly one thousand miles to the Rio Grande, fighting rebels and Indians as they went. The military supply chain allowed soldiers and civilians in the territories to establish towns, forts, and camps that supported bases from which attacks could be launched. Combined with alliances forged with

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[61] Orton, *California Men,* 72; McCleave, "Our Scout to Black Canyon," 20; William G. Morris, *Address Delivered Before the Society of California Volunteers* (San Francisco: Francis, Valentine & Co., 1866), 34; Goodwin and Basso, *Western Apache Raiding*, 84.
[62] Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches*, 164.

Indians and Hispanos that concentrated forces for coordinated attacks, logistical superiority gave the Anglo military its greatest advantage. [63]

Captain T.T. Tidball's expedition against the Aravaipa Apaches in southern Arizona epitomized the type of warfare waged by the U.S. Army against the warring bands within the territory. Tidball's command consisted of twenty-five picked men of Companies I and K, Fifth California Infantry, ten "American citizens"; thirty-two "Mexicans"; twenty Papagos from San Xavier; and nine "tame Apaches [*mansos*] . . . as spies and guides." While the soldiers saw to their weapons and pack mules, the Hispanos and Apaches *mansos* celebrated mass at their respective churches in preparation for the attack. The allies left Tucson for the "Cajon de Arivaypa" in May 1863 to "chastise" Aravaipa Apaches accused of stock raiding. "All grown males are fair game," wrote the Tucson garrison commander, Colonel David Fergusson, "the women and children capture and bring here."[64] The troops headed northwest, marching only at night, in silence, and did not light a fire for five days. Tidball's caution enabled his command to completely surprise Eskiminzin's Aravaipa village of men, women, and children. The savage attack killed more than fifty people and wounded as many more. Tidball's auxiliaries slaughtered men and women, including the wounded, and the captain personally interceded to prevent a complete massacre. When the bloody affair was over, the soldiers escorted only ten surviving women and children prisoners back to Tucson, and slavery in the homes of well-off Hispanos, along with sixty-nine head of captured stock.

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[63] Henry P. Walker, "Freighting from Guaymas to Tucson, 1850-1880," *Western Historical Quarterly* 1 (July 1970): 291-304; Constance Altshuler, " Military Administration in Arizona, 1854-1865," *Journal of Arizona History* 10 (Winter 1969): 215-38; see also: Darlis Miller, *Military Supply in the Southwest, 1861-1865* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989).
[64] Fergusson to T.T. Tidball, May 2, 1863, *OR*, 50(2): 422-23.

Thomas C. McClelland, an Anglo civilian, was the only man attached to Tidball's command killed in the raid. A machinist from Pittsburgh seeking Western adventure working at Colonel Colt's silver mine south of Tucson, wrote home to his mother, "I do not believe I was born to be shot by an Indian." The twenty-three-year-old volunteered to accompany the expedition several months after sharing his wisdom in a letter to his brother serving in the Army of the Potomac, "I tell you in an Indian fight a man has to be lively and not give the enemy time to surround or come up on you." His prophetic warning came true when a wounded Apache man, playing dead, shot the mounted McClelland through the heart as he boldly rode by. Some of his overconfidence may have resulted from a false sense of security provided by the state-of-the-art, five-shot Colt revolving rifle he carried that day, and lost to the Aravaipa warrior.[65]

Colonel Fergusson praised the one-sided fight as a "brilliant little affair," regarding it as "something for emulation to others in future campaigns against Apaches." Carleton encouraged rivalry between field commanders and did indeed urge his subordinates to emulate the "zeal, energy, and gallantry" of Tidball's soldiers and civilians in order to even the score that had not been settled for the deaths of men that had been tortured to death in Apache Pass as well as the killing of Sergeant Wheeling and the courier Chavez the year before. Of course, the Aravaipas had nothing to do with these killings carried out by Chiricahuas under Cochise and Mangas Coloradas.[66]

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[65]McClelland had worked at the Cerro Colorado Mine south of Tucson until Apache raiders forced the workers to take refuge in Tucson. On September 16, 1861 he wrote to his mother, "I do not believe I was born to be shot by an Indian." Tom McClelland to James McClelland, March 11, 1863. McClelland Papers, Senator John Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, MSS#66, Box 8, Folder 6.

[66] GO 8, May 12, 1863, Tucson, *OR*, 50(2):432-33; Orton, *California Men*, 671; *Daily Alta California*, September 11, 1863; *Los Angeles Star*, Aug 30, 1864; Carleton to West, May 30, 1863, Doolitte, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 111. Others followed Tidball's example during the war years, and as late as 1871, men who had accompanied Tidball instigated the infamous Camp Grant massacre. Their route, method of

In March 1864, Chiricahua raiders ran off with a herd of government mules corralled at Cow Springs, near the Arizona-New Mexico border. Captain James H. Whitlock's Company F, Fifth California Infantry, set out in pursuit with a mixed command of cavalry and foot soldiers, but he deliberately held his men back, allowing the raiders to get a good lead. When the Chiricahuas thought they had eluded the soldiers, they no longer attempted to mask their trail, which headed straight to a large village in the Sierra Bonita Mountains thirty-five miles northwest of Fort Bowie. Breaking free of his pack animals Whitlock struck out with a fast-moving force. To reduce the chance of reflected sunlight betraying his movements, he ordered his men to blacken the brightly burnished steel barrels of their rifle muskets. He allowed no fires for cooking or warmth and made his men hide out as much as possible during the day. Then he tracked the Chiricahuas by moonlight and attacked their sleeping camp at daybreak on April 7. Although outnumbered, the California soldiers killed twenty-one warriors, recaptured the stolen stock, and completely destroyed the Apaches' food supplies and camp equipage—all without loss to Whitlock's command. On the march home, Whitlock's men tested the extreme range of their rifle muskets, and their sharpshooting kept the Apache warriors from getting no closer than eight hundred yards from column or camp. Carleton congratulated Colonel Bowie and Whitlock while bragging about this rare victory to the high command in Washington.[67]

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attack, and results were almost identical; the main difference was that, in 1871, Chief Eskiminzin's Aravaipa Apaches had surrendered to the officer commanding Camp Grant and supposedly enjoyed his protection.

[67] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, Apr. 24, 1864, *OR*, 50(2):826; Bowie to Carleton, April 15, 1864, ibid., 826-27; James H. Whitlock to Capt. C.A. Smith, April 13, 1864, ibid., 827-29

The Anglo and Hispano volunteers cooperated with civilian volunteers in hunting down Western Apache bands in the Pinal and White Mountains of the upper Gila country. Carleton's edict not to treat with Indians and to kill Apache men on sight led to tragic results in the total war climate that gripped the borderlands in the summer of 1864. In June, Major Thomas Blakeney's command of New Mexico and California Volunteers and a company of Anglo citizen volunteers under the command of King Woolsey set out north from Forts Bowie and Goodwin while Captain Julius Shaw's company of New Mexico cavalry departed Fort Wingate by way of the pueblo of Zuñi and headed south. With mules packed with supplies sufficient for a sixty-day expedition into the heart of Apache country the columns moved out. Nearly everything that could go wrong did, beginning with some of Shaw's supply mules running away or falling over a cliff. The Apaches took Shaw's New Mexican soldiers for Hispano traders and even signaled for a parley in order to barter for powder, lead, and blankets. Shaw was incensed that the Zunis—who regularly traded with all sides from their neutral pueblo between Apachería, Navajo land, and the New Mexico settlements—had warned the Apaches of the coming expedition. Shaw reported to headquarters that the chances for successful negotiations had been nil from the start because the Zunis panicked the Apaches by telling them that, "after the Navajos had surrendered we had killed all the men, and left none alive but the women and children, of whom we made slaves."[68]

Though his men blackened their musket barrels and took other precautions to ensure stealth, Blakeney's column moved ponderously and took no one by surprise. Some Indians believing themselves to be under the protection of white flags were

[68] Capt. Julius Shaw to Maj. E. W. Eaton, First New Mexico Cavalry, July 14, 1864, *OR* 50(1), 370-73, 377.

captured by Blakeney's men, and when a captive exchange demand did not occur, the major summarily hanged his Apache prisoners, ending any hope of future negotiations and a mass surrender as Carson had forced with the Mescaleros. The Gila Apaches would now fight until the last. At water holes, Blakeney's men endured the taunts of the Apache warriors, who hurled epithets and stones with equal skill from positions of safety, high above the soldiers, on the rocky ridges. The troops contented themselves with long-range shooting and the destruction of more than 250 acres of Apache corn and wheat crops. Though he rarely got close to the warriors, Blakeney estimated that nearly half were armed with firearms, rifles or pistols, and most carried lances, bows, and "slung shots."[69]

The heaviest casualties inflicted during the expedition may have occurred after Blakeney received orders to return to Fort Goodwin to allow for the mustering out of some of the California troops whose enlistment terms had expired. Employing a ruse that Colonel Rigg had earlier taught him, the major hid twenty-four Hispano and Anglo soldiers and three of Woolsey's men in his apparently-abandoned camp while making a show of pulling out with the rest of the command. When fifteen Apache men approached to within thirty yards, intent on searching the deserted camp for food and valuables, the soldiers and miners sprang the trap, killing or wounding five or more of the Apaches. Altogether, the columns that converged in the Gila wilderness killed about twenty of the enemy, likely wounding as many more. The disruption to the *rancherías*, once thought safe from attack by outsiders, was even more devastating to the Apache families who now experienced firsthand the new brand of war-making in the borderlands.[70]

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[69] Rigg to Cutler, Sept 14, 1864, *OR* 50(1), 368; Report of Capt. Julius Shaw to Maj. E. W. Eaton, First New Mexico Cavalry, July 14, 1864, ibid., 370-77.
[70] For an excellent account of this expedition see: Charles Meketa and Jaqueline Meketa, *One Blanket and*

In the civil wars that raged in the territories, Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians perpetrated atrocities without regard for sex, age, guilt, or innocence. Between 1864 and 1867, the war with the Apaches devolved into a blood feud in which noncombatants on all sides suffered the most. In June 1865, Captain Martin H. Calderwood had been in Arizona for only a month when his company of the Seventh California Infantry responded to a call for help from Pedro Saavedra's "Spanish Ranch" near Tubac. Calderwood described in grisly detail the aftermath of the Chiricahua attack:

> Here I beheld one of the most sickening and cruel sights I ever witnessed during the whole of my campaign against the Apaches. The Indians had stripped naked the four women they had captured and after disemboweling them while still alive, had on the
> first sight of our approach lanced them through the heart. One of the lance heads had been pulled from its shaft and still remained in the woman's body. I pulled the lance from the woman and the still warm blood flowed from it. The two small children were lying dead near a mesquite log. The savages had taken them by the feet and smashed their heads to a pulpy mass on the log which was besmeared with their blood and brains. Saavedra, who was as brave a man as ever lived and who was esteemed by all who knew him, had purportedly been shot through his kidneys with an arrow; we found him alive but in awful agony. He lived for two days and then died.[71]

The Anglo soldiers became hardened to the realities of war in the borderlands and soon matched the Hispano and Anglo citizens in their calls for revenge and extermination of the Apaches. In 1864, Colonel Oscar M. Brown wrote a poem that the men of his First California Cavalry soon adopted as their marching song:

> We'll whip the Apache
> We'll exterminate the race

Ten Days Rations (Globe, AZ.: Southwest Parks and Monuments Association, 1980), 50-58.

[71] *Arizona Enterprise*, June 13, 1891; Capt. H.M. Calderwood to J.F. Calderwood, June 27, 1865, in *Dutch Flat Enquirer*, Aug 12, 1865. The killings at Saavedra's ranch outraged both soldiers and civilians in Arizona. See: Thomas E. Farish, *History of Arizona* (San Francisco: Filmer Bothers Electrotype, 1915-18)6:130-31. After Mangas Coloradas's death in 1863 at the hands of the California Volunteers, Cochise became the most aggressive and pursued Apache leader. See Report of Lt. Col. C.E Bennett, July 6, 1865, *OR*, 50(1):415-19.

Of thieves and assassins
Who the human form disgrace
We'll travel over mountain
And through the valley deep,
We'll travel without eating,
We'll travel without sleep.[72]

Carleton's far-reaching Apache campaign was one of the largest and most sustained ever mounted in the territories, including the decades before and after the Civil War, yet many citizens—Anglo and Hispano miners, freighters, farmers, and ranchers—complained that it was not enough.[73] Repeated military forays, they contended, seemed only to antagonize the Indians, prompting bloody reprisals. In fact only one in four expeditions or scouts resulted in any significant damage to the wary and very mobile Apache bands deemed hostile by the government. The soldiers measured their success in pounds of mescal, the dietary staple of the Western Apaches, destroyed; the number of weapons and animals captured; and, of course, body counts.[74]

Some of the formally educated men among the California Volunteers recorded and attempted to preserve knowledge of Arizona's rapidly vanishing Indian cultures and artifacts. It is sadly ironic that the same troops engaged in bloody and relentless combat with native peoples took the time and had the interest to study and carefully preserve evidence of their cultures. Some enlisted men kept daily journals, recording detailed accounts of prehistoric sites, early Spanish *visitas,* churches, and landmarks. Many described Indian artifacts, noting with wonder the variety of polychrome shards found near Casa Grande and other ancient ruins. Private Thomas Keam became fascinated with the Navajo culture. He learned the language, married a member of that tribe, and lived

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[72] *Santa Fe Gazette*, Dec. 17, 1864.
[73] Walnut Grove Gold Mining Co. v. Apache, Case 4715 and Case 7397, RG 123, NARA.
[74]Morris, *Address,* 34; Utley, *Frontiersmen in Blue*, 259.

near Fort Defiance where he collected ceramics and other objects which he shipped to educational institutions in the East, including Harvard's venerable Peabody Museum.[75]

During the war years, Apache warriors killed more Anglos, Hispanos, and enemy Indians than any other tribe, but the warriors of the powerful Navajo nation accounted for the largest number of raids and proportionately greater property loss. They emerged from their canyon strongholds in well-organized parties and targeted the livestock of New Mexico's Hispano and Pueblo Indian herders, whose losses approached one million animals during the 1860s. Because of their scale and frequency, the Navajo attacks had even greater economic impact than those waged by Apache bands, but the Navajo stock raids resulted in significantly fewer deaths than those involving Apaches.[76]

Apaches were far more likely to engage in raids and reprisals that resulted in enemy casualties. They attacked Hispano herders, Anglo miners and freighters, and even well-armed military patrols and expeditions in Arizona and western New Mexico. The attacks peaked in 1862-4, corresponding with the Anglo military power vacuum followed by increased military campaigning in those years and resulting in hundreds of casualties—killed, wounded, and captured.[77]

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[75] A soldier in the Seventh California Infantry's Co. E wrote that his unit stopped to admire the Spanish mission San Xavier, "the inside of which beggars all description. It contains some fine paintings and some of the most beautiful plaster statues I have ever seen." *Calaveras* [California] *Chronicle,* July 1, 1865; Bailey, "Thomas Varker Keam," 18.

[76] Saiz *vs*. Navajo, Case 2597, RG 123, NARA. See also: *U.S. Army, Adjutant General's Office, Chronological List of Actions &c, with the Indians from January 15, 1837 to January, 1891*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1891); *Report of the Secretary of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Arizona Superintendency and New Mexico Superintendency, 1861-1866.* More than 300,000 sheep and goats were reported stolen between 1861 and 1866. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1867* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1861-67; Depredation Claim Case Files, NARA, RG 123; Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, NARA, RG 75. See also: Michno, *Encyclopedia,* 83-189, 367-8.

[77]Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, NARA, RG 75; *U.S. Army Chronological List of Actions*, 1891; see also: Adjutant Generals Reports, 1861-1866; see also evidence from Catholic church burial records which clearly show that Apache attacks were more likely to result in death, especially among "non-

Apache warriors responded to increased army patrols that resulted in the deaths of kinsmen with avenging war parties of their own. All of the Apache tribes recognized two fundamentally different kinds of warfare: the raid and the war of revenge.[78] The raid was essentially an extension of the hunting tradition and required the same degree of stealth and skill with weapons. The avowed purpose of a raid was to bring home food for the family and band. War, on the other hand, involved a vengeance motive. It was localized and very personal. An Apache man would be expected to avenge the death of a family member when a widow or female relative approached him and implored him to mount a war party. Duty-bound, the men made their holy preparations, with the help of spiritual leaders and elders, and engaged in a war dance pre-enacting the deeds of revenge and bravery they planned to perform. The Apache word for this type of war translates literally as "to take death from the enemy." Vengeance attacks targeted people—either those responsible for the death of a family member or the same type of people (e.g. Pima, white man, Mexican, etc.). If successful the men of the war party would present the aggrieved widow or female relatives with property—horses, clothing, weapons, food, tools, etc.—and scalps or captive men to be ritually slain by the women. Captive children, especially boys, might be adopted by a family to replace relatives lost to the enemy. In this way, *gegodza* (to be paid back) might be achieved.[79]

Even in vengeance warfare, a secondary motive involved the capture of enemy property. During the preparatory war dance, before the war party departed, the men would attempt to gain as much "power" as possible. They smoked a pipe to the four

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combatants," David M. Brugge, *Navajos in Catholic Church Records of New Mexico, 1694-1875* (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2010), 149-52.

[78] Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 334.

[79] Goodwin and Basso , *Western Apache Raiding*, 16, 284-85.

cardinal directions and intoned a prayer: "May I kill an enemy. May I get food." [80] The warriors prayed to *Yusn*, the Great Spirit, and relied on spiritual helpers found in nature and preparations prescribed by holy men. Special shields, war paint, headgear, medicine pouches, and prayers would increase the chances for success. The men of a war party would speak a code-like sacred language reserved only for this purpose, and back at the band's camp the women would perform their daily chores as prescribed by holy men and ancient custom (e.g. stacking the fire wood in neat rows, avoiding contact with men other than their husbands, not scratching their heads with their fingers) to ensure their men would return victoriously and with needed supplies.[81]

Hispanos also recognized a difference between a raid and war. A raid against Indians for the purpose of capturing livestock and people—usually women and children—who could be sold as other property or kept as servants (*criadas*) was different than an attack intended to exact a measure of blood for blood spilled by the enemy. The Tidball expedition, co-captained by Jesús Maria Elías and his Hispano company from Tucson, set out to exterminate the Aravaipa Apaches believed to have perpetrated murders and thefts. Month's earlier, Elias's brother Ramón was killed by Aravaipas while attempting to recover stolen stock. He put up a good fight, evidently using his rifle so effectively that he killed one or more of the Apache raiders. When finally overwhelmed by attackers who rushed his rocky position, the warriors used the stones to smash Ramón's hands to pulp, making certain that he would not be so formidable an enemy in

[80] Opler, *An Apache Life-way,* 338.
[81] Opler, *An Apache Life-Way*, 340-45.

the afterlife.[82] This was the second of the four Elias brothers to be killed by Apaches, and Jesus Maria vowed vengeance. With the support of Tidball's men, the attack by the allied Hispanos and Indians quickly turned into a killing frenzy in which Apache men, women, and children died without mercy. Hispano warriors were more likely to take scalps as evidence of their kills than were Apaches or Anglos. For nearly a century the governors of Sonora and Chihuahua had paid cash bounties for Indian scalps as positive proof of enemies killed. This practice spawned independent bands of mercenary scalp hunters which preyed on Apache and other borderland tribes. Spanish and, later, Mexican soldiers and civilians took ears and hands as irrefutable evidence of slain enemies. These grisly trophies were more difficult to sub-divide and double-count, as was all-too-frequently the case with scalps.

Both Navajo and Apache attacks on New Mexico's Hispano settlements escalated dramatically as the U.S. troops and local militia units fought the rebel Texans. During the time of the Confederate invasion, old men and boys had to fight off the Indian stock raiders as best they could. On March 20, 1862, a large party of Navajos ran off cattle from the village of San Miguel. Most of the inexperienced townsmen that rode off in pursuit were teenagers, so the priest, Aniceto Lopez, went along to keep an eye on them. As usual, the raiders rode hard for the first twenty-four hours, knowing that they could push themselves and their animals through the night while the pursuers would have to wait until daylight to pick up the trail again. In this case, believing they had outdistanced their youthful trackers, the Navajos made camp at night and even built fires by which they could warm their feet and repair their worn-out moccasins. The Hispano boys crept

[82] Karl Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 84.

to within fifty yards of the camp and opened fire, scattering the warriors. The blood trails in the snow the following morning led the Francisco Sena to the body of a dead Navajo. The eighteen-year-old Sena victoriously scalped the warrior, took his ears, and cut off his "private parts" to show his friends, only to be severely chastised by the priest for this abhorrent behavior. [83]

An Apache war party on a successful revenge raid traditionally took a single scalp to dance over upon returning home. Generally, warriors wanted little to do with dead bodies or body parts, and handling such things required elaborate purification ceremonies. After the scalp dance, the trophy was usually discarded far from camp or thrown in a tree to decompose and return to nature. Still, the scalp dance became an important celebration of life for the families and bands of the successful warriors. Social restrictions limiting contact between unmarried men and women were relaxed at this time, and men who captured horses and other plunder demonstrated generosity and charity by giving away their goods to single women and others in need. Successful

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[83] *Daily Alta California*, September 11, 1863; David Fergusson to T. T. Tidball, May 2, 1863, OR 50(2): 422-23; Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 261. It was widely rumored during the late 1850s and early 1860s that the Mexican government had placed a bounty of 5,000 pesos on the scalp of Mangas Coloradas. For a firsthand account of borderlands scalp hunting see, Samuel E. Chamberlain, *My Confession* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956); Arizona Territory authorized scalp hunting in 1865, see Ian W. Record, *Big Sycamore Stands Alone: The Western Apaches, Aravaipa, and the Struggle for Place*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 124, 203, 319 n156; see also: Mark Santiago, *The Jar of Severed Hands: Spanish Deportation of Apache Prisoners of War, 1770-1810* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), *7, 81-6, 162-65;* James E. Officer, *Hispanic Arizona*, *1536-1856* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984), 308-9. All present agreed that scalping was common practice, but admitted that this sort of mutilation was not considered appropriate behavior. In this instance the perpetrator, Francisco Sena, was reprimanded by the priest and later attempted to deny the mutilation, beyond taking the scalp. See the testimony of witnesses in: Miguel Gonzales y Baca v. Navajo, Case 6564, RG 123, NARA. In a stock raid at the foot of the Picacho Mountains near Mesilla in 1861, one boy and one "old man" herder were killed and an eleven-year-old was captured: Jose Trujillo y Baca v. Navajo, Case 4083, RG 123, NARA; Vicente Lujan's 1862 depredation claim provides a case study in tracking Navajo raiders, pointing out that the raiders almost always had the advantage because they did not have to stop at dark while the trackers did and were, therefore, outdistanced by the raiders, Lujan v. Navajos, Case 5456, RG 123, NARA.

raiders might also use their wealth to acquire wives. In any case, a raider earned the honor and respect of his family and band.[84]

The Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians each had a fundamentally different approach to warfare and military service. The Indian men of the borderlands, both allies and enemies of the Anglos and Hispanos, were hunters and providers first and warriors second. The Anglos brought a new kind of warrior to the fight in the Southwest borderlands. The U.S. troops, whether regulars or volunteers in federal service, were trained professionals contractually bound and paid for their service. In contrast to the Indians and Hispano civilians in the territories, the Anglo and Hispano soldiers in U.S service were better armed and equipped, and they benefitted from a seemingly inexhaustible supply of provisions. Though the army traditionally organized its soldiers in regiments of one thousand men, the difficulty of moving large bodies of troops in a desert environment, short of water and other subsistence, required that most of the campaigning and fighting in the Southwest to be done by smaller units—usually no larger than one-hundred-man companies. Through effective use of written communication, carried by an elaborate network of military couriers or vedettes, and connected to the other states and territories by river and ocean transportation and by telegraph, military commanders in the Southwest could manage logistics and coordinate attacks on a large scale. Though the Apacheans were often numerically superior, the Anglos concentrated troops for coordinated attacks that offset their overall disadvantage in numbers. Whether

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[84] Goodwin and Basso, *Western Apache Raiding*, 84, 276-78, Apache warriors might discard a scalp before returning home if they had lost comrades to the enemy, believing the cost to the war party had been too high to permit rejoicing. Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 350. For comparison to similar Plains Indian traditions related to scalp dances see: David Halaas and Andrew Masich, *Halfbreed: The Remarkable True Story of George Bent* (Cambridge: DaCapo Press, 2004), 179, 185-6, 216.

the troops sent to the territories during the Civil War years were animated by patriotic or mercenary motives, they were in fact full-time soldiers.

The Hispano farmers and herders protected themselves and their families as best they could and occasionally joined militia companies for common defense, but these men received little or no training, were poorly armed, and seldom took the offensive. In 1861, many of the Hispano New Mexicans rallied around Kit Carson who was considered a kinsman of sorts, having married into the influential Jaramillo family. Colonel Manuél Chaves also recruited Hispanos when the call came for U.S. volunteer soldiers to fight the invading Confederates from Texas. Even these New Mexico Volunteers in federal service sometimes performed more like militiamen—part-time soldiers—whose roles as family men and providers came first. New Mexican officers were known to permit their men to return home for planting and other domestic duties, allowances never considered for Anglo soldiers. Even with the disparity in discipline and training, the Hispanos and Anglos cautiously joined forces to expel the Texans and put down the Southern rebellion. After succeeding in this strategic priority, they turned to face their common Navajo and Apache enemies. Often with Indian allies at their sides—and frequently leading the way—the Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians of the borderlands formed a powerful strategic alliance.[85]

Navajo and Apache chiefs and war leaders often achieved tactical success, but they rarely devised plans that might be considered strategic. The very idea of large-scale concerted effort by tribes and bands was foreign. Though warrior or "soldier" societies

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[85] In this case, the claimant's attorneys made the point that "killing by Indians was incident, not object, whilst as against the Indians both Mexicans and soldiers made personal slaughter the object." Lorenzo Labadie v. Navajo, Case 3252, RG 123, NARA, 5-9; F. Stanley, *The Civil War in New Mexico*, (Denver: World Press, 1960), 387-94.

existed, they were in no way parallel to the Anglo and Hispano military systems. Because of the deeply rooted native tradition of warfare based on stock raiding or vengeance, the war for survival precipitated by the increased Anglo military presence brought about by the Civil War was something very difficult for Indian warriors to understand and effectively counter. Though the word "genocide" had not yet entered the lexicon, the idea of annihilating an enemy people was openly espoused by white exterminationists; the magnitude of such an extreme doctrine seems to have been beyond the ken of the indigenous people of the territories. Certainly they understood the concept of wiping out a wagon train or even a small settlement in response to a deadly attack. But the idea of the planned and systematic extermination of an entire people seems not to have occurred to them.

As competition for food intensified during the Civil War years and gathering and farming became less reliable, both Navajo and Apache economies depended increasingly on livestock raiding. Killing the Hispano, Anglo, or enemy Indian providers of this bounty would have been economically foolish and counterproductive. The Navajos became expert horsemen and stock raisers themselves, which made them less dependent on raiding but also made them the target of Apache, Ute, and Hispano raiders. The Apaches never developed a sophisticated cattle and horse-raising tradition. They often preferred butchering and eating captured animals immediately or drying and preserving the meat. Believing that they could always obtain more animals from neighboring tribes and pueblos, the Apaches did not keep large herds of cattle or horses.

On a tactical level, only the Chiricahua Apache bands mounted large-scale offensive attacks aimed at killing or annihilating an enemy force or settlement. After

U.S. troops temporarily abandoned their forts, Apache leaders Mangas Coloradas and Cochise gathered two to three hundred warriors, numbers unheard of before or after the Civil War, for coordinated attacks against white civilians and soldiers. Though the Apaches achieved many small-scale tactical victories, they could not organize, coordinate, and sustain large-scale operations resulting in strategic success. Mangas and Cochise combined their Bedonkohe, Chihenne, and Chokonen bands in July 1862 and attempted to completely destroy Captain Roberts's California Volunteer infantry company in a well-planned ambush in Apache Pass. The fierce struggle for the springs lasted the better part of a day. By nightfall, the Californians had driven the warriors from the water, using artillery to clear the surrounding hills of Apache marksmen hidden behind hastily-built, stone breastworks. Though this coordinated attack nearly succeeded, it was a rare occurrence due in part to the difficulty in communications and cooperation between disparate bands. Though the Apacheans used smoke for long distance signaling and left directional messages for friends by piling rocks with stick pointers, detailed plans could only be communicated orally. Runners had remarkable memories, and, having grown up in a culture dependent or oral tradition, most Apache men and women demonstrated an ability to remember instructions with a high degree of accuracy. Still, the Anglo and Hispano soldiers employed detailed written communications and a well-organized express service that enabled them to better coordinate their separated commands and allowed them to quickly unite and take the offensive.[86]

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[86] When Apache raids shut down the southern Overland Mail, California Volunteer troops established a vedette service of mounted couriers. GO 11, July 21, 1862, *OR*, 50(1):92; written communications allowed

Apache raiding and war parties traditionally comprised only 10-20 men, and the leaders of these tactical units had little experience in synchronizing closely timed attacks and maneuvering large bodies of fighting men. Smaller attacks usually took the form of a dawn surprise, an ambush, or a decoy trap. All required stealth and patience. Stock raids consisted of gathering grazing animals or running off entire herds or flocks in broad daylight and moving the captured stock as fast as possible before nightfall. Morning attacks allowed the raiders sufficient light to move the animals out of harm's way before darkness retarded their progress. The raiding party generally divided into two groups—one intent on chasing off the herders or guards and delaying pursuers while the other focused on rounding up and driving off as much stock as possible.

Pursuit might be foiled by dividing herds or making false trails and reuniting at a predetermined rendezvous. The warriors often killed or wounded a small number of captured animals to discourage or distract pursuers. If the pursuers were Pueblo Indian or Hispano stock-raisers, they might well choose to butcher and return home with the meat from a slaughtered animal rather than continuing the chase and risk coming back empty-handed. Juan Cordova recalled a Navajo cattle raid that left dead cows in its wake. He believed that "this shows clearly that the Indians cared as much to do harm as to enrich themselves by stealing."[87] But the raiders also understood the psychological value of leaving a trail of death. Sometimes the warriors would shoot out the eyes or otherwise horribly mutilate the sheep or cattle they left to be found on the trail—a warning to those who followed. For the raiders, moving as fast and as far as human endurance would allow

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coordinated attacks from the U.S. territories and the Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua, Carleton to Gov. Ignacio Pesqueira, April 20, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 177.

[87] See Cordova's testimony regarding a June 1862 stock raid in Socorro Co. in Julian Torres v. Navajos, Case 5455, RG 123, NARA.

was the key to success. They might stay in the saddle two or more days without stopping, riding captured horses to death if necessary. Unless they were out for revenge, Navajo and Apache raiders ambushed or fought pursuers only as a last resort. When strong and determined military patrols, citizens, or enemy nations pursued, the raiders would turn and fight or prudently kill or abandon their captured animals and retreat.[88]

Hispanos

Hispano farmers, ranchers, and freighters suffered the most during the escalation of hostilities that characterized the civil wars in the territories from 1861 to 1867. Though accounting for less than sixty per cent of the total population (Indian, Hispano, Anglo), they suffered nearly ninety per cent of the depredations reported to federal authorities.[89] They lived in small *pueblos* (villages), often clusters of adobe dwellings inhabited by related extended families, or isolated ranches, far from population centers and protecting forts. The stock herders, with their large flocks of sheep and goats, were especially vulnerable to attack, as they traveled to and from pasturages often located more than a day's ride from their homes.

Typically, a Navajo or Mescalero Apache attack came in the early morning. In the pre-dawn light, the animals would be stampeded by one party of raiders as a second group cut off and surrounded the herdsmen. The Navajos rode in large raiding parties of twenty-five to two hundred men and almost always outnumbered the stockmen who usually ran for their lives or hid out until the danger had passed. The isolated herders had

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[88] Depredation Claims, NARA, RG 123, see, for example, Saiz & Son *vs*. Navajo, Case 2597, Labadie *vs*. Navajo, Case 3529, Elias *vs*. Apache, Case File 7550, Montoya *vs* Navajo, Case File 5954 and Armijo *vs*. Navajo, Case File 447; also NARA, RG 75 Depredation Claims, Otero *vs*. Navajo Claim 4048; Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 345; Goodwin and Basso, *Western Apache Raiding*, 67.

[89] Approximately 60,000 Indians of all tribes and conditions could call Arizona and New Mexico home in 1860. Hispanos accounted for about 80,000 inhabitants. Anglos, including soldiers only added another 2,000 to the total. *U.S. Eighth Census* (1860), 596-98 and *Ninth Census* (1870), xii, xvii.

always been the easiest prey for Indian stock raiders, but during the Civil War years, especially when able-bodied Hispano men served with militia companies or U.S. volunteers engaged in repelling the Confederate invasion in 1862, Navajo and Apache raids increased in frequency and boldness. [90]

The boy herders were vulnerable on two counts: charged with protecting their animals, they placed themselves in harm's way, but they were also desirable as captives. Pedro Padilla testified that two hundred Navajo and Apache raiders attacked Cañada Alamosa in January of 1862. Most of the men eligible for military service had joined the army or were engaged by the government as freighters or civilian contractors. The Indians, he said, "were well aware of our small number and were bold in consequence. The whole population lost in this one raid, all the cattle, horses, goats, etc we had. The loss was heavy for everybody. It placed us all on one level. The rich ones lost by the thousand and the poor ones lost a few goats or a cow. The herder who was watching the sheep and goats got killed that day, the one herding the horses and cattle escaped."[91] Juan Jose Montolla, an eleven-year-old Hispano goat herder taken by Navajos rode blindfolded behind his captors for three days. When he finally arrived in the Navajo canyon country, hundreds of miles from his home, he was immediately put to work herding the very animals that had been captured with him. Boy shepherds were in demand by both the pastoral Indians and the Hispanos. Trained sheep dogs were also

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[90]For examples of increased raiding and violent attacks as a result Hispanos serving in the militia or volunteer force during the Confederate invasion in New Mexico, see, Mariano Pino v. Navajo, Claim 6141, RG 75, NARA, Rafael Chavez v. Navajo, Case 4097 and Case 3044, RG 123, NARA, Juan Cristobal Armijo v. Navajo, Claim 4193, RG 75 and Case 447, RG 123, NARA, Tomas Montoya v. Apache, Case 4101, RG 123, NARA, Pilar Cordova v. Navajo, Claim 5620, RG 75, NARA, Lorenzo Otero v. Navajo, Claim 4048, RG 75, NARA; in Arizona see, Juan Elias v. Apache, Case 7550, RG 123, NARA, 23, Charles Poston v. Apache, Case 5845, RG 123, NARA, and Abraham Peoples v. Mimbres Apache, Claim 5216, RG 75 and Case 6253, RG 123, NARA. See also: Opler, *An Apache Life-way*, 343-45.

[91] Pedro Padilla v. Navajo and Apache, RG 123, no. 5957 NARA.

highly valued by the Navajos and swept up with their flocks for the same reason the human herders were.[92]

The stock and captive raids of the 1860s were not typical of the traditional violent exchange cycle of the borderlands. Felix Tafoya, also from the village of Cañada Alamosa, remembered that prior to 1861 the neighboring tribes had been friendly, but suddenly, relations changed and "the Indians went to murdering."[93] The boldness of the raids shocked even the most seasoned residents of New Mexico. Hispano pueblos came under attack by warriors who entered houses, took captives, and plundered at will. The raiders broke into the corrals that held in common the villagers' best horses and mules. Twenty-five Mescalero Apache raiders swept through the village of Anton Chico, New Mexico, in October 1864, driving before them the horses and mules found grazing on the commons. Roman and Estípulo Lucero led six other men in a mounted pursuit covering fifty miles in three days. The Lucero brothers died of bullet and arrow wounds received when the Apaches finally stopped running and turned to fight. The surviving Hispanos returned empty-handed. More often than not, Hispano and Pueblo Indian pursuit parties turned back after confronting Navajo and Apache warriors ready to stand and fight rather than give up their plunder.[94]

As war raged along the roads in Arizona and the Rio Grande settlements in New Mexico, the level of violence escalated. Deadly encounters increased and reports of

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[92] An older boy herder had been killed the day Montolla was taken. Young Montolla finally found a way to escape "Navajo country" and returned home three years later, though his patron never thought him mentally competent after his ordeal. See Montolla's testimony in: Victoria Gonzales de Candelario v. Navajos, Case 5421, RG 123, NARA. Sheep dogs were valued at $25. Manuel Barela v. Navajos , Case 4109, RG 123, NARA.
[93] Felix Tafoya v. Apache and Navajo, Case 5958, RG 123, NARA.
[94] Jojola (Rafael Chávez) *vs*. Navajo, Case 4097, RG 123, NARA, Julian Aragón *vs*. Navajo, Claim 1408, RG 75 and Case 2391, RG 123.

torture and rape began filtering in to federal authorities. Apache war parties waylaid freighters and burned the men alive, hanging them head down over slow fires or lashing them to the wagon wheels before setting the vehicles ablaze. Jose Chavez y Gallegos testified at a depredation hearing that his family party was attacked while traveling by ox cart to visit family at the neighboring village of Cubero, New Mexico. Chavez, his young wife, a female servant, and a young man were on the road near Las Lunas, on the Puerco River, when a lone Navajo man rode up and stopped them. Speaking in Spanish, the man ordered Chavez to hand over the Navajo blanket he wore. Chavez made a move for his pistol, but the warrior leveled his carbine and shot him through the body, then signaled with his red head scarf to hidden associates. The male servant leapt into the river and escaped just as twenty-four mounted warriors surrounded the wagon, stripped the three travelers, and repeatedly raped the women. The raiders smashed the cart to pieces, carried away everything of value, and rode off just as a heavy snow began to fall, leaving their naked and insensible victims to the elements.[95]

Attacks spurred retaliation and revenge. Often the people involved knew one another, if not by name, by family or general acquaintance. They also knew who had killed whom. When a large party of Navajos ran off Antonia Lucero's cattle near Socorro, the incensed stockman rode in pursuit with ten other men. When they caught up with the raiders, they found themselves hopelessly outnumbered. Lucero and several of his men were overwhelmed and killed, likely taking some of the warriors with them to the grave. Two weeks later, the surviving Navajos returned to Lucero's house bent on

[95] José Chávez y Gallegos v. Navajos, Claim 6149, RG 75 and Case 7549, RG 123, NARA.

revenge. They rode into his dwelling terrifying his widow and destroying everything—smashing furniture, slashing bedding, and making a shambles of the place.[96]

Augustín Montoya served with the New Mexico Volunteers in 1863 and 1864, but he knew virtually nothing of the war between North and South. His war was just as real, however, when Jicarilla Apaches attacked his village of Las Truchas in northern New Mexico, on July 5, 1865. Surviving four arrow wounds, he reported the Indians had killed two women and one man. Bent on destruction, the warriors lanced Montoya's burros, smashed the boxes of eggs he intended to market, and scattered flour and grain to the wind.[97] Juan Manuel Lucero, a farmer from Cañon Largo summed up the state of affairs in New Mexico. He believed that since all the men from New Mexico's villages had "gone down the [Rio Grande] river to fight the Texanians [sic], the Indians broke out into a revolution and went to stealing and killing." This was civil war.[98]

When a raiding party of twenty-six Chiricahua Apaches overtook a freight wagon near Peñasco, New Mexico in the summer of 1866, the teamsters ran for their lives, believing the Apaches would be content with their booty. But the mounted warriors rode down one of the men, dragged him back to his wagon, and proceeded to shoot him full of arrows—then they climbed onto the wagon and cut open sugar sacks, pouring the contents over him and allowing his blood to soak into the mound of white that covered him. Other warriors shot holes in the whiskey barrels and destroyed as much merchandise

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[96] Miguela Chaves de Lucero v. Navajos, Case 396, RG 123, NARA. Jose Gallegos testified that he knew the Navajos who took stock from Sabinal in Socorro Co. in Nov. and Dec. 1861, see: Victoriana Padilla v. Navajos , Case 3962, RG 123, NARA.

[97] Augustín Montoya (aka Montalla) v. Apaches, Case 1530, RG 123, NARA. Some Hispano New Mexican depredation claimants were not aware there had been a nationwide Civil War and, when being deposed, could not say what year the war had ended or when Lincoln had been assassinated.

[98] See Juan Manuel Lucero testimony in Nestor Armijo v. The Navajo, Case 425 RG 123, NARA.

as they could before a relief party from San Antonio fortuitously arrived and interrupted the attack.[99]

After Anglo and Hispano U.S. forces and allied tribes subdued the Navajos and Mescalero Apaches, the people of Arizona and New Mexico engaged in a civil war which pitted raiding Western and Chiricahua Apache tribes against Hispano citizens and soldiers, agrarian Indian villagers and auxiliaries, and Anglo citizens and soldiers. The allied forces arrayed against the Apaches created an irresistible combination which doomed the roaming bands to the confinement of reservations by the late 1860s. While the Apache warriors surprised and in many cases outfought their adversaries on a tactical level, strategically they were no match for the powerful Anglo-Hispano-Indian alliance. Driven nearly to starvation by a relentless war of attrition, the remaining Apache bands, and the few Navajo holdouts who escaped the Bosque Redondo round-up, sought peace by treating with the predominantly Anglo military and territorial officials.

A doctor who had come to the territories with the California Volunteers at the beginning of the Civil War wrote in 1866, "all the wild Indians of Arizona and New Mexico must either be fed or exterminated, and the sooner one policy or the other is adopted, and energetically carried out, the better it will be for both races." Volunteer troops brought to the Southwest to suppress the national rebellion exceeded in number and hostility the pre-war regular army and continued active campaigning in the territories until 1867.[100] Within a decade of the Civil War all of the Arizona and New Mexico tribes

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[99] Incredibly, teamster Luis Torres survived this attack. See his testimony in Jose Trujillo y Baca v. Apaches Case 4083 RG 123, NARA.

[100] Orton, *California Men*, 2-14; Morris, "Combats With Indians of Arizona and New Mexico," 1-2; Morris, *Address*, 7-21. At the beginning of the Civil War, the entire regular Army of the United States did not exceed 15,000 men. From 1861-66, California, New Mexico, and Arizona mustered more than 21,000

would be located on government prescribed reservations receiving food, clothing, and other annual allowances.[101]

Mexico

During the turbulent years from 1857 to 1867, President Benito Juárez's liberal Republicans competed for power with Mexico's parallel conservative government. Mexico struggled to survive its own civil wars, known to history as *La Guerra de Reforma* (Reform War, 1857-61) and its transnational continuation as the *intervención francesa* (French Intervention, 1861-67). *Hacendados* and Catholic Church officials, who controlled most of the nation's land and wealth, opposed Juárez's Republican reform laws supported by the *mestizaje* and poorer classes. The Indian peoples of Mexico's northern states, especially the Pimas, Ópatas, and Yaquis were divided in their loyalties and engaged in intra-ethnic civil war. When on July 17, 1861, Juárez placed a moratorium on the payment of foreign debts, Mexico's conservative elite took advantage of the opportunity to overthrow the Republican government by seeking assistance from European powers. On December 8, 1861, a tripartite coalition comprising Spain, Britain, and France arrived with an armada at the Mexican port city of Vera Cruz determined to seize assets and collect overdue debts. Of course, Lincoln's divided states, engaged in their own civil war, were unable to enforce the 1823 Monroe Doctrine that had discouraged European intervention in the Americas for more than a generation.

By the spring of 1862, Napoleon III made clear the extent of his imperialistic intentions in Mexico, and his reluctant Spanish and British allies soon departed. Within a

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soldiers for service in the Far West. During this time, the number of armed confrontations between military units and Indians increased by a factor of ten.

[101] Morris, *Address*, 25-34; *Daily Alta*, July 4, 1864 and May 6, 1866.

year, Napoleon's expeditionary army captured Mexico City and kept Juárez's beleaguered government on the run. Determined to overthrow Juárez, Napoleon enlisted the aid of Mexican conservatives to recruit Habsburg Prince Maximilian of Austria to serve as Mexico's puppet "Emperor" following a sham plebiscite in late 1863. Emperor *Maximiliano I* threw himself into his new role with a will. He and his Empress "Carlota" (Charlotte) affected native dress with a European flair and redecorated Mexico City's Chapultepec Castle as befitted a monarch. Still, Maximilian struggled to establish his legitimacy. Unable to control the events that swept him into the international spotlight, he turned his attention to the trappings of empire and personally involved himself in the design of the uniforms of his gaily out-fitted legions of lancers and riflemen and corps of voltigeurs and dragoons, merging brilliant Mexican colors and styles with the latest French and Austrian military fashion. He also saw fit to levy a fine of fifty pesos on any officer or enlisted soldier who wore outlawed Mexican medals, namely anything won during the years of Juárez's 1857-61 Reform War. Battle honors from the Texas rebellion and Mexican–American War, however, were allowed.[102]

The Franco-Mexican Imperial army consisted of nearly thirty thousand conscripts and volunteers from the lower classes of the *mestizaje*—many of the men were full-blooded Indians—while the officer corps comprised educated elites. This Mexican conservative force was augmented by French, Austrian, and Belgian regular and colonial troops, a force which by 1863 exceeded 45,000 men of all branches of the service—

[102]See: *Decreto, Palacio de México*, Nov. 7, 1864, AGN, *Segundo Imperio, caja* 44 in Robert H. Duncan, "Political Legitimation and Maximilian's Second Empire in Mexico, 1864-67," *Estudios Mexicanos*, 12, no.1 (winter, 1996), 27-66, 43-44. For descriptions of uniforms, see: René Chartrand and Richard Hook. *The Mexican Adventure 1861-67* (London: Osprey, 1994), 23-38.

infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Splendidly armed and accoutered, the Imperial army contrasted with the under-armed, attired, and equipped Republicans.

Juárez's army was a mix of some twelve thousand well-led regulars and auxiliary troops supplied from state National Guard and militia units. The regular infantrymen were distinguished in battle by their wool uniforms of dark blue wool, trimmed in red, and black leather shakos. British Enfield rifle muskets or obsolescent smoothbore muskets made up the armament of this professional establishment. Juárez's regular cavalrymen wore gray wool coatees edged in green and were armed with muzzle-loading carbines and sabers, when available. Mounted companies of *Rurales*, originally intended as rural constabulary forces, soon proved to be excellent light cavalry, especially effective with their lances when employed in hit-and-run attacks against Imperial troops. The state troops, of varying quality and reliability, often went un-armed until weapons of any kind could be issued from captured enemy stores or from stockpiles of arms smuggled into the country from the United States or Britain. [103]

General George Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific in the summer of 1861, had devised a plan for attacking Texas from California by way of the Mexican States of Sonora and Chihuahua. National boundaries, legalities, and politics aside, this invasion route was the most direct and easily supplied, but the War Department scuttled the notion of trespassing on Mexican soil while that nation was embroiled in its own civil war. The concerns were not limited to political squeamishness over trampling on Mexican sovereignty as had been done during the bald-faced

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[103] Chartrand and Hook, *The Mexican Adventure*, 8-9, 14-18; for additional detail on Republican Army order of battle and arms and equipage, see: Jesús de León Toral, et al, El ejército mexicano: historia desde los orígenes hasta nuestros días (México, DF: Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, 1979), 216-53.

aggression of the war of 1846-48. The political dangers were compounded by the fact that French, Spanish, and British naval and land forces were poised for their own invasion of Mexico, to collect unpaid debts incurred by the Mexican government during years of conflict with the United States and incessant internecine fighting.

At the same time the United States struggled to preserve its fragile union, a divided Mexico found itself in a desperate struggle involving foreign invaders. British, French, and Spanish claims for loans incurred by Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna and other past presidents could not be paid by Juarez's beleaguered government. The European nations sent warships to Vera Cruz to demand payment, but the British and Spanish withdrew when it became evident that Napoleon had imperialistic designs on Mexico. On May 5, 1862—as Carleton's column closed in on Tucson and Sherod Hunter's rebels rode east to the Rio Grande—General Charles de Lorencez's French army of six thousand seasoned veterans smashed itself against the fortified mountain town of Puebla, on the main road between Vera Cruz and Mexico City, held by General Ignacio Zaragoza's hastily gathered force of Mexican regulars and rag-tag militia men. While the Mexicans celebrated their *cinco de Mayo* victory, which inspired many Republicans with the belief that the French were not invincible, Napoleon resolved to return with a larger force of men and siege guns that would eventually batter their way through Puebla and on to the Mexican capital in 1863.

The Lincoln administration feared the consequences of Juárez's or Maximilian's recognition of the Southern Confederacy; either eventuality would add an international dimension to the American Civil War, open other battle fronts, and complicate the U.S. blockade of rebel ports of call. Though Lincoln secretly supported Juarez's Liberal

government, he could not risk more while the Southern rebellion still raged. All the U.S. officials in the borderlands could openly do during the war years was to tighten border security and enter into formal agreements with local Mexican authorities in the border states regarding matters of trade, pursuit of Indian raiders, and immigration related to gold mining activities. The California Native Battalion, composed almost entirely of Spanish-speaking *Californios,* joined the California Volunteer Cavalry in 1864 and 1865 for border duty in Arizona. Many of these predominantly Hispano cavalrymen sympathetic to Juárez's liberal government deserted their companies to aid their countrymen in ousting Maximilian's French-backed regime. U.S. troops pursued the deserters, who absconded with large quantities of government equipment, risking confrontation with Mexican and French troops. Tense military and diplomatic stand-offs resulted and federal officers were repeatedly warned by the Lincoln administration and War Department not to engage the forces of Maximilian or Juárez on Mexican soil.

General John S. Mason followed Wright as commander of the Department of the Pacific in 1865 and inherited the challenge of securing the international border with Mexico while civil wars raged on both sides of the line. He recruited new California units, including the First Battalion of Native Cavalry, the Second California Infantry, and the Seventh California Infantry. Federal officials chose the Native Battalion, composed almost entirely of Californios for service in Arizona because of the extraordinary horsemanship displayed by these *caballeros* whose fathers had come close to annihilating Kearny's First Dragoons in 1846. Mason, however, worried about using these troops so close to the border, fearing their sympathies for Benito Juárez's Republic of Mexico might result in conflicted loyalties. Although the liberal Juárez had been duly elected

president in 1861, Mexico's conservative landed aristocracy, backed by Napoleon III, installed Maximilian as emperor of Imperial Mexico in 1864. During the Civil War, California officers exercised diplomacy rather than military strength along the border in an effort to avoid open conflict with Maximilian's conservative government and its French allies. The pressing need for mounted troops for border patrol, however, soon overruled Mason's concerns about the loyalty of the Hispanos. The Native Battalion proudly rode into Arizona with red pennons waving from their nine-foot lances.[104]

Although Paragraph 1642 of the U.S. Army's 1861 *Revised Regulations* specifically stated that no volunteer "will be mustered into the service who is unable to speak the English language," most of the men of the Native Battalion spoke only Spanish. The *San Francisco Evening Bulletin* reported: "The battalion is truly a mixture of colors and tongues, the men very rugged and hearty—more than half being native Californians, and the remainder Mexicans, Chilenos, Sonorians, California and Yaqui Indians, Germans, Americans, etc. Those of them, however, who are not American speak more or less English, the English tongue crowd understanding Spanish—the officers being adept in both languages."[105]

Both the Hispano Native Battalion, commanded by Major Cremony, and parts of the Anglo-American Seventh California Infantry, commanded by Colonel Charles W. Lewis, served along the Arizona-Mexico border. Fort Mason, named in honor of the new district commander, became the principal post in southern Arizona in 1865–66. Its

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[104] Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty inNorth America, 1500–2000* , (New York: Viking, 2005), 305–7. See also Sidney B. Brinckerhoff, "Last of the Lancers: The Native California Cavalry Volunteers, 1863–1866," manuscript, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson, 6–7; and Tom Prezelski, "Lives of the Californio Lancers: The First Battalion of Native California Cavalry, 1863–1866," *Journal of Arizona History* 40 (Spring 1999): 29–52.

[105] Paragraph 1642, *Revised U.S. Army Regulations of 1861,* 496; *San Francisco Evening Bulletin,* July 8, 1865.

importance stemmed from its location near Calabasas on the main road from Arizona to Sonora. Union officers no longer feared Mexico as a possible route for a Confederate invasion, but they believed that French troops guarding Maximilian's puppet government posed an imminent danger. The presence of these foreign soldiers irritated American politicians and military men serving in the borderlands, but frontier commanders dutifully restrained their men and resorted to diplomacy.

In 1862 Carleton had opened correspondence with Ignacio Pesqueira, the Republican governor of Sonora. Carleton acted on orders from the Department of the Pacific commander at the time, General George Wright, who wanted to stay on the Sonoran's good side and hoped to purchase supplies and gain trade concessions at the Mexican port of Guaymas. Carleton tactfully warned Pesqueira against recognizing or agreeing to supply the Confederates in Arizona. The Mexican governor found himself in an embarrassing situation after his interpreter gave copies of his correspondence with Confederate ambassador James Reily to a correspondent from the *San Francisco Bulletin.* In truth, Pesqueira never really trusted the Texans, and relations between the Sonoran government and the Californians remained cordial. [106] In May Carleton lifted his ban against Mexican citizens crossing the border into Arizona to work the rich Colorado River placer fields, much to Pesqueira's benefit and satisfaction.[107]

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[106] In April 1857, during the Reform War, Henry A. Crabb's force of American colonists was defeated and then massacred by Ignacio Pesqueira's militia which included Tohono O'odham warriors. Pesqueira had initially invited the Americans to settle in northern Sonora, to help the fight his political enemies, but before Crabb's expedition arrived in Sonora, Pesqueira defeated the federal troops and took control of the state. When the Crabb party arrived, Pesqueira ordered his men to attack the Americans. Over the course of eight days, from April 1, to April 8, about twenty-five Americans and a reported 200 Mexicans and *O'odham* people were killed in battle, at the end of which, some fifty-five captured Americans, including Crabb, were executed by firing squad. In honor of the victory, in April 1948 the city officially changed its name to Heróica Caborca.

[107] Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 58; Carleton, Report 2, May 25, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):89.

By 1864, during the height of the French occupation of Mexico, California officers in Arizona and New Mexico had grown so friendly with the liberal Republicans in Sonora and Chihuahua that high-ranking officials in the War Department considered the relationship dangerous to the maintenance of France's neutrality in the American rebellion. In the fall of 1865, Franco-Mexican Imperial troops forced Sonoran Governor Pesqueira—with his family, servants, livestock, and valuables—to cross the border and take refuge with the Californians stationed at Fort Mason while pro-French Governor Don Manuel Gándara and Refugio Tánori's Ópata legion controlled much of Sonora and liberal forces engaged in dispersed guerilla attacks. At the same time that the French organized mounted *contra guerilla* bands to combat the "insurgents," sympathetic American officers and men entertained Governor Pesqueira's entourage. The Americans had allowed Pesqueira to cross into Arizona in pursuit of Apaches a year earlier, and they respected the Sonoran's capability as an Indian fighter and his defiance of the French invaders.[108]

Colonel Davis wrote General Carleton on March 22, 1864: "Pesqueira is friendly to the United States and says, *entre nous,* that in case of necessity or trouble in his State from the French, he will raise the United States flag and ask our assistance. If our Government will only allow our people to act in the matter, Sonora will soon be ours. Colonel Coult is anxious to go down with the troops here, when the proper opportunity arrives. I cautioned him to do nothing to complicate our international affairs with Mexico, or take any hasty steps in this matter. . . . Sonora must and is bound to be ours; it

[108] H. H. Bancroft, et al, *History of the Northern Mexican States* (1889), 696-97.

is well to have the question considered, and be prepared for whatever may turn up. It is essential to this Territory. We want the ports on the Gulf of California."[109]

Carleton agreed that the California troops ought to be ready to seize Guaymas. He wrote General Henry Halleck that "a naval station on the Gulf of California" would be the answer to the problems of developing Arizona's mineral resources. But the response from Washington quickly reined in the enthusiasm of the California officers. The Lincoln administration did not even want to discuss the possibility of conflict with French forces in Mexico while the rebellion still raged. Carleton reluctantly cautioned his subordinates: "It is required by the War Department that no steps be taken by the military forces within this department [New Mexico] which will at all complicate us in the matter growing out of the occupation of any of the States of Mexico by the French. Our relations with France are of the most friendly character, and it is desirable that they remain so. You will be careful not to jeopardize those relations by act, or word, or letter." General Grant summed up the attitude prevailing in the army while besieging Lee's army at Petersburg, Virginia: "we want Napoleon out of Mexico, but we don't want any war over it; we have certainly had enough war."[110]

Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward seethed at Napoleon's brazen disregard for the Monroe Doctrine, so they turned a blind eye to supplies of arms and ammunition sent from the United States to Juárez while publicly professing neutrality in the conflict. California Volunteers did, however, cross the international border on

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[109] Robert Miller, "Californians against the Emperor." *California Historical Society Quarterly* 37 (September 1958): 193–214.
193–212; Davis to Carleton, Mar. 2, 1864, *OR,* 50(2):842. See also Rudolph F. Acuña,."Ignacio Pesqueira: Sonoran Caudillo," *Arizona and the West,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1970), 159-60.
[110] Carleton to Halleck, Mar. 13, 1864, *OR,* 34(2):591–92; Carleton to Coult, May 10, 1864, *OR,* 50(2):842; Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, 256.

exploring and trade missions. Despite the official warnings to avoid contact with the French, U.S. troops also violated the border when the urgent necessity of hot pursuit of malefactors demanded it. On several occasions detachments pursued rebels, Apache raiders, and bandits into Mexico. The California soldiers conducted most of these forays quickly and without political incident. But rounding up *Californio* deserters from the Native Battalion in French-occupied Mexico proved more difficult.

In September 1865 Captain José Ramón Pico, with a mounted force comprising two junior officers and thirty men, crossed the Mexican border in pursuit of sixteen deserters from Companies A and B of the Native Battalion. The men bolted from Camp Mason with all of their arms and equipment and thirty good army horses. Pico followed the deserters to Magdalena, Sonora, ninety miles south of Fort Mason. There his party encountered about 250 poorly armed Mexican soldiers fighting under Maximilian's Imperial flag. Wishing to avoid armed confrontation, Pico entered the town with only six soldiers and Lieutenant William Emery, Seventh California Infantry, sent by Colonel Lewis at Fort Mason to record any negotiations with Mexican or French officials.[111]

At Magdalena, Mexican prefect Jose Moreno refused Pico's demand for the return of the deserters unless the American officer agreed to recognize Maximilian's government. Of course, Pico understood that his recognition of the Imperialists would have international repercussions as great as the recognition of the Confederacy by a foreign power, so the captain replied that his government would recognize only President Juárez, Mexico's legitimate ruler. As tension mounted, Pico ordered the twenty-four

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[111] Pico was the nephew of Andrés Pico and may have accompanied his famous uncle at the battle of San Pasqual in 1846. The younger Pico was famous for his horsemanship. *Alta California,* Oct. 7, Nov. 2, 1860; *San Francisco Bulletin,* Oct. 23, 1865.

troopers under Captain Porfírio Jimeno to return to Fort Mason while Moreno received instructions from the Imperial officials at Hermosillo. It took eight days for the orders to arrive from Hermosillo, during which time the Americans came to better understand the nature of Mexico's civil war as adherents of the two factions vying for control of the country alternately lauded and threatened them. Finally, Moreno sent word that he would not turn over the deserters and that the Californians had eight hours to leave Magdalena and forty-eight hours to get out of the country. Pico's party had no choice but to depart empty-handed.[112]

When Imperial commanders posted guards near the border, Colonel Lewis strengthened his own border sentinels. In late September six more Native Battalion deserters crossed into Mexico, taking fourteen pistols and fifteen horses with equipment. Lewis, fearing the consequences of another border crossing, mounted no pursuit. His men, however, chafed at this restraint. Lieutenant Emery wrote: "If we could only have a little fight with the French, it would be something worthwhile stopping here; but as it is, it is very dry. Fighting Indians is dangerous enough, but we do so little of that that the time drags." When rumors reached Fort Mason that Prefect Moreno was massing three hundred to four hundred men for an attack designed to capture Governor Pesqueira, the usually restrained Lewis exclaimed, "Let him come and try it."[113]

A Mexican Imperial force did attempt a raid across the border at San Gabriel, Arizona, opposite San Rafael, Sonora, about twelve miles north of the relatively large (population 3,000) city of Santa Cruz. On November 4, 1865, Colonel Refugio Tánori, an

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[112] *San Francisco Bulletin,* Oct. 20, 1865; Orton, *California Men,* 5; see also: Duncan, "Political Legitimation," 27-29, 64-66.
[113] *San Francisco Bulletin,* Oct. 20, 23, 1865; Prezelski, "California Lancers," 43–45.

Ópata chief, attacked the border town with a force of nearly five hundred men while in pursuit of Republican forces under Garcia Morales. For more than two hundred years, the Spanish had considered the Ópata Indians of Sonora to be willing subjects and eager converts to Christianity. The Jesuit priests found these sedentary people susceptible to their "civilizing" efforts and established missions among their villages between 1628 and 1650. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Spanish valued the Ópata men as warriors and this esteem was reciprocated as the two peoples forged a strong alliance against their common Apache enemies, who raided through the Sonoran borderlands and deep into Mexico from their Arizona and New Mexico homelands in the North. Over time, the assimilated Ópatas became nearly indistinguishable culturally from other Mexicans, though they lived in their own mestizo mission villages. In 1858, Juárez's reforms abolished these distinct communities, and the ably-led and well-organized Ópata militias were forced to side with either the liberal Juaristas or former-Sonoran-governor Manuel Gándara's French-backed conservatives and, later, Maximilian's Imperial forces. Tánori had followed the latter course, and by 1865 he dominated the Sonoran theater, attacking Ures and, in his greatest victory, capturing the city of Nácori Grande. [114]

Now Tánori and his predominantly Ópata Indian command boldly crossed the border at San Rafael and fired on American citizens, wounding one or two in the skirmish. Major Cremony, who had recently arrived at Fort Mason with Company C of the Native Battalion, chased after the invaders, hoping to obtain a truce and a parley.

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[114] William C. Sturtevant, *Handbook of North American Indians*, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978)10:320-21; Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conques Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960* (1962; reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 103-05; Bancroft et al, *History of the North Mexican States* (1889), 697.

Tánori retreated, however, easily outdistancing a detachment led by Lieutenant Edward Codington assigned to head off the Mexicans at Ures. Cremony later learned that the Imperial troops, most of whom were infantry, made the forty-three-mile retreat from Santa Cruz to the town of Ímures in record time. Tánori's precipitous withdrawal was accomplished in nine hours, a remarkable feat that the best Anglo-American, Hispano, or French light infantry would have been hard-put to duplicate.[115]

The Yaquis and closely allied Mayos had resisted the Spanish then Mexican regimes in Sonora for hundreds of years. In September of 1860 the Yaqui insurgents burned and leveled Mexican settlements between Guaymas and Hermosillo. Led by the Republican stalwart Governor Ignacio Pesqueira, the heavily fortified cities held out against the rebels. But the local militias and regulars sustained heavy casualties in a fight at Jacalitos where the Governor lost his entire command as well as the state seal, government documents, and baggage, only narrowly escaping with his life. There was no quit in Pesqueira, and in 1862 he invaded Mayo and Yaqui territory, forcing them to accept peace terms at Torim, Sonora. Although Yaqui leaders received pardons, a military post was established at Agua Caliente to watch over and control the Yaquis.

After the French defeated Pesqueira's Republicans at Guaymas in 1865, Mateo Marquín and a portion of the Yaquis joined Refugio Tánori's Ópatas and allied with the French-backed conservatives in fighting the Juaristas. These native forces took control of Alamos, Sonora, and drove Pesqueira from his headquarters at Ures in vicious fighting

[115] Brinckerhoff, "Last of the Lancers," 11–12; Cremony claims that he had encouraged Morales to shelter near the border crossing so that California Native Battalion lancers might support him in the event of such an attack. In this scenario, the pursuit of Tánori by the *Californios* was part of a plan to force a showdown with the Imperialists. Cremony took credit for the capture of Santa Cruz and driving the Franco-Mexican Imperialists from northern Mexico, which "emboldened [Morales and] other leaders, and animated the people generally," allowing Pesqueira's return and beginning the collapse of Maximilian's empire. John C. Cremony, "How and Why We Took Santa Cruz," *Overland Monthly*. (April, 1871), 335-340.335–40.

that pitted Yaqui against Yaqui and Ópata against Ópata. Following Maximilian's execution and the withdrawal of European troops, Pesqueira regained control but the bitterness caused by the civil war caused lasting resentment manifested in assassinations and continued conflict well into the twentieth century.[116]

The Native Battalion and the Seventh California Infantry served in Arizona until the summer of 1866. The battalion spent almost its entire tour of duty in southeastern Arizona at the posts of Tubac, Revanton Ranch, and Fort Mason, the latter noted for its malarial fevers and high desertion rate. Companies of the Second and Seventh Infantry regiments were scattered about the territory, with detachments at Fort Goodwin, Fort Grant, Fort Mojave, Fort McDowell, Fort Whipple, Fort Yuma, Tucson, and Fort Mason. As expected when they were first recruited, their principal duties involved "Mexican frontier" and "Apache service," which meant constant patrolling, campaigning, and protecting the military mail. The Californians provided communication between Arizona and the "outside" until late 1865, when civil authorities once again accepted responsibility for the mail service.[117]

By late 1865, General Mariano Escobedo's Republican Army of the North had grown in strength and boldness. Cities on the American side of the border boomed as Juarez's forces sheltered near the border communities. El Paso and Brownsville saw steadily growing concentrations of U.S. troops under the command of General Phil

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[116] Not all of the Yaquis sided with the French; Cajemé (aka José María Bonifacio Leiva Perez), the best known of the Yaqui military leaders, sided with Pesqueira and the Juaristas. At Pesqueira's direction Garcia Morales led a successful campaign against the Yaquis in 1868, interning captives in a church at Cocorit. When surrender negotiations broke down, Morales' artillery blasted the church and in the ensuing fire 120 people died. The massacre convinced other Yaqui holdouts to sue for peace. Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, 61-67.

[117] Orton, *California Men,* 763–65; SO 12, Jan. 31, 1864, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; Fergusson to J. F. Bennett, Apr. 14, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):396–97; Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 143; *Calaveras (California) Chronicle,* Aug. 12, 1865; San Francisco *Bulletin*, July 18, 1865.

Sheridan, Grant's most pugnacious combat officer. Stockpiles of arms, including artillery, now made their way across the Rio Grande on skiffs operated by Mexican civilians in broad daylight, much to the consternation of Maximilian's Imperial loyalists in the north who complained about this state of affairs but remained powerless to prevent it. Juarez himself was safely ensconced at El Paso in the summer of 1865 as Escobedo rallied more and more recruits from the frontier to the Republican cause. Mexican relations with the Americans in the borderlands had never been better. Andrés S. Viesca, Coahuila's liberal governor, wrote expansively of the burgeoning alliance, "The United States, that great republic, the admiration of the world and terror of crowned heads, has already manifested in a very explicit manner its disapproval of the imported and ridiculous empire that has been pretended to be erected in Mexico….Long live the national independence! Long live the legitimate government of the republic! Long life to the people of the frontier!" [118]

Receiving surplus Union Army uniforms and large supplies of weapons, including the latest Spencer and Henry repeating firearms, Juárez's northern forces were finally a match for the Franco-Mexican Imperial army. Marshal François Achille Bazaine and Maximilian's able field commander, Tomás Mejía, sought to win the hearts of the Mexican people while keeping Juárez's organized armies corralled along the U.S. border. Imperial forces in the remote northern states also attempted to suppress the wide-ranging

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[118] A. S. Viesca to the Inhabitants of Moncolva and Rio Grande, Aug. 13, 1865. *Message of the President of the United States, of March 20, 1866, Relating to the Condition of Affairs in Mexico, in Answer to a Resolution of the House of December 11, 1865,* 331-2; G. Weitzel to Tomás Mejía, Dec. 4, 1865*,* ibid, 353; see also: Miller, *Arms Across the Border: United States Aid to Juárez During the French Intervention in Mexico*, 6-7.

guerilla bands with irregular French *contra-guerilla* forces. Bazaine had a personal interest in continuing the French intervention; he married a well-connected Mexican woman and now desired to make Imperial Mexico his home.

By late 1865 Lincoln had been assassinated, but the American rebellion had been suppressed; President Andrew Johnson's most aggressive generals—Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan—who had already been covertly supporting Juarez's military efforts in northern Mexico, maneuvered their battle-hardened troops for action on the Texas border. The Americans, it seemed, were spoiling for a fight. Many officers and enlisted men who had gotten a taste of martial glory sought career and financial opportunities by serving with either of the warring Mexican factions or the French.[119] General Tomás Mejía, Maximilian's commander in the north, brought to the attention of the American commander in Brownsville, General George Weitzel, that African American deserters from the 23rd Infantry, U.S. Colored Troops, had been captured while fighting with the Juaristas at Matamoras. Weitzel appeared unfazed by this disclosure, knowing full-well that many officers and men, both Union and Confederate, had been offered lucrative inducements to bring their military skills to the fighting in Mexico. The American brushed off the peeved Mejía, saying, "if the three men of the twenty-third United States colored troops were captured in the lines of your enemies in arms against you, I have nothing more to say, of course. But for humanity's sake, I ask that, on their trial, your court may take into consideration their ignorance, their ignorance of your language, and

[119] Custer and others sought commissions in Mexico. Utley, *Cavalier in Buckskin*, 39.

the fact that officers and others from the other side induced these men to do what they did under promise of large sums of money."[120]

The brutal fighting along Mexico's roadways and outside of population centers, especially near the northern frontier, devolved into bloody and vengeful small unit actions and reprisals. Meanwhile, Juárez stepped up his diplomatic efforts. Margarita Maza de Juárez, the first lady of Mexico, visited Washington in the spring of 1866 and met with President Johnson, Secretary of State William Seward, and General in Chief U. S. Grant to plead for American support in ousting the French occupation forces. U.S. diplomats did indeed redouble their stern admonitions that Napoleon remove his troops. Under this pressure, Napoleon could not continue backing Maximilian's regime and made ready to withdraw the French soldiers as speedily as honor would allow.[121]

On October 3, 1865, a desperate Maximilian issued the "*Ley de 3 Octubre 1865*" in an attempt to finish off Juarista resistance before his French allies abandoned him. Maximilian and members of his entourage later claimed, and many historians agree, that

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[120] Approximately 180,000 black soldiers served in the United States Colored Troops (USCT) during the Civil War. The 23rd Infantry, USCT, suffered the heaviest losses of any unit engaged in the disastrous Battle of the Crater at Petersburg, Virginia, on July 30, 1864. African American troops captured by the Confederates ran the risk of execution or enslavement. After Appomattox, the 23rd USCT was assigned to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division of the XXV Corps in the Department of Texas. The three men referred to may have been: James McElrath, Bartley Quinn, and James Smith. *Message of the President of the United States, of March 20, 1866, Relating to the Condition of Affairs in Mexico,* Tomás Mejía to G. Weitzel, Dec. 1, 1865, ibid, 351; G. Weitzel to Tomás Mejía, Dec. 4, 1865, ibid, 353; see also: Jasper Ridley, *Maximilian and Juarez* (New York: Ticknor & Fields), 1992.
, 223; though the use of black troops was still controversial due to the racism endemic in the Army and general population, in 1866 the War Dept. authorized four Regular black regiments: 9th and 10th Cavalry and 24th and 25th Infantry, which eventually became known as the "Buffalo Soldiers." See: William H. Leckie, *The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), passim.

[121] After more than 30 years in the service Bazaine achieved the rank of Marshal of France in 1864, an amazing feat considering he had enlisted as a legionnaire and, by dint of hard work and personal bravery, risen through the ranks. Napoleon devised a three phase pull-out over the course of a year. Bazaine oversaw the departure of the last troop transport in March, 1867.

Marshal Bazaine had actually helped draft the document.[122] However it came about, Maximilian accepted authorship and published it in his official *El Diario del Imperio*, a newspaper intended for the Mexican intelligentsia and French allies. He also ordered the decree printed as a broadside in Spanish and Nahuatl, aimed at organized and irregular Juarista forces that now controlled the countryside. The *guerrilleros* attacked roadways, outposts, and towns at the edges of Maximilian's far-flung empire and then blended into the largely Republican population. When Maximilian learned that Juárez—whose presidential term had actually expired—might have crossed the U.S. border at El Paso to avoid capture, he jumped at the opportunity to declare victory and simultaneously offered an olive branch or a threatening sword to Republican forces still in the field.[123]

Maximilian's decree commended Juárez's followers for their "*valor y constancia*" (valor and constancy) but insisted that no good could come of further resistance. The decree maintained that the insurgents, referred to as criminals and brigands ("*criminales y bandoleros*"), only endangered the people, and it threatened harsh punishment to ensure the restoration of order. The carefully written law enumerated all of the punishments that would be meted out to *guerrilleros*, defined as any armed men loyal to Juárez as well as citizens who offered the insurgents shelter or aid. Maximilian and his ministers of foreign affairs, commerce, interior, war, justice, and public instruction, as well as the treasury

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[122] Only four months earlier, Bazaine had married a Mexican (17-year-old Josefa de la Peña y Azcarate) and redoubled his determination to defeat Juárez's government—it is not certain whether Napoleon, who already contemplated his Mexican exit strategy, approved of the drastic measures of the Black Decree, but Maximilian himself said that Bazaine had dictated portions of it. Samuel Basch, *Recollections of Mexico; the Last Ten Months of Maximilian's Empire* (1868; reprint, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 260.

[123] *El Diario del Imperio.*October 3, 1865: 1-4. Some historians believe that the Black Decree was not an act of desperation, but rather a calculated policy to end the civil war. See Mark E Neely, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 72-89.

undersecretary, all signed the *Ley de 3 Octubre 1865* which almost immediately became known as the "Black Decree."[124] Newspapers in the United States quickly picked up the story and trumpeted it on the front page: "This decree is a novelty in the history of civil wars," declared the San Francisco Daily Alta California, which went on to criticize the presumption of Napoleon and Maximilian while supporting the rights of the Juaristas to rebel, since they, as citizens of Mexico, had a more legitimate claim to the country than did European interventionists.[125]

Although the civil wars in the Southwest borderlands had been triggered or intensified by the American Civil War, each had its own peculiar history. The idea of sovereignty was at the heart of most of the conflicts, and in most instances one antagonistic community considered itself to be a sovereign political and cultural entity while the other did not. The idea of state sovereignty was much debated in the United States during the states' rights discussion preceding the secession crisis. Certainly, the Confederates considered themselves to be a sovereign nation, politically, culturally, and economically distinct from the United States. Not interested in dominating the more powerful North, the Southerners expressed their war aim as one of independence, though the acquisition of western territories and possibly parts of Mexico were not ruled out if the secession effort were successful. New Mexico's Hispanos were either unaware of or ambivalent toward the reasons for the Anglo civil war. Their loyalties centered on a self-interested maintenance of the status quo. Hispanos were, therefore, divided and found themselves fighting both Union and Confederate troops and, occasionally, one another.

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[124]For a full text transcription of the original *Ley de 3 Octubre* 1865 aka "Bando Negro" aka "Decreto Negro" ("Black Decree") see: http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1669/6.pdf, 246-250.
[125] *Alta*, December 29, 1865.

Navajos and Apaches fought to maintain their independence even though most of the Apachean tribes and bands had previously signed treaties subordinating themselves to the United States. It is no wonder that the term "sovereignty" was applied, however loosely, in reference to Indian nations under congressionally-recognized treaty obligations. By the 1860s, the tribes fought for free access to their ancestral lands and a way of life that included raiding and captive-taking as a survival strategy. The U.S. government represented by military and civilian Anglo newcomers to the region found willing allies in the sedentary Indian and Hispano residents of the territories. Both north and south of the border, tribes were split by civil war brought about by political and military alliances. The civil war in Mexico was a continuation of conflict that erupted into warfare between conservative and liberals political factions in the years following the Mexican-American War. The open warfare between 1858 and 1861, known as the Reform War, subsided in March 1861, when Benito Juárez was elected president. The North American power vacuum resulting from the American Civil War, however, further destabilized the already precarious political situation and led to renewed civil war with international dimensions and triggered long-simmering conflict between Mexico's borderland Indian tribes, splitting Ópatas and Yaquis and forcing Pimas and Papagos to choose sides.

Chapter 5

The Balance of Power

The disruption of federal U.S. authority in 1861 had upset the fragile balance of power among the Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples of the Southwest and changed the nature of conflict in the borderlands. By 1865, the struggles for power and dominance among ethnic groups and nations had increased, and the level of violence had also escalated. Driven nearly to starvation by a relentless war of attrition, the Apache bands, and the few Navajo holdouts who escaped reservations, were forced to seek peace with the predominantly Anglo military and territorial officials in New Mexico and Arizona. While inter-ethnic group fighting had existed since before the arrival of the Spanish, the Anglo Americans introduced the new concept of the war of extermination. The conflict in the territories had advanced far beyond the stock and slave raiding of the past and the killing would continue long after Confederate armies had surrendered in the other theaters of what was already being referred to as the "War of the Rebellion."

The peoples of Arizona and New Mexico were now engaged in violent conflicts that pitted raiding Navajos and Apaches against Hispano and Anglo citizens and soldiers and agrarian Indian villagers and auxiliaries. The allied forces arrayed against the Navajos and Apaches forced their confinement on reservations by the late 1860s. The peoples of the Southern Plains moved into the power vacuum left by the subjugated tribes, and the fighting shifted eastward along the Santa Fe Trail and Staked Plains. In Mexico, after the departure of French forces fearful of American military might, Juárez's restored Republican government turned its attention once again to Indian enemies along the northern border. On all fronts, clashing notions of manhood, honor, and warfare

escalated the violence in the borderlands. It was now evident, however, that the Anglo Americans from the United States would prevail and remain the foremost power in the borderlands.[1]

Mexico's Civil War

South of the border, the nature of the civil war between Mexican liberals and conservatives had shifted as well. The French invasion in 1861 temporarily tipped the scales in favor of Benito Juárez's conservative enemies, but Napoleon's puppet dictator Maximilian had been hard-pressed to control his vast empire, especially its northern borderlands where Republican forces and Indian raiders held sway. Some of the battles, such as the actions around Matamoros and Monterey, were set-piece affairs involving entrenchment, flanking movements, and cannonades in preparation for infantry and cavalry charges. Sabers and lances were very much in evidence on both sides, but firearms and artillery ruled the battlefield and often determined the outcome. The Republican arms had been deficient in both quantity and quality. Until 1865, many units still carried flintlock muskets that the men wrapped in their shirts to protect the priming powder from the rain. But as American rebellion wound down and weapons became available, the disparity in equipment became less of a factor. The violence escalated, however, as the armies in Mexico fought for survival rather than honor.[2]

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[1]Maximilian's personal physician and confidant reported in 1868 that, "the Union Government of the United States, which had been victorious against the Secessionists, wanted to settle accounts with the French Emperor because of his support of the South. The tough notes of the Washington Government were effective and successful. Caesar (Napoleon III) apparently did not feel strong enough to pick a fight with the American colossus and eagerly avoided any possible conflict." Samuel Basch, *Recollections of Mexico; the Last Ten Months of Maximilian's Empire* (1868; reprint, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 14.

[2] M. Escobedo to I. Mariscal, Dec. 1, 1865 and M. Saavedra to I. Mariscal, Dec. 8, 1865, *Message of the President of the United States, of March 20, 1866, Relating to the Condition of Affairs in Mexico*, 354-55;

Rumors of atrocities committed by the European troops in the interior states traveled quickly to the borderlands and to the United States, hardening public opinion against the invaders. The Belgian allies of the Imperialists were accused of using human shields and even baiting General Nicolas de Regules's troops to charge by displaying the General's captive wife "almost naked" on their earthworks at Tacambaro. The Imperialists were also charged with showing a white flag and turning their muskets "breech uppermost" in a sign of surrender, then opening fire as the Republican soldiers approached the breastworks. One republican officer wrote an open letter to "the Señor Marshal, Commander-in-chief of the French Army in Mexico, (or wherever he may be)" upbraiding him for commanding "officers and soldiers [who] failed to keep their word of honor." Such infamous acts of perfidy, whether true or not, rippled indignation through the Republican ranks and caused the Juaristas to respond in kind. The "native imperialists" were dealt with most harshly, especially those "traitors" who "incited insurrection" or recruited Ópatas, Yaquis and other Indians. Suspected traitors were subjected to the pretense of trials, but death by firing squad was invariably the sentence of the court.[3]

In October 1865, the desperate Maximilian issued his infamous "Black Decree" at the urging of his allies, both foreign and domestic. The fighting had been bloody enough prior to the order, but now it took a savage new form. French-backed *contra-guerilla* units showed the black flag and summarily executed men and women suspected of Republican sympathies. The French and Imperial Mexican troops targeted non-

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[3] José Maria Arteaga to Señor Marshal, HQ Tacambaro de Codallos. April 24, 1865. *Message of the President of the United States, of March 20, 1866, Relating to the Condition of Affairs in Mexico*, 396-97; José Maria Patoni to Pesqueira, HQ, Fuerte, ibid, 371.

combatants harboring Juaristas as well as enemy soldiers in the field and un-uniformed partisans. Republican forces, especially the unorthodox *guerrilleros*, retaliated in kind bringing about a frenzied orgy of killing that escalated until Maximilian's own death in 1867.[4]

The threat of U.S. intervention and Juárez's growing strength in the northern borderlands had forced Maximilian's hand. His Black Decree was a last-ditch effort to snuff out the "rebellion," but the ruthlessness of the order only stiffened Republican resolve and escalated the violence, ultimately leading to the Emperor's own death and the collapse of his empire. Without European support, the numerically inferior Mexican conservative forces and their Indian allies had little hope of continuing the war or prevailing in the internecine struggle.[5]

Maximilian's proclamation itself is loaded with meaning both for its intended audiences and for historians who care to read carefully enough to understand the powerful political, military, and social forces at play during Mexico's 1861-67 civil war and the "French Intervention," as this period became known. At the court martial following Maximilian's capture by Juárez's Republican forces under General Escobedo

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[4] San Francisco *Alta California*. July 26 and August 7, 1867.

[5] On April 4, 1864 the United States Congress had unanimously passed a resolution which opposed the establishment of the Mexican monarchy. On February 12, 1866, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. requested the French withdraw their forces from Mexico. At the same time, Gen. U.S. Grant moved soldiers to positions along the Rio Grande and ordered a naval blockade to prevent French reinforcements from landing. The U.S. officially protested to Austria about the Austrian volunteers in Mexico on 6 May. In 1866, choosing Franco-American relations over his Mexican monarchy ambitions, Napoleon III announced the withdrawal of French forces beginning 31 May. The Republicans won a series of victories taking advantage of the end of French military support to the Imperial troops, occupying Chihuahua on 25 March, taking Guadalajara on 8 July, and capturing Matamoros, Tampico and Acapulco in July. Napoleon urged Maximilian to abandon Mexico and evacuate with the French troops. The French evacuated Monterrey on 26 July, Saltillo on 5 August, and the whole state of Sonora in September. Maximilian's French cabinet members resigned on 18 September. The Republicans defeated Imperial troops in the Battle of Miahuatlán in Oaxaca in October, occupying the whole of Oaxaca in November, as well as parts of Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, and Guanajuato.

at the siege of Querétaro, May 15, 1867, the court referenced the execution provisions of the "Black Decree" in the Emperor's sentence. This damning evidence sealed his fate. He would receive the same justice he had meted out to Republican captives—death by firing squad.[6]

Maximilian's loyal generals, Miguel Miramón and Tomás Mejía, stayed by his side until the end. Most Europeans and Americans all expressed sympathy for the plight of the misguided archduke who would be king of the Mexicans. Empress Charlotte went to Napoleon himself, only to be rejected and humiliated. Princess Eugenie attempted to intervene on Maximilian's behalf, to no avail. Princess Agnes Salm-Salm, the beautiful American wife of Prince Felix zu Salm-Salm, a Prussian mercenary serving as one of Maximilian's officers, begged Juárez for clemency in the final, desperate hours of the empire. Her tearful entreaties were rebuffed by Porfírio Díaz, Mariano Escobedo, in overall command of Republican forces, and Juárez himself. The President could only say to the distraught woman, "It causes me great pain, Madame, to see you like that on your knees; but even if every king and queen were in your place, I couldn't spare his life. It isn't me who takes it from him, it is the people and the law who claim his life."[7]

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[6] The French evacuated Mexico City on February 5, 1867. On February 13, Maximilian withdrew north to Querétaro. The Republicans began a siege of the city on 9 March, and Mexico City on 12 April. An Imperial sortie from Querétaro failed on April 27. On May 11, Maximilian resolved to attempt an escape through the enemy lines, but he was apprehended before he could carry out this plan on May 15 and, following a court-martial, was sentenced to death. Many of the crowned heads of Europe and other prominent figures sent telegrams and letters to Mexico pleading for Maximilian's life to be spared, but Juárez refused to commute the sentence, believing that it was necessary to send a message that Mexico would not tolerate any government imposed by foreign powers. *Alta California*, August 26, 1867; *Boston Daily Advertiser.* "The Execution of Maximilian." July 6, 1867; *New York Times.* "Mexico and the Mexicans." July 26, 1867; *Washington Daily National Intelligencer.* "The Military Execution of Maximilian Confirmed." July 2, 1867.

[7] Daniel Moreno, *El sitio de Querétaro. Según protagonistas y testigos*. 3rd Edición, (México: Editorial Porrúa, 1982); *El Diario del Imperio.*October 3, 1865: 1-4; see also: Salm-Salm, Prince Felix Constantine Alexander Johan Nepomak. *My Diary in Mexico 1867: Including the Last Days of the Emperor Maximilian.* London: R. Bentley, 1868.

Maximilian's Black Decree played a significant role in bringing the Emperor's reign to a close by alienating his own people and potential allies as well. Its harsh terms and summary execution provision went beyond the norms of acceptable warfare in Europe, the United States, and Mexico. Though Maximilian attempted to repeal the order one year after its issuance, the damage had been done. In effect, the Black Decree became the Emperor's own death warrant.

On the morning of June 19, 1867, the sun rose on the cobble-strewn Cerro de las Campanas (the Hill of the Bells) overlooking the high desert city of Querétaro, some 125 miles northwest of Mexico City. Near the crest of the hill stood a wall of hastily-stacked adobe bricks. Without ceremony, *Maximiliano I* stepped un-aided from the donkey-drawn hackney that conveyed him the dusty mile from his prison, the convent of the Capuchins, near the city center. The Emperor emerged from the carriage escorted by blue-uniformed Republican guards. His pale skin and wispy blond Dundreary side-whiskers made him instantly recognizable as the Austrian prince who would be king of the Mexicans. His fashionable Paris-made suit of the finest wool contrasted sharply with his broad-brimmed sombrero, much like those worn by the dark-skinned spectators eager to get a glimpse of the condemned royal. All present—soldiers, clergy, and civilians—wondered at his calm. Only the priest who heard his confession and a few intimate friends understood that Maximilian was resigned to his fate. Honor would not allow him to abdicate and abandon the Mexico he had come to love.[8]

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[8] This reconstruction of the scene at Cerro de las Campanas is based on eye witness accounts and photographic evidence. The Emperor received credible, but erroneous, news of his wife's death as the Empress pleaded with Napoleon and the Pope to intercede and save Maximilian's empire. This news according to Samuel Basch broke his will to live, "one less tie that binds me to life." Though the reports turned out to be unfounded, Maximilian confided to friends that he now welcomed death. *Alta*, May 18,

Three six-man squads detailed for the execution stood stiffly in two ranks. An officer and a noncommissioned officer flanked each of the squads. Many present still believed that somehow President Benito Juárez, pressured by world leaders—Napoleon III, Leopold of Belgium, Franz Joseph of Austria, Queen Victoria, President Andrew Johnson, even Pope Pius IX—might intervene at the last minute and stay the execution. Maximilian was, after all, a son of the house of Habsburg. But the reprieve did not come, and most understood that the Emperor's own Black Decree had sealed his fate.

Two more dusty carriages rattled up the deeply rutted road, and armed escorts positioned General Miguel Miramón, once president of Mexico and now the Emperor's ranking officer and field commander, placing him on Maximilian's left. General Tomás Mejía, an "*indio puro*" (full-blood Nahua Indian) and the loyal commander of the Emperor's cavalry took his place on Maximilian's right. Though Juárez's able General Escobedo was nominally in charge of the execution, he seemed detached and willing to let the scene unfold as if it had already been scripted by a higher authority and could not be altered by his command. Perhaps sensing this leadership vacuum, the condemned Maximilian appeared to take charge. Stepping from his place, he embraced Miramón and said, without bravado but loud enough for the Republican officers and poised riflemen to hear, "you deserve the place of honor" and motioned him to the middle position. The Emperor then embraced Mejía saying that they would soon meet again in a better world.[9]

1867, July 8, 1867, July 26, 1867, August 7, 1867; New York *Tribune*, June 28, 1867; Basch, 244-47. For photographs taken soon after the execution by Francois Aubert, Noriega, and Agustín Peraire see: John Elderfield, *Manet and the Execution of Emperor Maximilian* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2006), 14, 83, 90, 98, 188, 190.

[9] Sara Yorke Stevenson, *A Woman's Reminiscences of the French Intervention in Mexico, 1862-67* (New York: The Century Co., 1897), 274; Alfred Hanna and Kathryn Hanna, *Napoleon III and Mexico; American Triumph Over Monarchy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 262-3.

All eyes followed Maximilian as he approached the officer of the detail on the far right, opposite his own place, and presented him with a pouch containing a gold sovereign for each man of the firing squad. He asked them to aim for his heart, "*corazon*," he said, as he looked each man in the eye. Then the Emperor handed his silver sombrero to his servant, returned to his place beside Miramón, and faced the firing line, less than ten paces away. Maximilian spoke his last words in a firm voice: "Mexicans! Men of my class and Race are created by God to be the happiness of nations or their martyrs. I forgive everybody. I pray that everyone may also forgive me, and I wish that my blood which is now to be shed may be for the good of the country. Long live Mexico! Long live independence!"[10]

He looked again at the firing squad, pointed to his heart and then held his arms out to his side, as if crucified. "¡*Preparen*!" "¡*Apunten*!" "¡*Fuego*!" The perfectly timed volley felled the three men at once. The one-ounce lead musket balls tore through their bodies and ricocheted up the hill to the adobe wall. But when the smoke cleared all could see the Emperor writhing on the ground—his hands appeared to clutch his chest and, though he did not cry out, his lips moved. The officer in charge ran to the wounded man and pointed the tip of his sword at the Emperor's heart; the corporal at his side aimed his musket at the spot indicated and, without waiting for further orders, pulled the trigger to administer the *coup de grâce*. The Emperor's death struggle ended as his servant scrambled to his master's motionless body and snuffed out the smoldering embers ignited on the vest by the muzzle blast. At 7:00 am June 19, 1867, Maximilian lay still on

[10]There are several versions of Maximilian's last words. Prussian minister Baron Magnus, an eye witness, is generally considered reliable, though the "men of my race" portion is not entirely consistent with Maximilian's generally liberal and egalitarian rule and accounts left by others. *Alta*, July 26, 1867; Jasper Ridley, *Maximilian and Juarez* (New York: Ticknor & Fields), 1992, 277.

the Cerro de las Campanas and the church bells of Querétaro tolled the end of an empire.[11]

As was customary in military executions, the men of the firing squad did not load their own muskets. One musket was secretly loaded with a blank powder charge, topped with a harmless wad but no bullet, so that when the volley was fired and the smoke cleared each man might imagine that he had not been the one to fire the fatal shot. This ritual would allow each man to plausibly deny the charge of murder when meeting his maker and, thereby, improve his chance of gaining access to the kingdom of heaven. Maximilian's powder-burned and bloodied shirt itself was preserved by the Emperor's private physician, Dr. Samuel Basch, who laundered the gory relic and allowed it to be photographed by the French artist, François Aubert. Basch then smuggled the tattered and stained shirt out of Mexico and presented it to the Emperor's grieving mother.[12]

Though Maximilian affected the dress of his adopted Mexico, often wearing a sombrero, bandana, and other tokens of native "*charro*" costume, he could not so easily change his preference for the finery of his homeland. With his dying words he uttered that his blood was now Mexican. This proved prophetic indeed for his life blood spilled on the *Cerro de las Campanas*, and ladies present at the execution, desirous of souvenirs, dipped the corners of their kerchiefs in the dark red pools before they soaked into the sunbaked earth. An embalmer drained what little blood remained in the Emperor's body

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[11] *Alta*, July 26, 1867; Basch, *Recollections of Mexico*, 244, 247, 250-4.

[12] *Alta*, July 26, 1867; Dr. Basch's autopsy described in detail the six perforating bullet wounds in Maximilian's corpse. Today, Maximilian's shirt looks like something the rag man would leave behind. It is in fact an historical document that speaks of empire, overweening pride, and tragedy—a Greek drama in an unexpected form. The powder-charred and bullet-riddled death shirt is still visibly blood soaked. More graphic and credible than any eyewitness account, it tells the story of Maximilian's last seconds of life. Six musket balls passed through it—three fatal shots tore through his chest and three through his abdomen. For details regarding disposition of the body see: Samuel Basch, M.D. *Recollections of Mexico; the Last Ten Months of Maximilian's Empire* [1868], 245-54.

and discarded it, perhaps in a privy, as usual, to discourage the ever vigilant curs and ubiquitous flies. The royal organs were carefully preserved and mummified, and Maximilian's pale blue eyes were replaced with artificial glass orbs of brown, the only color kept on hand by doctors in Querétaro (or anywhere in Mexico for that matter).[13]

After months of indecision, a worried Juárez, fearing he might have made a martyr of Maximilian, finally authorized the shipment of the elegant glass-fronted royal coffin to the Habsburg crypt in Vienna. Aubert's photographs of the corpse and bloodstained shirt created an international sensation. Napoleon banned them, but thousands of bootlegged *cartes de visite* circulated in France and throughout Europe and the Americas—testimonials to Napoleon's betrayal, Maximilian's vanity and *naiveté*, and the end of an empire in Mexico.

French artist Edouard Manet had followed Napoleon's invasion and occupation of Mexico with alarm. He and other French intellectuals saw the unfolding events for what they were: an imperialistic land grab intended to enhance the French emperor's prestige and power at the expense of a weaker nation. The installation of the Austrian archduke, some said "arch-dupe," as Napoleon's puppet did not surprise those watching France's "Mexican Adventure." Shocking, however, was the willingness with which Napoleon abandoned Maximilian once the occupation and counter-insurgency costs mounted and public opinion turned against the Mexican scheme.[14]

The French had pressured Maximilian to put an end to Juárez's Republican resistance as quickly and ruthlessly as possible—hence the Black Decree—while at the

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[13] The fineness of the linen and workmanship reveals that Maximilian's shirt was made in Europe.
[14] *Littell's Living Age*, Jan.-March, 1865, Vol. 84, 472. See also: Lynne M. Case, ed., *French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860-1867; Extracts from the Reports of the Procureurs Généraux* (1937), 327-30 and passim.

same time heavily taxing Maximilian's government and subjects to defray the expenses of the war. Manet's "Execution of Maximilian" was an oversized canvas (at 8'x10', larger than anything he had previously attempted) and a bold critique of Napoleon's greed and infidelity. It exposed the French emperor's betrayal of Maximilian and his Mexican allies while lauding General Mejía's loyalty and General Miramón's courage. Maximilian is depicted as an honorable character, refusing, as he did, Napoleon's entreaties that he abdicate his throne and abandon Mexico.[15]

As the United States ended its civil war, the Americans began exerting political and military pressure on France to begin the evacuation of its forces from Mexico. Prussia's rise as a European power also influenced Napoleon to reevaluate his priorities and focus his attention closer to home. In Sonora, the Imperialists' days were numbered, due in large measure to the fierce campaigning of Republican General Angel Martinez. He had joined the army at an early age, was quickly promoted, and, although only twenty-eight years old and illiterate, attained the rank of general by 1865. Motivated as much by plunder as political loyalties, Martinez and his machete-armed *mestizo* and Indian *macheteros* swept from Sinaloa into Sonora, killing and looting as they rode. By

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[15] Art historians debate the significance of the symbolism, especially the Christian allusions (including Christ between the thieves and the halo-like sombrero of the martyred king), but all agree that Manet intended to expose Napoleon's Mexico propaganda for what it was. The painting is today considered one of Manet's masterworks, yet it was never exhibited in France during the artist's lifetime. Napoleon's ministers censored the painting and all lithographic reproductions, and the work was banned from exhibition in the prestigious salon in 1868 and 1869. "*The Execution of Maximilian"* was first exhibited in the United States nearly fifteen years after the event. In creating the piece, Manet struggled to obtain accurate newspaper and eyewitness accounts. He pored over Aubert's photographs of the Mexican firing squad and even enlisted the help of soldier models from a local French garrison to pose for him. Art historians have x-rayed the finished work and analyzed it in detail. The artist revised the work four or more times. It is a powerful historical document in itself and can be used to examine issues of alienation, honor, loyalty, resistance, injustice, courage, as well as other human passions and frailties. Wilson-Bareau, Juliet. *Manet: The Execution of Manet; Painting, Politics and Censorship.* London: National Gallery/Prince University Press, 1992, 107. See also: Murphy, Kevind D. "New Information Concerning Edouard Manet's 'Execution of Maximilian'." *The Burlington Magazine Vol. 31, No. 1033 (April)*, 1989: 288-89.

February, 1866, Martinez had defeated the armies of Jose María Almada, once a loyal Republican who switched sides following the indiscriminate attacks of the Juaristas, who killed his father and other family members, desecrated churches, and looted the haciendas of Imperialists and Republicans alike. Almada became known as Chato and raised an Imperialist army composed of Yaqui and Mayo mercenaries. Now, Chato was dead and Martinez and the Republicans controlled the entire District of Alamos, Sonora, in northwestern Mexico. He publicly encouraged Governor Pesqueira to return from his Arizona sanctuary and rally his former supporters. From Calabasas, near the post of Tubac, Pesqueira cautiously viewed these developments. That same month he had received a petition from General Jesús Garcia Morales and his officers asking that he resume command of the Sonoran troops, and in March the *caudillo* arrived at Bronces, near Arizpe, and accepted the leadership of a *guerrilla* band serving under Major Bernardo Zuniga. At Buenavista, in April, Pesqueira resumed the offices of governor and commanding general of the State, and with three hundred men marched to Alamos. Encouraged by Pesqueira's return, Martinez headed south and, with Garcia Morales, captured Magdalena.[16]

On June 20, 1867, the day after Maximilian's execution, Mexican conservatives and Imperialists sued for peace and surrendered Mexico City, bringing to a close the deadly reprisals and civil war that had destabilized the nation and decimated the population. Those who could flee the war-torn republic took ship to receptive European ports or traveled north to the United States. Beginning in 1865, the international border

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[16] Rodolfo F. Acuña, *Sonoran Strongman: Ignacio Pesqueira and His Times* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 160; *Message of the President of the United States, of January 29, 1867*, *Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 2nd session*, see correspondence from Martinez, Romero, Seward, and Garcia Morales, Military Operations of the Western Division reports, 252-62.

itself had become a very different thing. Large numbers of U.S. troops, many of them well-armed-and-led combat veterans, now massed on the previously-porous boundary line along the Rio Grande in Texas. All along the border, from Texas to California, the Americans established check points requiring passports on main traveled roads. From El Paso to Yuma, military patrols turned back emigrants and Indian raiders alike as the border became not just an imagined line but a boundary that denied access. In the process, Indian peoples were divided, especially the Papagos and Pimas. Though at first the new rules had little impact on traditional ways, over time families, bands, and cultures separated and the people grappled with ethnic and national issues of loyalty and identity.[17]

Clash of Martial Cultures

As the Navajo campaign came to a close in 1864 and Carleton transported the surviving Navajos and Mescalero Apaches to Fort Sumner and the Bosque Redondo Reservation, other tribes began to feel the pressure of the increasingly aggressive U.S. military policy. The Western Apaches inhabiting the mountainous country along the upper Gila and the related Yavapais in Central Arizona now went on the defensive, resisting the incessant forays by soldiers and their allied tribes. On the Colorado River,

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[17] For the best recent work on the reimagining of national borders overlaid on traditional peoples and the influence of race and ethnicity see: Eric V. Meeks, *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 5-6 and passim; with the emphasis on economic influences on lifeways in the Southwest, see: Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-6; Samuel Truett, "Epics of Greater America: Herbert Eugene Bolton's Quest for a Transnational American History." In *Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends*, ed. Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and John M. Nieto-Phillips (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005.), 7-9; for the impact of cultures of violence, see: Lance Blythe, *Chiricahuas and Janos: Communities of Violence in the Southwestern Borderlands, 1680-1880* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 5-6; see also: Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *American Historical Review*, 104 (June, 1999), 814-841.

Chief Iretaba of the Mojaves counseled his warriors against making war and kept them in check by recounting stories of the "white father's" might. From November 1863 until June 1864 the Mojave headman had traveled, at government expense, to San Francisco and then by sea to Washington accompanied by Pima chief Antonio Azul and Indian agent John Moss. The Arizona Indian leaders embarked on steamships and rode in railroad cars hauled by steam locomotives, witnessed the firing of great cannons, participated in reviews of regiments of well-armed soldiers, and slept in fancy hotels in cities teeming with white men and women too numerous to count. In this case, the goodwill tour and propaganda campaign worked where military action might have failed. Iretaba returned to his people gaudily outfitted in the dress uniform of a major general, convinced that resisting the whites would be futile. Antonio Azul needed little convincing, for the Pima and Maricopa Indian farmers already benefited from army contracts and the military alliance that protected their Gila River villages from Western Apache and Yavapai raiders. Still, Arizona civilians and soldiers considered such trips and gifts well worth the expense, reasoning that it was more cost effective in both lives and treasure to inspire awe and loyalty in native leaders than it was to fight them.[18]

The Paiutes and Chemehuevis in northwestern Arizona, however, were another matter. They threatened Colorado River steamboat refueling stops and defiantly resisted incursions by Anglo and Hispano miners, freighters, and travelers on the Mojave-Fort Whipple road across central Arizona. U.S. troops retaliated, though with limited success.

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[18] *Alta*, June 12, 1864. Throughout the 1860s the government sponsored many such goodwill tours including chiefs and headmen from some of the tribes most resistant to government diplomatic and coercion efforts, including Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas, and Cheyennes. Herman J. Viola, *Diplomats in Buckskins: A History of Indian Delegations in Washington City* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 1-16 and passim.

Unprepared for the hit-and-run style of warfare, one soldier commented that the Indians "were too fleet of foot for infantrymen and gave us wide berth when we got after them."[19] Frustrated by their inability to track down elusive Chemehuevi warriors, the soldiers arrested innocent chiefs and held them hostage until depredations ceased or guilty raiders were apprehended.[20]

Colonel Thomas F. Wright, son of the former commander of the Department of the Pacific, led eight companies of the Second California Infantry to Arizona in the summer of 1865. Charged with hunting down Western Apaches on the upper Gila, the men of the Second had little stomach for combat once they learned that the Civil War was indeed over. Pressed by Carleton and Mason, however, the officers of the Second launched numerous scouts from Forts Goodwin and Grant. Corporal William A. Bushnell summed up the spirit of the men in a diary entry written on December 11, 1865, following a seventeen-day scout:

> At this season of the year, carrying one blanket, your overcoat, half a shelter tent, your gun accoutrements and 210 rounds of ammunition, is not very desirable pastime, especially when you are out seventeen days without finding an Indian. If Jomini [author of *The Art of War*] could peruse a detailed account of our expedition, he would, no doubt, see fit to change his definition of military terms considerably. Thus the term Scouting (in an Indian country, at least) as our experience proves, is to start out and travel 8 or 10 miles a day, camping about noon and keeping good fires burning all night so as to warn all Indians of your whereabouts. In the morning a large fire should be built so as to make smoke so that the enemy can see it and flee your approach. It is also well to take precaution a few days before leaving the garrison to post all guides and interpreters so that

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[19] Edward D. Tuttle, "River Colorado," *Arizona Historical Review* 1 (July 1928):50-68, 60-61; Alonzo E. Davis, "Pioneer Days in Arizona By One who Was There," (typescript) Arizona State University Library, 52.

[20] GO 4, Feb. 18, 1865, Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico, *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [*OR*],, 48(1):909; J. Ross Browne, *Adventures in the Apache Country*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1869), 29; Senate, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, 1857, S. Exec. Doc.1, pt. 1, Serial 974, 560; *Daily Alta California*, July 4, 1864; Col. James F. Curtis to Capt. Charles Atchison, Feb. 22, 1865, *OR* 50(2):1152.

> they can easily go out into the mountains and intimate the coming danger to their savage brother. Thus you will easily avoid coming into collision with the noble red man. An appropriate report to send to Headquarters would be something like this: "Deserted Rancheria, December 1865
> General: We are at the camp of the enemy and they are ours (hours ahead of us)."[21]

As Carleton directed the efforts of the New Mexico and California Volunteers toward the Navajos, Mescaleros, Chiricahuas, and Western Apaches, the warriors of the Southern Plains stepped up their attacks on the Santa Fe Trail and outlying Hispano and Pueblo Indian settlements in northeastern New Mexico and Colorado, south of the Arkansas. The young men of the Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Comanche, Cheyenne, and Arapaho tribes sought stock, goods, and other tradable commodities, including captive women and children.

The warrior cultures of the Apacheans and the horse peoples of the Southern Plains bore remarkable similarities. Though their languages evolved from different traditions, the peoples of the mountains and plains shared beliefs in personal bravery and honor and understood the same distinctions between raiding and war. The Southern Cheyennes, for example, divided themselves into six warrior or "soldier" societies—Bowstrings, Crooked Lances, Dog Soldiers, Kit Fox Soldiers, Red Shields, and Chiefs. Each of these soldier societies had their own dress, rituals, and songs. They recruited like-minded and compatible young men who formed close male bonds. They danced, sang, hunted, raided, and went to war together. Holy men provided decorated shields to warriors willing to accept the weighty responsibilities associated with such a powerful

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[21] William Addison Bushnell Diary, Dec. 11, 1865, typescript in possession of author. Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini (1779 –1869) served as a general in the French and later in the Russian service and was one of the 19th century's most influential writers on the Napoleonic art of war. His theories were taught at West Point prior to the Civil War, and some military historians consider him the father of modern strategy.

war talisman, designed to protect the bearer in battle. Weapons—bows and lances—were also carefully crafted and decorated to imbue them with power, when properly handled.

As with the Apacheans, the Cheyennes and other peoples of the Plains saw success in raiding and war as virtuous and a way to achieve status. They also recognized similar taboos against touching blood and the importance of ritual purification after battle. Scalps were handled with great care and discarded immediately if members of a raiding or war party were killed by the enemy. Women gloried in the victories and exploits of their men. Married women painted red lines on their faces to indicate the coups or brave deeds of their husbands, and the stringent restrictions on sexual contact between unmarried men and women were relaxed during scalp dances which celebrated victories over enemies and the well-being of the tribe or band. For men, success in raiding and war became the path to status within the tribe, access to women, and marriage. Women recognized that successful warriors were both good providers and protectors against external threats.

The Cheyennes and other horse peoples of the Plains developed a ritualized mode of fighting that involved a kind of mock combat in which a warrior might demonstrate his superiority over an enemy by counting coup—touching or striking his adversary as if to say, "I touched you, and could have killed you, but I choose to give you your life." The blow might be delivered with a special coup stick or other non-lethal implement, but the bravest coups were made with the bare hand. With the proliferation of firearms resulting from increased contact with Anglo-Americans during the 1860s, the rules of war changed. Warriors would still count coups but then return to kill their white enemies, who failed to recognize the customs of warfare on the Plains as the Cheyennes understood

them. As with the Apacheans and other peoples of the borderlands, killings and war-related deaths reached an all-time high during and immediately following the Civil War, as reprisals and retaliatory wars of revenge escalated.

As with the other peoples of the borderlands, a spirit of martial masculinity animated the Indian soldier societies, and elaborate preparations for war made fighting enemies, real and perceived, a forgone conclusion. As the Anglo-American military entered the fray in the Southwest as a result of the Civil War troop build-up, the violence generated by the clashing martial traditions reached unprecedented levels. On the Southern Plains for over one hundred years the Comanches, with their Kiowa and Kiowa-Apache allies, had been the greatest military power. By the 1860s, this power hierarchy was about to change.[22]

During the spring and summer of 1864, attacks by Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahos nearly shut down the Santa Fe Trail. Wagon trains from Kansas joined in caravans for mutual protection. One such train included ten wagons owned by the Taos firm of Guttmann, Friedman & Company. At Cow Creek Crossing, Kansas, on July 12, 1864, four hundred Kiowa, Comanche, and Arapaho warriors surrounded the heavily-laden wagons bound for Fort Union with uniforms, carbines, boots, shoes, and other government supplies, as well as general merchandise to be sold in Taos. The Indians first sent in a captive to ascertain whether this was a "Mexican" or an

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[22] In addition to those listed, the Northern Cheyennes included the powerful Crazy Dogs among their warrior societies. George Bird Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians* (1928, reprint, Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 2:48-78; George E. Hyde, *The Life of George Bent,* ed. Savoie Lottinville (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); David Halaas and Andrew Masich, *Halfbreed: The Remarkable True Story of George Bent* (Cambridge: DaCapo Press, 2004)*, 32*; see also: Jean Afton, David Halaas, and Andrew Masich, *Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a Ledgerbook History of Coups and Combat* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997), passim; Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008)„ 11, 71, 314-16.

"American" train, indicating that if it were a Mexican train they would not be molested. As most of the teamsters were Hispanos and Juan Santistevan was a principal in the company, the captive reported that they were Mexicans, and the warriors approached to parley and eat. But soon it became apparent that this was not a friendly encounter. The Indians chopped the four wagons bearing government supplies to pieces with axes, slashed bundles of uniforms with knives, and threw ransacked provisions on the prairie. The raiders ran off fifty-six yokes of oxen, but the terrified Hispano teamsters were spared, left standing on the tongues of their remaining wagons.[23]

The loss of vital supplies worried Carleton, but even more troubling was the intelligence he received regarding the singling out of Anglo merchants and teamsters by the depredating Comanches. William Allison's train was attacked at the lower Cimarron Crossing of the Santa Fe Trail and the Hispano survivors testified that the five Americans among them were separated and "brutally murdered and scalped." The New Mexicans were allowed to return to their settlements unmolested, the raiders even furnishing them with transportation. "The discrimination which the Comanches have frequently made," Carleton explained to Superintendent of Indian Affairs Dr. Michael Steck, "in favor of the people, natives of this Territory, and against Anglo-Americans, cannot be regarded in any other light than as an insult to the government and to our people." It now seemed to Carleton that a race war was underway, and he was determined to put a stop to it. "I should be derelict of my duty," he wrote, "if I should refrain from making at least an

[23] Teamster Elias Trujillo testified that the Plains warriors had made positive assurances that the "Mexicans" would not be harmed, implying that they were at war only with the "Americans." Adolph Guttmann Case 1898, RG 123, NARA. See also: Louise Barry, "The Ranch at Cow Creek Crossing," *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1972), 416-44.

attempt to avenge our slaughtered and plundered citizens." Short of troops because of the all-out campaign against the Apaches in Arizona, he dashed off messages to Carson and other officers in an attempt to recruit Navajo, Apache, and Ute auxiliaries that might be turned against the Kiowas and Comanches, as well as the Cheyennes and Arapahos, that threatened the Santa Fe Trail.[24]

Vicente Otero's six freight wagons loaded with 25,000 pounds of military supplies joined other Santa Fe Traders on the 680-mile trek from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to Fort Union in the summer of 1864. With more than one hundred teamsters driving the heavily laden mule and ox-drawn wagons, the caravan appeared strong enough to protect itself from attack—so strong, in fact, that Army officers at Leavenworth refused the escort promised by the military procurement officer. After suffering an attack near the Great Bend of the Arkansas on July 18, the freighters insisted on protection and appealed to the exasperated post commander at Fort Larned, who put his refusal in writing:

> Headquarters, Fort Larned, Kan.
> July 23, 1864
> Messrs. Otero, Luna and Jaramillo, Govt. Freighters, Fort Larned, Kansas.
>
> Gents: Yours of the 22nd inst. is received, and in reply I would say that on assuming command of this Post I found the force so small that I cannot with safety to the Government property at this Post spare any of the Troops for escort to freight trains, nor do I deem it necessary in your case. You have over one

[24] Dr. Steck arrived in the Territory as an army doctor in 1849 and served as agent for a number of tribes before being appointed Superintendent for New Mexico on Jan. 22, 1864. Carleton to Michael Steck, October 29, 1864, U.S. Congress, *Condition of the Indian Tribes: Joint Special Committee Report: Appointed Under Joint Resolution of March 3, 1865. J.R. Doolittle* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1867), 205-06; Carleton to Carson, Aug. 15, 1864, ibid, 190; Carleton confided in Brig. Gen. Marcellus Crocker, commanding at Ft. Sumner, that, "if the Navajos had the spirit with reference to the Comanches which they ought to have toward their hereditary enemies, a war party of 500 of the former could go out and get all the stock they wanted. It would add to the punishment which the Comanches deserve for their depredations and butcheries of this year." Carleton to Marcellus Crocker, Oct. 31, 1864, ibid, 209.

> hundred men, all armed, and you will proceed immediately to select some one of your number to act as Captain and proceed on your way, keeping a vigilant watch night and day over your stock and wagons.
> Wm. H. Backus
> Capt. Co. L 1st Cav. of Colorado, Commanding Post

The freighters duly elected Jesús Luna "Captain" and pushed on. Luna directed the company to circle the wagons for the noon halt at Las Palomas on August 6 and cautioned the teamsters to be prepared to drive the grazing mules into the center of the corral if Indians were sighted. But the hundreds of Comanche and Kiowa warriors that swept into the train came without warning and too quickly for the herders to react. The freighters suffered the loss of nearly all their animals, and the partners were forced to rent the oxen of returning traders at ruinous rates in order to complete their journey to Fort Union.[25]

As winter approached, the attacks on the Santa Fe Trail and Southern Plains became more frequent and more violent. Soldiers hid in freight wagons and attempted to bait raiders with seemingly easy pickings. But the warriors were wary and relied on carefully planned ambushes or hit-and-run attacks at river crossings. Watching from the few prominences on the prairie, they studied the movements of wagon and stayed ready to cut off hunters and outriders who strayed too far from the trains or their military escorts. The wagon masters learned to circle their wagons and corral the animals quickly, for the horses and mules remained the raiders' main objective, when they were not moved by vengeance. Atrocities committed by Anglos and Indians became commonplace. Finding teamsters with their feet chained to the wheels of their wagon and

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[25] Otero and his partners were Hispano traders subcontracting with Anglo businessmen Stewart, Slemmens & Co., which secured the government contract for supplying the New Mexico forts. See Otero's testimony and "Exhibit A" in: Vicente A. Otero v. Kiowa and Comanche, Case 88, RG 123, NARA.

hoop iron driven into their eye sockets, the soldiers determined that warriors had first scalped the men then piled sacks of bacon on their legs and burned them alive. Colorado Volunteer cavalry escorts adopted a fatalistic attitude as they hardened to their task and their enemies. Private Jesse Haire remembered, "If we go under, we get rubbed out. Game, you bet. For no quarters are given on either side fighting Indians."[26]

The callousness of the Anglo soldiers manifested itself in a kind of martial mob mentality. When a twelve-year-old Indian boy came into their camp with raised hands, the Colorado cavalrymen clamored for his immediate execution. Private Jesse Haire wrote in his journal: "Most every person in camp as is usually the case with a lot of unthoughtful men who is always ready to pitch in and kill somebody when there is no opposition against them hot headed with no reason they say he must die because he is an Indian. All want the boy to put up as a mark to shoot at for practice." Fortunately, a Spanish-speaking Anglo soldier among them discovered that the boy was a Ute who had just escaped his Comanche captors. The signs of torture—his finger and toenails had been pulled out—corroborated his story, and the soldiers took him back to Fort Union and reunion with his family.[27]

The constant attacks by Comanche warriors on the flocks and herds of the Mescaleros and Navajos confined at Bosque Redondo threatened to undo Carleton's grand reservation experiment. Determined to put a stop to these and other raids by "the nomads of the plains,"[28] Carleton ordered Kit Carson to mobilize his newly-organized

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[26] Jesse S. Haire, Journals 1859-1897, Ohio Historical Society, Jan. 18, 19, 20, and 25, 1865.
[27] The incident involving the Ute boy occurred on Sept. 16, 1864 about 20 miles west of Point of Rocks. Pvt. Haire, Co. D, First Colo. Cav., expressed relief that his hotheaded comrades had not touched off a war with their Ute allies. Haire, Journals, Sept 16, 1864.
[28] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, March 12, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 168.

regiment of New Mexico Cavalry, a highly effective mounted force designed for Indian campaigning that bore little resemblance to the hastily-recruited First New Mexico Infantry that he had rallied to repel the Texans and commanded at the Battle of Valverde in 1862. Having conquered the Navajos, considered by many to be the most powerful tribe in the border territories, Carleton believed the reliable and resourceful Carson could take on the nomadic Plains warriors with similar success. "It is my desire," Carleton wrote, "that you give those Indians, especially the Kiowas, a severe drubbing." Having known and lived with the highly mobile and militarily well-organized Plains tribes, he knew this was a tall order, but he obeyed and set about organizing a command to get the job done.[29]

In October 1864, Carson began gathering a mixed battalion of Anglo and Hispano volunteer cavalry, infantry, artillery, and Indian auxiliaries at Fort Bascom on the Texas border some two hundred miles east of Santa Fe. Fort Bascom, named for the same George Bascom that touched off the Chiricahua Apache war in 1861 and then died fighting at Valverde the following year, was one of a series of forts Carleton established to protect settlements between the Staked Plains and the Rio Grande Valley. Located on the Canadian River along well-known, east-west trading and raiding trails, Fort Bascom was the logical place from which to launch a punishing expedition. Comancheros, Hispano and Indian traders from northern New Mexican pueblos, knew the way to the large villages of Kiowas, Kiowa-Apaches, and Comanches that gathered for mutual protection while wintering on the grassy plains along the Canadian. With the consent of

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[29] George H. Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight With the Comanche and Kiowa Indians*, (Providence: Sidney S. Ryder, 1878), 5-6. Carson had married an Arapaho woman, *Waa-Nibe*, ("Singing Grass") and then a Cheyenne, "Making-Out-Road" in the 1840s, prior to marrying Josefa Jaramillo. Marc Simmons, *Kit Carson and His Three Wives*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011), 35–6.

the Comanches, the Comancheros lived by trading with the nomadic plains tribes, providing tools, cloth, flour, tobacco, and manufactured goods of all kinds—including firearms and ammunition—in exchange for hides, livestock, and slaves or ransomed captives.[30] Lieutenant George Pettis, First California Volunteer Infantry, remembered that Carson's battalion comprised men selected for their proven ability as campaigners:

> Colonel Francisco P. Abreú, First New Mexico Infantry; Major William McCleave,
> First California Cavalry; Captain Emil Fritz, Company B, First California Cavalry, one officer and forty enlisted men; Lieutenant Sullivan Heath, Company K, First California Cavalry, one officer and forty men; Captain [John] Merriam, Company M [L], First California Cavalry, one officer and thirty-four men; Lieutenant George H. Pettis, Company K, First California Infantry, one officer and twenty-six men, with two twelve pounder mountain howitzers mounted on prairie carriages; Captain Charles Deus, Company M, First New Mexico Cavalry, two officers and seventy men; Captain Joseph Berney, Company D, First New Mexico Cavalry, two officers and thirty-six men; Company A, First California Veteran Infantry, seventy-five men; Assistant Surgeon George S. Courtright…and an Assistant Quartermaster and Commissary—numbering,
> in all, fourteen officers and three hundred and twenty-one enlisted men.

Most importantly, the command also included seventy-two Ute and Jicarilla Apache warriors to whom Carson had promised all the plunder they could carry off. No friends of the Plains tribes, the mountain-dwelling, semi-sedentary peoples of northern New Mexico and southern Colorado respected Carson, who had once been their foe and then their Indian agent in the 1850s.[31]

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[30] Carleton attempted to control trading with the Kiowas and Comanches by issuing passes and regulating the goods sold. After the Adobe Walls battle he cracked down harder on those who traded powder, shot, and military intelligence with enemy warriors. G.O. No. 2, H.Q. Dept. of New Mexico, Jan. 31, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 268.

[31] He knew that he risked losing the Apaches and Navajos then corralled at Bosque Redondo, but Carleton was so eager to defeat the Comanche and Kiowa raiders that he ordered both McCleave and Carson—his most trusted officers—on this expedition. Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 8-9; Richard H. Orton, *Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion 1861 to 1867* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1890), 75, 156.

Riding newly-shod horses and supported with a supply train numbering twenty-seven wagons, an ambulance, and two mule-drawn mountain howitzers mounted on wide-tracking prairie carriages, the expedition set out from Fort Bascom on the frosty morning of November 6, 1864. [32] Directed by Comancheros, Carson headed his men down the Canadian River in the northern Texas panhandle straight for the ruined Bent brothers' trading post known as Adobe Walls. Carson knew the Indian people who had frequented the place years before, and they knew him. They had, warily, hunted and traded together in the 1840s and 1850s. Now, under orders from Carleton, he was bound to kill them. "You know where to find the Indians," Carleton wrote, "you know what atrocities they have committed, you know how to punish them." The Navajo war may have softened both men some, and knowing that Carson's command included Utes and Apaches sworn to kill their old enemies, Carleton stressed that only Indian men were to be targeted. "Of course," he added, "I know that in attacking a village women and children are liable to be killed, and this cannot, in the rush and confusion of a fight, particularly at night, be avoided, but let none be killed willfully or wantonly." The general had originally planned that a converging column under General James Blunt would strike from western Kansas, but these troops were diverted to attend to a rebel threat, and Carson was ordered to go it alone.[33]

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[32] The prairie carriage's axle was 16 inches wider than the version employed for packing the Model 1841 mountain howitzer; when towed the prairie carriage's track was 42.5 inches and the pack carriage was 30.2 inches. Still Pettis considered the prairie carriage to be too narrow and discovered that it was prone to tipping over in the tall grass and rough terrain of the southern Plains. Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 18; *Ordnance Manual for the Use of the Officers of the United States Army.* 3rd edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1861, 74-5.

[33]Carleton to James Blunt, Oct. 22, 1864, *OR* 41(1):939; Carleton to Carson, Oct 23, 1864, *OR* 41 (4): 214; Pettis, ibid, 9-10.

The command marched more than one hundred miles through a rapidly-changing weather system that brought a snow storm then bright sun and crisp, bracing air. The soldiers huddled together in blankets during the freezing nights as their Ute and Jicarilla allies danced, sang, and made their spiritual preparations for the coming battle. Their "war dance" involved singing and acting out in pantomime how they intended to slay their enemies. These rituals often went on until dawn, and the soldiers complained about losing sleep until they eventually "became accustomed to the groans and howlings incident to the dance." Carson prepared his Anglo and Hispano soldiers by regaling them with stories of daring deeds and deadly encounters that had occurred near Tucumcari Butte, the very ground on which they now slept. Here he told the story of Mrs. Ann White, a harrowing tale that quickened the men's hearts and inspired in them a lust for bloody vengeance, no doubt exactly the effect Carson desired. Some fifteen years earlier Kit had guided a troop of dragoons in pursuit of Jicarillas that had murdered a Santa Fe-bound caravan led by James White. The men of the train, Carson recalled, had been killed in the initial attack, but Ann, a daughter, and a servant were taken prisoner. Carson tracked the raiders, finding bits of the Anglo woman's clothing purposely left behind as clues, and finally located the Apache camp on the Canadian. The soldiers failed to attack as soon as the enemy was sighted, a blunder, Carson believed, that resulted in Mrs. White's death from an arrow shot through her heart as she lay just two hundred yards from the charging scout. The incident still weighed heavily on him partly because while searching the abandoned Jicarilla camp a soldier discovered a book, purporting to be history, featuring the heroic Carson and his exploits on the frontier. It was the first book of its kind he had ever seen, and after it was read to him he believed that he had failed

Ann White who surely must have been counting on him to come to her rescue. He now revealed to his men that the woman had been both physically and sexually abused, and he consoled himself that under these circumstances she was better off dead.[34]

By November 24, the day President Lincoln had recently proclaimed for the nation to observe Thanksgiving, the Indian scouts located a wide trail grooved by thousands of horses dragging lodge poles and followed by herds of cattle. Lieutenant Pettis reported that the scouts told Carson he "would have no difficulty in finding all the Indians that we desired."[35] As the command neared the enemy villages, Carson pushed on with his Indian, Hispano, and Anglo horsemen and the mountain howitzer battery, while the infantry escorting the wagons bought up the rear. The going was difficult in the bottoms near the river as the prairie grass grew to a height of eight feet in places, slowing the movement of the wheeled cannons and ammunition carts. The Utes and Jicarillas stripped off their buffalo robes and other impedimenta as soon as Kiowa outriders were discovered. Carson's warriors stopped only long enough to hurriedly paint their bodies for battle, don their feather bonnets imbued with spiritual power, and pray to the four winds. The Utes and Jicarillas led the charge followed by Major McCleave and companies of California and New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry. The chase tore through a Kiowa village of 150 buffalo hide lodges, the tipi skins brain-tanned so white that Lieutenant Pettis and his gunners had believed from a distance that they approached an

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[34] Kit Carson, *Kit Carson's Autobiography* , ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 131-34; Tom Dunlay, *Kit Carson and the Indians* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 138-40 (the book discovered in the Apache camp was likely Charles Averill's *Kit Carson, Prince of the Gold Hunters*, published in 1849, the first of many novellas featuring Carson), 154, 181, 391-2, 455.
[35] Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 14.

encampment of soldiers in their conical, bleached canvas, Sibley-patent tents. Four miles beyond the village lay the ruined adobe buildings and corrals of the old Bent trading post.

Around the Adobe Walls, Anglo and Hispano cavalrymen dismounted and deployed as skirmishers, kneeling or lying in the tall grass, keeping up a steady fire with their breech-loading carbines, while the Utes and Jicarillas shouted their war cries and charged forward toward a group of some two hundred Kiowa and Comanche warriors, who likewise made rushes toward the troops and their Indian allies. Both groups of mounted Indians would turn and rush back to their original positions when the opposing fire grew too hot or the momentum of an enemy charge seemed too great to resist. The main body of Kiowas and Comanches maintained their distance just out of rifle and howitzer range. Pettis set up his little mountain battery behind a twenty-five foot sand hill and busily loaded the guns behind cover then manhandled them to the top of the hill and lobbed exploding shells, as Carson directed, into large groups of enemy warriors. The violent recoil of the little guns rolled or tumbled them back down the hill where they were reloaded and shoved back into battery. The "guns that shot twice" appeared to unnerve some of the warriors, while others continued to make bravery runs, riding close to the soldiers' lines at a full gallop, hanging precariously on the far sides of their ponies, while shooting guns or bows under their animals' necks. Chiefs in elaborate feathered bonnets exhorted their men while a mile east of the warriors' position, women and children could be seen abandoning a Comanche encampment of five hundred lodges located less than a mile away.

The weathered mud buildings and corrals of Adobe Walls now became a field hospital and place of shelter for the soldiers' horses. Every fourth man detailed as a

"horse-holder" now led his four thirsty animals to drink from a stream of clear water that bubbled from the prairie nearby. Carson believed the Indians would break off once the women and children abandoned the village, but the warriors seemed disinclined to withdraw and now pressed the attack as men of different bands arrived from more distant camp circles. The soldiers sounded bugle calls directing the several companies to advance then retreat toward the Adobe Walls. Some confusion followed during these maneuvers as a Comanche warrior, some believed it to be Chief Satanta himself, blew opposite signals from a captured army bugle. "When our bugles sounded 'advance,' he would blow 'retreat'" Pettis remembered, "and when ours sounded the 'retreat,' he would follow with the 'advance'; ours would signal 'halt'; he would follow suit. So he kept it up all the day, blowing as shrill and clearly as our very best buglers."[36]

Outnumbered four to one, Carson now realized he had bitten off more than he could chew and ordered a general retreat. While he believed he could keep the Kiowa and Comanche warriors at bay, he could not advance and he feared for the safety of the seventy-five men left behind with the wagon train. Satanta now redoubled his efforts, his dismounted warriors igniting grass fires that swept through the soldier skirmishers and threatened to break their line as mounted warriors darted in through the smoke. On Carson's left flank, a Comanche warrior rode up to the skirmish line in a cloud of smoke when a sudden gust of wind cleared the air for an instant leaving a young New Mexico Volunteer totally exposed, twenty feet from the charging warrior. Both men fired almost at once, but the dismounted soldier's aim was true and the Comanche man fell dead from his horse. Though the warrior's comrades attempted a mounted rescue, a scene that the

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[36] Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 29; Col. Ford's sworn testimony, May 31, 1865, in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 64-5.

soldiers witnessed repeatedly throughout the battle, the Hispano soldiers kept up a covering fire as the boy scalped his fallen foe. This was the only scalp taken in combat during the whole bloody affair.

The unhurried and well-organized retreat took Carson's command back through the 150-lodge Kiowa camp they had earlier swept through. This time the soldiers, Jicarillas, and Utes had time to pick up beautifully tanned buffalo robes and other plunder. Two Ute women who had accompanied the warriors used an axe to kill the elderly and infirm Kiowas that had been left behind. Then all of the wonderfully painted and appointed lodges were put to the torch, lighting the night sky as the soldiers continued their retreat, covered by the fire of their mountain howitzers. Late that night the command, with severely wounded men lashed to litters on the gun carriages and ammunition carts, reunited with the infantry reserve and supply train. The Kiowas and Comanches dogged the trail of the retreating column for days, keeping a respectful distance just beyond the range of the howitzers. The Utes purchased the scalp taken by the New Mexican and used it in a night-long "scalp dance," celebrating their victory. Some of the California and New Mexico officers talked about renewing the attack and returning to destroy the five hundred Comanche lodges sighted near Adobe Walls, but this bold talk may have masked their genuine relief in having survived the ordeal.

The following day, November 26, the soldiers witnessed the ritualized warfare and martial masculinity of the Indian warriors of the mountains and plains play out as the two sides sparred for honor and dominance. Pettis reported:

> Two of our Indians, mounted, rode out leisurely on the plains towards the Comanches; presently two of the enemy left their party and rode toward us, when Another party of ten or a dozen left our camp, and then the same number left the camp of the enemy, like boys playing at goal, and then another from our camp,

> followed by a like party from the enemy, until there were over two hundred men of both sides moving at a walk towards each other in the centre of the plain. The leading parties of each side had approached each other until only about two hundred yards of space intervened, when shooting commenced, but before a dozen shots had
> been exchanged the entire body of the enemy turned their horses' heads towards their camp, and left on a run, followed by our people for a short distance, who afterwards returned to camp unharmed.[37]

Had the Utes and Jicarillas followed their adversaries over the next rise they might well have fallen into a decoy trap, a time-honored technique of luring over-bold enemies by appearing to run away.

When three weeks later the column rode into Fort Bascom, Carson reported the expedition to be a success, but he later confessed that he had been lucky to extricate his command before being wiped out. Still, Carleton was elated by the initial report of the expedition, writing to Carson:

> I beg to express to you and to the gallant officers and soldiers whom you commanded on that occasion, as well as to our good auxiliaries, the Utes and Apaches, my thanks for the handsome manner in which you all met so formidable an enemy and defeated him. Please to publish an order to this effect. This brilliant affair adds another green leaf to the laurel wreath which you have so nobly won in the service of your country.

But Kit knew it was a very near thing, as he recounted years later to George Bent, the half-Cheyenne son of Owl Woman and trader William Bent, the builder of Adobe Walls. Reflecting on the campaign, Carson confided to Carleton that he would be willing to return to the Canadian to finish the job, but it would require one thousand men and heavier artillery, preferably long-range, rifled guns.[38]

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[37] Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 40.
[38] Carleton to Carson, December 15, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 213-14. Too costly in terms of men and matériel, Carleton never mounted the second campaign. Pettis, *Kit Carson's Fight*, 32-6.

As Carson's command had marched back to Fort Bascom, on November 29, 1864, two hundred miles to the north on a tributary of the Arkansas River known as Sand Creek, Colonel John Chivington attacked the peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho village of more than six hundred people gathered under the Chiefs Black Kettle and Left Hand.[39] The ambitious Chivington desperately wanted a brigadier's star and, eventually, a congressional seat. He believed a victory over the Colorado tribes would win him the fame needed to achieve these goals, but he needed to strike before the expiration of the 100-day enlistments of Colonel George Shoup's Third Colorado Volunteer Cavalry. With companies of the battle-tested First Colorado Cavalry and a loaned company of Carson's First New Mexico Cavalry,[40] Chivington mustered nearly one thousand men. He wasted little time, moving quickly to attack Black Kettle, whom Army officers at Fort Lyon had recently instructed to camp nearby for protection. An American flag and a white flag of peace flew prominently over the chief's own tipi. More than 150 confused and panicked Indian men, women, and children were cut down amid their lodges or in the five-mile running pursuit that followed the initial attack, the soldiers firing small arms of all description and mountain howitzers loaded with exploding shrapnel and canister into the

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[39] Eye witnesses interviewed by the investigative committee headed by Sen. James R. Doolittle in 1865 estimated the number of people in the Cheyenne/Arapaho village to be between 500 and 800. Robert Bent thought 600 to be the most accurate number. Recent research sponsored by the National Park Service at the Sand Creek National Historic site which incorporates Cheyenne oral history and a reconstruction of the bands and families present at the time of the attack put the number at more than 700.

[40] Though Carleton was desperately short of manpower as his Apache campaign ramped up in the summer of 1864, Colorado Governor Evans pressured him for troops to fight Indians, real and imagined, which the Coloradan believed threatened Denver. Carleton eventually dispatched some of Carson's men but lectured the panicked Evans on not starting an unnecessary war and to first negotiate. If war is unavoidable, he wrote, "it should be commenced because they have been the aggressors and are clearly in the wrong." Carleton to Evans, June 26, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 186.

masses of fleeing people and pockets of frightened women and children huddled in hastily-dug pits beneath the banks in the dry creek bed.[41]

Chivington had previously announced to his officers and men, "Damn any man who sympathizes with Indians....I have come to kill Indians, and believe it is right and honorable to use any means under God's heaven to kill Indians." The U.S. attorney for Colorado Territory reported the "Fighting Parson" had said, "kill and scalp all, big and little…nits make lice."[42] Invoking the memory of white women and children killed in Indian attacks, Chivington had incited in his men a killing frenzy that resulted in the wanton murder of innocents by the unruly and disorganized hundred-day men. Even some of the officers participated in the killing of children and the mutilation of corpses. Eye-witnesses among the First Colorado soldiers, some of whom refused to fire or take part in the massacre,[43] and Anglo traders present in the village reported seeing a Cheyenne child with a white flag on a stick deliberately shot down, a woman on her knees begging for her life sabered, an unborn baby sliced from its mother's womb, and

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[41] John Smith sworn testimony, Jan. 16, 1865, in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 60; Lt. C. M. Cossitt sworn testimony, ibid., 74; Robert Bent testimony, ibid., 95-6; Halaas and Masich, *Halfbreed*, 145-50.

[42] Lt. Cramer sworn testimony in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 73-4; S. E. Brown sworn testimony, ibid., 71; George E. Hyde, "Manuscript based on the letters of George Bent (working copy)," *George Bent Collection*, WH 1704, Box 1, Western History Department, Denver Public Library. See also: Gary L. Roberts and David Fridtjof Halaas, "Written in Blood: The Soule-Cramer Sand Creek Massacre Letters," *Colorado Heritage*, (Winter 2001): 22--32.

[43] It is estimated that 100 of the First Colorado men, including Capt. Soule's company and Lt. Baldwin's battery, refused to participate in the butchery. Some of these men later provided damning testimony against Chivington and the Third Colorado men. Soule was murdered on the streets of Denver following his testimony. Haire, Journals, Nov. 28 and Dec. 1, 1864. Pvt. Haire wrote dispassionately in his journal: "no quarters are given on either side fighting Indians." Ibid., Jan. 18, 1865. See also: Pam Milavec, "Jesse Haire: "Unwilling Indian Fighter," *Prologue Magazine*. Vol. 43, No. 2, NARA (Summer 2011). 1-7; Christopher Rein, "'Our First Duty Was to God and Our Next to Our Country': Religion, Violence, and the Sand Creek Massacre," *Great Plains Quarterly*, volume 34, no. 3 (Summer 2014), 217-38; Roberts and Halaas, "Witten in Blood," 22-32.

many other acts of obscenity and cruelty. Even the camp dogs were shot, their squealing pups thrown on the fires of the burning lodges.

The destruction was complete, and the violence was unprecedented in the annals of U.S military history. The returning volunteers openly displayed scalps and other body parts hacked from the Cheyenne and Arapaho men and women. Some of the grisly trophies were paraded by the triumphant troopers on hats and saddle bows and still more exhibited in the Denver Theater.[44] Exterminationist sentiment ran high among Colorado's Anglo population; Jacob Downing, a New York lawyer before the war and a commissioned major of the First Colorado Cavalry, admitted, "[I] killed all I could; and I think that was the general feeling in the command. I think and earnestly believe the Indians to be an obstacle to civilization, and should be exterminated."[45] But the scale and level of violence perpetrated on the Cheyennes and Arapahos at Sand Creek was unusual in the Southwest, and detailed reports of the atrocities committed by the troops shocked the nation. When Carson learned of the massacre, and that some of his own men had been used in the affair, he was disgusted and ashamed. Perhaps thinking of his own Cheyenne and Arapaho wives and children, he is reported to have said:

> Jist to think of that dog Chivington and his dirty hounds, up thar at Sand Creek! Whoever heerd of sich doings 'mong Christians! The pore Indians had the Stars and Stripes flying over them…they jist lit upon these Friendlies, and massacreed'em…that durned miscreant and his men shot down squaws, and blew the brains out of little innocent children. You call sich soldiers Christians, do ye? and pore Indians savages?…I don't like a hostile red skin any more than you do. And when they are hostile, I've fit'em—fout'em—and expect to fight'em—hard

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[44] Robert Bent sworn testimony, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 95-6; the body parts and other trophies were exhibited at the Denver Theatre on three occasions. *Daily Rocky Mountain News* (Denver), December 28, 29, and 30, 1864.
[45] Jacob Downing sworn testimony, July 21, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 68-70.

> as any man. That's my business. But I never yet drew a bead on a squaw or papoose, and I despise the man who would.[46]

Though Chivington's and Carson's efforts had not destroyed the Santa Fe Trail Indian raiders or swept them from the Plains, the expeditions did have far-reaching consequences for Indian people of the Southwest. Survivors of the Sand Creek Massacre and warriors previously aligned with Black Kettle's peace faction now rode with the Cheyenne Dog Soldiers in a war of revenge along the Platte. Other Cheyenne and Arapaho bands fled to the Southern Plains, seeking refuge from the whites even if it meant entering the territory of their traditional Indian enemies. At the same time, Carson's expedition sent a clear message that even the powerful united tribes of Kiowas, Comanches, and Plains Apaches were not invulnerable, and within a year they, along with the Cheyennes and Arapahos remaining in the south, sued for peace on the Little Arkansas River and signed a treaty with U.S. Peace Commissioners. The 1865 Treaty of the Little Arkansas recognized new reservation lands and made provisions for reparations to the families of the Sand Creek victims. Through the detailed investigative work of Senator Ben Wade's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War and Congressman J. R. Doolittle's Special Joint Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes, commissioned by Congress in 1865, the government and most of the American people came to understand that Chivington's massacre had been just plain murder. The Army authorized its own tribunal which condemned the affair in no uncertain terms.

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[46] For graphic testimony of the Sand Creek Massacre see: U.S Senate Report No. 142, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, Benjamin Wade, chairman, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War*. 3 Vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1865), i-v and testimony in "Massacre of Cheyenne Indians"; Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, "The Chivington Massacre," 26-96; Capt. Silas Soule to Maj. Edward Wynkoop, Dec. 14, 1864 and Lt. Joseph Cramer to Wynkoop, Dec. 19, 1864, Colorado Historical Society; Halaas and Masich, *Halfbreed*, 147, 160; Edward S. Ellis, *The Life of Kit Carson: Hunter, Trapper, Guide, Indian Agent and Colonel U.S.A.* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1889), 258-9. See also: Dunlay, *Kit Carson*, 391-93.

Most of the Army's officer corps and high command abhorred the "Chivington massacre," yet they also recognized that the winter campaigns and coordinated pressure applied by several military departments in 1863 and 1864 had succeeded in punishing tribes considered hostile and forced them to surrender and treat. While the Army's investigation of Sand Creek ingloriously hounded Chivington out of the service, the military men saw something worthy of emulation in Carson's campaign. His level-headed leadership demonstrated what might be accomplished by a small force when the commander understood the enemy, could read the tactical situation, and know when to aggressively attack and when to retreat. It was also clear that adequate support had made a difference when operating far from base camps—rolling stock with plenty of supplies, and, most importantly, artillery, which provided both long-range cover and the moral advantage over the more numerous tribesmen. Carson knew, and others were beginning to learn, that the key to successful campaigns against the native peoples was to be found in employing native allies as trackers, scouts, and front-line fighting men.[47]

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[47] Halaas and Masich, *Halfbreed*, 250-51; Pettis, ibid., 41-42; see also eyewitness testimony recorded by the two Joint Special Committees of Congress in 1865: Benjamin Wade's, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War* (1865) and James Doolittle's Joint Special Committee report, *The Condition of the Indian Tribes*. For convenient reference to these reports see: John M. Carroll, ed., *The Sand Creek Massacre*: *A Documentary History* (New York: Sol Lewis, 1973), passim. Col. Patrick E. Connor, 3rd California Volunteer Infantry, commanding the District of Utah, assigned to protect the Overland Mail Route and telegraph, attacked and defeated chief Bear Hunter's Shoshone encampment on the Bear River in southeastern Washington Territory (present Utah) on January 29, 1863. This battle, also considered by many to be a massacre, resulted in 67 soldier casualties and at least 250 among the Indians, including more than 50 women and children. In the Bear River fight, well-armed Shoshone warriors mounted significant resistance from prepared defensive positions. Women and children were taken prisoner and, in some cases, provided with medical care. Snow and freezing temperatures worsened the horrors and death rates for both sides. This winter campaign had a profound impact on the Shoshones and was held up by many military men as a model worthy of emulation. Connor was promoted brigadier soon after the battle. *OR*, 50(1): 185-87; Hunt, *Army of the Pacific*, 194-6; *Alta*, Feb. 19, 1863.

Strategic Alliances

A good deal of the Army's success in reducing raiding attacks and subduing tribes designated as hostile by the government resulted from alliances that pitted neighboring and related tribes and bands against one another, and by making common cause with the Mexicans in combatting the cross-border raiding. Dr. Michael Steck, Indian Superintendent for all New Mexico tribes, criticized Carleton and Carson for recruiting his charges and encouraging inter-ethnic rivalries and warfare. Steck had become Carleton's nemesis and the embodiment of all that was wrong with the impractical and corrupt Department of Indian Affairs. The General acknowledged that he should have informed the agent when he was about to launch a campaign against people within his Superintendency, promising to send him copies of his attack orders, after the fact. Carleton was clearly on the defensive in this matter and condescendingly explained the patently obvious situation to Steck:

> I was not aware, until so informed by yourself, that it was expected that investigations, with reference to Indian hostilities on our people, were to be made through your office before a blow could be struck. It is, however, acknowledged that you should be informed when hostile demonstrations are to be made against Indians within your superintendency, and, therefore, copies of orders in such cases have been sent to you. Utes and Apaches have had authority to go against the Comanches and Kiowas, with Colonel Carson, mainly because it was desirable, when so many coalitions are forming between the various Indian tribes against the whites, to have the savages of the mountains committed on our side as against the Indians of the plains. This subject seemed to be the peculiar province of the military department, which is charged with the protection of the people.[48]

Much of the conflict between Carleton, Steck, and the Indian agents was jurisdictional rather than philosophical. Nearly all of the American civil and military officials agreed with the idea of concentrating and "civilizing" the "predatory tribes" of

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[48] Carleton to Steck, November 8, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 210-11.

the "red race" in order to spare them from extermination or extinction in the face of competition with the "white race." Though they agreed in principle that it was better to feed and care for the tribes than wage war against them. But Carleton, Steck, Labadie, and other agents would continue sniping at one another over matters of authority and control. Steck eventually lost his struggle with the strong-willed Carleton and resigned as Superintendent in 1866, while Labadie was banned from the reservation that sheltered his charges. The feud was reflected in the Joint Special Committee's report which eventually influenced major changes in the conduct of Indian affairs, with the Army entrusted with greater control of Indian reservations and their increasingly dependent wards.[49]

American military men also found fast friends among the warriors among the Pimas and Papagos living along the Gila and Santa Cruz Rivers. These agrarian O'odham people welcomed the Anglos' weapons and manufactured goods and found the U.S. government to be a reliable trading partner. There had been tension at the beginning of the Civil War when the commander of the troops at Fort Yuma called the Quechans and Cocopas to meet with the Maricopas and Pimas as equals to discuss alliances and contracts. The Anglos, who focused entirely on their own pressing need to feed troops gathering to suppress the Confederates, had not considered the deep-seated animosities that existed between the Indian peoples of the borderlands. The allied Maricopa and Pima tribes of the Gila River threatened to resist the march of the California Column if the soldiers intended to treat the Colorado River Yumans as friends and allies. The Anglos quickly learned their lesson and engaged in separate negotiations that betrayed no favoritism, but a succession of Fort Yuma commanders kept a close watch on the

[49] *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861*, 634-37; ibid., *1863*, 5-6.

Quechans and other Yumans throughout the war while the Gila tribes became the staunchest of allies, supplying tons of forage for Army teams and feeding the successive columns of hungry troops tramping up the Gila and stationed at military garrisons in the territories. The Pimas and Maricopas traded surplus stores of wheat and corn flour and fresh vegetables in exchange for bolts of manta and other manufactured clothing, tools, and goods. Importantly, the Gila tribes wanted weapons to keep the Yumans at bay and to fend off the ever-present Apache raiders from the north and east.[50]

In 1865, the War Department took the unprecedented step of authorizing the formation of a multi-ethnic battalion of Arizona Volunteers in order to combat increasingly aggressive Hualapai, Mojave Apache, Yavapais, and Western Apache warriors in Central Arizona. The Maricopas, who had borne the brunt of the 1857 Quechan attack, discovered that the Yumans of the lower Colorado River no longer posed a serious threat once the young men of this agrarian Gila River tribe joined the Arizona Volunteers and allied with the Pimas, Papagos, Anglos, and Hispanos from both sides of the border. Though chronically undersupplied, the integrated Indian-Hispano-Anglo Arizona Volunteers were among the most effective troops ever to take the field against the raiding groups. The Pima, Maricopa, and Hispano soldiers received little in the way of uniforms, other than blue wool blouses[51] and a yard of red flannel per man for headbands that distinguished them from enemy warriors. Food rations on campaign and in camp were often woefully inadequate, and the deficiencies forced the men to

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[50] Carleton to Governor John Goodwin, April 20, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 178.
[51]Lonnie Underhill, *The First Arizona Volunteer Infantry, 1865-1866*, (Tucson: Roan Horse Press, 1983), 24, 35. The blue uniforms of the Company B Maricopas were trimmed in red while the Pimas of Company C wore blouses with blue trim. The Arizona Volunteers also drew sky blue wool trousers which were worn as issued or were adapted for leggings, breech clouts, or other garments as preferred by the soldier. When supplies of shoes ran out, worn-out Army brogan scraps were recycled and adapted as sandals.

supplement their diet by fishing, hunting, and foraging when possible. The government supplied rawhide and buckskin for the native troops to make their own sandals and *teguas* (thick-soled, ankle-high moccasins), but oftentimes the men could be seen with their feet wrapped in rags—their only protection from rocky terrain and bitter cold while on mountain patrols in search of well-concealed Apache camps.

The allied warriors most valued, however, the government issues of new .58 caliber Springfield rifle muskets and, when those ran out, the older, second-class but still deadly-effective .54 caliber Mississippi Rifles and plentiful supplies of ammunition that enabled them to take the war to the enemy. The Anglo and Hispano recruits of Company A received triangular socket bayonets for their Springfields, while the other companies drew the shorter-barreled rifles without bayonets. Captain Hiram S. Washburn commanding Company E, composed of Sonorans, made repeated requests that his men also be issued lances for use when fighting in close quarters while mounted. His soldiers were familiar and effective with this traditional weapon. Though formally designated as infantry, many of the Indian and Hispano volunteers chose to supply their own horses and fight as mounted rifle units.[52]

Anglos commanded the Arizona Volunteer companies, but the Indian and Hispano soldiers showed them the way to enemy camps, hideouts, and seasonal gathering and planting locations. As winter of 1865-66 wore on, the semi-nomadic Western Apaches sheltered against the cold in mountain rancherías and retreats. Their horses were weak for want of forage this time of year, and as women left camps in search of roots and other edibles, they left tell-tale prints in the snow. In February, the native troops stationed

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[52] Underhill, *First Arizona Volunteer Infantry*, 3, 24, 27

at Camp Lincoln stepped up offensive operations. Company E located and attacked a large group of Apache families living in five caves at the South Fork of Beaver Creek. At sunrise, Lt. Manuel Gallegos called out in an Apache dialect and attempted to convince the people to surrender. The response came in a storm of arrows, stones, and gunshots. After a day of fighting the volunteers discovered thirty Apache bodies in the captured caves and took twelve women and children prisoners of war to Fort Whipple. Seven of the Hispanos received wounds and nearly the entire command had been struck by slung stones or rocks rolled from the heights. The toll in killed, wounded, and captured in combats had been high that winter, but even more devastating to the people who managed to get away was the loss of stored food supplies and the destruction of the meager crops on which they depended for survival.[53]

By August, starving bands of Indians began raiding the mining camps and roads of Central Arizona. Lt. Oscar Hutton's Company F, Arizona Volunteers, operating from Camp Mason southwest of Prescott, came upon a large party of Hualapais, Mojaves, and Apaches while patrolling the wagon road to the mining camps at La Paz on the Colorado. The warriors had intercepted and hailed a freight-wagon train, which they appeared ready to attack. Lt. Hutton questioned the Indian leaders, one of whom revealed that they intended to "clean out" the newcomers from the valley that had been robbed of its wood, water, and grass which rightfully belonged to the united tribes. The standoff grew tense as some of the warriors drew closer to the wagons, holding aloft the government identification papers, issued by Army officers and Indian agents, attesting to peaceful relations. But when the warriors and some of the Indian women rushed the freighters and

[53] Ibid., 36, 50, 57; Prescott *Weekly Miner*, June 13, 1866.

volunteers a melee ensued. When the smoke cleared, twenty-three Indians lay dead, including Hualapai Chief Hitachapitche. [54]

The intelligence-gathering and language skills of the Arizona Volunteers—combined with their familiarity with the land, tracking abilities, and ability to survive in the desert—made them especially effective when pitted against their traditional enemies. The Hispano and Indian soldiers repeatedly attacked with a vengeance-inspired determination not often seen in the Anglo volunteers and regulars. Arizona Territorial officials lauded the native soldiers who had inflicted more casualties on the Apaches than "all other troops in the territory." The Hispano and Indian Arizona Volunteers demonstrated that Apache bands could be tracked and attacked successfully by lightly-equipped troops that approached stealthily by night marches. These precedents were held up as models worthy of emulation for other troops.[55] From their Indian allies the Anglo soldiers also learned how to better protect slow-moving freight wagons with military escorts and skirmish with warriors without being sucked into ambushes. By the end of 1866, the Colorado River tribes no longer posed a significant threat to Anglo and Hispano river men, miners, and settlers. The Western Apache and Yavapai tribes remained more cautious around and less likely to raid the Pima Villages, forts, and ever-growing Central Arizona town sites, which now harbored more than 4,500 citizens where in 1860 there had been only a few hundred.[56]

By 1867, it had become apparent to all that the Anglos held the upper hand in the struggle for the Southwestern territories. Strategic alliances and superior weapons kept

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[54] Underhill, Ibid, 38.
[55] Underhill, Ibid, 58; Prescott *Weekly Miner*, April 25, May 9, 1866
[56] *Arizona Territory Special U.S. Census*, 1864.

the raiding tribes on the defensive. But as the violence escalated during the 1860s, it was not the superiority of the Anglo troops and their Hispano and Indian allies or even the military technology and battle tactics that really made the difference. Logistics became the key to power. Carleton convinced the War Department that the side that controlled the food supply would ultimately win the conflict. The Anglos and their allies were able to produce or import, store, and transport large quantities of subsistence stores all year round, while the Navajos' fields and livestock were destroyed and the Apaches' access to trading and raiding opportunities was cut off due to the increase in military pressure from all directions, especially during the lean winter months. In the winter, when the raiding tribes' horses were low in flesh and stored supplies had been consumed, the Anglos' wagons moved needed supplies from New Mexican granaries, Pima and Papago caches, army stockpiles at forts, and even from the eastern states, Mexico, and California.

Once the winter campaigns broke the fighting spirit of the besieged Navajo clans and starving Apache bands, surrender soon followed. Their crops and herds destroyed, hungry Navajos and Mescaleros were herded by the thousands to Bosque Redondo to feed on army beef and flour rations. Indian agents also fed Western Apache bands that sought peace while some of the Chiricahua bands in southern Arizona preferred to cross the border into Mexico to seek food and supplies from the people of Chihuahua and Sonora. In time, however, even the most resistant of the Apache bands became dependent on government rations, blankets, manufactured goods, and shelter. Dr. David Wooster editorialized in the San Francisco *Daily Alta California* that, "the Apaches, and, indeed, all the wild Indians of Arizona and New Mexico, must either be fed or exterminated, and

the sooner one policy or the other is adopted, and energetically carried out, the better it will be for both races."[57]

In 1866, entrepreneurial Texans saw the potential for making huge profits driving herds of longhorns and other beef cattle to New Mexican military posts and Indian reservations. At Bosque Redondo the government paid $40 a head for steers that would feed nearly eight thousand interned Mescaleros and Navajos, as well as their Army guards. Principal among these cattlemen were Charles Goodnight and Oliver Loving, who blazed a trail from Fort Belknap Texas along the old Butterfield route across central Texas then over the Staked Plains to Horsehead Crossing on the Pecos and on to Fort Sumner. The Comanches quickly saw the potential for raiding the herds on this cattle corridor. The warriors could trade captured cattle, and the remudas of horses that inevitably accompanied them, to Comancheros who would then sell them to the government.

One hundred and fifty Comanche and Kiowa warriors under Heap of Bears and Kicking Bird attacked four of cattleman Andy Adam's eight herds bound for Fort Sumner. Adams had contracted with the Army to supply five thousand beef cattle for the interned Mescaleros and Navajos at Bosque Redondo and broken his herds into groups of four hundred to one thousand each. The Comanches and Kiowas reasoned that since they were starving and the government intended the animals for the use of Indians, they would simply appropriate them at the Pecos River crossing. The warriors waited until the "grass

[57] D. Wooster, "Indian Affairs in California, Arizona and New Mexico," Alta, May 6, 1866. Dr. David Wooster advocated either feeding or exterminating the Indians in order to develop the territories. The doctor accompanied the California Column to Arizona in 1862 and later became one of California's most prominent physicians. This position predominated among educated Americans. Even Kit Carson and William Bent who believed the "Indian troubles" to be the fault of whites encroaching on Indian lands and rights believed that protective reservations and feeding at government expense were the only alternatives to extermination. See also Senator Doolittle's report *The Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 3-8 and passim.

began to rise" and their ponies were strong enough, then they launched their raids between April 23 and May 28, 1867, netting 2,449 cattle, as well as horses, mules, and oxen. The attacks came in overwhelming force in broad daylight, the "Texican" herders fighting for their lives. The Indians burned the supply wagons and provisions they could not carry off.

The raiders butchered most of the animals for their own use over the next year or traded them to Comancheros or Mexicans for ammunition and other needed supplies. Jesse Leavenworth, the Comanche and Kiowa agent, reported that "a general guerilla warfare" had broken out and that much of his time was focused on securing the return of white captives held by the rebellious tribes and "to induce them to recognize their dependence upon the Government." The Comanche chiefs allowed that they had committed the depredations but had been forced to do it because of their starving condition resulting from raids on their herds by Navajos and Cheyennes who, pressured by the Army, now invaded their territory from the west and north.[58]

About sixty miles above Horsehead crossing on the night of July 15, 1867, sixty warriors stampeded the combined herds of Goodnight, Loving, and William J. Wilson. Nearly three thousand terrified animals thundered into the darkness, and at daybreak the cattlemen saw that they had lost more than a quarter of their animals. The Comanches had cut out the biggest and strongest steers running at the head of the stampede, leaving

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[58] Horsehead Crossing, some 75 miles from the New Mexico border and 250 miles from Fort Sumner, became a favorite place for attacking the Texas cattle herds. Some of the tribes and bands, then under treaty, admitting responsibility for these attacks were: Comanche—Qua-ha-das (Kwahadas), Co-che-ta-kyas, Penne-tag-ka (Peatekas), Noconee (Nokonis) and Kiowa—Lone Wolf, Satanta, Timber Mountain. When the chiefs were deposed and Horse Back (Ter-yer-quoiss) of the Noconee appeared to be assigning blame to the Qua-ha-da band of Comanches, Kiowa chief Lone Wolf interjected, "why not tell the whole story, as it was, as we were all in it." The total amount of the compensation paid from Comanche and Kiowa annuities was $107,560. Andy M. Adams, Case 7803 RG 123 and Claim 237 RG 75, NARA. See also: Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, 314.

the cows, yearlings and weaker animals behind. Goodnight sent Wilson, Loving, and four drovers in pursuit of the raiders. "One-armed Bill" Wilson had lost his right arm years earlier but could still outride and outshoot most of the other men; Goodnight thought him the "clearest headed" man in the outfit, but the searchers turned back two days later after a circuitous ninety-mile chase. They had found the cattle all right, watering on the Pecos just south of where the original attack occurred, but they also found one hundred Comanches, loading their guns, stringing their bows, and ready to fight. The other cowboys galloped back to camp to tell Goodnight while Loving and Wilson hurried on to Fort Sumner, nearly 150 miles, to alert the soldiers. The Comanche raiders, however, thought it best to intercept the two riders or risk military retaliation and the loss of their hard-won herd. On the third day out, Loving and Wilson made camp on a bank of the Pecos but soon found themselves surrounded and under attack. Arrows and bullets ripped through the tall *tules* and *carrizo* in which the men took shelter. A lead ball shattered Loving's wrist and lodged in his side while Wilson kept the warriors, creeping toward them through the dense cane, at bay with his five-shot Colt revolving rifle and the men's two pistols, which he dexterously managed with his one hand. When it got dark, he stripped down to his underwear, slipped into the water, and escaped downriver past the Comanche guards. After a four-day, eighty-mile trek, which included a wolf attack, he stumbled barefooted into Goodnight's camp. Riders set out in search of Loving only to discover that he had been found by New Mexican traders who conveyed him by wagon to Fort Sumner, where he died not long after the inexpert amputation of his arm.[59]

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[59]Wilson detailed the Comanche attacks in his depredation claim. He noted that the warriors drove the stampeded cattle due east for 25 miles, then south for 25 miles, then—once they thought they were no longer being followed—turned the cattle westward toward the New Mexico settlements. Wm. J. Wilson

Such encounters did not deter the stockmen from Texas, many of whom had fought Comanches before and some of whom had been north with Sibley in 1862. The lure of great profit spurred the Texan cattle drives to New Mexico for as long as there were lucrative government beef contracts needed to feed hungry Indian captives and the garrisons of soldiers assigned to guard them. The Army had rounded up the Mescalero Apaches and Navajos and focused its attention on protecting Colorado's overland routes and the Santa Fe Trail against attack from the warriors of the Southern Plains. In the late 1860s, the Goodnight-Loving Trail and other cattle trails from the southeast, however, remained vulnerable. The large herds funneling through Fort Sumner provided the most profitable targets for the Comanches, whose once endless domain seemed to shrink each year as more white immigrants and displaced tribes began to crowd the grasslands and the great buffalo herds rapidly diminished.

More than any other man, James H. Carleton shaped and determined the course of the civil wars in the Southwest borderlands. He had known from the beginning that the outcome of the struggle in the territories would be determined more by the commissary than combat. By controlling the food supply he could starve enemies into submission and win the hearts and minds of allies. The Navajos saw the near total destruction of their orchards and annual crops as well as the slaughter or confiscation of domesticated animals upon which they depended for survival. Similarly, the Western Apaches suffered from the loss of seasonal crops and the shutting down of traditional raiding routes through military interdiction. The warring Mexican governments, liberal and

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Depredation Claim No.784 (24559), NARA, RG 75; J. Marvin Hunter, *Trail Drivers of Texas: Interesting Tales of Early Cowboys …* (Nashville: Cokebury, 1924), 904; James Cox, *Historical and Biographical Record of the Cattle Industry and the Cattlemen of Texas and Adjacent Territory* (St. Louis: Woodward and Tiernan, 1895) ,306, 477.

conservative, both understood the Americans' need for food supplies and made efforts to prevent access unless political exigencies made such concessions necessary or expedient. Carleton never gained what he considered satisfactory control over Mexican supplies of fresh food, but he was able to bring some subsistence stores of preserved food by way of the Gulf of California, either overland through Guaymas and Sonora or up the Colorado to Fort Yuma. In the end, Pima and Maricopa farmers in Arizona and Pueblo people in New Mexico were the key to maintaining troops in the territories. Carleton bartered manufactured goods for wheat and fresh produce while at the same time offering the most valuable assistance, protection from the raiding tribes.[60]

Anglo-American Power shift in New Mexico and Arizona

By 1867, the raiding tribes no longer dominated the political and military landscape in New Mexico, Arizona, and northern Mexico, and the Hispano population of the borderlands fit uneasily into the new order prescribed by the Anglos. Though civil governments existed in the territories north of the border, Carleton firmly held the reins of power as military governor and the supreme authority in both army and civilian affairs. The stern Maine Yankee had done more than defeat those deemed hostile to the federal government, he had reimagined the borderlands and begun a transformation of the communities in the Southwest.

Though the Hispanos of New Mexico appeared initially to accept Carleton's brand of government and authority, they were worlds apart in temperament and ideology.

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[60]Typical of the missions assigned the volunteer troops, Capt. Ffrench was ordered to destroy a 10-acre crop of Apache wheat spotted by scouts in Aravaipa Canyon north of Tucson. The 15 soldiers dispatched on the raid were instructed to feed the wheat to their stock and destroy the rest to prevent the Indians from harvesting it. N.H. Davis to T. A. Coult, Commanding Tucson, June 5, 1864, *OR*, 50(2):860-61; F. Stanley, *The Civil War in New Mexico*, (Denver: World Press, 1960), 367-85.

Adult Hispanos residing in Arizona and New Mexico had been born Mexican citizens; individuals in their 40s came into the world when the Spanish still ruled the borderlands. The unrestricted war against the Mescalero Apaches and Navajos and the internment of these tribes on the vast Bosque Redondo reservation on the Pecos had broken the symbiotic cycle of raid, reprisal, and trade that for generations had fueled the economy and ethnic animosities along the Rio Grande in northern and central New Mexico. Chaplains brought Christianity and teachers taught the children English reading and writing in a concerted cultural assimilation effort focused on the interned tribes. Government contractors attempted to instruct adult Indians in Anglo farming techniques and permanent home building. Cultures collided as the Anglos came to understand that the Apacheans felt compelled to destroy or abandon the house in which someone had died or risk offending the ghost that inhabited the place. As the Civil War wound down, Carleton's reservation experiment came under even greater opposition in the form of political pressure from New Mexico Hispanos who hoped to put an end to the reservation system altogether and return to the antebellum status quo.

From the time he entered the territorial Southwest, Carleton maintained rigid military discipline wherever he went, but his heavy-handed authority made him many enemies. It was evident as early as the spring of 1862, when he closed most of Tucson's dram shops and gambling halls; those that remained open he vexed and worried with regulations and heavy taxation. Desperados charged with crimes committed as many as four years earlier stood trial before his military commission composed entirely of California Volunteer officers. The commission sent Palatine Robinson, accused of

murder and kidnapping, to Fort Yuma for confinement, along with other known criminals and secessionists.

In a controversial move, Carleton had ordered the seizure of Sylvester Mowry and his Patagonia Mine. Mowry, a former officer who despised Carleton and an avowed rebel sympathizer, filed a damage claim in December 1862 totaling $1,029,000 for the loss of the property associated with his southern Arizona silver mine, naming in the suit Carleton and other officers involved in his arrest. Writing letters and planting defamatory newspaper stories, the well-connected Mowry did manage to get Arizona's first territorial legislature to pass a concurrent resolution condemning Carleton's actions, but even after a congressional investigation the government never paid damages. Military authorities also seized and sold at public auction property abandoned by southern Arizona secessionists who fled with Sherod Hunter's ranger company in 1862.[61]

Most Anglo and Hispano citizens loyal to the Union considered Carleton's tough tactics justified. The presence of his troops encouraged the return of citizens to the territory and promoted the rapidly-expanding mining industry in the territories. In Tucson troops repaired William S. Grant's flour mill, which the departing regulars had disabled to deprive the rebels of its use. Law-abiding Anglo citizens and those who had escaped Carleton's justice generally believed that the law-and-order campaign served the interests

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[61] Mowry, a second lieutenant in the 3rd U.S. Artillery, and Carleton had locked horns in California before the war. In 1859, Mowry famously fought a duel with the editor of the *Weekly Arizonan* in Tubac. Constance Wynn Altshuler, "The Case of Sylvester Mowry, the Mowry Mine," *Arizona and the West* 15 (Summer 1973): 149-52, 149. Frank C. Lockwood, *Life in Old Tucson, 1854–1864* (Tucson: Tucson Civic Committee, 1943), 132–33; Aurora Hunt, *James Henry Carleton; Frontier Dragoon* (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clarke, 1958), 265–67; Ray Charles Colton, *The Civil War in the Western Territories: Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 110. Carleton took advantage of the opportunity to relieve his command of deadwood and made certain that the escort ordered to Fort Yuma with the Tucson prisoners was made up of hard cases and outcasts from the California Column. See George H. Pettis, *The California Column* (Santa Fe: Historical Society, 1908), 15.

of the territory. Fair elections continued only because of military supervision. Hispanos, too, benefitted from the new order. In August 1862, the Tucson depot commander announced that Francisco S. Leon had been confirmed as "Commissioner of Streets, Roads, and Bridges" and Francisco Romero as "Mayordomo de Acequias," or head of Tucson's water department, under Carleton's authority as Arizona's military governor.[62]

Arizona residents had petitioned the U.S. government repeatedly for separation from New Mexico beginning in 1857. They believed that officials at Mesilla ignored the needs of the sparsely populated western portion of Doña Ana County. John R. Baylor recognized the need for separating Arizona from New Mexico Territory when his Texas command invaded in the winter of 1861, and Confederate president Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation in support of Baylor's plan in February 1862, the Confederate Arizona Territory Organic Act, which also confirmed Baylor as military governor.[63]

Carleton's proclamation on June 8, 1862, first established Arizona as a U.S. territory, and as military governor he became the first federally recognized executive of Arizona. With congressional as well as military authority backing his actions, Governor Carleton moved quickly to define the territorial boundaries and to establish mail, legal, and police services. He ordered maps made, property disputes settled, and a census taken. Accordingly, Major Fergusson commissioned Tucsonan William S. Oury to survey property in an attempt to settle land-ownership claims. This became no small task as irate citizens besieged the military government with requests for clear titles to disputed properties. In September 1862, Fergusson wrote Governor Pesqueira of Sonora

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[62] Gilbert J. Pedersen, "A Yankee in Arizona: The Misfortunes of William S. Grant, 1860–61," *Journal of Arizona History* 16 (Summer 1975): 127-144, 141; Proclamation, Aug. 2, 1862, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, NARA RG 393.
[63] "Executive Dept., Ariz. Terr., Proclamation," June 11, 1862, *OR,* 9:692.

requesting his aid in settling Tucson land claims based on old Spanish and Mexican grants. The frustrated major even asked that Pesqueira forward to him the Mexican government documents taken when Mexican troops abandoned Tucson in 1856, two years after the United States ratified the Gadsden Purchase.[64]

Following the arrival of the newly appointed Arizona territorial officials in December 1863, military authorities gradually turned over the reins of government to these civilians. Although the military government was no longer needed, Governor Goodwin did rely on the volunteer cavalry for protection and assistance in making his inspection tour of the territory, establishing a capital, and defining three temporary judicial districts. On July 18, 1864, voters in Arizona held a general election and selected Charles D. Poston as their delegate to Congress. Citizens also elected the twenty-seven members of the legislative assembly. Several of these legislators were California Volunteer officers who took leaves of absence to serve the new territory.[65]

During and immediately following the Civil War, Anglo-Americans began to dominate territorial politics, and a number of California soldiers became civil officials in the territories. Captain Converse C. Rowell, Fourth Infantry; Colonel Charles W. Lewis, Seventh Infantry; Lieutenant Edward D. Tuttle, Fourth Infantry; and Sergeant Alonzo E.

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[64] James H. Carleton, Proclamation, June 8, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):96–7; Hunt, *James Henry Carleton,* 220–21; Fergusson to Ignacio Pesqueira, Sept. 15, 1862, Sonora, in "Fergusson," Hayden Arizona Pioneer Biography Files, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson. Fergusson commissioned John B. Mills to make an accurate map of Tucson. C.L. Sonnichsen, *Tucson: The Life and Times of an American City* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), 66.

[65] Capt. John H. Butcher, 11th Mo. Cavalry, escorted Gov. Goodwin's party from Los Pinos N.M. to Arizona. Carleton cautioned the troops new to the Territory that once crossing the Rio Grande into Chiricahua country the men must be more than usually vigilant, keeping advance men and flankers out to foil ambushes—especially near water holes—the men sleeping in their clothes with their weapons at their sides, and the trooper to dismounting and walking most of the time to spare the horses and ensure that they are rested and "ready for fighting." "If…you lose a hoof of stock," he warned, "you and your men will be forever disgraced." Carleton to Butcher, Nov. 23, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 145; Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530–1888* (1889; reprint, Albuquerque: Horn and Wallace, 1962), 522, 539.

Davis, Fourth Infantry, all served in the Arizona legislature. Rowell also served as U.S. district attorney for Arizona and later became district attorney for Yuma County. Davis's commanding officer had allowed him to "read law" in a darkened commissary building at Fort Mojave after taps. The ambitious sergeant later received an appointment as Mohave County attorney after serving several terms in the territorial legislature. Discharged from the Second California Infantry at Fort Yuma in 1864, Private George E. Young received appointment as public administrator and examiner of schools for Mohave County. In short California Volunteers provided the young territory with a corps of literate, formally-educated, and energetic men to draw on for political leadership during and soon after the war. In Arizona, Anglo legislators now outnumbered Hispanos nearly ten to one. In 1861, New Mexico's (including Arizona's) Hispano legislators had outnumbered the Anglos-Americans more than ten to one. Now dominated by Anglos, the new Arizona legislature reflected and represented the rapidly-growing population of newcomers to the territories.[66]

As the Civil War dragged on, so too did the occupation duty as the thinly-spread garrisons of volunteers soldiers provided protection and essential services for the civil government and the growing population, explored and improved roads, and prepared the first accurate maps of Arizona's interior. The Anglo soldiers also took advantage of their situation to mine, explore, and fraternize with the locals. The soldiers also provided the

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[66] Davis, "Pioneer Days in Arizona," 53, 93; *Alta*, June 12, July 19, and Sept. 10, 1864; "Alonzo E. Davis," Hayden Arizona Pioneer Biography Files; Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico,* 539, 634-36; New Mexico legislatures included more Anglos but Hispanos predominated—all of the governors, attorneys, clerks, and other appointees were Anglos, ibid., 704-07; see also: Andrew Masich, *The Civil War in Arizona: the Story of the California Volunteers, 1861-1865* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 265, 269, 272.

only reliable source of law and order in the territory, though occasionally they engaged in criminal activity themselves.[67]

When not engaged in active campaigns against the Apaches and Navajos, the volunteer soldiers escorted politicians, surveyors, and journalists, as well as miners and other travelers. In the fall of 1863, a contingent of Californians accompanied Arizona territorial governor John Goodwin's party from the East, by way of New Mexico, to the new territorial capital of Prescott. Volunteers also escorted those Federal officials who traveled the long way from Washington by sea and entered Arizona from California. During the war years the Army provided food, supplies, and protection for starving refugees from the Pinos Altos and Santa Rita mines on the Arizona-New Mexico border and other victims of attacks by raiding warriors.[68]

California troops also guarded the Colorado River steamers, the key to provisioning the Arizona Territory. Army officers considered the supply shipments from the Gulf of California to Fort Yuma and Fort Mojave especially vulnerable to attack or sabotage. Early in the war Carleton had ordered the commander at Fort Yuma to keep all boats secured on the California side of the river. Every vessel had a guard with instructions to be especially vigilant on downriver runs to the gulf. If the steamboat pilots were found to be in league with secessionists or even suspected of betrayal, the soldiers

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[67] Illegal trade in army goods plagued all the posts situated near population centers in Arizona. Corrupt soldiers in the Quartermaster Department sold civilians everything from government mules, wrongfully branded "C" for condemned, to army clothing. Inspector General Davis informed Carleton that "grave and discreditable accusations…of fraudulent and unauthorized transactions [had surfaced at Fort Yuma and elsewhere] with regard to supplies purchases of horses, etc." Davis to Carleton, Apr. 4, 1864, *OR,* 34(3):207; SO 14, June 13, 1862, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; Daniel E. Conner, *Joseph Reddeford Walker and the Arizona Adventure*, eds. Donald Berthrong and Odessa Davenport (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 307–8.

[68] GO 27, Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico, Oct. 23, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):653–64; Browne, *Adventures,* 139.

had orders to shoot them and disable or burn their boats. An attack on Fort Yuma by river would mean disaster for the entire District of Arizona, and possibly California as well.[69]

Some entrepreneurs accused Carleton of restricting business in Arizona Territory, when in fact he was one of the Territory's most ardent boosters. His troops enabled the resumption of commerce and the establishment of new enterprises. The general believed that only a firm hand would preserve military security, public health, and safety. Concern for private-property rights and individual liberties did not deter him. When Confederate attack seemed imminent in 1862, he had ordered his soldiers to destroy five Colorado River ferryboats, including one in Mexico thirty miles below Yuma, and to move three others to the crossing near the fort. The Mexican ferry owner who lost his boat, a man named Gonzales, never received compensation from the U.S. government.

Anglo and Hispano officials and citizens of Arizona and New Mexico agreed that the extermination or subjugation of the Apaches constituted the most important contribution the federal government could make to economic development. They firmly believed that the raiding tribes prevented the full exploitation of Arizona's mineral wealth by limiting the movement of miners, supplies, and ore. It mattered little that the Apacheans had occupied the borderlands for more than a hundred years prior to settlement by U.S. citizens. Carleton turned his full attention to the Chiricahuas, Western Apaches, Mescaleros, and Navajos once he felt confident the Confederate threat had abated. His New Mexico and California troops responded to pleas for help from Indian

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[69] SO 9, Jan. 17, 1864; and SO 16, Feb. 16, 1864, HQ, Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, Special, General and Post Orders, RG 393, NARA; Davis to Carleton, Apr. 5, 1864, *OR,* 24(3):209–10. Drum to Commanding Officer, Fort Yuma, Apr. 11, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):390; Carleton to West, Nov. 5, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):704–5; Carleton to Rigg, Feb. 5, 1862, ibid., 847–48.

stock raiders, and miners petitioned to have soldiers stationed at their mines and escort freight wagons hauling supplies and machinery. In 1864, Arizonans pressured the governor to request permanent garrisons for mines in the booming Lynx Creek and Randall districts of Yavapai County.[70]

In February 1864 a detachment of volunteers commanded by Major E. B. Willis had established Fort Whipple, a new fort in the center of Arizona Territory. Some seventy-five miners, as well as the territorial governor, accompanied this scouting party. Willis reported, "we propose to afford them all facilities possible in prospecting the country over which we pass, and at the same time, if possible, to strike a blow at the Indians." When the major selected a site for Fort Whipple on Granite Creek, the governor and the miners established Prescott, the new capital, one and a half miles farther upstream.[71]

On at least two occasions in 1863, California officers ordered their men to prospect in the Arizona gold fields. In April Major Fergusson instructed Captain James Whitlock, commanding Fort Bowie, to explore and prospect: "take advantage of your own experience, and that of so many members of your company as possess it, to prospect the vicinity of Fort Bowie for minerals. I am under the impression that very rich deposits of gold and silver can be found in the Chiricahua Mountains in the vicinity of Fort Bowie. . . . When you can spare the men let them have leave to go hunting and prospecting in sufficient numbers to make it safe. . . . It is our duty to do all we can to develop the rich mineral resources of this country." In June Carleton ordered Captain

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[70] Davis to Carleton, Mar. 2, 1864, *OR,* 34(2):595; Lonnie Underhill, "A History of the Regiment of Arizona Volunteers." Master's thesis, University of Arizona, 1979, 7–8.
[71] E. B. Willis to Cutler, Feb. 11, 1864, *OR,* 34(1):121–22.

Nathaniel Pishon's company of the First California Cavalry to the new diggings near Lynx Creek in central Arizona. He instructed Pishon to have his men "prospect and wash," record the time each soldier worked, and carefully note the amount of gold obtained. Carleton stressed that citizens relied upon such statistics, which would also determine whether the army would establish a post in that area. Carleton's tests proved that the diggings were indeed rich, and he ordered Fort Whipple built in the "heart of the gold region."[72]

The general believed the discovery of new mineral wealth of strategic importance, not only for the development of the territory but also to aid the greater war effort. He thought it "providential that the practical miners of California should have come here to assist" in the discovery and development of Arizona's riches and pleaded with superiors in Washington to sanction his prospecting plan: "I beg to ask authority to let, say, one-fourth of the command at a time have one month's furlough to work in the gold mines and the country will become developed, while the troops will become contented to remain in service where the temptation to leave is very great."[73]

Apparently the War Department saw wisdom in Carleton's request, and the men prospected whenever they had the chance. Many soldiers whose enlistments expired in 1864 began successful placer operations in southern Arizona. California Volunteers in central Arizona filed 828 claims between 1864 and 1866. These men led the way for others who came with capital and equipment to work the rich gold and silver deposits.

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[72] Carleton to Nathaniel Pishon, June 22, 1863, in Orton, *California Men,* 72; Hdqrs. Dept. of New Mexico, GO 27, Oct. 23, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):654; Fergusson to James Whitlock, Apr. 23, 1863, ibid., 413. See also Carleton's correspondence in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes* (1867), 98,110,115-16, 121, 135.
[73] Senate Rep. 156, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., 1866, 110, 114–15, 135–37, 140; Thomas E. Farish, *History of Arizona* (San Francisco: Filmer Bothers Electrotype, 1915-18) 3:153.

The entire Seventh California Infantry, raised in January 1865, became known as the "gold diggers" regiment of Arizona. Many had journeyed to California during the rush of 1849 and never lost hope that one day they might strike it rich in the Far West.[74]Mangas Coloradas's prophesy had come true—the men in search of the "yellow iron" were the same men who seemed determined to exterminate the Apache people.[75]

On May 19, 1863, two companies of the Fourth California Infantry had crossed the Colorado River 200 miles above Yuma and reestablished Fort Mojave. Captain Lewis Armistead's company of the Sixth U.S. Infantry abandoned the post two years earlier when the Civil War forced the withdrawal of the regulars, but miners drawn by the rich Colorado River gold deposits coexisted uneasily with the Mojave Indians, prompting the Department of the Pacific to reoccupy the place.[76] The Mojaves remained peaceful, and the volunteers played a significant role in the economic development of the upper Colorado region. Glowing accounts of the richness of the area sent home by the soldiers encouraged many more Californians to prospect along the Colorado and its tributaries. The men of the Fourth California Infantry alone established several mining districts. In fact they dominated the mining in the Cerbat Mountains near Fort Mojave to the extent that the citizen prospectors complained of a soldier monopoly.

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[74] Charles Dunning and Edward H. Peplow, *Rock to Riches* (Phoenix: Southwest, 1959), 73; Yavapai County *Book of Claims* No. 1, 1864–66, Yavapai County Courthouse, Prescott.

[75] Carleton strongly advocated the use of California soldiers to exploit mining opportunities in the territories. See his correspondence related to the importance of developing the mineral wealth of the borderlands (including Sonora, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa) with political leaders, Army superiors, and subordinates in Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes* (1867), 98,110,115-16, 121, and 135.

[76] Armistead had established Fort Mojave in April 1859 and successfully combatted the Mojaves, forcing them to negotiate a treaty in August that ended organized hostilities with the U.S. Government. Armistead was killed in Picket's Charge at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863, just two weeks after Fort Mojave was reestablished. Constance Wynn Altshuler, *Cavalry Yellow and Infantry Blue: Army Officers in Arizona between 1851 and 1886* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1991), 11.

Alonzo E. Davis, then a corporal in Company I, Fourth California Infantry, understated the amount of soldier prospecting around Fort Mojave when he wrote, "a few of us boys went out on prospecting trips into the mountains. We would get a pass and, taking ten days rations of hardtack, pork and beans, we would explore the region for mining wealth." The volunteers controlled several of the mining districts, modeling their organizations on districts in northern California. In 1864 they filed 22 percent of the claims in the Sacramento and San Francisco mining districts of Mohave County.

Many of the Fourth California Infantry soldiers stationed at Fort Mojave did not want to return to Drum Barracks, near Los Angeles, for their discharges because they hoped to remain with their profitable claims. Some had purchased lots in Mohave City, situated on a bluff overlooking the river about a mile north of the fort. Soon after mustering out they returned with mining equipment and building supplies and began constructing houses. Even the soldiers on active duty somehow found time for prospecting and mining, recording their discoveries and working their claims. They established the Iretaba District near Fort Mojave and competed with civilian miners, who continually criticized the soldiers in the press for holding all the best claims. Most of these soldier-miners returned to Arizona and developed their claims. While few got rich, these veterans established new businesses and communities and led in the economic development of the territory.[77]

Heedless of the disruptive impact their presence had on the habitat and the hunting traditions of the indigenous peoples, many of the California soldiers engaged in other-than-military activities including hunting, fishing, and sightseeing. Commanders

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[77] Davis, "Pioneer Days in Arizona," 53; *Alta,* Jan. 26, Mar. 26, 1864, Jan. 15, Apr. 3, 1865; Mohave County Book of Claims, 1864–66, Office of the Mohave County Historian, Kingman.

occasionally sanctioned hunting parties for the subsistence of the troops; foragers ventured out in small detachments to hunt the bear and antelope that abounded in the rugged mountains and grassy river valleys. The men also hunted and fished individually for recreation and to vary their dismal diet of salted or dried meat and hard bread. The Anglo soldiers viewed the mountains and desert valleys with the naïve delight of tourists. Lone hunters and unwary fishermen frequently fell victim to Apaches whose lands they had invaded. The soldiers seemed not to comprehend that the game they took to give their diet variety might result in hunger for an Indian family. The taking of food without permission was akin to Indian raiders helping themselves to the stock in Anglo corrals. An Apache man remembered, "The deer had been killed by the soldiers and we killed some of their cattle to stay our hunger. What man can bear to hear his child crying for food and do nothing? And why was it any worse for us to kill the White Eyes' cattle than for them to kill our deer?"[78]

The soldiers wondered not only at the diversity and abundance of the game but also the incredible strength and tenacity of the Arizona fauna. Wherever they went the soldiers wrote of the sights they saw. They marveled at Arizona's giant saguaro cactus and other desert flora. Ancient Indian ruins, such as the abandoned city of Casa Grande north of Tucson with its massive multi-storied mud structures, captured the imagination of many of the scholars in the ranks. Some of the volunteer officers demonstrated a talent for ethnography and included observations of native customs and lore in their reports and letters. Lieutenant E. D. Tuttle wrote a detailed description of the bark skirts worn by the women of the Colorado River tribes. Captain John C. Cremony actually compiled a

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[78] Eve Ball, *Indeh; An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 202.

dictionary of Apache words, while other volunteers recorded Piman and Navajo dialects for the first time. Some of these educated men lamented the plight of "Lo, the Poor Indian," and recognized that the way of life for some of the Indian peoples of the borderlands was about to change.[79]

Most Anglo newcomers to the borderlands believed that the strange desert fauna and the Indian peoples were doomed, and some of the soldiers regretted their role in this seemingly inevitable extinction. A California officer traveling with Joseph R. Walker's mining and exploring party in 1863 asked superiors if he could send the cremated remains of an Indian, discovered in a cave, back to New York for analysis. The burial practices of the natives intrigued the men, who wrote home about them and published stories in their hometown newspapers. A number of soldiers noted in their journals that the Maricopas practiced cremation as did the Colorado River Yumans, while the Pimas buried their dead. The Anglos considered the Indian people they encountered part of the natural environment—worthy of admiration perhaps but somehow disconnected from the human race. Mangas Coloradas had been feared and respected as one might a fierce animal. Few Anglos thought anything amiss when, following his murder at Fort McLane, his de-fleshed skull was sent to phrenologists and curators in the East for study.[80]

The racism born of ethnocentrism and a providential belief in Manifest Destiny was not confined to the enlisted ranks or lower grades of the officer corps. The highest ranking officers in the Western army subscribed to the idea that Darwin's new theories of

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[79] Tuttle, "River Colorado," 59; One volunteer private swore on his honor as a gentleman that "he had shot a hare four times and carried away a leg every time, so that the body of the poor animal had nothing left on it but the ears and the tail; yet with even such limited means of locomotion it actually escaped by whirling over on its ears and tail, though he ran after it as fast as he could." Brown, *Adventures,* 280.
[80] Conner, *Joseph Reddeford Walker,* 47; John C. Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches* (New York: A. Roman, 1868), 102–3; *Alta,* June 29, July 9, 1862, July 4, 1864.

natural selection or divine will would eventually dictate that Indian peoples would become extinct and Anglos would inherit the earth. Even the apparently hard-hearted Carleton lamented, "the red man of America is passing away!" He summarized views held by many in authority—both in Congress and the Army—when he testified before the Doolittle Commission in 1865:

> As a general rule, the Indians alluded to are decreasing very rapidly in numbers, in my opinion. The causes for this have been many, and may be summed up as follows:
> 1st. Wars with our pioneers and our armed forces; change of climate and country among those who have been moved from east of the Mississippi to the far west.
> 2d. Intemperance, and the exposure consequent thereon.
> 3d. Venereal diseases, which they are unable, from the lack of medicines and skill, to eradicate from their systems, and which, among Indians who live nearest whites, is generally diffused either in scrofula or some other form of its taint.
> 4th. Small pox, measles, and cholera—diseases unknown to them in the early days of the country.
> 5th. The causes which the Almighty originates, when in their appointed time, He wills that one race of men—as in races of lower animals—shall disappear off the face of the earth and give place to another race, and so on, in the great cycle traced out by Himself, which may be seen, but has reasons too deep to be fathomed by us. The races of the mammoths and mastodons, and the great sloths, came and passed away. [81]

His deep religious convictions enabled him, without shame or regret, to dispassionately ascribe the extinction of American Indian people to the unfathomable design of a higher power. At the same time he thought it of paramount importance for a dictionary of Apache dialects to be made so that these tongues might not be lost to history.

Kit Carson held a much more pragmatic view of who was to blame for the destruction of the tribes of the borderlands. "As a general thing," he said, "the difficulties arise from aggressions on the part of whites." The Doolittle Commission supported Carson's thinking but acknowledged:

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[81] J. H. Carleton testimony, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 4-6; see also testimony by General George Wright and General Sprague.

> From whatever cause wars may be brought on, either between different Indian tribes or between Indians and whites, they are very destructive, not only of the lives of the warriors engaged in it, but of the women and children also, often becoming a war of extermination. Such is the rule of savage warfare, and it is difficult if not impossible to restrain white men, especially white men upon the frontiers, from adopting the same mode of warfare against the Indians.[82]

The Commission's findings also concluded that the loss of hunting grounds, the invasion of gold seekers, and the coming of the railroads would surely precipitate the decline of the tribes.[83] Carleton had presaged this event as early as 1863 when he wrote superiors in Washington that, "as sure as the sun shines, [mineral treasures] will bring the great railroad over the 35th parallel, and thus unite the two extremes of the country by bars of steel, until, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, we become homogeneous in interest as in blood."[84]

It appeared inevitable to Anglo elites that the indigenous peoples of the borderlands were doomed to extinction, along with other "natural wonders." Placing the endangered Indians on reservations for their own protection and collecting evidence of their cultures, artifacts, and even human remains in natural history museums housing exotic species from around the world seemed to be the best chance for preserving the memory of a dying race. Even the best-educated among the soldiers were too preoccupied with the natural wonders and resources to bother about the impact the Anglo newcomers were having on the peoples of the borderlands. Carleton himself took time from his busy schedule to inspect a meteorite used as an anvil by Tucson blacksmith Ramón Pacheco. The "aerolite," a 632-pound meteor fragment of iron and nickel, so impressed the general

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[82] Kit Carson testimony, ibid, 5; William Bent also condemned whites for their aggressions against the tribes.
[83] Ibid, 6.
[84] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, Sept. 13, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 136.

that he succeeded in wresting it from the reluctant smithy. The "Carleton Meteorite" received a great deal of attention from geologists and others in San Francisco; eventually it became part of the Smithsonian's collections. Sergeant Alonzo E. Davis, stationed at Fort Mojave, also reported seeing meteors flash across Arizona's night sky and hunting for the meteorites that fell to earth.[85] While it might be expected that the officers would keep detailed journals, the men also recorded temperatures and made scientific observations. Whether driven by curiosity, scholarly zeal, or boredom, the soldiers continued to send specimens to academicians and museums. Seeds, flora, and fauna received much attention. Even the exorbitant freight rates did not deter them from shipping their discoveries back home to California or to the East. One item particularly treasured by the Smithsonian was the skull of a two-headed rattlesnake found by a California soldier. [86]

The troops stationed in Arizona and New Mexico during the Civil War became ardent boosters, and their letters home were printed in newspapers that kept the territories on the front pages in California for four years. Soldier correspondents touted the rich mines and wrote descriptions of climate, natural wonders, people, politics, towns, and events. The first accounts of Arizona sent back to California stressed the harshness of the land. Stories of "Plutonian" heat, rugged terrain, and gagging alkali dust riveted eager readers. But the soldiers developed a new appreciation for Arizona after they settled into the routine of garrison life. California newspapers began featuring accounts of sparkling

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[85] Hunt, *James Henry Carleton,* 326; *Alta,* Apr. 3, 1865.
[86] The Carleton Meteorite may be seen on exhibit at the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History. Farish, *History of Arizona,* 3:153; William Addison Bushnell Diary, Oct. 11, 1865, typescript in author's possession.

rivers, picturesque mountains, antelope herds, and abundant fish. Correspondents soon dispelled rumors of 142-degree temperatures as "humbug."[87]

Some volunteer correspondents and columnists attempted to lure capitalists and immigrants to the territory in order to develop the mines. Thousands of letters reached California postage due; unlike civilians, soldiers did not have to pay postage in advance. Many proud relations of volunteers willingly turned over their private correspondence for publication in local newspapers, which touted the efforts of the California soldiers in checking the hostile Indians, considered a necessary first step in exploiting Arizona's vast mineral wealth. The soldiers also submitted articles to mining journals praising the richness of the mines and encouraging investment by capitalists. Although it is difficult to accurately gauge the influence of these correspondents, Arizona's population exploded between 1863 and 1866. The territory also experienced an unprecedented boom in mining claims located and recorded during this same period.[88]

At least five volunteer soldiers had previous newspaper experience, while others learned the trade during their enlistments. Alonzo E. Davis wrote under several pseudonyms during the war, including the thinly-disguised "SIVAD" and even less imaginative "California Volunteer." Davis also wrote a chapter in J. Ross Browne's highly regarded book *Mineral Resources of the Pacific Slope,* published in 1866. After mustering out of the service, Davis returned to Arizona and continued as an "occasional correspondent" for California's most popular daily, the *San Francisco Daily Alta*

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[87]For the best treatment of the post-Civil War impact of the California Volunteer soldiers in the territories, see: Darlis Miller, *The California Column in New Mexico*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), passim. See also: San Francisco *Daily Alta* and other California newspapers for letters written home by soldier-correspondents, many of which are compiled in Masich, *Civil War in Arizona*, 143-331.

[88] There were more claims filed in central Arizona between 1864 and 1866 than during the next two decades combined. Yavapai County Book of Claims No. 1.

California. Invariably his articles cast Arizona in a favorable light, pointing out investment opportunities for capitalists and promising prospects for miners. In 1864, as many soldiers' enlistments expired, he wrote that most of the men "intend to stick to the country, for they feel confident they have got their 'golden-egged goose' cooped, sure." At the same time, the California soldiers increased "outside" awareness of the territory, providing information-hungry Arizonans with news from the States by sharing their incoming letters and newspaper subscriptions.[89]

The presence of a large military force resulted in increased business and profits for entrepreneurs in the borderlands. Lucrative army contracts encouraged new businesses and alleviated the chronic currency shortage in the territories. Government contractors stood to gain the most, but all of the citizens of the rapidly growing territories reaped the benefits of access to commodities, currency, and improved transportation. A number of energetic men saw the profit potential in the contracts for delivering subsistence stores to the military garrisons; George F. Hooper, F. Hinton, Louis Jaeger, and José M. Redondo made small fortunes supplying cattle and other stores in Arizona. These men employed hundreds—teamsters, herders, butchers, farmers, smiths, mechanics, and laborers—to prepare food for men and animals and to haul massive quantities of supplies. The citizens of Arizona City, on the banks of the Colorado across

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[89] J. Ross Browne, *Mineral Resources of the Pacific Slope*, (New York: D. Appleton, 1869), 443–81; *Alta,* July 19, 1864. In May 1862 some of the printers among the Californian Volunteers attempted to publish their own newspaper in Tucson and cranked up the old Washington hand press that had once issued the *Arizonian.* After the war, California Volunteer officer Sidney R. DeLong purchased the press and started a new paper in Tucson. Soon after, DeLong became the city's first elected mayor. See *Arizona Daily Star,* Nov. 29, 1879; Sonnichsen, *Tucson,* 82, 91.

from Fort Yuma, enjoyed a boom period as their town became the jumping-off point for freight destined for the interior.

Steamboating on the Colorado River made possible the establishment of forts and sustained campaigns against the raiding tribes of the interior. The Spanish had dreamed of this kind of water-borne support three hundred years earlier, when Captain Alarcón attempted to supply Coronado's overland expedition. But only with the advent of steam power was it possible for boats to beat against the strong currents of the western rivers. The urgent necessity of supplying armies during the war years enabled steam navigation to flourish. Entrepreneurs supplied the military posts and mines for nearly three hundred miles above Fort Yuma. George Alonzo Johnson, who began his career as a Colorado River ferryman in the early 1850s, monopolized the river trade until 1864. Johnson secured so many contracts that supplies stockpiled in Arizona City sat for months before he could ship them upriver on his overburdened boats.

In 1861 George A. Johnson and Company operated two sternwheelers, the *Colorado* and the *Cocopah.* Big government contracts prompted Johnson to dismantle the *Colorado* under the protection of the guns of Fort Yuma in 1862 and cannibalize its parts to construct a larger boat. By 1864 miners and officers upriver clamored for supplies, so Johnson built a third boat, the *Mohave,* a twin-engine vessel capable of beating against the mighty Colorado River even in flood stage. Before the *Mohave* launched, however, Thomas E. Trueworthy of San Francisco successfully established the Union Line to break Johnson's monopoly. Trueworthy commissioned Captain George B. Gorman to pilot the company's only boat, the *Esmeralda,* which towed a barge for increased capacity.[90]

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[90] For the steamboat industry in Arizona and on the Colorado River, see: Richard E. Lingenfelter,

Yet another boat, the *Nina Tilden,* entered the Colorado River trade competition in September 1864. Alphonzo F. Tilden, managing director of the Philadelphia Silver and Copper Mining Company, soon found the going too tough, and in the summer of 1865 he sold out to yet another new company that also bought Trueworthy's *Esmeralda.* The fierce rivalry for river trade continued until the late 1860s, when Johnson and his newly organized Colorado Steam Navigation Company once again controlled river traffic. Reduced shipping rates and more frequent service made possible the development of many mining towns along the lower Colorado and as far as six hundred miles upriver from the mouth. The army, which was largely responsible for the boom, also benefited from the regular shipments and lower prices.

The cost of provisioning the territories was prohibitively high due to the vast distances the goods had to be transported. Still as more miners swelled the population of soldiers, citizens, and Indians the demand for food increased and prices continued to rise during the war years. Starving Indians often saw no other course but to take what they needed from unguarded supplies at settlements or, even more frequently, from freight wagons laden with coffee, sugar, flour, bacon and all manner of comestibles and useful merchandise. Apaches waylaid one such wagon bound for the Walnut Grove Mine in Peebles Valley, Arizona, in 1865. The surviving children of the freighter later testified that, "everything was brought there [Central Arizona] around by the Gulf of California, up the Colorado River, to La Paz, or Fort Mojave, and then packed across the Desert, on Spanish burros, 260 miles. It was very nearly worth its weight in gold when it got there."

Steamboats on the Colorado, 1852–1916 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978).

For the Anglo and Hispano entrepreneurs the profits outweighed the risks, so the boats kept steaming and the wagons kept rolling.[91]

Several of the Indian tribes in Arizona also benefited from military occupation. Yuma and Mojave Indians regularly gathered and stacked wood at designated points along the Colorado River for use by the steamboats carrying government supplies. In Tucson Major Fergusson issued a circular requiring citizens to reward Papago Indians who recovered stolen stock from the Apaches. The Papagos received four dollars per head for stock returned or one-third of the herd. The Pimas and Maricopas also profited directly by providing food crops and forage to the army.[92]

Since the arrival of the California Column in 1862 the Gila River tribes provided wheat and corn for military consumption. The army, however, rarely paid the natives in cash. Carleton planned from the start to supply his command with the surplus crops produced by these farming tribes. Before the volunteer troops even entered the territory, the army commissioned Ammi White to trade for wheat. Later volunteer quartermaster and commissary officers dealt directly with the Pimas and Maricopas. In April 1863 James H. Toole, acting assistant quartermaster, with the assistance of Pima subagent Abraham Lyon, distributed fifty-eight "old pattern dragoon coats and jackets, and 415 pompons" to the Indians. Major Fergusson had suggested that Toole use these obsolete items for barter, adding that "two fanegas [1.56 bushels] of wheat can be got for each coat and jacket." Carleton also requested that the army ship ten thousand yards of manta

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[91] Abiel Lord McCloud testimony in: William Abiel McCloud Case 8047 RG 123, NARA.
[92] Circular, July 27, 1862, Hdqrs. Dist. of Western Arizona, Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; Tuttle, "River Colorado," 57.

(cheap cotton cloth) and five thousand pounds of other "presents" to Arizona to trade for Pima and Maricopa grain and fodder.[93]

Anglo businessmen and soldiers showed even less trust in the army than the Indian and Hispano contractors did. Most citizens disliked government scrip, but specie was in short supply. In the gold-based economy of the borderlands, lenders and merchants discounted paper money as much as 60 percent during the war years. General Wright requested that the army pay California troops in hard currency, for greenbacks "can only be converted at a ruinous discount." The soldiers accused the army of favoritism, particularly when rumors circulated that the few regulars still remaining in California received payment in specie. Whenever possible, the paymaster counted out hard cash to the volunteers in in the territories.[94]

The government payroll benefited the territories by providing a steady supply of money into the region. In some of the placer mining settlements, gold bars, some as small as two dollars in value, served as currency. Volunteer officers repeatedly asked headquarters for hard money, insisting that beef contractors and Sonoran farmers would not accept paper money. They demanded U.S. gold dollars or Mexican silver *reales*. Lieutenant Colonel Davis wrote Carleton in 1864 that "coin is the currency which makes the mare go." To make matters worse for the soldiers, pay days were infrequent and unpredictable for the volunteers serving in Arizona and New Mexico. When the men did

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[93] Fergusson to George A. Burkett, Apr. 17, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):405–6; Cutler to West, Mar. 31, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):970; Carleton to Drum, Dec. 21, 1861, ibid., 773–80.
[94] John Phillip Young, *Journalism in California* (San Francisco: Chronicle Publishing, 1915), 61; Wright to Thomas, adjutant general, Feb. 4, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):303.

get their money, they often received six months or even a year in back pay, making them targets for unscrupulous merchants, crooks, and procurers.[95]

The Anglo soldiers serving far from home in the borderlands were starved for female companionship. Officers' wives and laundresses that accompanied the troops often found themselves at the center of controversy in the all-male military environment during the war years.[96] The soldiers also sought the attentions of local women. Competition for the affections of an attractive Hispana at a Tucson fandango resulted in a riot followed by arrests and a guardhouse full of bruised and battered soldiers. Prostitutes could be found wherever soldiers were stationed. At fort Sumner the First California cavalry troopers suffered an unusually high incidence of syphilis. Starving Navajo women sold themselves and young girls were offered to soldiers in exchange for food and supplies need by the families confined on the Bosque Redondo reservation. Unwanted pregnancies among the Navajos resulted in abortions and death.[97] Corporal Bushnell observed that a shooting at Fort Goodwin resulted from jealousy over a "mujere [woman]

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[95] Altshuler, "Case of Sylvester Mowry, the Mowry Mine," 160; Davis to Carleton, Mar. 2, 1864, *OR,* 34(2):595.

[96] Lt. William J. Perkins of the Seventh California Infantry had gotten disgracefully drunk while in charge of a wagon train en route to Fort Yuma during the final days of the war in April 1865. The lieutenant's wife had accompanied the train, and Perkins accused her of dallying with an enlisted man. The enraged officer threatened to "shoot any damned son of a bitch" who attempted to interfere and then aimed his cocked pistol at the head of Private Henry A. Howard of Company K while screaming at his wife, "if you want some beef, I'll shoot it for you." Mrs. Perkins and Private Howard both survived the assault, which took place in front of the entire command. Lieutenant Perkins was cashiered for drunkenness and conduct unbecoming an officer. Perkins clearly violated Article of War 45 ("Any commissioned officer who shall be found drunk on his guard, party, or other duty, shall be cashiered"), for he admitted at his court-martial to being "so drunk that he did not know his ass from a hole in the ground." William J. Perkins Court-Martial, GO 2, Jan. 5, 1866, Hdqrs. Dept. of California, C. E. Bennett Papers, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; Orton, *California Men,* 767; *Revised U.S. Army Regulations of 1861,* 494; *Alta,* Jan. 16, 1866.

[97] M. Hillary to Theodore Dodd, Sept. 6, 1866, U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1863, 1865, 1866, 1867* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1861-67), *1866*:150-1; Erastus Wood to Marcellus Crocker, Jan. 5, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 214; testimony of Navajo chiefs, ibid., 356; Gerald Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment, 1863-1868* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 81; Sides, Hampton. *Blood and Thunder: The Epic Story of Kit Carson and the American West* (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), 456.

who holds forth in the lower part of the garrison." At isolated posts, however, even women of ill-fame were a rarity.[98]

Still, lasting liaisons between Anglo soldiers and local women occurred with some frequency. The men met and married Hispanas and Indian girls, most of them still in their teens. One of the express riders at Fort Mojave wed the youngest daughter of *Bio-oo-hoot*, a Mojave chief, in a service performed by the enlisted men in the presence of Captain Atchisson. Other volunteer soldiers married Indian women shortly after their enlistments expired. J. D. Walker married and settled with the Pimas at Sacaton after his discharge from the Fifth California Infantry; he later commanded a company of Pima Arizona Volunteers. Thomas V. Keam, a veteran of the First California Cavalry, married Astan Lipai (Gray Woman) and lived with the Salt Clan of the Navajo. These "squawmen" suffered discrimination from fellow Anglos but were generally held in high regard as interpreters and Indian agents.[99]

Many California soldiers married youthful Hispanas at the Cathedral of San Agustín in Tucson between 1864 and 1867 and still more Anglo veterans married New Mexican girls during and soon after the Civil War. Ninety percent of the Anglo veterans,

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[98] Bushnell Diary, Feb. 19, 24, 1865; Hand Diary, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, 1862. Women rarely accompanied the California soldiers to Arizona, but occasionally exceptions were made for surgeons and officers. The army frowned on such arrangements, however, because the practice undermined morale and discipline. See: Perkins Court-Martial, ibid., and *Alta,* Jan. 16, 1866. Many California soldiers wrote home with titillating tales of licentious local women. Some disparaged the virtue of Hispanic and Indian women who fraternized with the volunteers, though in truth the camp followers that inevitably hovered around army posts—from California to Washington, DC—were not representative of the general population. Invidious racism pervaded the ranks, and while contact with people of the territories enlightened some soldiers, others continued to harbor deep-seated prejudices: "The whole race of natives of this country are no better [than "*peones* (slaves)"] neither do they look any more enlightened than the dirty Greasers of Cal. The women here are nearly all prostitutes, never work but all smoke, drink, and gamble. There is some exceptions but they are few and far between. The diggers [Diegueño Indians] of Cal. will compare better with the natives of Mexico than anything I know of." Cpl. Aaron Cory Hitchcock to Thomas and Naomi Hitchcock, July 20, 1864, Hitchcock Letters.

[99] Farish, *History of Arizona,* 4:117–18; Bailey, "Thomas Varker Keam," 15–19; *Alta,* July 15, 1864.

who legally married in the late 1860s, wed teenage Hispanas, an age deemed respectable and appropriate in the marriage customs of the Southwest borderlands. The enlisted men received permission to wed from their company commanders, who generally preferred that their men avoid local entanglements. The Army had a longstanding tradition of noncommissioned officers marrying company laundresses, but marriages between California soldiers and the daughters of the most prominent Hispano families in the territories had the potential for creating political complications. Yet in many garrison towns, the opportunities for fraternization increased the chances of meeting and marrying. Some of the soldiers eschewed convention, but it is difficult to determine the incidence of cohabitation or common-law marriages. In Yavapai County four volunteers married local women soon after discharge, and along the Colorado River Alonzo E. Davis married Emily W. Mathews, the daughter of a Hardyville businessman, whom he had met at the Fort Mojave New Year's Eve Ball in 1864–65. Other veterans wed in later years when they returned to settle in the territories.[100]

Supply deficiencies continued at the Tucson depot throughout the war years. In the spring of 1864, army officials attempted to reroute the garrison's supply line through the Sonora towns of Libertad and Guaymas, on the Gulf of California, bypassing Fort Yuma entirely. As early as September 1862, Carleton had instructed Fergusson to survey

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[100] Marriage Registry, 1864–67, San Augustín Cathedral, Tucson; Marriage Records, Yavapai County, 1865–75, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; Davis, "Pioneer Days in Arizona," 83, 114. Some of the Californians expressed revulsion at the thought of marrying outside their race. Soon after leaving Tucson for New Mexico, Cpl. Aaron Hitchcock wrote his parents, "Once and awhile we hear of a Soldier marrying a Spanish Girl. I tell you what it is I will die single before I will disgrace the whites so much as to marry one of those that live in this country." Hitchcock to Thomas and Naomi Hitchcock, July 20, 1864, Hitchcock Letters. Miller, *California Column*, 25, 196-99; in the colonial period, one in four New Mexican hispanas were married before age 15 and canon law allowed marriage as young as 11; Simmons, *Kit Carson*, 60; see also Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 249-53, 271, 295.

a wagon road to these important costal ports; the Guaymas route particularly offered advantages in freighting time and expense. The major reported that the route was "smooth or even all the way; and the largest stretch without water at any time is forty-five miles." But the French blockade of Mexican ports, mutual distrust between the United States and Mexico, and government red tape doomed the Sonora route to failure during the war years. Nevertheless, General Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific, was so pleased with Fergusson's report that he recommended him for the colonelcy of the First California Cavalry. And Fergusson's map of the Tucson–Lobos Bay route became a standard source for cartographers and travelers in southern Arizona.[101]

The increased military presence contributed greatly to the exploration and mapping of the borderlands. A detailed map of Tucson commissioned by Fergusson in 1862 depicted the layout of the "Old Pueblo" for the first time since the Spanish occupation nearly one hundred years earlier. Military surveyors also made a map of the District of Arizona, showing practical wagon roads. The most spectacular and useful chart of the Southwest ever produced to that time was drawn in 1864-5 by Captain Allen L. Anderson, on detached service from the Fifth U.S. Infantry. General Carleton ordered him to draft a map of Arizona and New Mexico that would identify transportation routes, facilitate mineral exploration, and serve field commanders in search of Indians "not in amity" with the government. With an escort of volunteer soldiers, Anderson explored Indian homelands considered "virgin territory" by the Anglo newcomers. He also relied upon the reports of officers who had made forays deep into uncharted country. The result, Carleton proudly proclaimed, was "much more correct than any other map of this country

[101]Henry P. Walker, "Freighting from Guaymas to Tucson, 1850-1880," *Western Historical Quarterly* 1 (July 1970): 291-304," 294; GO 20, Sept. 5, 1862, Hdqrs. Las Cruces, *OR,* 50(1):115.

hitherto published." Volunteer officers also provided the miners flooding into the Arizona gold fields with reports of wells, grazing conditions, and intelligence regarding Indian tribes.[102]

The Anglo presence during the Civil War physically transformed the borderlands. Captain Cremony accurately summarized "the gigantic labors performed by the Column from California, in making roads; digging and restoring wells in desert places; constructing bridges; establishing depots; [and] escorting trains" as they occupied the territories.[103] During the five years of their service in the territory, the volunteer troops blazed or improved hundreds of miles of trails and, more importantly, wagon roads. They gave early attention to the ferry landing at Fort Yuma, where for years wagon masters had to double-team their wagons to haul loads up the steep grade from the river to the Gila Trail. Under Major Rigg's direction the volunteer soldiers cut through the bank and re-graded the approach from the Colorado, facilitating travel for military and civilian trains alike. Along the Gila route itself, troops removed obstacles, graded roads, and dug wells.[104]

Projects undertaken in the later years of the war included work on the Mohave Trail across southern Nevada (then part of Arizona) to the Colorado River. Besides making this route passable for wagons destined for central and northern Arizona, the volunteers built fortified way stations to guard against Indian attacks. The California troops also explored a new wagon road from Las Vegas to Fort Mojave. In October 1863

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[102] Carl I. Wheat, *Mapping the Trans-Mississippi West, 1540–1861,* 5 vols. (San Francisco: Institute of Historical Cartography, 1963)*,* 5:127–28, 381; Carleton to Drum, Sept. 15, 1865, *OR,* 48(2):1230.

[103] Cremony's newspaper stories, articles, and books should be read with a critical eye for he was prone to self-promotion and exaggeration; in this case, however, his claims can be substantiated. Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches,* 145.

[104] Charles D. Poston, "Military Roads in Arizona," *American Railroad Journal* 38 (Jan. 14, 1865), 54.

a detachment under Captain Herbert M. Enos blazed a practicable wagon road between Fort Whipple (near Prescott) and the Colorado River. The Californians generally strengthened the lines of communication between the northern Arizona outposts, Las Cruces, and other points east.

Anglo military and civil officials worked to improve roads and facilitating movement through previously inaccessible regions, spelling doom for the Apache bands whose remote mountain homes had once been their final refuge. In addition to improving the route from Fort Whipple to the La Paz placers along the Colorado, Major Thomas J. Blakeney opened a road between Fort Goodwin and the Salt River near the Pinal Mountains in the summer of 1864. In July 1865 Brigadier General John S. Mason directed Lieutenant Colonel Bennett to lead a small mounted force on a reconnaissance from Fort Bowie to Fort Barrett via old Fort Breckenridge. Bennett reported on the feasibility of a new, shorter wagon road. He also led a combined force of Arizona Volunteers and Californians to clear a road between Maricopa Wells, at the Gila, north to Fort McDowell, a new post in Tonto Apache territory at the Verde River. As a result of these efforts, a network of easily traveled roads now linked the forts and population centers of Arizona Territory. Traveling the primitive trails through the upper Gila country—some accessible only by pack mule—was not easy, but soldiers and traders now penetrated previously inaccessible areas, and the Western Apaches' homeland was now vulnerable to usurpation and attack as never before.[105]

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[105] Report of Thomas J. Blakeney, Aug. 8, 1865, *OR,* 41(1):81–86; Clarence E. Bennett to Green, AAG, Hdqrs. District of Arizona, July 21, 1865, *OR,* 50(1):421–23; Lonnie Underhill, "A History of the Regiment of Arizona Volunteers," Master's thesis, University of Arizona, 1979, 38.

The Army provided other basic services required by civilians until the establishment or resumption of territorial governments. Besides blazing trails, developing roads, and making maps, army supply contracts for forts along the Colorado River and isolated interior posts bolstered the economies of the territories. The military occupation also kept criminals and Indian raiders in check, encouraging Anglo and Hispano settlement and resulting in a population boom during the war years. Both officers and enlisted men publicized the mineral wealth of the borderlands and drew national attention to the region's climate, geography, and cultures. The Californians in particular took an active role in the establishment of the new territory of Arizona, and many would return after their military service to settle there and to shape New Mexico's future as well.[106]

General Carleton felt strongly that the volunteers should be mustered out in Arizona and New Mexico, where they had served. Establishing a "military colony," he believed, would be an excellent way to populate the territories and provide a "good class of citizens" to develop the mines and establish the institutions required to civilize the borderlands. This social engineering experiment was entirely consistent with his belief in Anglo-Saxon dominance and manifest destiny. While populating the border territories with energetic and enlightened Anglos made perfect sense to him, he badly misjudged the desires and priorities of his men. Many veterans wanted to return home to California or the "States" when their enlistments expired. Believing that they ought to have choice in the matter, some felt misused and cheated, even though Carleton believed he was being magnanimous by offering soldiers discharged in the territories a travel allowance which could be used they chose to go home. The unhappy volunteers circulated petitions

[106] For the best treatment of the post-Civil War impact of the volunteer soldiers in the territories, see: Miller, *California Column*. See also, Masich, *Civil War in Arizona*.

seeking redress, and Carleton, who had once been universally admired and respected by the men, became the principal target of their displeasure. California Volunteer newspaper columnists and letter writers now openly criticized him.[107]

Introducing a military colony to the territories was one thing and permanently establishing it quite another. The volunteer regiments that served in Arizona from 1863 to 1866 suffered from poor morale, especially when contrasted with the high discipline and heady patriotism exhibited by Carleton's 1862 command. The men of the California Column had marched to war with a will after enlisting to fight Confederates and save the Union. General Wright marveled at their training and discipline, declaring that he had never seen a finer body of troops. The First California Infantry earned an enviable record. Five companies of this regiment had not one desertion during their four years of service. In contrast the Fifth California Infantry and the Native Battalion which followed the California Column had some companies that suffered desertions totaling 30–40 percent of their total strength.[108] The war had already ended in the East when most of these soldiers arrived for garrison and patrol duty. Malarial fevers and poor living conditions at Fort Mason on the Mexican border frequently left only one-third of the command fit for duty. Sympathy for the Mexican loyalists fighting against the French-backed Imperial forces probably precipitated some of the desertions, and many former volunteers, officers and enlisted men, offered their services to the Republic of Mexico upon discharge.[109]

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[107] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, Sept. 13, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 135-36; *Alta,* July 4 and Oct. 17, 1864; Cremony, *Life Among the Apaches,* 198.
[108] Hunt, *James Henry Carleton,* 202; Orton, *California Men,* 5.
[109] *Santa Fe New Mexican,* Apr. 7, 1865; *Alta,* Sept. 26, 1866; Orton, *California Men,* 76, 151. See also Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 182–83; Miller, *California Column,* 43; and *OR,* 50(2):788–89; Leadership at both the regimental and company level made a big difference in troop morale. The Seventh California Infantry served at various posts in Arizona at the same time the Native Battalion patrolled the border. The "hungry Seventh" experienced only a 5 percent desertion rate, and most occurred at the Presidio in San

It is true that the Anglo soldiers from California and Colorado exhibited a high degree of independent and decidedly unmilitary thinking from the time they enlisted until their final discharge. Notable cases of dereliction of duty, absence without leave, desertion, and even mutiny began as early as 1862. Most of the men came West with the massive voluntary migration following the gold rushes of the1850s. They took initiative and thought and acted as their own best interests dictated, a course that occasionally took them beyond the bounds of law and authority. Many had participated in the vigilance committee violence that characterized the ad hoc justice systems in early California and Colorado towns and mining camps.

Much of the volunteers' resistance to military authority stemmed from poor communication from inexperienced officers and the, at times, arbitrary nature of military justice. The hard-charging Captain Henry Greene was one of Carleton's favorites because he pursued Apaches without let-up. Some of Greene's men, however, despised him as a disciplinarian and risk-taker. They endeavored to undermine his authority and humiliate him whenever possible. The soldiers took real chances of suffering harsh corporal punishments or even death for violating military law during wartime. A court martial for a minor offense might result in punishment ranging from a night in the guardhouse, a month of hard duty, or carrying a heavy log around the parade ground for a day. The *Articles of War*, however, prescribed a sentence of death for falling asleep on guard duty during time of war. Private Amos Taylor's conviction for the latter offence was commuted by President Lincoln and the private was returned to duty and honorably served out his term of service. The inflexibility of the Anglo-American code of martial

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Francisco just prior to discharge. Once home many volunteers could not understand the delay in formal mustering out, especially when the war was over and their job done, Orton, *California Men,* 776–87.

honor and justice was difficult for the volunteer soldiers to accept and seemed incomprehensible to the Hispano and Indian allies that fell under its control.[110]

Officers remained vigilant and guarded against mutiny, the most dreaded threat to good order and discipline. When the Californians converged on Fort Yuma in March of 1862 in preparation for the invasion of Arizona, an entire company of the First California Infantry refused to drill with loaded knapsacks in the desert heat until the officers patiently explained the necessity of the rigorous exercises. On November 26, 1862, two months after Colonel Joseph R. West's command reached Mesilla on the Rio Grande, the colonel ordered Corporal Charles Smith summarily executed by firing squad after speaking for the men of Company K, who refused to answer roll call in protest over the incarceration of some of their comrades accused of intentionally allowing deserters to escape from the guardhouse. The men of Company D selected for the detail believed the rash sentence unfair and deliberately aimed high to spare Corporal Smith's life. Their sympathy only compounded the tragedy, however, when their errant shots killed and wounded innocent bystanders. A second volley killed Smith and, indirectly, his distraught bunkmate who committed suicide shortly after the execution.

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[110] Morale and discipline suffered most during extended periods of tedious garrison duty. Charges at courts-martial ranged from sitting down on guard to outright insubordination. The judges found most offenders guilty of minor infractions, such as refusing to police the camp or straying from the post boundaries. Many of the enlisted men believed themselves to be their officers' equals. Sergeant Hand commented that Captain H. A. "Humpy" Greene of Company G, First California Infantry was not an effective commander because he had not won the respect of the men. They mocked him and called him "Right Face" and "Shoulder Arms" behind his back, see: Hand Diary, Sept. 30, 1862, AHS. Results of Garrison Court-Martial, May 12, 1862, Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; Results of Garrison Court-Martial, June 19, 1862, ibid.; Orton, *California Men,* 363. A Tucson court-martial convicted one private of "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline." He received a sentence of thirty days at hard labor and forfeited ten dollars of his pay for addressing a second lieutenant "with words too obscene to repeat." Private Frederick Franklin of Company D, Fifth California Infantry allegedly remarked while on duty at the Tucson depot on January 21, 1864, that "he would be damned if he would turn out the Guard for Coult or French." The court sentenced the defiant soldier to carry a forty-pound log on his shoulder in front of the guardhouse for three days. GO 4, Jan. 21, 1864, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; E.D. Townsend, *Court Martial and Courts of Inquiry, 1817-93,* War Dept., GO No. 197, Washington, June 30, 1863, Vol. 6-382.

Officers were not immune to retribution by wronged enlisted men. Some Colorado soldiers threatened to kill their commander. Colonel John Slough reported that he had been deliberately fired upon by his own men during the New Mexico campaign, and eventually, fearing for his life, resigned and left his command. Captain William H. Rossell of the Tenth U.S. Infantry embarrassed his company with his cowardly behavior and capture at the Battle of Valverde. After his speedy parole, an around-the-clock guard watched over his tent to prevent his men from killing him, and a few days later he was seriously injured in a mysterious explosion near Hatch's Ranch, New Mexico. In San Elizario, Texas on December 29, 1863 a private in Company A, First California Cavalry used his pistol to shoot to death Samuel H. Allyne, who had risen through the ranks to be commissioned the company's first lieutenant only a month earlier.[111]

There are several explanations for the desertions and relatively low morale during the last two years of the war. The overall desertion rate for California troops reached 10 percent, slightly higher than the national average for volunteer soldiers but well below that of the regular army. Reduced rations, isolation, and the practice of mustering out

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[111] Orton, *California Men*, 89, 94, 124, 377, 871; Mesilla Valley Independent, Oct. 6, 1877; George Pettis, *Personal Narratives of Events in the War of the Rebellion, Frontier Service* (Providence: Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island, 1885), 34-7; William S. Kiser**,** *Turmoil on the Rio Grande: History of the Mesilla Valley, 1846-1865* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2011)*, 198;* Canby saw fit to recommend Rossell for promotion to major by brevet for "distinguished and meritorious service" at Valverde, but by 1863 he was retired from the service. *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*. Wilmington, Delaware: M. Glazier, Inc.(1887): 216, 518; William Clark Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War: The New Mexico Campaign in 1862* (Denver: State Historical and Natural History Society of Colorado, 1906), 101-02; J. P. Slough to Samuel Tappan, Feb. 6, 1863, letter, Colorado Historical Society; Flint Whitlock, *Distant Bugles, Distant Drums: The Union Response to the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006), 157, 222; Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis, *Bloody Trails Along the Rio Grande—A Day-by-Day Diary of Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis*, ed. Nolie Mumey (Denver: The Old West Publishing Company, 1958), 67. New Mexico Chief Justice John Slough was eventually gunned down in 1867 by William Rynerson, a former California Volunteer officer, in Santa Fe in an affair of honor. See: Gary L. Roberts, *Death Comes for the Chief Justice: The Slough-Rynerson Quarrel and Political Violence in New Mexico* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990), 155 and passim; see also: Darlis Miller, "William Logan Rynerson in New Mexico, 1862–1893," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 48(April, 1973).

soldiers in the territories may have caused men of the Fifth Infantry to desert in larger numbers. Company D, which garrisoned Tucson—well-known for its many opportunities for carousing and gambling—suffered an incredible 39 percent desertion rate. This hard-luck company, recruited primarily from Sacramento and Marysville, had three men die in post hospitals and a fourth shot to death by a noncommissioned officer of the provost guard. Ten other men received dishonorable discharges.[112]

Morale among the Californians in Arizona and New Mexico reached a low point in late 1865 and early 1866. As the war wound down in the East, so did the zeal of the volunteer troops in the West. Manning forts, fighting Indians, patrolling the Mexican border, and staying on the lookout for diehard rebels became the tasks of the fresh regiments. But most of these men could not wait until the day came for their final discharge from service. In January 1865 General McDowell annexed the Arizona Territory to his Department of the Pacific. Carleton had suffered much criticism from military men and civilians alike for neglecting Arizona during his administration. Actually the troops and transportation at his disposal allowed him to do little more than maintain the garrisons at only a few key forts in the territory.[113]

The state of California had never needed to conscript soldiers to meet the wartime quotas imposed by the U.S. government, but enlistments began to decline as the Southern rebellion began its fourth year. On April 4, 1864, the California legislature passed an act authorizing the payment of $160 for enlistment bounties, $40 payable at the time of enlistment and $20 at the end of each successive six-month period of service. In addition

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[112] Ella Lonn, *Desertion During the Civil War* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966), 219.
[113] GO 9, AGO, Jan. 10, 1865, *OR,* 50(2):1121; GO 10, Hdqrs. Dept. of the Pacific, Feb. 20, 1865, ibid., 1137.

to these incentives, the U.S. government also began paying bounties to encourage reenlistment. Veterans received $50 for one-year extensions and $100 for two years. Of course these bounties also had time-payment provisions designed to discourage desertion. Some of the California soldiers wanted nothing more than a chance to fight the rebels. A few actually deserted in order to reenlist in eastern regiments and engage organized Confederate forces in the bloody battles that would determine the outcome of the war. One volunteer wrote: "There would be glory and honor in being a soldier if we were where we could distinguish ourselves in any way, but to be kept in this out of the way place doing nothing, there is but little fame in it that I can see."[114]

Most of the volunteer companies serving in Arizona in 1865 and 1866 formally mustered out on the West Coast or at one of the military posts in New Mexico. Individual soldiers occasionally received their discharges in Arizona, but as a rule commanders sent troops to the large military installations in California, which made provisions for paying the troops, issuing discharge papers, and turning in arms and accoutrements at permanent forts and arsenals. Although Carleton's decision to discharge troops in New Mexico angered many of the soldiers, the order had a positive influence on the development of the border territories and was lauded by some public officials and business leaders.[115]

California troops in the borderlands remained alert for Confederate reinvasion attempts until the Civil War ended, but in 1865 the morale of the Anglo soldiers still on

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[114] Hunt, *Army of the Pacific,* 140–41; Davis, "Pioneer Days in Arizona," 52; Andrew Ryan, *News from Fort Craig, New Mexico, 1863: Civil War Letters of AndrewRyan with the First California* Volunteers, ed. Ernest Marchand (Santa Fe: Stagecoach, 1966), 65.

[115] Carleton had to rethink his policy of disarming at Fort Union those troops determined to be mustered out in California. The military storekeeper and Chief of Ordnance at Fort Union pointed out the men of the First Infantry, CV, would need their arms for self-defense while traveling "in the wilderness surrounded by hostile Indians." He convinced Carleton and others up the chain of command to allow the men to purchase their arms at cost. Capt. W. R. Shoemaker to Carleton, May 27, 1864, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, NARA, RG 156, Entry 21, box 236; Miller, *California Column,* 33-6.

duty in the territories deteriorated. Newspapers brought reports of the grand reviews of the victorious armies in Washington, D.C., following the surrender of the Confederates in the eastern and western theaters. The last spark of rebellion had been crushed, and the California Volunteers remaining in Arizona were eager for discharge and home. Since the beginning of the war, volunteer officers and men stationed in the borderlands felt their primary responsibility was to guard against another Confederate invasion of the territories. Rumors of rebel troop buildups and occasional confrontations with Southern sympathizers fueled their fears of attack from Texas or Mexico or even the "Red rebels" of the Southern Plains.[116]

Sympathy for the Confederate cause had been high in southern California in the months following the fall of Fort Sumter in 1861. Those first shots signaled an exodus of heavily armed secessionists, who traveled overland via Arizona or Mexico to the East. As soon as they were mustered, federal authorities diverted the first California Volunteer units to quell civil unrest in Los Angeles and the southern counties. In November 1861 these troops surrounded and captured eighteen men traveling with the notorious secessionist Dan Showalter, on his way east by way of Fort Yuma and the Gila Trail. Rebel secret societies and unrest continued in southern California throughout the war, and the troops in in the border territories remained constantly on alert for rumors of uprisings.[117]

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[116] Pettis, *California Column,* 18; Orton, *California Men,* 669–70.
[117] Rigg to Carleton, Nov. 30, 1861, *OR,* 50(1):33. See also L. Boyd Finch, "Arizona in Exile: Confederate Schemes to Recapture the Far Southwest." *Journal of Arizona History* 33 (Spring 1992): 57–84; Robert J. Chandler, "California's 1863 Loyalty Oaths: Another Look," *Arizona and the West* 21 (Autumn 1979): 215–34; and Robert J. Chandler, "The Velvet Glove: The Army during the Secession Crisis in California, 1860–1865," *Journal of the West* 20 (Oct. 1981): 35–42.

Soon after arriving in the territories, Carleton clamped down on all Southern sympathizers bound to or from California on any of the overland routes near the Mexican border. In 1862 he had ordered suspected secessionists arrested and imprisoned at Fort Yuma. Most of these political prisoners were eventually released after they signed loyalty oaths, but one diehard rebel, captured with the Showalter party, launched an attack in Arizona Territory that became the westernmost engagement of the Civil War. William "Frog" Edwards ambushed three soldiers belonging to the Fourth California Infantry near the steamboat landing at La Paz, Arizona, on May 20, 1863. Edwards seethed with resentment for his rough treatment by Carleton's men and waited for an opportunity to strike a blow for the Confederacy in the Far West. When news of General Robert E. Lee's victory at Chancellorsville, Virginia, reached the Colorado River, Edwards saw his chance. Soldiers escorting military cargo on the steamer *Cocopah* disembarked to purchase supplies. The men had gathered in front of Cohn's Store when gunshots suddenly burst from the darkness, killing Private Ferdinand Behn of Company H. Two others, Private Thomas Gainor of Company H and a civilian bystander, also received severe wounds. Lieutenant James A. Hale quickly organized a search of the town, but to no avail. A month-long search by a forty-man detachment from Fort Mojave under Captain Charles Atchisson failed to bring the "Frog" to justice, but soon afterward soldiers found a body in the desert that authorities identified as that of Edwards. On the run and alone, he had died of exposure in the waterless waste while attempting to elude his pursuers.[118]

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[118]This skirmish is considered by some historians to be the farthest west action of the Civil War. Though Edwards appears to have acted alone, he was a duly enlisted Confederate. Tuttle, "River Colorado," 57; C. E. Bennett to Drum, May 28, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):459–61; Bert Fireman, "Extending the Civil War

The La Paz incident alerted federal authorities to other Confederate movements. On May 28 Captain Joseph Tuttle received orders in Tucson to intercept a party of fifteen to twenty secessionists intending to join Confederate forces in Texas. Intelligence reports indicated that it might be possible to head off the rebels, along with the cattle and horses they had stolen in San Bernardino County, California, before they rode east. Tuttle commanded twenty men of the Fifth California Infantry and a "spy party," including Jackson H. Martin, deputy sheriff of San Bernardino County; Joseph Bridges; and a Mexican *vaquero* named Prefetto. The captain also had authority to enlist any other citizens deemed necessary to intercept the rebels. Tuttle tracked the raiders into Mexico and finally apprehended them in the Sonora village of Altar. The pursuers recovered the stolen livestock and prevented the California secessionists from uniting with Texas Confederates. Mission accomplished, Tuttle's exhausted command returned to Tucson nearly a month after the chase began.[119]

Loyal citizens in the territories occasionally alerted authorities to rebel activity. On November 29, 1864, Major General Irvin McDowell, commanding the Department of the Pacific, which then included Arizona, received an alarming letter from M. O. Davidson, a mine superintendent:

> Dear Sir: Mr. Elihu Baker, a major-domo of the Arizona Mining Company, has just come down [to Guaymas] from Arizona to escort me to the Territory. He informs me that a band of Confederates are encamped in Sonora, between Magdalena and the boundary, awaiting re-enforcements from Texas, Chihuahua, and Durango, to make an attack upon the advanced military posts of Calaba[sas], Tubac, and Tucson. If they are successful in such a raid, for a while they will have the southern portion of Arizona at their mercy. Although you may not be the

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Westward to the Bloodied Banks of the Colorado River," paper presented at the Arizona Historical Convention, Tucson, March 16, 1962.

[119] Orton, *California Men,* 669–70; Pettis, *California Column,* 18; French to Joseph Tuttle, May 28, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):461.

> military commander of that department, I think it proper to give you this information, as it may be in your power to communicate with those who have the power to re-enforce speedily the limited garrisons of the posts so seriously threatened.[120]

While many of the rumors investigated by military authorities never panned out, some were based on solid evidence. On October 16, 1864 a Los Angeles "Government Detective" named Gustav Brown reported that a party of thirty-two heavily armed members of the Knights of the Golden Circle, an active Copperhead organization, had left San Diego for Texas on August 12. Brown cautioned that King S. Woolsey, the noted Arizona "Apache hunter," was waiting for a chance to spring into action with his armed band as soon as he could get assistance from Texas. The detective added that men were leaving "daily from Los Angeles by twos and threes who represent themselves as miners going to the Colorado." These California rebels believed that, in the event that Abraham Lincoln defeated General George McClellan in the November presidential election, they would be ready to grab Arizona.[121]

Judge Lansford W. Hastings had proposed this same plan to President Jefferson Davis in January 1864. Hastings outlined an elaborate scheme to capture "the most valuable agricultural and grazing lands, and the richest mineral region in the known world." He would send men disguised as miners to the Colorado mines above Fort Yuma and to Guaymas as well. These agents would then capture the vast quantities of military stores stockpiled at Yuma and use them to launch a campaign to recover the territories.

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[120] M. O. Davidson to Irvin McDowell, Nov. 29, 1864, *OR,* 50(2):1080.
[121] Gustav Brown to A. Jones Jackson, Oct. 16, 1864, ibid., 1018–19.

Hastings believed the Knights of the Golden Circle and other secret societies would spring to the call and help carry out his plan.[122]

High-ranking Confederates had a genuine interest in retaking the border territories. In February 1863 Major General John Bankhead Magruder busied himself with the organization of an Arizona Brigade, "having been directed by the [Confederate] Secretary of War to take steps to recover Arizona." Colonel Baylor's removal from command had stalled the planning effort; President Davis personally disliked Baylor and found his exterminationist Indian policy repugnant. Consequently the Confederate campaign never got out of the planning stage, and Judge Hastings's clandestine approach never received official approval by the War Department. James A. Seddon, Confederate secretary of war, agreed that "the overthrow of Federal domination in Arizona and the repossession of that country through the instrumentality of forces to be drawn from California [was] an end important to be accomplished," but he had no confidence in Hastings. General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the Confederate Trans-Mississippi West, concurred, and so ended government sanctioned Southern operations in Arizona. Unaware of the Confederate strategy shift and command difficulties, the California Volunteers and other troops in the territories remained vigilant for any renewal of the rebel threat.[123]

By 1866 the War Department began shifting the burden of military duties in the borderlands from the California Volunteers to other troops. The four companies of Hispano and Indian volunteers continued to wage a bloody campaign against defiant

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[122] Lansford W. Hasting to Jefferson Davis, Dec. 16, 1863, ibid., 700–701.
[123] John B. Magruder to S. Cooper, Mar. 2, 1863, ibid., 332; Baylor to Thomas Helm, Mar. 20, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):942; Colton, *Civil War in Western Territories,* 123; James A. Seddon to E. Kirby Smith, Oct. 15, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):648–49; Smith to Seddon, Nov. 22, 1863, ibid., 681.

Apache raiders. These Pimas, Maricopas, Papagos, and Mexicans had endured decades of warfare with the Apaches, and they knew the ways, raiding paths, and places of refuge favored by their enemies. The native troops took to the field with a will. An enlisted man in the Second California Infantry noted that "the Pimas and Maricopas are allies against the Apaches, between which there seems to be a hereditary hatred," and conceded, "they fight the Apaches in their own way and in this respect are superior to our own soldiers." The army also began filtering regular troops back to the frontier after four years of hard service against the rebels in the East.[124]

In the spring of 1866, regulars of the Fourteenth U.S. Infantry and First U.S. Cavalry began marching into Arizona Territory to relieve the volunteer soldiers. The professional army's return to the borderlands after a five year hiatus resulted in a peculiar turnabout as the veteran volunteers returning home to California to be mustered out came to the rescue of the inexperienced regular soldiers unfamiliar with desert survival. John Spring, an enlisted man in Company E, Fourteenth Infantry, remembered that his company became lost in the desert east of Yuma. Fortunately a homeward-bound company of the First California Cavalry saw their signal fire and came to their relief. The Californians buried one man, who had died from exposure, and provided the others with water and food. The regulars marched the roads and trails blazed by the volunteers. The new companies often rested near the rain-filled *chalcos* at Picacho Peak and wondered who lay buried beneath the bleached and nearly illegible headboards marking the graves of the first soldiers to fall in the struggle for Arizona. Reoccupying the camps and forts recently turned over by the Californians, the regulars appreciated the comfortable

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[124] Carleton to Drum, June 10, 1862, *OR,* 50(1):52–53; Hunt, *James Henry Carleton,* 222.

quarters at Fort Bowie and other posts, though they little understood the effort and sacrifice that had gone into building these places in the inhospitable desert.[125]

The men of the Second California Infantry turned over their quarters at Fort Goodwin to U.S. regulars on May 10, 1866. A seven-day march brought the volunteers to Tucson, where Corporal Bushnell observed, "the boys indulged themselves to their heart's content drinking Tucson poison, Tarantula juice, Arizona lightening & & &. Many of the boys deprived for so long a time of the beverage they favored, got unconsciously drunk and in this state many were robbed of what few greenbacks they possessed by a set of harpies in the shape of regular soldiers belonging to the 14th U.S. Inf. stationed in the town." By the time the regiment reached Picacho Peak, most of the intoxicated men had rejoined the command, completing the 462-mile march from Fort Goodwin to Yuma in twenty-six days. A Colorado River steamer took the weary soldiers to the delta at Port Isabel to avoid contact with Mexican ports on the mainland. Here on the featureless tidal flats the muddy river joined the blue water of the Gulf of California, and in this international no-man's-land the homesick men, sang and cheered as they boarded an oceangoing vessel bound for San Francisco.[126]

Of the Anglo veterans discharged in or returning to the borderlands after the Civil War, many played prominent roles in the social, political, and economic development of the territories.[127] Carleton lectured his superiors in Washington that the mineral wealth of the territories would bring on a population explosion initiated by the troops posted there.

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[125] *San Francisco Evening Bulletin,* Mar. 11, 1863, July 9, 1864; Coult to Drum, Dec. 31, 1862, *OR,* 50(2):270–71.
[126] GO 5, Apr. 18, 1863, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, R 393; SO 2, Jan. 1, 1864, ibid.
[127] Browne, *Adventures,* 134–35; George O. Hand Diary, Sept. 30–Oct. 4, 1862, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; Fergusson to J. F. Bennett, Apr. 14, 1863, *OR,* 50(2):396. See also Bushnell Diary, Nov. 10, 1865.

He had predicted that, "every regiment you send here, whether from the east or from California, will stay. Thus, each one is a military colony to people the vast uninhabited region from the Rio Grande to the Pacific." Although Carleton's plan to muster-out troops in the territories stirred controversy and heated debate in the press, most of the veterans did eventually march with their companies or regiments to the Presidio in San Francisco for their release from the service. By 1867, more than six thousand Californians had gotten a good look at the territories during the war and liked what they saw. Hundreds who were not mustered out in New Mexico soon returned to seek their fortunes, believing the territories to be a land of opportunity. Most came back to work in the mines or to prospect for new ones.[128]

Mining activity boomed from the lower Colorado River region to central Arizona and the mountains of southwestern New Mexico. At Pinos Altos former California Volunteer Lt. Colonel and New Mexico legislator William L. Rynerson held five important gold claims and introduced the first steam powered quartz mill to extract the precious metal. Other veterans found the more sedentary existence of hotelkeeper, shopkeeper, or military-post sutler to their liking. Still others raised cattle or worked on Colorado River steamers. A number of those returning were former officers and well-educated men. Several became prominent lawyers and territorial legislators, while others obtained government appointments. Some accepted the dangerous duties of town marshal or sheriff. Two veterans worked as educators, one serving as Mohave County school superintendent. Some of the volunteer soldiers demonstrated an aptitude and liking for the military and accepted commissions in the regular army. Some had developed Indian-

[128] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, September, 13, 1863, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 136.

language skills and served as interpreters and guides for the postwar army. The returning soldiers equaled 10 percent of the population and provided a boost to the growth of the territories.[129]

Strategically located to deter Yavapai and Western Apache raiders, Fort McDowell became the key to unlocking the riches of the Salt River valley. In September 1865 Lieutenant Colonel Clarence E. Bennett, First California Cavalry, had established Fort McDowell along the Verde River, just above its junction with the Salt River in central Arizona. The fertile valley of the Salt lay uninhabited and fallow for centuries. Situated as it was between the sedentary Pimas and Maricopas of the Gila River and the raiding Yavapais and Western Apache bands to the north and east, the valley had become a no man's land between warring tribes. Hispano and Anglo miners and settlers also steered clear of the place until John Y. T. Smith discovered that the abundant native galleta grass in the river bottoms might be a path to wealth. Lieutenant Smith came to Arizona in 1863 with Company H, Fourth California Infantry. Soon after mustering out, the entrepreneurial officer secured the sutler contract at Fort McDowell. He successfully bid on other lucrative government contracts to supply provisions for the hungry garrison, composed of three Seventh California Infantry companies, and hay for the horses and mules. The hay, it turned out, was the easy part. Seasonal rains caused the Salt to overflow its banks and flood the bottoms, yielding tons of forage—free for the taking.

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[129] GO 35, Sept. 14, 1862, Hdqrs. Tucson, Commands of J. R. West, RG 393; GO 13, June 28, 1862, ibid. More than five hundred California Volunteers settled in Arizona after the Civil War. See U.S. censuses for Arizona and New Mexico territories, 1864, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910; and Hayden Arizona Pioneer Biography Files, Arizona State University Library, Tempe; Miller, *California Column*, 35, 43-59.

By 1867, Smith needed help to keep up with the demand for the forage and produce needed to fill the Army's contracts. He enlisted former Confederate ranger, and later scout for the California Volunteers, Jack Swilling. Although Swilling had spent more time fighting Apaches than he ever invested in mining or ranching, he knew a good opportunity when he saw one and almost immediately organized his own Swilling Irrigation and Canal Company. Beneath the fields of grass, Smith had pointed out, the valley was crisscrossed with ancient canals abandoned by the Hohokam people nearly five hundred years earlier. The men took advantage of the well-sited and engineered depressions and cut new connections to the river that flushed out the prehistoric ditches. Within months Swilling's crew had shoveled and scraped canals enough to flood fields of vegetables, corn, and grain. An agricultural boom resulted, which provided the economic base for a thriving new settlement, appropriately dubbed Phoenix, for it had miraculously emerged from the ruins of an earlier civilization.[130]

Though the Colorado and New Mexico Volunteers had borne the brunt of fighting the Confederate invaders in the borderlands, the California Volunteers had marched across the desert and finished the job, securing California, Arizona, and New Mexico during the Civil War years. The Californians also held warring Mexicans factions and

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[130] Early in the twentieth century, Phoenix took its place as Arizona's largest and most prosperous city. The three men most often honored with the title "Father of Phoenix" all have a California Volunteer connection . William A. Hancock, Seventh California Infantry, built the first store; served in every imaginable elected office, including first sheriff; and surveyed the canals that provided the desert town with its vital water supply. In 1866 John Y. T. Smith, Fourth California Infantry, established his hay camp and recognized the agricultural potential of what became the Phoenix town site. Jack Swilling served the Confederacy for only eleven months before defecting and working as a scout and government contractor with the California Volunteers. To Swilling goes the credit of renewing the ancient Hohokam canals and beginning large-scale irrigation in the Salt River Valley. Farish, *History of Arizona,* 6:70–74; L. Boyd Finch, "Sherod Hunter and the Confederates in Arizona," *Journal of Arizona History* 10 (August 1969): 139–206, 194–97; Orton, *California Men,* 651, 794.

foreign invaders south of the border while, at the same time, spurring the growth of the Southwest territories by providing protection for the settlers and prospectors who came from the United States and Mexico to open mines and build homes. Carleton's vision of establishing a military colony in the territories while improving the infrastructure to allow for further development and "civilization" seemed to be working. Prospecting boomed as the soldiers announced new discoveries of their own and established military posts in mining districts, making travel and living conditions safe and profitable for the newcomers. After leaving the service, many California soldiers returned to continue prospecting and worked the mining districts and related enterprises they had founded while serving in the territories. The volunteer soldiers also dealt the raiding tribes of the borderlands a devastating blow, particularly the Navajos and Mescaleros of New Mexico, who lost their ability to wage war. Establishing precedents for warfare against the Apaches in the borderlands, the Californians systematically utilized Indian auxiliaries and inaugurated a system of international and military-civilian cooperation. The exigencies of the Civil War had allowed the introduction of a policy of total war against Indian groups considered hostile. At the same time, the sedentary tribes flourished during the 1861-67 occupation. The agricultural Pimas, Maricopas, and Papagos as well as many of the Pueblo peoples benefited from army contracts and the military alliance against their traditional enemies.

Conclusion

The American Civil War triggered multiple wars in the Southwest borderlands during the 1860s, a decade of violent interaction that transformed the region's communities. The pre-existing inter-ethnic tensions among the peoples of the Southwest borderlands lay at the root of these conflicts. Each group viewed its struggle for survival and dominance differently—some characterizing it as civil war and others as transnational conflict. The antagonists' warrior traditions and cultures of martial masculinity contributed to the extraordinary levels of violence and, ultimately, led to a re-ordered power hierarchy in the region.

The disruption of federal authority, as tenuous as it had been in the western territories in 1861, upset the fragile balance of power among the Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples of the Southwest and changed the nature of conflict in the borderlands, resulting in an escalation of civil wars and struggles for power and dominance among ethnic groups and nations. Driven nearly to starvation by a relentless war of attrition, the Apacheans were forced to seek peace with the predominantly Anglo military and territorial officials in New Mexico and Arizona. While interethnic fighting had existed since before the arrival of the Spanish, the Anglo Americans introduced the new concept of total war that appeared to many to be a war of extermination.

By 1867 the Anglos dominated the borderlands militarily, politically, and economically. The conflict in the territories had escalated far beyond the stock and slave raiding of the past, and the killing would continue long after Confederate armies had surrendered in the other theaters of what was already being referred to as the "War of the

Rebellion." The civil wars in Arizona and New Mexico bore an indirect connection to the national Civil War. The peoples of Arizona and New Mexico were now engaged in violent conflicts that pitted raiding Navajos and Apaches against Hispano and Anglo citizens and soldiers and agrarian Indian villagers and auxiliaries. In Mexico, after the departure of French forces fearful of American military might, Juárez's restored Republican government turned its attention once again to Indian enemies along the northern border and worked to unify the Republic while crushing dissent among indigenous peoples.

With the onset of the Civil War, more than 300 years after the initial Spanish *entrada* into what eventually became known as the American Southwest, Hispanos and Anglo-Americans interpreted Indian resistance to be rebellious behavior, tantamount to civil war. Many of the indigenous groups characterized their struggle as war against outside invaders. In truth, the conflicts of the borderlands were at once civil and international wars, depending on the perspective of the antagonist. The fighting between Yuman-speaking Colorado River nations against the Yuman-speaking Maricopas and their allies, the Uto-Aztecan Pimas, was at once a civil war and a transnational conflict, since the Maricopas were River Yuman schismatics who sought the assistance (or intervention) of an outside nation. Similarly, the United States-Anglo-Hispano alliance opposing the Apacheans—Navajos and Apaches—can be characterized as both a civil war and conflict with an international coalition. The Athabaskan peoples were semi-nomadic (or semi-sedentary) and reliant on raiding-pastoral economies. Their struggles amongst themselves and with their neighboring communities and nations may appropriately be considered civil wars and international struggles.

In the Southwest borderlands, nations existed within nations. The resulting struggles should be viewed and understood as both civil wars and transnational conflicts. Communities perceiving themselves to be separate based on language, tradition, culture, religion, ethnicity, or race may, *de facto*, constitute a separate community or nation. In 1860, southern members of the United States union declared themselves to be separate and sovereign states based on differences in culture (especially in regard to slavery), economy, perceptions of democracy, and definitions of freedom. The United States refused to recognize the separateness of the "rebelling" states even though the Confederacy exhibited all of the traits of a nation—from culture to constitutional government. Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. government exercised confused and inconsistent Indian policies. Since the 1830s they were referred to as "domestic dependent nations," but individual Indian people were wards or subjects of the federal government. Indains may have seen themselves as sovereign nations, but when they resisted federal authority the government viewed the Indian insurgents as rebelling subjects. These rebellions were both civil wars and trans-national conflicts. If "civil war" is interpreted to mean violent conflict between members of one nation, community, or polity over real or perceived political or ideological disagreements—from the U.S. government's perspective the answer is yes, they *were* civil wars. This was, of course, the Union/Republican/Lincoln point of view of the sectional crisis during the American Civil War. But when civil war is examined as a clash between imagined communities (nations or ethnic groups), it is apparent that in most cases the resisting/rebelling communities do not recognize the boundaries drawn by larger nations attempting to control them—this was Jefferson Davis's secessionist argument. In the Southwest

borderlands, claimed as Union and Confederate states and territories during the 1860s, simultaneous wars occurred among ethnically related and unrelated communities occupying the same geographic territory. These conflicts constituted civil wars or international conflicts, depending on the perspective of each antagonist.

Each community in conflict fostered a belief in its own cultural and, in some cases, racial superiority that permitted the warring parties to rationalize extreme measures and contributed to the unusually high levels of violent interaction. By classifying enemies as "others," not sharing racial or cultural bonds, "war to the knife," "showing the black flag," "total war, and "war of extermination" all became possible and escalated the violence to unprecedented levels. Anglos racialized Indians and Hispanos. Hispanos categorized races in an elaborate system of *castas* based on *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood), though by the 1860s the mestizo population was so predominant that the phenotype of a mixed race person was only one factor in determining desirable family lineage and social rank (*calidad*). Indian peoples, though generally more open to adoption and inclusion, organized themselves in parochial groups and bands that set clear bounds of culturally appropriate behavior and recognized purity of blood and heritage as important to full acceptance. The civil wars of the borderlands pitted ethnically-unrelated and related people—even family members related by blood as a result of years of captive-taking, adoption, and slavery—against one another.

Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos each brought distinct martial cultures and ways of war to the struggle for the borderlands, but in all cases a culturally-rooted sense of manhood animated the warriors of the Southwest. Though all of the warring peoples subscribed to long-established traditions regarding vengeance, honor, and compensation

for wrongs inflicted by enemies, each acted on them differently. Even within each broad ethnic group there were significant differences in how subcultures acted and interacted. The semi-nomadic Apacheans were both pastoralists and raiders whose willingness to fight carefully balanced risk with the benefit derived from attacking those who possessed what the band or tribe needed to survive—livestock, useful tools and goods, and captives to replace their losses or for trade. The more acquisitive and semi-sedentary Navajos invested more energy in agricultural and domestic pursuits than their Apache cousins. Although both communities relied heavily on raiding, Apaches were far more likely to kill their enemies, while Navajos sought stock to augment their herds and captives to care for them. Navajo chiefs tended to be numbered among the *ricos* of the nation, while Apache leaders owned little and often distributed their wealth among the poorer band members. Among both the Apaches and Navajos, chiefs only rarely coordinated the fighting efforts of tribes and bands, and in many cases were embarrassed by being unable to direct young men nominally under their control. Inter-band rivalries among the Apacheans also hindered cooperation and concerted action against common enemies.

Though Indian men were expected to care for their families as full-time providers, all men capable of being "warriors" were expected to fulfill their obligations to fight when necessary for raiding or in war. War and raiding activities often overlapped and to outsiders may have been difficult to distinguish. But war meant killing, usually in retaliation for a death taken by an enemy. *Gegodza* demanded revenge. But in a sense, all revenge was local and very personal. Band members, often related by blood or marriage, might feel duty and honor-bound to avenge losses to their family or band, but rarely was a war of revenge extended beyond the band level, and a multiethnic coalition was a short-

lived and fragile union. Women encouraged the warriors to exact retribution in response to losses, and the men developed elaborate rituals, weapons, and tactics that enabled them to fulfill their martial responsibilities. The warrior traditions—tactics, logistics, weapons, martial rituals and customs, treatment of enemy captives—of the communities in conflict played a major role in the causes and outcomes of the wars for the borderlands. The preparation and practice of warfare by men of the different ethnic groups set in motion actions that resulted in conflict.

North of the Mexican border, Hispano martial traditions evolved and adapted to the needs of the sedentary, agricultural communities. The last of the presidios protecting Mexico's far northern frontier was abandoned in 1856 when the Mexican garrison finally left Tucson. Some of the professional soldiers willing to accept U.S. citizenship remained behind, and there were always men with a propensity for war—including those who participated at some level in local militias—but most of the men inhabiting the New Mexican pueblos were not trained, armed, or equipped for combat. Even the New Mexican Hispanos who enlisted as U.S. Volunteers in the 1860s did not see themselves as full-time soldiers, believing their duty to family and farm outweighed the demands of the service. These soldiers often returned home, with or without permission, for planting and harvesting—and when they perceived that the risks of soldiering were greater than the rewards. As with their Indian adversaries, Hispano men raided for livestock and captives. They were also motivated by revenge and displayed a highly developed notion of *vergüenza*—the shame brought about by the loss of personal and family honor—which demanded that an attack not go unanswered. Brave but unprepared men often pursued raiders only to become victims themselves.

The Hispano lancers riding with California Native Battalion stood in marked contrast with the New Mexico Volunteers. The Californios had entered the fight for reasons different than the men of New Mexico whose homes had been attacked by Texans and Indian raiders. Though the Native Battalion men had proven themselves in active campaigning against Apaches along the Mexican border, the alliance with the ethnocentric Anglo Americans was not easy. The border service tested the loyalty of many of the Hispano soldiers who deserted across the line to join the Juaristas fighting the French. When Captain José Ramón Pico had addressed, in Spanish, the crowded plaza in San José to recruit Hispanos for the Native cavalry battalion in 1863, he mentioned the Star Spangled Banner of the United States, but the loudest cheers came when appealed to his *compadres'* Mexican pride:

> Sons of California! Our country calls, and we must obey! This rebellion of the southern states must be crushed; they must come back into the union and pay obedience to the Stars and Stripes. United, we will, by the force of circumstances become the freest and mightiest republic on earth! Crowned monarchs must be driven away from the sacred continent of free America![1]

The Californios were skeptical and recruitment had been slow, but eventually the lure of martial distinction drew the young men in. Still, for the sons of the men who had lassoed and lanced General Kearny and the pride of the American army at San Pasqual in 1846, it was difficult to read the racist sentiments expressed by Anglo officers and citizens. A patronizing San Francisco newspaper announced that the Native Battalion men:

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[1] *Alta California*, March 11, 1863. Pico was only a teenager when he accompanied his famous uncle, Andrés Pico at the battle of San Pasqual. Many California Hispanos supported the Union war effort only because they believed it would help the Republican cause in Mexico. Alan Rosenus, *General Vallejo and the Advent of the Americans* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 227-28.

> …make hardy and docile soldiers, exactly fitted, when commanded by officers who speak their language and understand their habits, for this very Mexican frontier or Apache service. The English have their Afghans and other Asiatic sepoys; the French, Algerians and Turcos; the Austrians, Slavs and Croats; and Maximilian his Austrians and Belgians; and out of the 10,000 or 12,000 Mexican Americans below San Jose it is singular if we could not get as many as we wanted for this kind of frontier and Indian service, and mix them with Americans to increase their intelligence and fighting capabilities.[2]

South of the border, Mexico's stratified race-based society defined by the *casta* system influenced the alliances formed during Mexico's civil war. Though the liberal Republicans represented the majority of the mixed-race, *mestizaje*, population and the higher caste Mexicans of predominantly European descent generally supported conservative economics and the Catholic Church, both sides vied for the support of the indigenous Indian peoples, especially in the borderlands. More Europeanized than the Hispanos of the northern frontier and the Southwestern United States, the Mexican civil war became a struggle for ethnic survival and dominance. At first the fighting more closely resembled the stylized combat of Napoleonic armies. By the end of the French intervention and Maximilian's execution the violence had devolved into guerilla warfare characterized by brutality and violence with neither side offering quarter nor recognizing previously accepted rules of engagement.

The Anglo-Americans who fought in the borderlands in the 1860s had much in common with their allies and enemies, but there were significant differences as well. The Anglos from the United States and Confederate States waged a systematic and relentless brand of total war with armies composed of full-time, professional soldiers. Whether enlisted as regulars or volunteers, these soldiers were contractually bound to serve for specified periods—sometimes for the "duration of the war"—during which time they

[2] San Francisco *Bulletin*, July 18, 1865.

could not be released from duty without special authorization. The Confederates exhibited considerable *élan* but often neglected logistics, the key to success in the harsh and resource-poor desert Southwest. Even when outnumbered, the U.S. Anglos brought war to their enemies at any time of year and in all geographic and climatic conditions. They coordinated their campaigns using written communications that could be transported great distances by mail and telegraph. Their martial culture rewarded risk-taking in concentrated frontal assaults calculated to awe and overwhelm enemies in a single blow, which they characterized by the French military term, *coup de main*. Technological superiority in weapons, transportation, and food preservation and storage gave the Anglos the advantage tactically and logistically. They did not launch expeditions for the purpose of raid or plunder. The soldiers were motivated by a spirit of martial masculinity, honor, and vengeance, but, with notable exceptions, military discipline generally prevailed—a decided advantage in coordinating attacks and extended campaigns. Anglo commanders also recognized the strategic advantage of controlling food supplies and water. By mobilizing Hispano and Indian allies while controlling the means of subsistence, the numerically inferior Anglos prevailed in a war of attrition that eventually broke the fighting spirit of their enemies.

In 1865, Senator James Doolittle distributed hundreds of "circulars" to Americans with experience in Indian affairs—public officials, military men, chiefs, and Indian agents—asking twenty-three questions aimed at better understanding the causes for the decline and apparent degradation of Indian peoples in the United States. A massive 532-page report titled: *The Condition of the Indian Tribes; A Report of the Joint Special* Committee delved into military and civilian affairs across the continent, though more

than two-thirds of the document focused on the Southwest borderlands. Through written responses and oral testimony, the respondents (all of which were men) confirmed that through war, disease, physical dislocation, and moral decline, the tribes were, in fact, diminishing at an alarming rate. A good deal of the questioning targeted gender issues relating to including sexual mores, prostitution and related venereal diseases, as well as the roles of men and women relative to work.

The Anglos saw the Indian women as enablers in perpetuating the male-dominated culture that resulted in the unbalanced workloads and status accorded the sexes. The men of the more nomadic nations in particular were criticized for "laziness" and abuse of women, who, it seemed, did most of the remunerative labor and provided for the family to a far greater extent than the men, who, it was generally believed, spent an inordinate amount of time preparing for or engaging in war, raiding, hunting, and idling about. The experts believed that if idle men were put to work, conflict resulting from warrior cultures could be avoided or sublimated. Some military men and religious leaders believed that farming or wage labor in mines and industry could eventually mitigate the dangers attendant to large numbers of unemployed and unproductive young men. However biased and culturally insensitive the study was, it did reflect widespread beliefs among some Indian as well as Hispano, and Anglo military, political, and cultural leaders of influence in the borderlands.[3]

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[3] More than 200 leaders provided oral testimony or responses to queries made by the Joint Special Committee in 1865. U.S. Congress, *Condition of the Indian Tribes: Joint Special Committee Report: Appointed Under Joint Resolution of March 3, 1865. J.R. Doolittle* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1867), 3-10, 424; see also: James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 349, 368.

Euro-Americans generally perceived the Pueblos and other sedentary peoples as models for behavior that would lead to sustainable Indian communities in the rapidly changing world of the vanishing frontier. In the successful sedentary and semi-sedentary pueblos and villages, men shared with women the labor of farming, activities considered unmanly by the warriors of the nomadic and raiding tribes. The asymmetrical gendered work roles contributed to the continuous raiding for wives and wealth that for generations had characterized the relations between the Hispano and Indian communities of the borderlands. Often at the behest of Navajo *ricos*, *ladrones* stole stock and took captive boy herders from the New Mexicans in order to accumulate enough wealth and status to take a wife. Similarly, Hispano *nacajalleses* took stock and captured children and women for *criadas* and concubines. The Anglos broke the violent exchange cycle with still more violence—on an unprecedented scale—while at the same time disrupting centuries of culturally-rooted tradition.[4]

Each cultural group brought to the conflict its traditional means of fighting, and each adapted to the evolving political and social landscape. The societies in conflict actively prepared for war, made war a priority, and fostered warrior cultures. The young men of each group shared aspects of their cultures of martial masculinity and each valued personal bravery and skill with weapons. The men saw themselves as the protectors of their communities and cultures. Many of their martial traditions were tied to their ethnicities. In the end, each fought not only for the physical survival of family, comrades, and community but for ethnic identity and cultural preservation. At the beginning of the Civil War, more numerous and militarily powerful Navajos, Apaches, and Southern

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[4] Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, 366-68.

Plains groups held the reins of power in the borderlands, while sedentary Indians, Hispanos, and Anglos struggled to maintain strongholds in fortified communities, outposts, and mining settlements. The national conflict spawned or reignited regional civil wars. The level of violence reached new levels, and Anglos introduced to the borderlands the concept of extermination. [5]

Most of the borderland Anglos, culturally endued with an ethic of "restrained martial masculinity," recognized limits even in a "war of extermination." Only individual Anglos and some Hispano civilians and soldiers advanced the idea of genocidal extinction of all Indian people—no government, Union or Confederate, ever espoused such a policy. It is true that some Army officers believed "extermination" to be an unwritten policy, but extermination talk by civilians and military men was often just so much rhetoric intended to spur government action and protection from raiders. [6] Neither Baylor nor Carleton, among the most influential extermination advocates, ever advocated the slaughter of women and children. They focused their wrath and resources on adult male "warriors" who were "hunted" and shown no quarter until their bands surrendered unconditionally. Though both commanders believed collateral casualties among

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[5] Amy Greenberg addresses the Anglo-American filibustering phenomenon that reached its peak in 1857, arguing that economic stress and a form of "martial manhood" led ambitious young men like William Walker to seek opportunity and empire south of the United States border. Amy Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), passim. The peoples of the borderlands, though ethnically distinct, have much in common. In 1982, David Weber furthered the evolution of Borderlands History by looking northward at the United States from the vantage point of post-Spanish Mexico. His transnational approach in *The Mexican Frontier, 1821-45: The American Southwest Under Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1982) helped bring about a better understanding of how interconnected the people of the United States and Mexico were and are. Where some historians focused on difference, Weber saw commonalities.

[6] Colonel Carroll H. Potter of the Sixth U.S. Volunteer Infantry ("Galvanized Yankees"), commanding the South Sub-District of the Plains, believed "as far as I know the policy of the military department here, is to exterminate the Indians." Some 5,600 captured Confederate soldiers enlisted as "United States Volunteers" and organized into six regiments between January 1864 and November 1866 for service along the Overland Mail routes and on the frontier. Col. Potter sworn testimony, July 27, 1865, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 71.

noncombatants inevitable and morally acceptable, they exhibited a measure of restraint. It appears that both would have preferred either confinement or slavery to the indiscriminate slaughter of an entire race.

While some officers curbed exterminationist policies among their men, others like Colonel John M. Chivington exemplified the rogue commander, willing to massacre innocents. Major Edward McGarry also earned a reputation as the "no prisoners" leader of the Second California Cavalry in campaigns against Chief Bear Hunter's Shoshones in Idaho and Utah. In late 1862 he had executed male prisoners when Shoshone emissaries failed to comply with the conditions of a truce. But superiors saw promise in this officer who had seen combat in Mexico with the Tenth U.S. Infantry in 1847-8 and, while campaigning against Indians in the West during Civil War, followed orders with uncommon zeal. Under Colonel Patrick Edward Connor he had won accolades at the battle of Bear River in 1863. Connor won his brigadier's star and McGarry became a lieutenant colonel following their crushing defeat of the Shoshones that left Bear Hunter and more than 250 of his people dead. The action drew "massacre" allegations and the attention of the Doolittle Commission, though both Connor and McGarry were exonerated.[7]

After serving in Nevada Territory, the southern portion of which was ceded from Arizona in 1866, McGarry was posted to Tubac in 1867, having been commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the newly-created 32nd U.S. Infantry. With characteristic energy he set out after Cochise's Chiricahua warriors, then raiding virtually unchecked back and

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[7] Fred B. Rogers, *Soldiers of the Overland* (San Francisco: Grabhorn, 1938), 33; *War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* 139 volumes (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1880–1901) [*OR*], 50(1):178-9.

forth across the international border. They thought the Apaches ghost-like, and frustration levels quickly rose for the Anglo officers and men. One soldier wrote of "Apache hunting": "chase them and they sink into the ground or somehow vanish, look behind and they are peeping over a hill at you."[8] McGarry ordered that, "no prisoners will be brought back" from punitive expeditions against the Apaches, and he instructed his officers to hang all Indians they captured. This harsh order brought a reprimand from the Pacific Department commander, Irwin McDowell, who informed the Arizona officers that "no killing in cold blood will be authorized. If the Indians are captured they will *not* be put to death. This is due to the character of civilized warriors."[9]

The peoples of the far West followed somewhat different rules of war during the Civil War years, but for most Anglo-Americans—even in the borderlands—restrained martial manhood was still seen as a virtue. Kit Carson may have come closest to epitomizing that masculine ideal. He was a self-confident man of action, but he was possessed of a conscience. While he could be driven to violent action when duty or necessity demanded it, he did not enjoy killing or boastfully celebrate the conquest of an enemy. Carson quickly sprang to the defense of women, children, and even vanquished

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[8] *Army and Navy Journal*, Sept. 28, 1867.

[9] Shortly after this reprimand, McGarry was removed from command in Arizona after being disgracefully drunk on parade at Tubac; transferred to San Francisco, he committed suicide in his hotel room by cutting his throat with a knife. Constance Wynn Altshuler, *Chains of Command: Arizona and the Army, 1856–1875* (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 1981), 78-81, 256-58; Dan L. Thrapp, *Encyclopedia of Frontier Biography,* 3 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 903. Army policy on the appropriate level of violence was still evolving at this time. Commanders issued conflicting orders, and in 1867-8 both Gen. William T. Sherman and Phil Sheridan believed that total war should be the policy and encouraged Lt. Col. George Custer and other field commanders to hang Indian depredators in order to put an end to the fighting on the Southern Plains. Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The U.S. Army and the Indian, 1866–189.* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 144. See also: James A. Donovan, *A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - the Last Great Battle of the American West* (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2008), 62-63.

enemies, while at the same time earning a reputation among friends and foes alike for his honorable conduct in war.[10]

All of the antagonists in the civil wars of the 1860s engaged in acts of violence that were previously uncommon or unknown. Vengeance torture and summary execution were most likely among Apaches, Anglos, Mexicans, and Plains Indians, though even the agrarian and semi-sedentary peoples occasionally engaged in these practices. Women and children were often victimized. The incidence of captivity, forced servitude, and concubinage reached an all-time high. Documented acts of rape were uncommon, but examples exist for each of the warring groups. The martial traditions that characterized the peoples of the borderlands contributed to the outbreak of civil wars, and the warfare resulted in unprecedented violence in the region.

Indian people also perpetrated what might be termed "massacres" in which all enemies were slain, but these, too, were isolated incidents and in most cases women and children were spared when identified as suitable for adoption, enslavement, or trade.

The persistence of slavery in the borderlands, however, remained a major obstacle to bringing about peace between the races. Slavery differed from that practiced elsewhere in the United States, but it figured prominently as both a cause and a product of the civil wars of the 1860s. Carleton quickly discovered—as had Stephen Watts Kearny, his mentor and predecessor as military conqueror and governor of New Mexico—that the Anglos, both army and civilian, were not ideologically aligned with the Hispano residents of the territories. Slavery based on ethnicity was endemic and central to the cultural economy of the Southwest. The slave system practiced by Indians and Hispanos bore

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[10] Charles F. Keefer, *Muster Roll, Kit Carson Post, No. 2* (Washington, DC: GAR Department of the Potomac, 1889), 3-4.

some resemblance to the South's peculiar institution and yet there were significant differences that evolved as a result of the conditions and cultures of the borderlands.

The fact remains that the Anglo, Hispano, and Indian peoples of the borderlands had all engaged in some form of slavery before and during the Civil War. Carleton himself, a Maine Yankee married to a Southern woman, sold the first African American slave in New Mexico while stationed there with the regular army in the 1850s. When the war began, he brought his black servant, Jim, along with the California Column as it marched to recapture the territories from Texas Confederates, who also brought their black slaves with them. But in the territories, enslaved African Americans never exceeded one hundred in any given year, and Southern-style chattel slavery did not figure significantly in the mining and agricultural economies of the Southwest. Shortly after the Mexican-American war and the acquisition of New Mexico, territorial Governor James Calhoun advocated the exclusion of free blacks, and in 1857 the territorial legislature passed the Act Restricting the movement of Free Negroes to the Territory. The racist sentiments expressed toward blacks by Southwest border Anglos from the North and South cannot be denied, but the majority of western volunteer soldiers would not have admitted to fighting for or against slavery, professing instead patriotic "Union Forever" or "States Rights" motives.[11]

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[11] Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, 309; for examples of Anglo ethnocentrism and discrimination directed at both African Americans and Hispanos see George Hand "Diary," October 26 and November 2, 1862. Aurora Hunt, *James Henry Carleton; Frontier Dragoon* (Glendale: Arthur H. Clarke, 1958), 48-50,120 and Aurora Hunt, *Kirby Benedict, Frontier Federal Judge: an Account of Legal and Judicial Development in the Southwest, 1853-1874 ...* (Glendale, CA.: Arthur H. Clark, 1961), 112-22; Jerry D. Thompson, *From Desert to Bayou: The Civil War Journal and Sketches of Morgan Wolfe Merrick* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1991), 38; Indian peoples of the borderlands had limited contact with African Americans prior to the Civil War; Cheyennes referred to them as "black whitemen" (*mok-ta-veho*). George Bent to George Hyde, Aug. 10, 1910 and Feb. 5, 1913, Bent Letters, Coe Collection, Beinecke Library, Yale. See also: Jean Afton, David Halaas, and Andrew Masich, *Cheyenne Dog Soldiers, a Ledgerbook History of Coups and*

Arizona and New Mexico Hispanos had come to depend on the labor of enslaved Indian captives, primarily Apaches and Navajos, for domestic servants and workers. This paternalistic *crianza* system of slavery was not unlike that espoused, but not necessarily practiced, by Southern plantation owners. In the minds of the perpetrators of the evil, slavery and peonage served to civilize, educate, and improve the life of those enslaved. Of course, this argument was also used by Southern slave owners, and, as in the South, many Southwestern slaves and peons resisted their captivity and resented their mistreatment at the hands of even the best-intentioned master. As in Southern slavery, in the Southwest captive women satisfied the sexual appetites of well-off, land-owning men and were sometimes taken into households as concubines or second wives. Unlike the South, the condition of slavery was not hereditary. The offspring of enslaved Indians could and often did merge into the general Hispanic population within a generation or two. The *compadrazgo* (Catholic god-parenthood) system enabled children to be baptized and watched over by their owner who was also their *padrino* (godfather, or, in some cases, biological father). In the hierarchical but flexible Spanish-Mexican *casta* system, the stigma of race or color did not prevent socio-economic integration in the same way the "one drop rule" in the American South limited upward mobility for people of African ancestry. In the early days of the transatlantic trade, children descended from African captives had been categorized as "colored" if the mother was phenotypically "black," but by the nineteenth century most Anglo Americans believed black racial identity to be tied to any African blood quantum, whether provided by the father or mother.[12]

Combat (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1997), 108-09.

[12]Morris Edward Opler, *An Apache Life-way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions of the Chiricahua Indians* (1941; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 336-37; Grenville

For the Indian peoples of the Southwest, the practice of capturing enemies to replace losses due to war and natural attrition was both ancient and natural. Enforced servitude in an Apache band or Navajo *rancheria* may not have been benign at first; the captors inflicted beatings and physical coercion to force compliance with band rules and family needs. Like the chattel slavery of the South, rape and the threat of physical punishment ensured a hegemonic authority over the enslaved people. Apache war parties that returned with captives often bartered them in Mexico or to other bands or tribes for needed supplies or stock. The plight of these captives was frightening and abusive but like Southern chattel slavery, commodification also meant that the chattel had monetary value that protected them from the harshest forms of torture or summary execution. However, in Apache bands, captives might be turned over to families that required revenge for a relative killed by that enemy people. While death might be exacted, often the aggrieved family would be "paid back" by adopting the captive—a form of retribution called by the Apaches, *gegodza.* Once incorporated into the nation, the newcomer soon enjoyed the rights and privileges of the people, though to some degree the captives would always be considered outsiders, and when disputes arose the purity of one's blood might be called into question. As in the Hispano tradition and unlike the Atlantic slave trade and Southern chattel slavery, adult male captives or slaves were

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Goodwin, *Western Apache Raiding & Warfare*, ed. Keith Basso (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971), 77; Brooks, *Captives & Cousins*, 236-7; Matthew Restall, *The Black Middle; Africans, Mayas, and Spaniards in Colonial Yucatan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 90-6; see also: Lawrence Wright, "One Drop of Blood," *The New Yorker*, July 24, 1994; Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime*. (New York: D. Appleton, 1918); Kenneth Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South* (New York: Knopf, 1956); Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South* (New York: Pantheon, 1965); Kathleen Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), passim.

rarely taken. More tractable than men, women and children were preferred for domestic service, marriage, and adoption. Wealthy Navajo *ricos* became so dependent upon their enslaved Hispano and captive Indian servants and herders that even the best efforts of army officers and Indian agents of the new Anglo regime following the Civil War did not completely eliminate the practice until a generation had passed.

Civil leaders in the territories clamored for more protection from Indian raiders, but when the campaigns launched against the Navajos and Mescalero Apaches by volunteer troops from New Mexico and California resulted in the wholesale destruction of Indian crops and herds and the submission and relocation of some Indians to reservations, presumably protected by U.S. troops from white civilians and sedentary nations seeking stock and slaves, the Hispanos and their Indian allies cried foul. New Mexico's Hispanos often masked slave raids as attempts to recover livestock taken by Indians, but the real object was captives to be used as slaves or concubines.

Even with New Mexico Governor Henry Connelly's May 4, 1864 proclamation prohibiting "traffic in captive Indians" and the thirteenth amendment to the U.S. constitution (signed by Lincoln on February 1, 1865 and officially adopted December 6, 1865) declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States," chattel slavery and peonage still thrived in the territories. The Peonage Act of 1867 finally closed any loopholes, lingering doubt, or chances for misunderstanding related to the abolition of slavery in the Southwest.[13]

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[13] Aviam Soifer, "Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition of Voluntary Peonage" *Columbia Law Review,* Vol. 112:1607 (2012), 1617; Risa L. Goluboff, "The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights," *Duke Law Journal* 50 (2001), 1609, 1638; see also: Gary L. Roberts, *Death Comes for the Chief Justice: The Slough-Rynerson Quarrel and Political Violence in New Mexico* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990), 36-8; for examples of Anglo confusion over

Carleton had been the lead actor in the drama that unfolded in the Southwest borderlands. He was unwavering in his conviction that the white race and the "powerful Christian nation" that the United States had become had a moral obligation to civilize the Indian tribes. For Carleton, this missionary cause was in itself sufficient justification for subjugating the indigenous peoples, but he needed more to convince Congress, the War Department, and the Bureau of Indian affairs. During the Civil War years, the military necessity of suppressing the rebellion was reason enough for seizing control of the territories and their peoples. The fierce resistance offered by the warrior cultures of mountains and plains in response to increased military campaigning fueled the fires of civil war in the Southwest. Carleton made the economic argument, insisting to the War Department and all who would listen that, "*we can feed them cheaper than we can fight them.*" By 1864, however, Carleton relied on the apparent urgent necessity of securing the mineral wealth of the region—against threats foreign and domestic—to support the national war effort.[14]

Carleton himself eventually became disenchanted with the territories he had helped save for the Union and then transform into the Anglo-American vision of civilization. Once he had exercised supreme control, making war and peace as he saw

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the status of peons, see: J. H. Whitlock to Nelson H. Davis Aug. 22, 1866 and Davis to Whitlock, Sept. 1, 1866 in House Exec. Doc. No. 1, 39th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial No. 1284, 137; many Hispanic New Mexicans refused to admit that peonage was a form of slavery, e.g. Antonio José Martinez testimony, Taos, July 26, 1865: "there is an idea that the Indians captive and bought from their fathers, similar to the Yutas [Utes], who sell their sons and daughters in exchange for horses and other objects, are held as slaves. No, they are servants, and are well treated; if they marry, they are free to live in their master's house and pass their life as they please, the same as with the sons of Indians, who, if not married when attaining their majority, become free after their marriage." Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 490.

[14] Carleton to Lorenzo Thomas, AG, Feb. 7, March 6, and March 12, 1864, Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes*, 157, 162-63, 166-68.

fit.[15] He built forts, roads, and oversaw all government activities, military and civil. He colonized the Navajos and Apaches and even envisioned a colony of Anglo-American soldiers that would "civilize" the territories. Now, stung by criticism from his own California soldiers and hounded mercilessly by Anglo and Hispano political opponents—including territorial leaders, newspapermen, and business interests—opposed to his "military despotism," the general seemed incapable of making new friends or political allies. Most felt him unapproachable and imperious in his dealings with soldiers and citizens alike. "Behold him!" wrote the editor of the Santa Fe *New Mexican,* "his martial cloak thrown gracefully around him like a Roman toga." Carleton's efficiency and self-reliance had made him a favorite of his superiors, up to and including General U. S. Grant, who saw fit to bestow upon him the brevet rank of major general of volunteers in October, 1865. But during the months following the end of the war, Carleton's Bosque Redondo reservation for relocated Navajos and Mescaleros had proved a disaster as the emotionally devastated Indian internees died by the hundreds of disease and malnutrition.[16]

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[15] Carleton brought his military governorship and control of civil affairs in New Mexico to an end on July 4, 1865, the same day the Doolittle Committee began its hearings in Santa Fe. C.L. Sonnichsen, *The Mescalero Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 131.

[16] Select Committee on Indian Depredation Claims Report No. 1701, 50th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Report to Accompany bill H. R. 9383, 3-7. The congressional committee accepted the depredation claim of J.G. Fell and other trustees of the Walnut Grove Gold Mining Company which concisely summarized Carleton's "supreme control" in the territories and also implied culpability for failing to protect the lives of citizens and property in his domain. Walnut Grove Gold Mining Company v. Apaches, Case 4715, RG 123, NARA. Carleton died in 1873, still on active duty but embittered by the treatment he received from the country he had served for more than thirty years. News of his death, at age fifty-eight, was received with expressions of sorrow in the territories. Even his critics seemed willing to recognize his accomplishments. The citizens of Santa Fe drew up resolutions honoring Carleton's memory, which they asked to be published in territorial newspapers, the San Antonio *Herald,* the *Army and Navy Journal,* and the San Francisco *Daily Alta California. Santa Fe New Mexican,* Sept. 23, Dec. 16, 1864, Feb. 4, 11, 1873; Hunt, *Carleton; Frontier Dragoon,* 348–49; Darlis Miller, *The California Column in New* Mexico, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 210; Gerald Thompson, *The Army and the Navajo: The Bosque Redondo Reservation Experiment, 1863-1868*

The 1866 election of Carleton's one-time subordinate and now chief political adversary, J. Francisco Chavez, as congressional delegate from New Mexico territory sent the War Department a clear message—the people had lost confidence in the general's leadership. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton informed the beleaguered Carleton that as of April 30, 1866 he would be relieved of his duties in the territories. After a furlough and much-needed rest with family and friends in the East, the War Department saw fit to assign Carleton to serve as Lt. Colonel of the Fourth U.S. Cavalry and military oblivion in Texas. While Carleton stewed in self-righteous indignation, Anglo politicians and many of the traditional *jefes politicos*, like Chavez, took advantage of their new freedom to woo New Mexico Hispanos. Even though the majority of Hispanos resisted political and social Americanization, many took an accommodationist stance. In some ways, New Mexican politics continued as before. American political parties—Republican, Democrat, and Whig—had little meaning. Allegiances were based on family and church ties. New Mexicans joined the "Chavez Party," "Gallegos Party," or "Perea Party." As Hispanos struggled to find their place in an increasingly Anglo world, Anglos jockeyed for power and dominance in the world of wild-west politics and frontier justice. In 1867, John P. Slough, the Colorado Volunteer regimental commander who had won victory at Glorieta Pass in 1862, was shot down in the lobby of a Santa Fe hotel in a political dispute with former California Volunteer officer, William Rynerson. Rynerson and other Anglo power brokers backed the Chavez faction. Slough was anti-peonage and determined to break up the alliance between Hispano elites and Anglos that

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(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 121–28; Arrell Morgan Gibson, "James H. Carleton," in *Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier*, ed. Paul A. Hutton (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 59–74.

flouted the justice system. He had become the chief justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court yet his widow could get no justice for his murder in the volatile, partisan environment that characterized the territory's political environment in the post-war years.[17]

With the end of the Civil War, the nomadic peoples of the Southern Plains saw that their traditional way of life was coming to an end. By 1867, Anglo immigrant trails and transcontinental railroad tracks divided the buffalo, once numbering in the tens of millions, into northern and southern herds. Eastern businessmen discovered buffalo hides were a commercially viable substitute for leather formerly produced from domesticated cattle for industrial drive belts and other applications. Railroad workers, soldiers and westering Americans—white and black—displaced by the War of the Rebellion[18] created a demand for buffalo meat as well. The slaughter of the herds disrupted the lifeway of the people of the Southern Plains. In response to this invasion, Comanche, Kiowa, Cheyenne, and Arapaho buffalo hunters turned increasingly to raiding for subsistence and, inevitably, to wars of revenge. The destruction of the buffalo economy doomed the nomadic hunters who were eventually resettled on reservations and became truly "dependent nations"—an enforced dependency—that made them wholly reliant on the federal government. By the end of the decade, the disintegration of the Indian tribes of the Southern Plains and borderlands was well underway.

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[17] Miller, *California Column*, 174-75. Carleton assumed duties as lieutenant colonel of the Fourth U.S. Cavalry at San Antonio, where he died of pneumonia at the age of 58 on Jan. 7, 1873. His obituary noted: "During the Rebellion his duties lay not only in suppressing the rebels in Texas and New Mexico, which he successfully did, but in subduing the Apaches and Navajoes, who were then virtually the rulers of those Territories." *Alta*, Jan. 9, 1873; see also: Roberts, *Death Comes for the Chief Justice*, 6-7, 37, 103, 156-7.

[18] By the end of the Civil War, the U.S. government officially named the four-year conflict as the War of the Rebellion, though it was referred to then, and still is today, by other names depending on one's cultural and geographical perspective e.g. War Between the States, War of Northern Aggression, War for Southern Independence, Second American Revolution, Freedom War, War of Session.

By 1867, the Republic of Mexico emerged from its civil war financially and militarily exhausted but more united politically than at any time since its creation as a nation. Mexico's civil war also brought great social change, especially for Indian peoples. The Ópatas of Sonora, most of whom sided with Manuel Gándara, the Mexican conservatives, and Maximilian's Imperial regime, were either killed or dispersed by Juarez's supporters. Many Ópatas had counted on the Conservatives to restore lands and autonomy wrested from them first by the Spanish and then by Mexican reformers. But General Refugio Tánori Ópata army suffered defeat by Republican forces aided by their own Ópata auxiliaries at the battle of Mátape in 1865. It seems that Mexico's civil war spawned a more localized internecine conflict between Ópata factions.[19] Tánori himself boarded ship at Guaymas en route for Baja California but Republican forces stopped the vessel before it reached the peninsula and executed the general.[20] A similar fate befell the Yaquis and their Mayo allies. The Juaristas colonized many in settlements in Sonora and

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[19] William C. Sturtevant, *Handbook of North American Indians*, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978) 10:321.

[20] Tension between the Spanish, Mexicans, and Ópata manifested itself in numerous revolts in the 19th century. In 1820, 300 Ópata warriors defeated a Spanish force of 1,000 soldiers, and destroyed a mining town near Tonichi. Later, the Ópatas won another battle at Arivechi, killing more than 30 soldiers. A Spanish force of 2,000 soldiers finally defeated the Ópatas, forcing the survivors to surrender. The Spanish executed the Ópata leaders, including Dorame, whose surname is still common in the Opatería region of Sonora. Revolts continued after Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821. Another Ópata leader, Dolores Gutierrez, was executed in 1833 by the Mexicans for his involvement in a revolt. Although the Ópatas had formidable reputations as warriors, they were never able to unite as a single people to oppose the Spanish and Mexicans. Most of the Ópatas supported the French during their brief rule of Mexico from 1864 to 1867, as did many other Sonoran Indians. Republican retribution following the expulsion of the French resulted in the loss of nearly all of the Ópatas' remaining lands and the end of their resistance to Mexican rule. Edward H. Spicer, *Cycles of Conques Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533–1960* (1962; reprint, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), 62; David A. Yetman, *The Ópatas: In Search of a Sonoran People* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 243-45; see also: Jack D. Forbes, "Historical Survey of the Indians of Sonora, 1821-1910," *Ethnohistory*, Vol. 4, No. 4. (Autumn, 1957), 335-349; for the early war practices of the Ópatas and other Sonoran Indians see Nentvig, *Rudo Ensayo Sonora . . .* (San Augustin de la Florida: Albany, Munsell Printer, 1863), 64-66, 84-92; "Message of the President of the United States, Jan. 29, 1867, Relating to the Present Condition of Mexico in Answer to a Resolution of the House Dec. 4, 1866," Government Printing Office, 1867.

Chihuahua or assimilated into the general mestizo population, but others continued to resist until destroyed or driven north across the border into Southern Arizona where the refugees eventually established a separate Yaqui community near Tucson.[21]

After Juárez's Republican victory, Mexico's Conservative party was so thoroughly discredited by its alliance with the invading French troops that it effectively ceased to exist, and the Liberals went almost unchallenged as a political force during the first years of the restored Republic. U.S. support of the Liberals had also restored, to some degree, less hostile though still mutually suspicious international relations, but the border itself was more regulated than ever before, complicating the continuing struggle with Apache raiders who took advantage of the lack of cooperation that resulted from the hardened borderline. O'odham people (Pimas and Papagos) also found that families and bands were now separated by an international boundary that now interfered with movement, communication, and community cohesion.[22]

The Civil War years saw the largest engagements and the most war-related deaths in the history of the borderlands. Although the violence abated by 1867, the struggle for physical and cultural survival continued for many peoples and communities, especially the Chiricahua and Western Apache bands. Isolated instances of raiding, warfare, and vicious retaliation between these Apaches and their Hispano and Anglo adversaries, both military and civilian, can be documented through military reports, petitions to congress, depredation claims, and newspaper accounts through the 1870s. Even so, the scale,

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[21] In the 20th century, the Yaquis' economic survival strategy changed radically in Arizona, but many rituals and traditions were maintained or adapted. Edward H. Spicer, *Pascua: A Yaqui Village in Arizona*), passim.

[22] Eric V. Meeks, *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 241-47.

frequency of attacks, and death toll related to this fighting do not come close to that seen between 1861 and 1867.[23] The Anglo-dominated U.S. military exploited the use of Hispano and Indian auxiliaries, sometimes resulting in conflicted loyalties leading to civil conflict. The Chiricahua Apache leader Victorio, under intense pressure from constant campaigns by U.S. troops and their Indian allies, promised, "we want a lasting peace, one that will keep. We would like to live in our country, and will go onto a reservation where the government may put us, and those who do not come, we will go and help fight them."[24] South of the border internecine war saw a marked decline with death of Maximilian in 1867, the departure of his European allies, and the triumph of Juárez's Republican government; but for Indian people such as the Yaquis, determined to maintain their established traditions, the struggle for cultural survival continued.[25]

The Civil War years ushered in a new age of increased federal control and involvement in the lives of the American people. Slavery was constitutionally abolished, an income tax was instituted for the first time, and millions of veterans became eligible for pensions and other public assistance not previously recognized as the responsibility of the U.S. government. Congress empowered federal agencies to compensate citizens and subject peoples for war losses and "depredations." Citizens and Indians alike made

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[23] The number of armed combats and "depredations" during the period 1861-67 far exceeded the period preceding and following it. For comparison see: *Record of Engagements With Hostile Indians Within the Military Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882, Lieutenant General P. H. Sheridan, commanding. Compiled from Official Records*. Chicago: HQ Military Division of the Missouri, 1882.

[24] Victorio made this statement in 1865. He found the enforced dependence of the U.S. reservation system humiliating and untenable for his Chihenne people and continued warfare. He was killed by Mexican troops in the Tres Castillos Massacre of 1880. Jessica Dawn Palmer, *The Apache Peoples: A History of All Bands and Tribes Through the 1880s* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2013), 279.

[25] For perspective on the Chiricahua experience, which differed from that of other Apaches and Navajo people, see Roger Nichols' summary in *Warrior Nations: The United States and Indian Peoples* (Norman: Oklahoma Press, 2013) 146-65; Spicer, *Cycles of Conquest*, 64-67, 83-85 and *Pascua: A Yaqui Village*, passim.

claims for property destroyed by armies and by tribes recognized by treaty as being "in amity" with the U.S. government. Indian tribes were placed on reservations and provisions made for housing, provisioning, educating, and re-training the semi-nomadic and nomadic peoples as farmers and stock-raisers in the Anglo-American tradition. The expanded role of government necessitated a greatly expanded government bureaucracy, including a massive Indian Bureau, an expanded Interior Department, Court of Claims, and an enlarged regular army for duty in the Reconstruction South and the Western territories in order to keep order and prevent a renewal of civil war.

The American Civil War created conditions that expanded the long-simmering strife between peoples of different communities (nations, tribes, ethnicities) and led to civil war on a scale that had never been seen before in the Southwest borderlands.[26] The causes of civil wars are so deeply rooted that such conflicts never really end—they just subside until triggered again. The Indian, Hispano, and Anglo people of the borderlands had evolved cultures of martial masculinity that became a precursor of deadly conflict. They were pre-disposed for war, and the competition for resources—water, food, minerals, and land—contributed to igniting the wars of the 1860s. Equally important was the desire of competing cultures, especially semi-nomadic raiders and sedentary agriculturalists, to dominate and enslave one another. The American Civil War was not the root cause of the multiple civil wars of the Southwest borderlands, but it did fan the smoldering embers of cultural and economic insecurity into flames of war.

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[26] Gutierrez argues that the Pueblo Revolt against the Spaniards in 1680 was in fact a civil war with terrible consequences. The losses in dead alone are difficult to estimate for the Pueblo insurgents, but 422 Spanish citizens died in the 1680 uprising in New Mexico. By 1700 the "rebellion" was quashed and Spanish rule prevailed until the Mexican Revolution of 1821. Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), *xxvii-xxix*, 107.

Ethnic groups struggled for survival and dominance in ways that reflected their unique cultures and traditions. These conflicts played a role in shaping social relationships that are still evident today. Before the Civil War, there existed a hostile but interdependent raid and reprisal relationship between the Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples characterized by raiding and captive-taking but not "war to the death," resulting in the total domination or extermination of the enemy. Before the war, the numerically superior and militarily powerful Indian peoples of the borderlands set the terms of engagement. The concurrent rise of militaristic cultures in which young men—Indian, Hispano, and Anglo—glorified and prepared for war, while at the same time the Anglo newcomers to the region advanced the idea of total war, contributed significantly to the escalation of violence that made the 1860s the deadliest decade the borderlands had ever seen. The peoples of the borderlands struggled not just for the physical safety of their communities but for their cultural survival as well. These conflicts resulted in new military, political, and social alliances and hierarchies.

The initial withdrawal of Anglo soldiers in 1861 led to a power vacuum filled by Indian raiders that far outnumbered their Hispano, Anglo, and agrarian Indian adversaries. The subsequent invasion of the territories by Anglos, Union and Confederate, resulted in alliances among Anglos, Hispanos, and sedentary Indian tribes allowing them, collectively, to wage a relentless war on the raiding Navajos and Apaches.

By 1867, peonage and slavery—as economic and social systems—were dying and a new social, political, and economic order existed with Anglos, Hispanos, and assimilated and sedentary Indians at the top of the hierarchy and the raiding nations at the bottom. Racial and ethnic distinctions were institutionalized, and the federal government

exerted control over reservation-restricted Indians and defined new territorial boundaries. Hispano and Anglo citizens adopted and uneasily shared the Anglo American political and economic model for survival in the Southwest while struggling for cultural identity. International relations had also changed, and a better-defined and more-controlled border between Mexico and the United States—a border that divided some Indian communities—characterized the new world that emerged from the war-torn borderlands.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A



Indian tribes and language groups of the Southwest Borderlands c. 1860

1. Cheyenne, Arapaho
2. Kiowa
3. Apache
4. Comanche
5. Lipan
6. Jicarilla
7. Pueblo
8. Mescalero
9. Navajo
10. Chiricahua
11. Ute
12. Western Apache
13. Paiute
14. Havasupai
15. Mojave
16. Chemehuevi
17. Yavapai
18. Hopi
19. Quechan
20. Maricopa
21. Pima
22. Cocopah
23. Papago
24. Opata
25. Shoshone
26. Yaqui
27. Zuni

APPENDIX B

Graphs and charts



Figure 1. Arizona and New Mexico Indian depredation claims 1860-1867[1]

[1] The number of armed combats and "depredations" during the period 1861-67 far exceeded the period preceding and following it. For comparison see: *Record of Engagements With Hostile Indians Within the Military Division of the Missouri, from 1868 to 1882, Lieutenant General P. H. Sheridan, commanding. Compiled from Official Records*. Chicago: HQ Military Division of the Missouri, 1882.



Figure 2. Tribes accused of depredations in New Mexico and Arizona, 1860-1867



Figure 3. Ethnicity of Depredation Claimants in New Mexico and Arizona 1860-1867



Figure 4. Casualties inflicted by Indians in Arizona and New Mexico based on Depredation Claims, 1861-1867



Figure 5. New Mexico citizens/subjects killed in Indian attacks as recorded in Catholic Church records. (Brugge: 30-31, 156)



Figure 6. Captives recorded in New Mexico baptismal records, 1860-69 (Brugge: 22-3)

		killed	wounded	captured
1863	Indians	301	87	703
	U.S. soldiers	17	25	0
	Citizens	48	7	3
1864	Indians	363	140	8090
	U.S. soldiers	7	25	0
	Citizens	20	14	1

Figure 7. Casualties inflicted by U.S. Army and Indians in Arizona and New Mexico, 1863-1864.[2]

[2] U.S. Army report of casualties in New Mexico and Arizona resulting from Indian conflict 1863-1864. Doolittle, *Condition of the Indian Tribes: Joint Special Committee Report.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1867, 256-7, 267-8; Lorenzo Labadie *vs*. Navajo, Case 3259, RG 123, NARA, 7-8.

APPENDIX C

Arizona and New Mexico Indian Depredation Claims at the National Archives

The largely un-organized and un-researched group of documents known as "Indian Depredation Claims" are housed with related United States Court of Claims records at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. There, researchers will find more than ten thousand depredation claim cases filed between 1796 and 1920, many still bundled and securely tied with their original red tape. Of these claims, more than five hundred relate to Arizona and New Mexico during the period 1861-67. The case files in record groups 75 and 123 contain depositions, testimony, cross-examinations, and other evidence—a wealth of information detailing the nature of raids and warfare in the Southwest that can allow historians to answer questions about the groups initiating the attacks; the number, extent, and violence of depredations over time; and the patterns of conflict and tactics employed. The claims represent only a fraction of the raids, attacks, and skirmishes that occurred during this period, but when examined with other primary sources, a complex picture emerges of culturally distinctive methods of conflict, accommodation, cooperation, and other survival strategies employed by Indian, Hispano, and Anglo peoples of the Southwest during the Civil War. The battle lines were not always drawn along racial or cultural lines—economic and political interests at times trumped race in the regional conflict intensified by the national war. Today, the

Southwest borderlands are growing faster than any region in the United States, and daily news reports indicate a potentially explosive convergence of races and cultures that Americans would be well advised to study and understand.[3]

The Indian Depredation Claim files found in record groups 75 and 123 at the National Archives represent a rich and largely untapped body of records relating to claims made against American Indians by individuals seeking compensation for lost property or productivity as a result of thefts or attacks while the defendant nation was "in amity" (under treaty and considered at peace) with the federal government. Nearly 10,000 claims were adjudicated between 1796 and 1920. The problem for historians wishing to access these records is the lack of finding aids and consistent cataloging. The disorganized state of the collection resulted from changes in the depredation claim process and jurisdiction of the records. Though the Department of the Interior was nominally responsible for the records, the U.S. Army, Office of Indian Affairs, Congress, and U.S. Court of Claims all, at one time, became directly involved in the review of the case files and recommendations for awarding payment for losses. When administrative jurisdiction changed, the records were bundled and moved. New numbering systems were created and indexes made. Over the years, most of the indexes have been lost, and

[3] Depredation Case Files, NARA, RG 123; Evidence Concerning Depredation Claims, NARA RG 75. Taken alone, these documents do not represent a complete record of conflict during the Civil War. The claims report losses of civilian property to Indians considered to be at peace with and under the protection of the U.S. government. Army reports and War Department records, Office of Indian Affairs reports, newspaper accounts, reminiscences (letters, diaries, oral interviews, memoirs), and church and cemetery records should also be consulted to complete the picture. Depredation claims must also be scrutinized for indications of fraud. During the late nineteenth century, unscrupulous lawyers preyed on victims of Indian attacks in an effort to cash in on the federal government's depredation payment program. The U.S. Court of Claims received a flood of claims in the 1880s and 1890s. Chicago and Washington attorneys sought out potential claimants and promised windfall payments for losses suffered at the hands of Indian depredators in the 1860s. Many of the claimants were Mexican Americans in their 50s or 60s at the time they testified or provided depositions. Most spoke Spanish as their primary language and were either illiterate or poorly educated. See Larry Skogen, *Indian Depredation Claims, 1796-1920* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996) for an overview of the depredation claims process.

the only remaining finding aid is a partial name index, relating to Court of Claims records in RG 123, created by 49th Congress in 1887. [4] I used this index, and a supplement made in 1896, to locate the names of claimants that I believed were located in Arizona or New Mexico. These names could then be matched by NARA staff, who had access to a master name index prepared in 1955, to case files stored in RG 123, yielding about one hundred claims made for depredations occurring in the territories between 1860 and 1867.

Suspecting that there were more claims to be found, I systematically examined nearly ten thousand Depredation Claim file "jackets" located in RG 75. These mostly empty folders had once contained claims, depositions, testimony and correspondence relating to each claim. In most cases, the contents were missing but handwritten on each jacket cover was the name of the claimant, the Indians involved, the date of the alleged depredation, and a summary of what was lost and its value. These jackets served as an index, of sorts, from which I identified additional Civil War Arizona and New Mexico claimants. Knowing the date, place, and name of a depredation, I used the 1955 RG 123 name index to locate more than three hundred additional claims. While sorting through each box of numerically filed claims, I discovered nearly one hundred additional claims, not previously identified in RG 75 or in the RG 123 index. In total more than five hundred claims relating to Arizona and New Mexico from 1860-67 were found. Each folder was examined in detail. Photocopies or digital photographs were made of claim statements, depositions by claimants and witnesses, testimony and cross-examinations

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[4] *Indian Depredation Records All Claims filed to 1887, House Ex Docket 125, 49th Cong. 1st Sess., Congressional Serial Set 2399, No. 125, Vol. 31.*

generated by attorneys for the claimant and defendant, relevant correspondence, printed documents from appeals, and evidence (including brand books, watercolor paintings, and sketches). A worksheet was created for each claim, organized by the name of the claimant. From this information I created an Excel spreadsheet that enabled me to classify and quantify the details of the depredations by permitting additional analysis and graphing. This information provides insights into the difference between raiding and warfare, warrior traditions, and primary motivations for civil wars in the Southwest borderlands.

- What years (months, days) saw the greatest number of raids from 1861-67? Can this be correlated with other events (e.g. U.S. military activity)?
- What were the human losses (dead, wounded, tortured, and sexually assaulted) and property (horses, cattle, goods, etc.) losses? Which group killed the most? The fewest?
- Are there patterns of raiding/warfare by culture group and what do they reveal about the martial traditions and cultures of the combatants?
- Did violent attacks (war, revenge, and raid) increase during the Civil War years (1861-67)?
- Did revenge attacks increase following an increase in Anglo (Union, Confederate) activity?
- What was the frequency of attacks (war, revenge, and raid) over time?
- Who were the most frequent attackers?
- Who were the most frequent victims?
- What property was most often taken or destroyed?
- What was the value of the property loss? 1861? 1862? 1863? 1864? 1865? 1866? 1867?
- How often were the victims of an attack killed or wounded? Captured? Sexually assaulted? Tortured? Which group was responsible for the above? (e.g. did Apaches kill more often?)
- What was the motive of the attack: "war" or retaliation or raid (for property)?
- What was the "anatomy" of an attack by the different groups? Are there significant differences that provide insight their respective cultures?
- What time of year? What day of the month? What time of day? (can an historical almanac tell moon cycle—is there a pattern?)
- Did attackers come mounted or on foot?
- Did attackers use firearms?
- What was the average size of a war/raiding party?

- What was the tactic most frequently employed? Did it differ by ethnic group or attacking nation? (e.g. Anglos, Hispanos, Apache, Navajo)
- Which group was the most frequent instigator of an attack in Arizona? New Mexico? Did this change over time?
- What was the primary motive for an attack by Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians? What about sub-groups, e.g. Apaches, U.S. soldiers, Hispano civilians?

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