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Presented by: Doug Cloud

Accepted by the Department of English

Readers:

Chairperson, Professor Linda Flower — Date: 4/15/2014

Professor Barbara Johnstone — Date: April 18, 2014

Professor Andreea Ritivoi — Date: 04/18/2014

Approved by the Committee on Graduate Degrees

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The Gay Warrior and the Untroubled Comrade

The Rhetoric of Identity Categories in the Public Sphere

Doug Cloud

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Identity Categories and Public Discourse

Imagine yourself as a spectator at a congressional hearing held by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) in the spring of 1993. The topic: gays in the military. The topic has been the subject of intense public debate for months because newly elected president Bill Clinton has pledged to end the ban on gay troops. It's late in the afternoon and individual representatives are taking turns making their own arguments and questioning witnesses. Rep. Patricia Schroeder, a Democrat from Colorado and the first woman elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from that state, uses her time to argue that Congress should not make decisions about gay service based on stereotypical images of gay people. You watch as retired Brigadier General William Weise repeatedly interrupts Schroeder and offers his own point of view on gays in the U.S. military. Weise is a credible witness. Revered by Marines in particular, he is a decorated Vietnam veteran who played a major role in the creation of the National Museum of the Marine Corps outside Quantico, Virginia (Jackman, 2013). At the end of a tense back-and-forth between Schroeder and Weise, the general offers the following argument:

> The point is, if you put homosexuals in a situation like that—and in a study that I [have] seen, less than 2 percent claim celibacy—it is like putting a hungry dog in a meat shop. It is like putting a fox guarding a hen coop. It just doesn't make sense. (HASC, 1993, p. 165)

Weise's statement is a bit shocking. One could dismiss it as a sign of the times—1993 may seem recent, but in the terms of public attitudes toward gay people it was indeed a different century. Contemporary readers might regard Weise's comments as nothing more than a regrettable public display of anti-gay animus. Perhaps the comment is revealing of Weise's own attitudes, but it certainly isn't *serious* public policy discourse.

But what if we chose to see Weise's comment as indeed serious, perhaps even a necessary element of public discourse?[1] What if, rather than dismissing his words as textbook homophobia, we understood Weise's comment and other comments like it as important moments in public deliberation? From this point of view, Weise was doing more than expressing animus; he was articulating his own working understanding of what the category "homosexual" means in practice—what gay people do and why they do it. His comments are but one small piece of a much larger process, a process in which public discourses circulate—and slowly revise—the knowledge contained within identity categories. This knowledge is key because identity categories, especially those invoked in policy discourse, are not "objectively apparent" but constructed and re-constructed in discourse through "powerful processes of representation" (Asen, 2010, p. 127). Even in the context of public issues that are not traditionally seen as implicating "identity" (i.e. debates well outside of the realm of identity politics), identity categories are a powerful resource for persuasion and public decision-making. For example:

> In the Social Security debates, politicians supportive of the existing Social Security program cast retirees as frugal grandparents enjoying fulfillment in retirement, whereas some advocates of privatization (albeit less often politicians), cast retirees as "greedy geezers," pursuing conspicuous consumption over the long-term well-being of their children and grandchildren. (Asen, 2010, p. 127)

What we *do* about gays in the military and Social Security privatization is going to depend, in part, on how we understand retirees and gay people as identity categories. What are their habitual actions and motivations? What do they do and why do they do it? And this process doesn't only affect the beneficiaries (or victims) of public policies. Identity categories can also influence how other participants, such as expert witnesses, are perceived. If, for example, we see environmentalists as "spoilers" who oppose progress of any kind (cf. Killingsworth & Palmer, 1992, pp. 26, 31), we are going to interpret their arguments differently than if we were to see their actions as motivated by a concern for public welfare.

In this project, I explore the rhetorical dimensions of identity categories in public discourse. I do so in the context of a specific issue: gay people in the United States military. Given my focus on a marginalized identity category, the findings described here will have special relevance for those seeking to understand how democratic societies confront difference through public discourse. The project aims to offer a generalizable framework for understanding how identity categories function rhetorically in public discourse.

Chapter two develops a theoretical framework for studying the rhetoric of identity talk. The framework draws on rhetorical and sociolinguistic theories to help further define the rhetorical dimensions of identity talk, specifically identity talk that invokes categories. Any theoretical framework for studying identity talk will need to answer the essentialism

charge that is often leveled against identity research. In this case, a rhetorical understanding can help us avoid an essentialized or oversimplified view of identity and identity categories. This theoretical framework also clarifies some of the ways in which rhetorical identity talk differs from ethos. The final section of chapter two addresses the social value of categorical identity talk by examining multiple perspectives on its role in public deliberation.

Chapter three outlines a methodological framework for studying the rhetoric of identity categories in public deliberation: *rhetorical archetype analysis*. This method allows one to locate and track patterns in the use of identity categories across long stretches of public deliberation (i.e. texts and transcripts that comprise hundreds of pages, thousands of turns and dozens of speakers). Rhetorical archetypes are widely circulating, prototypical representations of individuals who fall within an identity category or categories (e.g. gay, soldier)—a kind of rhetorically potent "stock character." These archetypes can be found, named, and described in a way that makes them recognizable in texts. The end result is a reliable coding scheme (i.e. a set of well-described archetypes) that can support research into how identities-in-discourse shape and are shaped by public deliberation over time.

Chapter four test-drives the framework and methodology proposed in chapters two and three through an analysis of two sets of hearings held by the House Armed Services Committee on the subject of gays in the military. Five rhetorical archetypes circulate around gay people in the hearings: the gay warrior, the gay victim, the gay spoiler, the gay activist and the gay family member. The analysis breaks each archetype down into elements that can be spotted individually (including motives, attributes, actions and keywords). I analyze each archetype individually to show how each one functioned argumentatively. Tracking these

archetypes across both hearings yielded some surprising findings, most notably a huge rise in the incidence of the gay warrior.

The fifth and final chapter offers additional social and historical factors to help explain the rise of the gay warrior. The increasing frequency of the gay warrior in the hearings is, at least in part, a sign of its growing "ordinariness" in public discourse. An additional rhetorical archetype—the untroubled comrade—may help explain the increased circulation of the gay warrior and its rhetorical potency within the discourse surrounding DADT. These findings have historical importance for the study of gay rights discourse, but their true value lies in what they can tell us about how identity categories functioned in a live public controversy. In particular, a critical appraisal of the gay warrior suggests that even an ostensibly "good" archetype may entail serious tradeoffs on the part of a marginalized group.

2. Don't Ask, Don't Tell and Gays in the Military: Some Context

This project seeks, first and foremost, to understand the rhetorical functions of identity categories in public policy discourse and public discourse more generally. However, the project is situated in a case study of two moments (Congressional hearings in 1993 and 2008) in the public deliberation surrounding Don't Ask, Don't Tell.[2] Although an in-depth history of the gays-in-the-military issue in the United States is beyond the scope of the project, it will help to have some historical and social context. The phrase "don't ask, don't tell" was the creation of Charles Moskos, a prominent military sociologist. The policy came into being as the result of President Bill Clinton's public commitment, during the 1992 presidential election, to end the ban on gay service during his first weeks as president. What followed was an extended public discussion of the gays-in-the-military issue during which it

became clear that Clinton and his gay supporters had vastly underestimated the ferocity of resistance to allowing gays to serve openly.[3] DADT, the resulting policy, stopped far short of ending discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It ended the practice of asking recruits about their sexual orientation (don't ask) but forbade them from revealing a gay orientation or allowing it to become known in any other way (don't tell). The policy—called by many a compromise—was in part the work of Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), who felt that the gay and lesbian lobby, such as it was, lacked the influence necessary to achieve a policy of full non-discrimination. Frank believed that, barring some sort of intermediate option (i.e. DADT), the likely outcome of the 1992-1993 discussion was an outright ban (Lehring, 2003, p. 145). The policies that became collectively known as DADT were implemented in 1993. The legislative effort that ultimately succeeded in repealing DADT began to pick up steam with Barack Obama's public commitment, made during his 2008 presidential campaign, to end the policy. A measure to repeal DADT was passed in December 2010 and took effect in September 2011.[4]

Beyond a basic sense of the timeline, there are three things readers should know about DADT and the gays-in-the-military issue as a whole. First, DADT was not a response to a new concern: its creation and repeal represent only a small chapter in the complex, evolving story of gays in the United States military. Second, although the gays-in-the-military issue was not new at the time of DADT, it nevertheless represented a fundamental shift in focus for the gay rights movement—to many gay and lesbian people, the concern with the right to serve seemed to "come out of nowhere" in the early 1990s. Third, the DADT controversy is an ideal candidate for a case study on the rhetorical functions of

identity categories because it showcases several of the functions that identity categories can perform in public discourse.

The creation of DADT was not the first attempt to regulate homosexuality in the armed forces. Not even close. If we take a broad view of homosexuality, then the question of what to do about gays in the military has been with us since the American Revolution when the first American soldier was "found guilty of sodomy, defined broadly as 'unnatural' sexual penetration'," with another male soldier (Frank, 2009, p. 1). A more conservative view might hold that the question of gays in the military couldn't have been an issue before the *idea* of homosexuality entered broad circulation at the close of the nineteenth century. In this case, we can still say that the gays-in-the-military issue has been a concern for the armed forces since at least 1917, when the U.S. military began to make formal, concerted efforts to rid its ranks of "sodomists" (Frank, 2009, p. 5; Haggerty, 2003, p. 10). However, we should not interpret this long history as a simple progress narrative, beginning with highly intolerant attitudes toward homosexuals and moving toward gradual acceptance at the turn of the twenty-first century. The period between 1917 and the implementation of DADT is marked by a series of inconsistent approaches to dealing with homosexuality in the military, not all of which moved from less tolerant to more tolerant with the passage of time (Haggerty, 2003). To a large extent, policies toward gays in the military have mirrored social and scientific understandings of homosexuality as an identity category, in particular the growing dominance of essentialized understandings of homosexuality—i.e. views of homosexuality as a coherent, unchanging category of personhood.[5] Although the question, "should gays serve?" had been asked for decades (the answer being mostly "no"), the right to serve openly did not become a major concern for the

gay rights movement until the early 1990s, partly through the work of organizations like the Military Freedom Project and the Campaign for Military Service.[6] The nascent push for gay service gained surprising support from Bill Clinton during his 1992 presidential campaign. Indeed, for many gay activists, the gay movements' perceived pivot away from AIDS research and employment non-discrimination toward military service came as something of a shock and filled many with deep hesitation (cf. Lehring, 2003, pp. 143-148; Frank, 2009, pp. 16-17).

The DADT controversy,[7] which I am here defining as a period beginning with the debates over gay service in the 1990s and ending with the repeal of DADT in 2010, represents an ideal context in which to observe the role that identity categories play in public policy deliberation and public discourse more generally. Why DADT specifically? From a pragmatic perspective, DADT is a good case because the gays-in-the-military issue in the United States is, if not over, then at least *settled* for the moment. At the same time, it is still a recent controversy and so offers a current portrait of how identity categories function in public policy debates in the United States. Studies of recent controversies are likely to have the strongest predictive power, but I don't want to overstate the necessity of timeliness—I suspect that identity categories function in similar ways in late capitalist democratic societies.[8] Nevertheless, things can change. For example, the role of "corporate" identities (i.e. identity categories recognized and protected by the state) has grown tremendously in the United States over the last half century in part due to the influence of the women's liberation and African American civil rights movements (see section four in the next chapter). If one is optimistic, it is also worth paying attention to efforts to make citizens more *critical* in their reception of identity talk by, for instance, drawing their

attention to "the politics of paranoia" and its role in recent controversies (cf. Belkin, 2013). In short, the DADT controversy (being both recent and settled) gives us a chance to reflect on what identity talk and identity categories are doing in public deliberation at the turn of the 21st century.

Another reason DADT is a good candidate for a project like this is that, although it is ostensibly over, it is closely related to controversies that are still ongoing. This study may offer some idea of how those related controversies may play out. I am thinking here of two debates in particular, one that may be nearing its end and one that is just beginning. The first, the same-sex marriage controversy, may have entered its final chapter in the United States. Any resolution of the SSM controversy will almost surely hinge on changing public perceptions of gay people as an identity category, especially if said resolution involves popular referenda. One important connection between these two controversies will be similarities in how they depict gay people: some of the identity archetypes that circulated in the DADT controversy (see chapters four and five) are probably circulating in the SSM controversy, too. The second controversy that may be further illuminated by this project is the as-yet-unresolved question of how to secure equal treatment for transgender people in the military. To my knowledge this is not yet a central concern for transgender people, but retrospectives on DADT suggest that such a conversation is coming (e.g. Yerke & Mitchell, 2013).

A final reason that the DADT controversy makes for a good case study: it showcases the contradictory functions that identity categories often perform. Foucault (1978) famously argued that the invention of homosexuality as a distinct category of person allowed both for

the regulation individuals identified as "homosexuals" and opened up a space for their resistance:

> There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality… made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of "perversity;" but it also made possible the formation of a "reverse" discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or "naturality" be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. (p. 101)

Reviewing the history of DADT, one finds the very same tension. Military policy played a crucial role in making the homosexual an "official" entity for the purpose of identifying and regulating individuals who could be placed into that category.[9] At the same time, gay rights advocates used this "official" identity to argue that they deserved equal treatment under military policy. In the analysis that follows, I will show that circulating representations of gay people were both an impediment to change, and a means of hastening that change. Assumptions about who gay people are and what they do allowed public officials to justify excluding them from military service. When those assumptions changed, the debate changed with them.

CHAPTER 2

THE RHETORIC OF IDENTITY CATEGORIES IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Introduction

Within the field of rhetoric, the concept of identity is sometimes met with skepticism or else a preference for analytical concepts that are more native to the field of rhetoric, such as *ethos* or *persona*. However, an emerging body of scholarship within rhetorical studies has begun to explore the rhetorical potential of identity and identity categories. Because identity is a key concept within this project, I set out in this chapter to explain what it would mean to take a rhetorical approach to identity talk and, more specifically, identity categories. I focus on the persuasive potential of identity categories (e.g. man, woman, gay, soldier) within public deliberation. A rhetorical approach to identity in public discourse is going to be concerned primarily with arguments: the circulation of claims, supported by public reasons, with the goal of creating adherence to those claims in an audience of strangers (Warner, 2002) or a universal audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). The rhetoric of identity, like any rhetoric, is about persuasion and, from a normative perspective, ought to persuade through the giving of reasons. However, the arguments that emerge from identity

talk—and public arguments generally—do not always take the form of disembodied, propositional claims, much less the syllogistic proofs of formal logic. This is partly the reason why argumentation theorists like Perelman choose rhetoric over dialectic: they see argument "as a situated act closely connected to an audience" (Leff, 2009, p. 305). Rhetoricians can better understand the realities of public deliberation by recognizing that the presence of identity categories in public discourse has significant rhetorical consequences. Of course, it goes without saying that identities, especially identities in the private, internal sense of the word, are not inherently argumentative. My assumption is merely that they *can* be under certain circumstances.

In this chapter I develop a framework for studying the rhetoric of identity categories in four sections. In section one, I draw on rhetorical and sociolinguistic theory to help further define a rhetorical approach to identity categories and clarify that approach's complementary relationship with the rhetorical concept of ethos. In section two, I answer the essentialism charge that is often leveled against identity research, explaining how a rhetorical perspective can help us avoid an essentialized and essentializing take on identity. In section three, I discuss some of the rhetorical functions that identity categories can have in public discourse that differ from ethos. In the final section, I address the social value of identity categories by examining multiple perspectives on their role in public deliberation.

1. Clarifying A Rhetorical Approach to Categorical Identity Talk and Its Complementary Relationship with Ethos

By taking a rhetorical approach to identity categories, I am attempting to complement work like Anderson's (2007) *Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversion*, which sets out to "outline a means for bringing identity's rhetorical functions

more clearly into the critical foreground" (p. 5). The rhetorical function of identity, he argues, rests on the idea that "the expression of identity, one's sense of self-understanding, is a powerful means of persuasion" (p. 5). The idea of rhetorical identity is already circulating. The problem, it seems, is that we lack a detailed understanding of "*how* identity accomplishes the cultural, rhetorical work it does" (Anderson, p. 5). However, researchers outside of rhetoric and composition have already made significant progress toward understanding how identities are constituted (and re-constituted) in language, including researchers in the areas of ethnomethodology (e.g. Goffman, 1959, 1963), conversation analysis (Sacks, 1972; Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998), critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992, 2003), discursive psychology (Potter, 2005), social psychology (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) linguistic anthropology (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005) and elsewhere. Rhetoric is ideally placed to contribute to this conversation asking not only "how identity is constituted in discourse?" but also "toward what end?" Moreover, although previous research has uncovered a great deal about how identities are shaped and used in individual interactions, there is still a great deal we do not know about how identity talk affects public discourse and democratic deliberation. Recent work (e.g. Roberts-Miller, 2009; Fernheimer, 2009; Grabill & Pigg, 2012) has shown that argumentative and deliberative uses of identity are indeed a growing concern among rhetoricians.

Given my focus on the *public* consequences of identity talk, and the vague, catch-all nature of a term "identity," it's important to recognize several distinctions between previous work and my own effort to uncover the public, rhetorical life of identity talk. I focus on *categorical* identity, a focus that is quite different from *individual* identity. Research on identity talk that takes an individualistic approach might focus on how particular individuals

such as David Brock (Anderson, 2007) or Barbara Jordan (Johnstone, 2009) attempt to shape their discursive self-presentation for rhetorical ends. Alternatively, research on a specific political figure, such as Hilary Clinton (Parry-Giles, 2014), might capture how media discourse shapes an individual's public identity in ways that hinder that figure's goals. Although I too am concerned with individual identities and first-person identity constitution (e.g. a single rhetor articulating his or her own self-understanding in discourse), I am only interested in them only insofar as they affect a larger process. Any particular individual's identity (or membership in an identity category) takes on significance in this project only because it forms part of a larger public conversation about the meaning and value of a particular identity category. This is not to say that a single charismatic individual can't have a huge effect on the public discourse surrounding a particular identity category. But my approach takes, as its unit of analysis, categories of identity that circulate in public discourse. Categories can be embodied in specific individuals, but they can also be discussed in the abstract without reference to a particular person, as when a prototypical gay soldier is offered up for discussion during DADT deliberations. Moreover, an identity category can be relevant to a stretch of discourse—a part of the context for an utterance—without a direct reference to that category by any of the participants (Kiesling, 2006, p. 274). In focusing on identity *categories* I am also drawing on the work of Harvey Sacks, whose "membership categorization devices" (of which identity categories are one example) "order together what would otherwise be disparate objects, or objects knowable under some other description" (Antaki & Widdicombe, p. 3). In other words, identity categories classify objects and people, bringing them together in an abstract, rather than physical or concrete sense, and associating them with a set of features or characteristics.

Identity categories often share names with counterpublics and social movements. For example, racial labels can be used to describe a counterpublic discourse or public sphere, as in a Black public sphere or spheres (Squires, 2002). But, those same racial labels can refer to membership categories with an array of associated characteristics. Identity categories are closely related to concepts such as social movements and counterpublic discourses because categories are often the basis of group justice claims and collective identities are used to mobilize large groups of people. But it is important not to confuse identity categories with social movements or counterpublic discourses. Identity categories are not historically and temporally bound in the same way as the social movements that have been the subject of extensive rhetorical scholarship. As with publics, an individual can be a member of multiple identity categories (Antaki & Widdcombe, p. 4)—at least two (age, sex) according to Sacks and Schegloff (2007). But, unlike the publics described by Hauser (1999), Flower (2008) and Warner (2002), membership in an identity category does not require attention, active participation or a shared problem around which to organize; membership in an identity category can be a passive process, imposed on an individual or individuals by an institution, group or hegemonic discourse with or without that individual's knowledge or consent. However, identity categories can be instrumental in social change in the same way that a counterpublic discourse can challenge marginalization or exclusion from a broader public sphere. Sacks (1979) argues that one strategy for achieving social change requires that one first understand the meanings that a public assigns to an identity category and then try to change the circulating representations of that category, and in so doing alter "how it is that persons perceive reality" (Sacks, 1979, p. 9—see section 2.2 in the next chapter for a more detailed version of this claim).

Another important characteristic of a rhetorical approach to identity categories—which serves to further differentiate it from work on individual and "private" identity—is that I do not restrict my analysis to identity talk in the form of one person speaking directly about their own self-understanding (e.g. an autobiographical account). In public discourse, a person's membership in an identity category and the meaning and value assigned to that membership will be subject to multiple forms of agency other than their own at any given time. Individuals apply identity categories to themselves, of course, but this is only one permutation among many. Individuals may have categorical identities applied to them by other individuals and institutions. Individuals may have identities applied to them against their will. And, this is by no means a one-way process; individuals may contest being labeled with a group identity, or negotiate the meaning of that identity. They may resist the applicability or meaning of a given group identity, circulate a discourse that affirms the positive value of that identity or even take on an additional, competing identity category label in order to nullify the stigma attached to the first identity category (by, for example, referring to themselves as a "gay Ohioan" to emphasize their "localness" or regional affiliation). The possibilities are almost endless. Sometimes specific individuals are not invoked in an instance of identity talk. Identity categories—their meaning, value, etc.—can be debated without reference to an actually existing person. So, for example, opponents of gay service can speak of an abstracted, hypothetical gay soldier, imbuing that soldier with negative characteristics such as a desire to escape military service by disclosing his or her sexual orientation.

Defining my own rhetorical approach to the rhetoric of identity, I would be remiss if I did not explain its connection to the *original* approach to rhetorical identity, ethos. It is

through ethos that rhetoricians have been attending to the importance of character or personhood in argument for millennia, long before the advent of "identity" as a key term in scholarship. Ethos is a broad term for argumentative appeals based on the character of the speaker with origins in ancient Greece. It comes in two forms. The first kind of ethos, often associated with Aristotle (2007), refers to the *artistic* creation of credibility in a speech. This means that the rhetor creates a sense of credibility or trustworthiness based on the speech itself, not a preexisting reputation. The second kind of ethos, generally associated with Cicero, Quintilian and other Roman rhetoricians, is more holistic. It does draw on the rhetor's public life and prior reputation, oftentimes attempting induce audience sympathy for or identification with the rhetor. As a result, it has a close connection to pathos, or appeals to emotion (Miller, 2004, p. 211; Alcorn, 1994). An easy way to remember the distinction between these two conceptions of ethos is to think of it as the difference between being "a good man" (Ciceronian ethos), and merely seeming credible through a set of discursive moves (Aristotelian ethos) (Baumlin, 1994). Of course, the division between Aristotelian and Ciceronian ethos—in particular the idea that Aristotle cared only about *appearing* credible—may not be as simple as this (Smith, 2004; Garver, 1994, pp. 203-205). But, in any case, ethos gives us a vocabulary for argumentative appeals that depend on character, or personhood. The concept has been broadened considerably to fit contemporary situations and has been a productive concept across multiple disciplines (Amossy, 2001). Ethos can denote a speaker's membership in a collective or group, such as a professional group or a generic category of person (Halloran, 1982). It can even encompass something as broad as the character of a population creating, for example, a "national ethos" (Blair & Michel, 2004). Ethical appeals can also create a *negative* reputation, usually for someone

other than the speaker. This is sometimes called "anti-ethos" because it is meant to suggest that a person is untrustworthy (Smith, 2004). Given the broadening of ethos, one might ask why it could not provide a suitable vocabulary for understanding the identity talk that played such a key role in the DADT controversy. Studying the DADT debate under the rubric of ethos would allow me to use a term that is already at home in rhetorical scholarship, rather than importing a word like "identity." There are three reasons why identity is useful as a theoretical term separate from ethos.

The first reason to use identity as a theoretical concept separate from ethos is that ethos is inextricably tied up in the assumptions of the society the produced the term, regardless of how extensively it has been reconceived by modern rhetorical theorists. Ethos is alive and well as both an appeal and source of invention in contemporary public discourse and the study of that discourse, but it becomes increasingly problematic when applied to distinctively modern practices like identity politics. There is a tendency to imprint modern (or postmodern, as the case may be) ideas about the self onto classical treatments of ethos but, as Swearingen (1994) points out, "[w]e look at questions of identity, voice, self, and authenticity as intrinsic to ethos" in a way that is simply inconsistent with how classical thinkers viewed the concept (p. 115). One has to realize that the identity categories invoked in this project would have been utterly foreign to Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and their ilk. Sexual identity categories in particular are just too recent, too wedded to contemporary medical and scientific discourses[1] to be completely understood as a simple matter of practical wisdom, virtue and good will or lack thereof (Aristotle, 2007, p. 112).

This is not to say that examining the contested ethos of marginalized people cannot tell us a great deal about how difference is negotiated in political discourse or that ethos is

insufficient just because it is "too old," but rather that the processes of identifying and being identified—the rules of the road for identity—have changed. As Alcorn (1994) points out, attachments "defined by blood, race, language, region, religion, and custom" traditionally "established social groups and probably also determined the values held by these groups" (p. 18) and this was certainly true of the ancient cultures in which ethos originated as a rhetorical term of art. However, contemporary categories of identity are more open to self-definition:

> Extreme social mobility now allows and encourages people to situate themselves within a much wider diversity of relationships. It is common for children to leave their parents, marry outside their religion, abandon old customs, and move to new regions. As the authority of primordial ties diminishes, new forces work to situate and regulate the self. One of these forces is modern culture itself, which is characterized by diversity and plurality and which reduces the sense of an unquestioned authority. (Alcorn, p. 18)

In other words, the difference between our time and Aristotle's time is not just that there are new categories of identity into which one can be placed, but also that identity—the changeable but enduring sense of who we are in relation to others—is increasingly determined not by birth but through human agency. This does not necessarily make us more mobile or "free," however, because powerful institutions and discourses also have the power to identify us in ways that are both lasting and consequential. And it is probably this last element, consequence, that most powerfully differentiates identity from ethos. Ethotic appeals draw on who we are to create a sense of credibility in a given interaction, but

identity talk can sometimes powerfully *determine* who we are far beyond a single interaction, speech or text.

A second reason to use identity separately from ethos is that rhetorical identity talk draws part of its persuasive power from modern assumptions about the relative stability of identities over time:

> Simply stated, the identity or self-understanding a rhetor portrays evokes much more powerful expectations about realness and authenticity than the character or agential nature a rhetor may depict. Identity draws on—and often depends upon—these cultural expectations of realness in persuasion in a way that character does not. (Anderson, 2007, p. 96)

Or, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) put it:

> The concept of a person introduces an element of stability. Any argument about the person has to do with this stability: it is assumed when an act is interpreted as a function of the person, and it is failure to respect this stability which is deplored when someone is reproached for incoherence or unjustified change. (p. 294)

In other words, one way to differentiate identity talk from an ethical appeal is to examine the extent to which each implicates a rhetor's "real" or "true" sense of self. One cannot claim to be an atheist in one public address and an evangelical Christian preacher in another, or at least not without some kind of conversion narrative or other explanation—this is identity. However, an evangelical Christian preacher can choose to be "wrathfully indignant" in one sermon and "patiently forgiving" in another, even if the same audience is witness to both events, because these are simply different manifestations of ethos appropriate to different situations (Anderson, 2007, p. 98). Identities are changeable, which

Anderson demonstrates with his analysis of conversion narratives, but they also imply stability. At the heart of identity, then, is an inherent contradiction, an ongoing tension between changeability and solidity:

> In one sense, people change, and in another sense, people do not change. This assumption is essential for rhetorical theory. The self is stable enough to resist change and changeable enough to admit to rhetorical manipulation but not so changeable as to constantly respond, chameleonlike, to each and every social force. Rhetoric therefore needs a theory of the self that is sufficiently complex to conceptualize these features. A theory of rhetoric needs an understanding of the self that appreciates the relative stability of self-structure. (Alcorn, p. 17)

The third and final reason for using identity as a key term is that it brings with it a complex, specified way of talking about the rhetorical effects of identity talk in public discourse. Ethos is traditionally understood as a way of making a speaker (or group of speakers) either more credible or less credible for an audience. That is, ethical appeals either create credibility by establishing things such as wisdom, virtue and good will or else harm credibility by doing the opposite (as in the case of an "anti-ethos" or a failed ethotic appeal). Membership in an identity category can affect credibility, too, in that a perceived affiliation with a real or imagined group can make one more or less credible depending on the audience's perception of that group. However, identity categories do more than just establish the credibility of a speaker. Drawing on scholarship from rhetoric, critical discourse analysis, sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology can reveal how the rhetorical potential of identity talk goes beyond credible/not-credible function of ethos. In section three, I discuss two additional functions of identity talk in public argument:

associate/dissociate and essentialize/de-essentialize. Sometimes these functions position membership in an identity category as a positive attribute; sometimes not; mostly, the value of membership in a given identity category is going to depend on context. Before I describe these functions in depth, I address a common objection to research that uses identity as a theoretical concept: that it essentializes identities in general and homosexuality in particular.

2. Avoiding the Essentialism Pitfall

The essentialism charge is an obstacle for any researcher who uses identity as a category of analysis. By "essentialism charge," I refer to suggestions that scholars should abandon identity as a theoretical concept because it "smacks of a certain naive modernism, of enlightened, unified, atomistic individuals freely doing and becoming as is their fancy" (Anderson, 2007, p. 5). An essentialist charge holds that identity, as a theoretical concept, "seems to connote… an agential self that exists prior to and ultimately outside the forces of language, culture and history" (p. 5). In the case of sexual identity, the word "essentialist" also has epistemological consequences. An essentialized view of homosexuality holds that it is an inborn, scientifically knowable category of persons that exists prior to and outside of individual choice—in short, that one is "born that way." The essentialist view of sexual identity is usually contrasted with a social constructivist (or constructionist) position. Andrew Sullivan's (1996) description of "the liberationists" offers a nice example of constructivist thinking. The liberationists, like constructivists, dismiss the biological view of homosexuality in favor of a more socially-constructed image of homosexuality:

> … homosexuality as a defining condition does not properly exist because it is a construct of human thought, not an inherent or natural state of being. It is a "construction," generated in human consciousness by the powerful to control and

> define the powerless. It reflects not the true state of human affairs, but a crude and arbitrary ordering imposed upon them. [From this point of view] there are no homosexuals, merely same-sex acts… [and] even these acts are dependent on their social context for their meaning. (p. 57)

There are slight differences between biological essentialism in relation to homosexuality and a more generic essentialism that plagues identity research as a whole, but here it will suffice to consider biological essentialism as one instance of a larger essentialism problem.

Avoiding essentialism is a challenge for anyone studying a complex social and linguistic phenomenon, but it is especially acute in the case of identity. On the one hand, research on identity talk and especially identity categories will always run the risk of turning a set of complex social and linguistic phenomena into something that is too neat and stable to tell us anything useful about how actually existing people think and talk. And, an essentialized notion of identity is a particular danger when one is dealing with identity talk in the context of identity politics, which frequently simplify and essentialize identities for strategic, political purposes. On the other hand, researchers who avoid essentializing identity by "softening" it with constructivist terms like "multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented… negotiated, and so on" may be left with "a term so infinitely elastic as to be incapable of performing serious analytical work" (Brubaker & Cooper, p. 11). Furthermore, one cannot avoid the essentialism problem merely by switching to the social constructivist paradigm that is dominant in academic circles because "gay" and "lesbian" *can* be coherent, essentialized categories. That is, many people use these terms to understand and narrate their own experience in essentialist terms. In the end, neither perspective can do the job on its own. As Epstein (1987) explains:

> Neither strict constructionism nor strict essentialism are capable of explaining what it means to be gay. The fact that contemporary gay self-understandings and political expressions are inexplicable within the bounds of these theoretical perspectives therefore should come as no surprise (p. 43).

One solution to this problem is to shift the unit of analysis and argue—truthfully—that the subject of this research is not "identities" at all, but rather identity talk, or the ways in which representations of identity are made persuasive in public discourse. From this perspective, the persuasive power of identity talk and the existence of "identities" are separate issues. One would simply need to argue that although identity may be a social myth, the identity categories thrown about in identity talk are an ethnographic fact because they have real persuasive power regardless of whether "identity" is a meaningful term. This is the logic behind Anderson's argument for a rhetorical approach to identity, one that seeks to understand how a shared, understanding of identity "govern[s] its meaning and possible uses in a given culture" (p. 8) and rhetorical potential.

Although I am arguing that my object of analysis is "identity talk" and not "identities," I take seriously Brubaker and Cooper's warning that when researchers use the word "identity" as an analytic category, we risk becoming unwitting participants in an ongoing and politically motivated reification of categories such as "gay" and "lesbian" into coherent, clearly-defined categories for sorting individuals (p. 6). B&C's warning is important for any researcher studying how people deal with difference in public discourse. When identity categories are politicized and brought into publicly-oriented identity talk (as "gay," "lesbian," and countless others have been), these identity categories become subject to a set of unspoken assumptions about identity that are, if possibly politically

advantageous, also problematic. Identity talk often carries assumptions that all individuals or groups should have identities, that groups and individuals can have an identity without knowing it, that groups and individuals can be mistaken about their own identities and that identities can be "discovered," both by the people who have them and by others (Brubaker & Cooper, p. 10). In addition, identity talk often assumes "strong notions of collective identity" that "imply high degrees of groupness, an 'identity' or sameness among group members, a sharp distinctiveness from nonmembers [and] a clear boundary between inside and outside" (p. 10).

A rhetorical approach to identity talk is going to be more concerned with understanding how these assumptions work than with problematizing them, because it is these assumptions that give discursive practices like coming out their rhetorical force. For example, the idea that people can "come out to themselves" before coming out to others makes no sense unless one assumes that those individuals can have had an identity without already knowing it (never mind that this severely complicates the idea of identity as *self*-definition). The act of "outing" someone who has never called themselves gay assumes that one can "discover" an identity that pre-exists its discursive representation. In other words, however much the category of "gay" might be socially and historically constructed, however much its meaning might be up for grabs, the label can be applied as though we all knew quite clearly what it means. Even more fantastically, one can be said to have had a sexual identity before that concept even *existed*, as is often the case when this or that historical figure is said to have been homosexual. The more enlightened among us will surely react skeptically to such claims, protesting on the grounds that coherent sexual identities are a relatively recent innovation in human culture that are problematic when

applied transhistorically, perhaps citing the work of Michel Foucault and Jeffrey Weeks (2009) as backup. Even so, the essentialist language game that surrounds homosexuality in the public sphere is likely to be unaffected by such protests.

I do not mean to say that essentialism has "won the day" and that it is therefore OK for researchers to speak of identity in essentialist terms. Instead I argue, as Epstein does, that one "must be able to speak of sexually based group identities without assuming *either* that the group has some mystical or biological unity, *or* that the 'group' doesn't exist and that its 'members' are indulging in a dangerous mystification" (p. 45, emphasis original). To uncritically accept an essentialized view of gay identity would be to risk becoming a mouthpiece for the overly simplified, politically expedient understandings of identity rampant in identity politics and, in so doing, collude in the strategic essentialization of an identity category. To totally reject essentialist understandings of identity would leave analysts making a false-consciousness argument, in which the participants in the DADT controversy have been fooled into thinking that identity categories are real things and not socially constructed fictions. Furthermore, I do not believe that essentialist understandings of identity have totally eclipsed more nuanced constructivist understandings, or made it impossible for constructivist critiques of essentialized identity to circulate in the public sphere. Constructivist arguments can still be found in public discourse, such as this excerpt from a 2011 *Atlantic* piece:

> In direct opposition to both the mainstream gay movement and Lady Gaga, I would like to state for the record that I was not born this way. I have dated both men and women in the past, and when I've been with men, I never had to lie back and think of Megan Fox. I still notice attractive men on the street and on television. If I were

> terrified of the stigma associated with homosexuality, it would have been easy enough to date men exclusively and stay in the closet my whole life. Obviously, no one sits down and makes a rational decision about who to fall in love with, but I get frustrated with the veiled condescension of straight people who believe that queers "can't help it," and thus should be treated with tolerance and pity. To say "I was born this way" is to apologize for the person I am and for whom I love. It's like saying I would be different if I could. I wouldn't. (Miller, 2011)

Miller advances a constructivist argument by critiquing an inborn, essentialized view of homosexuality (i.e. one that constitutes sexual orientation as a clearly defined category with sharp boundaries). Her self-presentation challenges biological essentialism by positing an attraction to men or women based not only on her essential nature, but also on a larger set of social conditions including, to a limited extent, personal choice.[2]

Constructivist critiques can and do circulate alongside essentialist images of homosexuality. On the other hand, the apparent novelty of Miller's *Atlantic* piece, the way it presents constructed, *chosen* homosexuality as a shocking "hook" for an argument, testifies to the ascendancy of essentialized images of homosexuality in popular culture. But even if it has become *de rigueur* not to question the inborn "realness" of sexual identity, a thorough examination of rhetorical identity talk needs to be open to the possibility that a constructivist critique could re-emerge and begin circulating more widely in the future. At the very least, such a study ought to consider *why* essentializing identity talk could become so dominant that, as Lehring recounts, a group of university students enrolled in a course on gender and politics could view a constructivist position on sexual identity as an artifact of the 1960s, "hopelessly dated, trapped in a time that [is] no more" (p. 167).

In explaining the appeal of essentialized homosexuality, I am drawn again and again toward the notion that essentialized identities are, or appear to be, rhetorically and politically advantageous. This is certainly the conclusion one draws from the work of political scientists such as Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2005) who demonstrate a positive correlation between support for same-sex marriage and the belief that homosexuality is an inborn trait. Some, like Lehring, have portrayed strategic essentialism as a kind of Faustian bargain, a choice to embrace essentialism for the purpose of legitimizing the gay rights movement in the eyes of a larger public:

> The answer, of course, has been to declare sexuality "essential," an intractable aspect of a persons' *being*, determined by genetics, biology, or some other "deep property" over which the individual has no control. In order to free homosexuality from the stigma associated with problematized sexual behavior, a flight into a fixed identity is required. As one's identity, sexuality is inexorable, unchangeable, and not the responsibility of the individual. The fact of my homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is simply "beyond my control." (p. 175)

The cost of the bargain, according to Epstein, is that strategic essentialism represents an appeal to "hegemonic ideologies" and "raises questions about [the gay movement's] potential (or desire) to mount a serious challenge to the structural roots of inequality—whether that be sexual inequality or any other kind" (p. 46). For Lehring, the adoption of a biologically essentialized gay identity has meant the abrogation of the individual choice, leading to an obsessive focus on "true" sexuality that rests outside of self-definition (pp. 175-177).

My overall goal in this section has been to respond to the specter of essentialism within scholarship on identity. I suggested that identity *talk* as an object of analysis (rather than identities in-and-of-themselves) can help draw focus to the rhetorical possibilities presented by identity talk, regardless of the ontological status of its referent, identity. I also argued that scholars must be able to talk about identity in essentialist terms, because much of the rhetorical power of identity talk rests on essentialist assumptions about identities. The unspoken, essentialist assumptions that undergird identity talk form a kind of shared cultural logic that is rhetorically potent, not least of all because the assumptions that go hand-in-hand with "identity" can be toted from situation to situation. Scholars who wish to study identity talk must be able to discuss identity in essentialist terms because those are the terms under which it so often operates in real situations. We must also recognize that, although essentialist conceptions of sexual identity are pervasive in the public sphere,[3] constructivism (essentialism's chief rival) still operates in public identity talk. The dominance of essentialism in identity talk does not preclude the resurgence of a constructivist critique. Nor does the overwhelming essentialization of "identity" in public discourse *prove* that an essentialist viewpoint is better or that marginalized groups *must* present their identities in this fashion. Elite voices may proclaim that an essentialized, inborn image of homosexuality is more politically potent than a messier constructivist alternative, but this does not make it the only, or best, option available.

3. Describing Some Rhetorical Functions of Identity Talk

I argued above that employing identity as a theoretical term alongside ethos could help explain the rhetorical functions of identity talk that do not fit neatly onto the credible/not credible binary of ethos. In this section, I propose two additional functions that

can help capture the rhetorical functions of identity talk in greater detail and with more specificity than a simple credible/not credible binary. Both functions are made up of two opposed terms (associate/dissociate, essentialize/de-essentalize). These are by no means meant to summarize all of the rhetorical functions that identity talk can have, nor are these functions totally separate from ethos—all of the rhetorical functions of identity can potentially have ethos effects. Rather, these terms are meant to add to and enrich our understanding of the rhetorical life that identities and identity categories lead in public discourse.

Both functions of identity talk discussed here are pairs of verbs. This is a conscious choice in the sociolinguistic tradition of viewing identities as performative, or things one "does" or "achieves" in discourse (Sacks, 1984; Antaki & Widdcombe, 1998; Goffman, 1959). Viewing identity as an action or achievement means that identity talk does not create an "objective and permanent state but [rather] a motivated social achievement that may have temporary or long-term effects" (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004, p. 383). The terms are analyzed with accompanying examples from the DADT controversy and connections to rhetorical theory, sociolinguistic research and other fields. Although my examples all relate to DADT, the terms are meant to explain the rhetorical functions of identity talk in a broad sense. Moreover, the terms are not mutually exclusive. Snatches of identity talk can have overlapping rhetorical functions, or function differently for different audiences.

3.1 The Rhetorical Functions of Identity Talk: Association/Dissociation

One way that identity talk argues is by attempting to change the circulating images of an identity category in a larger public. In other words, one may attempt to alter the "activities, attributes, motives and so on" associated with an identity category that make it a

"powerful cultural resource [for] warranting, explaining and justifying behavior" (Widdicombe, 1998, p. 53; Sacks, 1979, 1995). Association and dissociation work toward this end by attempting to alter identity categories in ways that can reflect either positively or negatively on one or both of the identity categories in question. For example, one might associate the category of LGB (lesbian, gay or bisexual) with a brave soldier, an association that would be positive for most audiences if successful. Conversely, one might create a negative association by conflating LGB people with sexual predators, as is often the case when gay and lesbian public school teachers become the subject of a public debate. Dissociation functions in a similarly versatile way, having the potential to create positive, negative or mixed effects on public perceptions of an identity category. It's worth noting that dissociation, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) use the term, has a somewhat technical meaning, but it will suffice here to define these two terms in a general sense:

> By processes of association we understand schemes which bring separate elements together and allow us to establish a unity among them, which aims either at organizing them or at evaluating them, positively or negatively, by means of one another. By processes of *dissociation*, we mean techniques of separation which have the purposes of dissociating, separating, disuniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole or at least a unified group within some system of thought…" (p. 190)

For members of identity categories who seek legitimacy in the eyes of a large public or dominate culture—and remember, not all do—the question is not merely shall members of an identity category seek acceptance within a larger public discourse, but also, on what grounds? Should members of an identity category articulate a sense of association with the

larger publics to which they speak? Or should they focus on dissociating themselves from the negative images of their category that are circulating? They might also choose to circulate a different or new set of positive attributes with which their identity category can be associated. It's hard to overstate the versatility of these tactics.

Although one could use many terms to describe these two contrasting functions of identity talk (merge/sever, join/divide, assimilate/differentiate, integrate/separate, etc.) association and dissociation fit well because they are general argumentative moves not unique to marginalized identity categories. One could call these two functions "integration" and "separation" and invoke a connection to the discourse of ethnic minorities and of in-groups and out-groups generally. And, this connection would make sense given the similar challenges faced by members of identity categories that we might describe as out-groups. But, of course, not all forms of marginalization are the same, not least of all because there are many different perspectives on what marginalization means and who can claim that they have been the subject of it.[4] Moreover, regardless of how one defines marginalization or labels its many forms, association and dissociation can be found in almost any discourse involving identity categories, whether or not those categories are seen as marginalized out-groups in a given context. A teacher could, for example, try to associate a student identity with an image of explorers in wild territories in an attempt to induce fervor for learning and make studying seem less onerous.

Association and dissociation are also useful concepts for describing the rhetorical functions of identity talk because these two terms are less likely to be used to label figures and movements in broad strokes. Terms like "integration" and "separation," on the other

hand, are all too easily transformed into labels like "integrationist" or "separationist." "Separationist" in particular is often used in a pejorative sense. As Cone (1992) explains:

> According to Malcolm [X], the concepts of "integration" and "separation" were merely different methods which blacks employed in their struggle for freedom. Whites often used these terms to divide blacks, labeling the ones they disapproved of, like Malcolm, as separatists or segregationists and the ones they approved of, like Martin [Luther King Jr.], as integrationists and moderates. (p. 247)

To my knowledge, no one has ever labeled a rhetor a "dissociationist" or "associationist" and this is a good thing because, as Aristotle reminds us, a good rhetor has the "ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 37, brackets original to translation). The point is that any smart rhetor will see differences between situations and audiences and adjust his or her arguments accordingly, and thus it's likely that someone like Malcolm X will at times employ association and at other times dissociation.

Additionally, I should point out that *association* and *dissociation* bear more than a passing resemblance to *adequation* and *distinction*, two of Bucholtz and Hall's (2004) "tactics of intersubjectivity" or "relations created through identity work" (p. 382). They define adequation as attempts to establish "sufficient sameness between individuals and groups," perhaps for the purpose of "preserving community identity in the face of dramatic cultural change" (Bucholtz & Hall, p. 383). Distinction, on the other hand, is "the mechanism whereby salient difference is produced" and "difference is underscored rather than erased" (p. 384). Distinction typically, though not always, leads to dichotomous, binary

reasoning. It has a tendency to "reduce complex social variability to a single dimension: us versus them" (p. 384).

Association: Two Examples and Their Polysemous Implications

My first example of association as a rhetorical function of identity talk can be found in a rather famous anecdote taken from the *Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"* compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense. The anecdote is attributed to an unnamed "special operations force warfighter" who was a participant in a focus group on the possible effects of a repeal of DADT. The anecdote was repeated endlessly in media coverage of the repeal of DADT, and was quoted nearly verbatim in President Obama's 2010 speech on the repeal of DADT. Below is the anecdote as it first appeared in the *Comprehensive Review*:

> As one special operations force warfighter told us, "We have a gay guy [in the unit]. He's big, he's mean, and he kills lots of bad guys. No one cared that he was gay." (p. 126)

This anecdote demonstrates, from the perspective of a servicemember whom we assume to be heterosexual, a neutral or positive evaluation of one unnamed gay soldier in particular, and potentially *the* gay solder in an abstract sense. The two identity categories—gay and soldier—are associated when the unnamed servicemember argues that one identity (soldier) is not at all incompatible with the other (gay) in his eyes and in the eyes of the gay servicemember's other comrades-in-arms. Note that the ability of this particular gay servicemember to function well in his unit is attributed to his size, disposition and propensity for killing "bad guys," all key elements of a kind of warrior identity that is a common element of military culture (Allsep, 2013). That these two identity categories can

both inhabit the same person powerfully embodies the idea that gay people can be good soldiers. The Big-Mean-Kills anecdote is an evaluative form of association because it uses the compatibility of two identity categories to justify a change in how servicemembers and others should view LGB people. The anecdote does not argue that gay servicemembers could make some unique contribution to military culture on the basis of their difference; instead, they are shown to embody the soldier identity just as it is already is and is supposed to be (strong, aggressive, doing what needs to be done—i.e. killing "bad guys").[5]

Association is polysemous. That is, associative arguments probably will not have a single, much less universally positive or negative, meaning for all audiences. The Big-Mean-Kills anecdote is a good example because it is nominally supportive of the rights of LGB people, and from this perspective one could call it "pro-gay." However, in its association of gay person and good soldier, the argument problematizes one identity category much more than the other. LGB people, it is implied, can be just like any other soldier, despite what you may have heard about them. The idea that "no one cared" that the servicemember was gay is presented as exceptional, a testament to how well the gay servicemember fights and kills. Goffman (1963) might call this move a third-person version of "normification" or "deminstrelization," processes in which stigmatized individuals

> …without actually making a secret of their stigma, engage in careful covering, being very careful to show that in spite of appearances they are very sane, very generous, very sober, very masculine, very capable of hard physical labor and taxing sports, in short, that they are gentlemen deviants, nice persons like ourselves in spite of the reputation of their kind. (pp. 110-111)

Goffman argues that stigmatized individuals typically *avoid* this kind of move when discussing their identities, or else suffer the "distaste" of other members of their stigmatized identity category. Because it "normifies" gay people, The Big-Mean-Kills anecdote might resonate most with an audience of heterosexuals who lack direct experience with openly gay people and thus need to be reminded that gay people too can hold a rifle. And, because Big-Mean-Kills was not only included in the Pentagon's report but also repeated endlessly outside in speeches and news coverage, one could surmise that it struck a chord with a mainstream heterosexual audience, including those responsible for writing President Obama's speeches (he too used the Big-Mean-Kills anecdote).

A second example of association in identity talk will help further clarify polysemous nature of association. This example is taken from Lehring's (2003) book on DADT:

> Explaining to a *New York Times* reporter why she was contesting her discharge from the military, Colonel Margarette Cammermeyer said, "What I hope to represent is a part of the normality of being homosexual, of not being in leather or shaving my hair, but rather show how much we are all alike. If people can see the sameness of me to you, then perhaps they won't have the walls that make it so that they have to hate us." (p. 179)

Cammermeyer's comments associate homosexuality with normality by arguing for "the sameness of me to you." What are being associated here are not two identity categories but rather an identity category and a very generalized idea of normalness. It is not normalness, however, that is being broadened; it is homosexuality that is being narrowed. That is, a positive presentation of homosexuals as a category of "normal" people depends, in Cammermeyer's argument, on the exclusion of anyone associated with a leather subculture.

In her association we have another implicit argument that would probably be more apparent to gay audiences than to others: some homosexuals do shave their hair and wear leather, but this is not acceptable behavior for a normal person.

Dissociation: An Example and its Implications

Dissociation, also called the dissociation of concepts, involves the separation of previously joined elements into two, hierarchically valued terms.[6] That is, one concept, idea or, in this case, identity category is split into at least two, with one being more valued or "better than" the other. First proposed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) in *The New Rhetoric*, the dissociation of concepts "assumes the original unity of elements comprised within a single conception and designated by a single notion" (pp. 411-412). P&O-T describe dissociation as a fundamental split in the meaning of a previously unitary concept; one gets an image of a lightning bolt splitting a tree trunk turning what was once one entity into two entities that are forever changed cannot be rejoined. In public deliberation, however, few arguments can separate a previously unified concept (or identity category) so fundamentally that all audiences will view that concept differently for all time. More likely, one will encounter dissociative arguments that attempt to create new divisions or reinforce old ones with varying levels of success among different audiences.

One can see a dissociative argument at work in "Mission Compromised: How the Military is Being Used to Advance a Radical Agenda," an interview-style video created by the Family Research Council and distributed on the Internet. This particular string of dialogue is from a short, commercial-like interlude between interviews conducted by Tony Perkins, FRC president, and various guests, mostly retired military personnel:

> NARRATOR: They fought in trenches, stormed beaches, cut through sweltering jungles, marched over burning deserts. Our military has protected our soil, seas and skies. But today they're drawn into a new battle—homosexual activists and liberal politicians are attempting to advance their political agenda by overturning "don't ask, don't tell." (n.p.)

In this excerpt, the narrator dissociates the military from "homosexual activists" and "liberal politicians." The allegation that the military is being used politically is only part of the argument; there is also an implicit refusal to acknowledge that the soldiers who "fought in trenches, stormed beaches," etc. may themselves have been gay activists and, perhpas later in life, liberal politicians. The narrator creates a fundamental separation (i.e. a dissociation) between identity categories (brave soldiers vs. homosexuals and liberal politicians) by suggesting that those in favor of repealing DADT are entirely separate from those who have served bravely in defense of their country. Obviously, brave soldiers occupy a higher place in the hierarchy, as they are shown "protect[ing] our soil" in the ad, whereas homosexuals and liberal politicians are depicted "advanc[ing] a political agenda," symbolized by a juxtaposition of pride imagery (parades, rainbow flags, etc.) and the United States Capitol.

The two sets of imagery in the ad—soldiers storming beaches and rainbow flags waiving—are standard fare. The juxtaposition of the two elements with one being good (soldiers fighting bravely) and bad (homosexuals being activists) is unremarkable. But, by viewing the separation of soldiers from "homosexual activists and liberal politicians" through the lens of dissociation, one gets a deeper, more revealing understanding of the argument. In particular, approaching the ad as an example of dissociation reveals the threat that an emerging public of gay and lesbian servicemembers posed to the opponents of

DADT repeal. Gay and lesbian servicemembers exist and they have maintained a constant, if sometimes limited, public presence during the entirety of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell controversy (Fulton, 2013). One could argue that much of the debate over DADT repeal was, in large part, about the question of *openly* gay soldiers, not the existence of gay men and lesbians in the armed forces. And yet, the FRC's portrayal implicitly denies the existence of an emerging public of gay and lesbian servicemembers, totally excluding them from the "soldier" identity category. To portray repealing DADT as a political imposition on brave soldiers, as the ad does, one must avoid acknowledging the reality of gay men and lesbians who also happen to be brave soldiers. Dissociation makes it possible to avoid recognizing gay and lesbian soldiers, creating a strict separation between brave soldiers and anyone interested in repealing DADT (including, of course, gay and lesbian soldiers themselves). The meaning of the dissociative argument above appears altogether simpler than the associative arguments excerpted before it. Its negative connotations are unambiguous, and it is difficult to interpret its argument in any other way than as a straightforward attack on those parties advocating a repeal of DADT. In other cases, however, dissociative arguments can carry ambiguity in the same way that associative arguments do.

3.2 The Rhetorical Functions of Identity Talk: Essentialization/De-essentialization

When I addressed the essentialism charge in section two, I argued that one reason it's so difficult to separate identity talk from its essentializing tendencies is that those same tendencies give identity talk much of its rhetorical force. Part of what makes identity talk so effective is the assumption that identities are stable, unchanging and sometimes pre-discursive phenomena (that is, they exist prior to their construction in discourse). To

essentialize an identity category is to view it as a "culture-independent, objective and intrinsic property" of a person (Stein, 1990, p. 325). A strongly essentialized understanding of an identity category would envision that category as a stable characteristic, something that person could have "even if she were the only person or thing in the world" (pp. 325-326).

Arguments can essentialize an identity category a by applying it to groups and individuals whose deaths preceded the creation of the category (e.g., by suggesting that Jesus Christ was a socialist, Republican, hippie, etc.). Readers will probably be familiar with the historical essentialization of homosexuality such as this example, taken from a speech given by Larry Kramer (2005):

> Your family, your brothers and sisters, have been here a very long time and have an ancient and distinguished lineage. You must learn that Abraham Lincoln was gay and George Washington and Meriwether Lewis and so many others we are only just beginning to uncover. (p. 81)

Kramer's ongoing excavation of gay historical figures essentializes in a strategic way, choosing long-dead figures from American history and assigning them membership in a sexual identity category for the purpose of legitimizing that category. It's important to keep in mind, though, that essentializing arguments are often much less overt than Kramer's laundry lists of long dead (and now gay!) people, mostly male. Another, less obviously essentializing tactic involves references to "LGBT families" rather than gay people or homosexuals. This choice might represent an effort to neutralize the ideographic power of "family values" (Cloud, 1998) and also to humanize gay and lesbian people by reminding us that they too have families. In the process, however, such a choice could also be seen to

essentialize gay identity by introducing a kind of one-drop rule dictating that any family that produces or embraces a gay person, regardless of the sexual orientation of its other members, be labeled a "gay family."

Conversely, an argument can de-essentialize an identity category by representing that category as "culture-dependent, relational, and, perhaps, not objective" (Stein, p. 325). Scholarship on identity sometimes de-essentializes sexual identities by chronicling the emergence of a particular category in a particular time and place as a tool of domination or oppression (e.g. the emergence of homosexuality from medical and scientific discourses [Foucault, 1978], or the constitution of the homosexual as an identifiable, knowable group of people who could be tracked and regulated by military policy [Lehring, 2003]). Tactics for de-essentializing an identity category in public discourse often appear at the level of lexis, tending to involve word choice on some level. For example, one might choose "sexual preference" over "sexual orientation" because "preference" suggests a choice rather than an essential characteristic. One might set apart group identity labels using quotation marks or other discourse markers to suggest that these sexual orientations are affectations that do not represent actually existing human conditions (e.g. by referring to "so-called gay people"). And, of course, one may de-essentialize an identity category in explicit terms, refusing to accept that people are born homosexual.

To further clarify what essentialization and de-essentialization mean as rhetorical functions of identity talk, I need to again draw on Bucholtz and Hall (2004) whose notions of authentication and denaturalization can help further clarify what it means to essentialize and de-essentialize identity categories. Essentialization is reminiscent of their term, authentication, in that it too "highlights the agentive processes whereby claims to realness

are asserted" (Bucholtz & Hall, p. 385). B&H choose authentication rather than "authenticity" to disentangle the term from essentialist connotations of realness. They caution scholars against essentializing identities, but it is important to again recognize that, although scholars may not recognize an identity category as real in the positivistic sense of the term, essentialization (or authentication, to borrow their term), is an important effect that identity talk can have in public arguments. Any identity talk can essentialize (or authenticate) insofar as it seeks to portray an identity category as natural or intrinsic to a person.

Just as B&H's notion of authentication supports my idea of essentialization, their concept of denaturalization informs my notion of de-essentialization. Denaturalization accounts for "the process whereby identities come to be severed from or separated from claims to 'realness'" (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004, p. 386). Identity talk that denaturalizes a group identity label would "highlight the artificiality and non-essentialism of" the identity category in question (p. 386). It would denaturalize—and de-essentialize—by pointing out the artificiality or constructedness of an identity category. Of course, speakers de-essentialize identity categories for vastly different reasons. In the case of homosexuality, a constructivist might point out that "homosexual" is a socially imagined category in order to make a larger critique of oppressive social institutions. On the other hand, an opponent of DADT repeal, or legal protections for gay people in general, might highlight the constructedness of homosexuality to undermine legal arguments for equal protection for LGBT people.

Essentialization: Two Examples and Their Rhetorical Significance

Essentialization works in subtle ways in public discourse surrounding DADT, particularly in the personal accounts of LGB servicemembers. Notice, for example, how a former combat medic, writing in the Seefried (2011) volume, describes the difficulty of "faking straight" to comply with the strictures of DADT:

> Along with my relationship suffering, I lost a part of my identity. Faking straight for 365-plus consecutive days eventually reformats your identity. I'm not as comfortable being me anymore. (p. 51)

The writer frames appearing straight as a kind "faking" that has effects beyond deceiving those around him; faking straight also harms his "real," gay identity leaving him unable to feel "comfortable being me anymore." The identity category "gay" is replaced with "being me" in his final sentence, and this is a powerfully essentializing move because it implies that sexual identity is intrinsic to his personhood. Moreover, the "reformatting" metaphor is also revealing: formatting, as a computational process, structures the way a hard disk receives, stores and processes data. It takes place at a level more basic, fundamental and *essential* than, say, programming. The writer does not completely essentialize his sexual identity—he speaks of having it *re*formatted—but to change that identity would cause discomfort and affect his ability to "be me." He positions homosexuality as something that cannot be changed or else cannot be changed without inflicting significant trauma to his person. If changing someone's sexual identity is so damaging, it seems worthwhile to consider the alternative: changing military policy.

Our medic essentializes an identity category in a personal way, arguing that it is essential to his identity, his very being. It is possible to essentialize an identity category in

other ways. Historical essentialization—the assumption that gay people have always existed in some recognizable form—also carries with it a powerful set of implicit arguments. President Obama's remarks as he signed the repeal of DADT essentialize homosexuality as an identity category in rhetorically significant ways. For example:

> There will never be a full accounting of the heroism demonstrated by gay Americans in service to this country; their service has been obscured in history. It's been lost to prejudices that have waned in our own lifetimes. But at every turn, every crossroads in our past, we know gay Americans fought just as hard, gave just as much to protect this nation and the ideals for which it stands. (The White House, 2010)

Obama essentializes the gay identity in a very strategic way. He claims that gay Americans have "fought just as hard" at *every* "crossroads in our past," implying a continuity in the gay identity across the entire history of the United States. His claim implicitly assumes that gay Americans have existed throughout the history of the United States in forms that remain recognizable to us today. I call this move strategic because Obama's generalization—that gay identity has existed in more or less the same form for the last two and a half centuries or so—is not at all a universally accepted idea. Obama also essentializes when he speaks of "gay Americans" who fought "just as hard" as, presumably, "straight Americans."

Obama clearly intends to suggest that gay Americans are, to borrow Bucholtz and Hall's phrasing, not just similar but *sufficiently* similar—that is, good enough. But, in the process of making this positive claim, Obama also alludes to circulating images of gay people in which their worth—their ability to do their job and contribute to society—is defined primarily in light of their membership in a sexual identity category. I call this an essentializing move because it evaluates a group of people based primarily on their

membership in a group identity. It is quite a different argument than saying that many of the brave soldiers from American history happen to be gay, or that many gay Americans can count themselves among America's cherished war veterans. Rather, Obama's phrasing makes their category membership not just salient, but a defining characteristic of their personhood. Obama's gay Americans are constituted and evaluated by their membership in an identity category. And, they are good soldiers *despite* that identity category membership. A much rarer argument could make a very different but no less essentializing argument: that gay soldiers are good soldiers *because* they are gay. This would be a difficult claim to find in widely circulating discourse related to gays in the military.

De-essentialization: Two Examples and Their Rhetorical Significance

It is much more difficult to locate examples of de-essentialization in the DADT corpus on any side of the debate. Perhaps this is because an essentialized version of homosexuality has been embedded in military policy since the 1980s when, according to Timothy Haggerty (2003), military policies began to conceive of homosexuals as "a discrete identifiable group" (p. 34). DADT "played a central role in defining the 'homosexual' juridically, presenting authoritatively and *officially* who and what lesbians and gay men *are*, creating a category of identity that would serve both as a new site of regulation and a new form of resistance to regulation" (Lehring, 2003, p. 6, emphasis original). And, as I have already argued above, gay activists and their allies frequently essentialize homosexuality, positioning it as a genetic or biological condition and creating an ethnic-style identity (Epstein, 1987). And so, what one typically finds on either side of the DADT debate is an essentialized view of homosexuals, whether that view is based on biological essentialism (i.e. "born that way" homosexuality) or whether the assumption is simply made that people

either are or are not gay for the duration of their lives. When gay and lesbian servicemembers describe their membership in the gay identity category, they speak of it as an essentialized, "true" identity. When military officials and congressional representatives speak about DADT they either do the same, or else avoid engaging with the notion of identity categories at all. Few political elites oppose the repeal on the grounds that homosexuality is not a real or intrinsic quality of a person.

But, nonetheless, some political elites do attempt to de-essentialize identity categories, such as former senator (R-PA) and 2012 Republican presidential candidate Rick Santorum, who, in an interview on *Fox News Sunday* in October 2011, made a de-essentializing argument against protection for openly gay and lesbian servicemembers:

> And look, the idea that somehow or another, that this is the equivalent, that being black and being gay is simply not true. There are all sorts of studies out there that suggest just the contrary, and there are people who were gay and lived a gay lifestyle and aren't anymore. I don't know if that's a similar situation—I don't think that's the case with anybody that is black. So it's not the same. And I know people try to make it the same, but it is not. It is a behavioral issue, as opposed to a color of the skin issue, and that makes all the difference when it comes to serving in the military. (Santorum & Wallace, 2011)

Santorum undercuts any argument for DADT repeal based on the fact that the military was racially de-segregated successfully. He rejects the comparison between gay people and black people and de-essentializes the gay identity category in order to dissociate it from ethnic identity categories. As evidence for his dissociation, he cites the idea that homosexuality is a "behavioral issue" and alludes to the ex-gay phenomenon.

The Servicemember Legal Defense Network's "Stories from the Frontlines: Letters to President Barack Obama" campaign provides an example of de-essentialization in action in the writing of a gay servicemember. Writing on May 4, 2010, former staff sergeant Anthony Loverde writes about his initial decision not to resign from the military; he instead chooses to take on a more demanding position in the military in the hopes that it would ease the difficulty of hiding his homosexuality from his comrades:

> Eventually I changed my mind and was able to better manage living under DADT. I applied for cross training into C-130 Loadmaster and was accepted. I figured the high ops-tempo, frequent deployments and lack of down time would make for a great environment to keep me so busy that I just wouldn't have time to be gay. I thought it was a brilliant plan.

Loverde looks back on his hope that he "wouldn't have time to be gay" with some self-deprecation, as evidenced by his own commentary ("I thought it was a brilliant plan"). His assertion that less personal time would in some way alleviate the burden of his membership in a gay identity category could position that membership as behavioral, and thus implicitly de-essentialize it: if downtime limits one's ability to be gay, then it must be behaviors that constitute it, not some inborn, permanent trait. On the other hand, this is only one interpretation, and our ability to discern between competing meanings is limited by the fact that the letter is written and therefore lacks verbal cues. It is also entirely possible that Loverde is joking when he suggests that one could be so busy that one "wouldn't have time to be gay." This could be, for example, a humorous insider reference to just how busy C-130 Loadmasters are (i.e. so busy that they do not even have time to be the things that they are!).

Although de-essentialization is harder to find in DADT discourse, its rhetorical significance is still important to understand for two reasons. First, although later debates about DADT and the value of gay and lesbian servicemembers typically take for granted that homosexuality is an intrinsic characteristic of a person not subject to change, earlier debates about homosexuality in the military did not make that assumption and therefore de-essentialization played a larger role in earlier stages of the debate about homosexuality in the military. Second, since this is a *general* account of the rhetorical functions of identity categories, we should assume that in the case of other identity categories, arguers might choose to de-essentialize. Such a strategy could be an important part of a public discussion of the meaning and value of those categories.

4. The Social Value of Identity Talk in Public Deliberation

Having explained some of the rhetorical functions of identity categories in public discourse, I now turn to the role and value of their presence in that discourse. It is hard to talk generally about the role of value of identity categories in public deliberation because these categories are used in so many different ways in so many different contexts. The words that make up different identity categories are easy to find (men, women, gays, lesbians, black people, union workers, etc.), but they function differently depending on how they are circulated and taken up. It makes more sense to talk either about what identity categories *can* do in public deliberation or else what they *did* do in a particular instance. I will address what identity categories[7] did do in the DADT repeal controversy in chapters four and five. This section deals with understanding what previous scholarship says identity categories can or might do in any instance of public controversy.

Identity Categories Can Help Us Confront the Limitations of Our Own Perspectives

Arguments that invoke identity categories might force us to confront our own sense of identity and the limitations of our own perspectives. The differences articulated by identity talk could become resources for deliberation rather than obstacles to it. In other words, when identity categories are used as shorthand for individual experiences or perspectives, the resulting identity talk may help articulate difference and reveal gaps our own in experience. Identity talk may help public arguments offer what Young (1997) calls a "plurality of perspectives," which emphasizes *justice* in a broad sense rather than a common interest based on the presumed universalizability of a single perspective. Without multiple and conflicting individual perspectives (i.e. the viewpoints of people in marginalized identity categories), the position of one group or type of person can be made to seem universal:

> Too often those in structurally superior positions take their experience, preferences, and opinions to be general, uncontroversial, ordinary and even an expression of suffering or disadvantage. (Young, p. 403)

In other words, without other identities to bump up against, our own identities cease to be *our* identities and become universal argumentative warrants.

Identity categories can—but do not always—provide a ready-made template for understanding why an individual perspective matters, and why ours alone is insufficient, in deliberation. If, for example, a policy is discussed in terms of its effect on "welfare mothers," an audience might infer that 1) if they are not themselves members of this category, they lack some of experience necessary to evaluate it and 2) the perspective of a member of this identity category should be heard as part of the deliberation. In this sense,

identity talk can add to our understanding of difference and our social knowledge as a whole allowing participants in public deliberation to "gain a wider picture of the social processes in which their own partial experience is embedded" (Young, p. 404). But this is only one possibility. It is also possible that a speaker's membership in a "welfare mother" category would disqualify her as a speaker, or else define her testimony as self-interested in the view of the audience (Asen, 2002).

Performing or Representing an Identity Category Can Powerfully Embody That Category by Bringing It Out of the Abstract.

When identity categories take the stage in public deliberation, especially in a physical, embodied sense (i.e. an actual speaker from a membership category stands up and speaks), difference can take on a more visceral, real form in discourse. Performing an identity category can create the kind of knowledge that Flower (2003, 2008) is after when she argues for the importance of "situated experiential knowledge." Situated knowledge, she explains, brings out a "body of powerful, unarticulated, experientially based interpretive resources [that multiple] parties bring to what appear to be common, public topics of discussion…" (2003, p. 39). In this way, the performance of identity categories can be a powerful deliberative resource that can enable publics to better understand causes, attribute motives and predict outcomes. Roberts-Miller (2004) makes a similar point about confronting difference as part of a larger analysis of argument instruction in the composition classroom. Learning to confront difference directly, she argues, is an important part of a liberal education because the alternative is *imagining* a different perspective:

> By telling students that they can imagine opposition arguments, we are reinforcing the notion that one need not listen terribly carefully to other people, as one can oneself accurately predict their arguments. (p. 86)

Roberts-Miller makes clear one reason we might want identity categories to be articulated in a deliberative, democratic space: unless we can confront difference *in person*, we cannot really understand it. For Dewey (1954), this kind of interaction with difference is crucial to a communal life. Without it, we are condemned "to mushy sentimentalism or else to extravagant and fanatical violence which in the end defeats its own aims" (p. 149). Asen (2002) demonstrates the consequences of abstracted, imagined representations marginalized people in his account of congressional hearings on welfare policy: "imagining affects participants in public discussions differently, often disadvantaging socially and historically marginalized people and groups while tacitly aiding the appeals of others" (p. 347).

To view public performances or representations of identity categories as having the ability to *embody* those categories is also to assume a particular kind of uptake on the part of an audience or public. An individual who allows herself to represent an identity category in public discourse risks having her beliefs, motives and experiences reduced to a manifestation of that identity category. In other words, the public performance of an identity category might complicate others' understanding of what that category means, but it might also reduce that audience's ability to view the individual performing an identity category as anything other than a member of that category. An individual's category membership can, in other words, be transformed into his or her defining characteristic (cf. Roberts-Miller, 2004, pp. 197-98). In addition, an audience can mistake an individual performance of an identity category for a universalized representation of what that identity category means. To put it

another way, an individual can perform an identity category to bring it out of the abstract, but, depending on audience uptake, that performance might also have the effect of universalizing that individual's experience to an entire category. An audience might view one lesbian servicemember as a stand in for *all* LGB servicemembers and, indeed, this has to happen in order for individual narratives to matter in a large, public decision-making process. The challenge, then, for individuals who perform group identities in public (or who are labeled as members of an identity category by others and choose to respond) is to articulate the value of their individual perspective without 1) having their own motives and beliefs defined entirely by that group membership or 2) becoming a stand-in for all members of that category: "An environmentalist is not representative of all environmentalists, but s/he might indicate some of the reasons that environmentalists have for being environmentalist" (Roberts-Miller, p. 198).

Performing or Representing Identity Categories May Obscure Economic or Material Inequality or Even Support Racial and Ethnic Violence

The public performance of identity categories might also divide us in ways that are problematic for public deliberation. Benhabib (1999) argues that

> …today's resort to 'culture' as a group-identity marker and a justification for claims against or within the state constitutes a challenge, sometimes even an affront, both to the originary humanist liberalism…and to what is best in universalist liberalism that evolved from the original affirmations of autonomy and individual dignity (p. 402).

Benhabib's critique, and others like it, contend that identity and multicultural politics have eclipsed class-based politics to the extent that the arguments for redistribution are now conflated with arguments for recognition. Benhabib suggests that appeals to justice based on

"corporate identities" (identity categories recognized by the state) will encourage citizens to form and attempt to legitimate an ever-increasing number of these identity categories. Equality and identity become competing interests in a zero sum game: a focus on legitimizing a particular identity category undermines efforts to secure economic or material equality, especially if that legitimization is primarily a cultural or symbolic legitimization. Fraser (2000) points out that identity-centered discourses have "become predominant within social movements such as feminism, which had previously foregrounded the redistribution of resources" (p. 107). This is the problem that Michaels (2006) names when he argues that we have "learned to love identity and ignore inequality." Part of the reason that it's hard to differentiate recognition and redistribution is that the two are often intertwined. As Behabib points out:

> Claims to redress cultural domination, as raised by native peoples and by ethnic and racial minorities, would, if recognized, have both economic and social consequences for these groups. So would recognition of demands to end homophobia and to treat same-sex marriages as legally sanctioned forms of domestic partnership (p. 403).

One can also argue, as Taylor (1994) does, that the misrecognition of an identity category (i.e. the circulation of a demeaning representations of it) can "inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with crippling self-hatred" (p. 26). As a result, "even when some of the objective obstacles to their advancement fall away, they may be incapable of taking advantage of the new opportunities" (p. 25). But there are even darker aspects to the discourse of identity categories, and these become especially apparent when one considers how identity categories operate in developing countries and non-democratic societies, as Fraser (2000) does: "…from Rwanda to the Balkans, questions of 'identity' have fuelled

campaigns for ethnic cleansing and even genocide—as well as movements that have mobilized to resist them" (p. 107).

The solution may not be the rejection of identity categories in the public sphere, but rather a rejection of an identity politics that is interest-based. Even Benhabib, ever critical of identity politics and its divisive potential within public deliberation, acknowledges that, "a democratic people needs to reenact its identity in the public sphere. As with individuals, so with collectivities: threats of being different which are not defused turn into resentment toward the 'others' whom one is not" (p. 411). Like Flower, Roberts-Miller, Dewey and Asen, Benhabib sees great value in the ability to citizens to "take the standpoint of others into account" in a meaningful way (p. 411). But, she argues, we must not abandon the idea that "in the face of all that divides and distinguishes us, that in some fundamental sense we are all equally worthy of moral respect…" lest we succumb to "the tyranny of intolerant minorities and narcissistic collectivities" (pp. 411-412). In other words, recognition claims based on identity categories may challenge the quality of democratic deliberation because those categories can lead us away from mutual recognition and toward a cynical, self-centered politics of group identity.

This possibility may be the reason for Young's (1999) insistence on a politics of difference, rather than a politics of identity. She argues that a politics of difference is broader, and aimed at challenging ruling norms "that position some people as deviant in relation to standards or expectations of who the bearer of rights is supposed to be, and these individuals are thereby usually disadvantaged in the competition for offices and positions, distributive benefits, or public attention and respect" (p. 416). Like Taylor, she sees the conflation of symbolic and material privilege as inevitable because they are so frequently

intertwined. A politics of difference is a good alternative to the politics of identity because it "expands our understanding of privilege beyond the ownership of property" (p. 417). So, for example, movements to address equal access for people with physical disabilities demonstrate that a politics of difference is not merely about "culture" because those movements rely on a shared group difference, but are focused on securing real, material redress in the form of equal access to public facilities.

Another reason why scholars like Michaels and Benhabib approach the performance of identity categories in the public sphere with caution is that they believe that quests for "recognition" are too easily satisfied. For instance, the quest to end racial inequality can become a quest to end racism, a quest that neglects the very real issue of poverty in the African American population. As Michaels points out, the United States government is all too happy to dedicate a day or week or month to the heritage or history of a particular group because this does not cost money (p. 13). Comparatively speaking, governments are much less keen on a redistribution of material wealth, especially if cultural recognition is presented as an alternative. If a public becomes willing to settle for recognition, it is unlikely to seek true economic or social equality. But this concern does not warrant an abandonment of group identities as the basis for claims to justice; it presents one possible consequence of allowing these claims to consume our political culture. If we abandon or condemn group-based claims based because they detract from a material or redistributive quest for justice, we fundamentally misunderstand the reason that those group identities come into being: claims to justice require "a more comprehensive and objective account of the social relations, consequences of action, and relative advantage and disadvantage" than any one person can provide alone (Young, 1997, p. 385).

5. Conclusion

In the face of all of these warnings about the destructive potential of identity talk in the public sphere, I should point out that identity is *already* the focus of many of the issues with which our democratic society are struggling. As I show in chapters four and five, even a strong public dedicated to legislation and public policy (e.g. the U.S. House of Representatives) seems to spend a significant amount of time visiting and revisiting the moral worth of the people who belong to (or are said to belong to) a particular identity category. In the debate over gays in the military, participants often seem to couch their arguments in ostensibly non-identity-related issues such as national security and military readiness. But then, these arguments almost always regress to claims that members of a specific identity category (e.g. gay men) harm national security or military readiness by virtue of their membership in that identity category. It is hard, in other words, to get far from identity even when one is trying to do so. For better or worse, explicit and implicit claims about identity categories strongly affect the character and content of many of the public policy controversies of our time.

Recent history is replete with examples of the rhetoric of identity having had relatively positive outcomes (the 1964 Civil Rights Act, women's suffrage, the repeal of DADT, etc.). On the other hand, the sobering warnings offered above about the power of identity give us a powerful reason to resist an oversimplified progress narrative. Given the multiple and conflicting potentials of identity categories within public discourse, it is essential that we assess not only what identity talk might do, but also what it has done and is doing in actual public controversies. Toward this end, I synthesized voices across disciplines to offer a framework for understanding the rhetoric of identity categories that goes beyond

the credible/not-credible binary of ethos. Identity talk can do more than just create the impression of credibility (or a lack thereof); it can also, among other things, essentialize, de-essentialize, associate and dissociate identity categories within a public discourse. In the next three chapters, I expand this framework by offering a methodology for studying the rhetoric of identity categories in action: rhetorical archetype analysis.

CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCING RHETORICAL ARCHETYPE ANALYSIS, A METHOD FOR STUDYING THE RHETORIC OF IDENTITY CATEGORIES IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE

1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I argued that categorical identity talk serves important argumentative functions within public deliberation and that, although significant work has been done within rhetorical scholarship to understand the rhetorical significance of identity (often through the lens of ethos), there is still a need for inquiry into the role that identity talk can play—and has played—in public deliberation surrounding contentious social issues. This chapter presents a methodology designed to reveal and track the rhetoric of identity categories in the public sphere: *rhetorical archetype analysis* (RAA). Rhetorical archetype analysis is designed to identify and track archetypal representations of identity categories and their argumentative use across time, large corpora and long texts. Rhetorical archetype analysis is a hybrid of several methodological traditions, most notably membership categorization analysis (Sacks, 1972, 1979, 1995)—in fact, one might well understand rhetorical archetype analysis as a "rhetoricalization" of membership categorization analysis. In addition to introducing a methodology, this chapter also expands the theoretical

framework developed in the preceding chapter by arguing that identity talk—specifically, the rhetoric of identity categories—can be understood partly as a set of archetypes: circulating, prototypical representations of an identity category each with an associated set of motives, attributes and actions.

This chapter presents rhetorical archetype analysis in two parts. First, I offer detailed explanations of the central concepts of rhetorical archetype analysis, drawing on membership categorization analysis and, to a lesser degree, framing theory and schema theory. I argue that rhetorical archetypes are rich sources of inferential knowledge that circulate widely and present both an obstacle to and a means of achieving social change. Second, I offer a how-to for doing rhetorical archetype analysis and explain the procedures involved in conducting a rhetorical archetype analysis and the benefits of doing so. In adapting discourse analytic techniques (specifically, membership categorization analysis) for rhetorical analysis, I am part of an ongoing trend identified by scholars such as Barbara Johnstone and Chris Eisenhart (2008), who argue that more and more rhetoricians are becoming attuned to the "potential of discourse-based, observation-driven theory building for rhetorical studies and criticism" (p. 3). Other rhetoricians (e.g. Bhasin, 2008) have identified the rhetorical power of membership categories in particular.

2. Rhetorical Archetype Analysis: Origins, Influences and Central Concepts

Spend enough time reading public arguments about any contentious social issue, and you're bound to be struck by how repetitive public discourse is. In the discourse surrounding gays in the military, one sees the same tropes repeated over and over; notable examples include: accounts of decorated gay soldiers, vaguely articulated concerns about things like "cohesion" and "discipline," fear at the prospect of sharing intimate space with

gay people, dismissals of the gays-in-the-military question as activism or "social experimentation," and others. When I bring an example from the Don't Ask, Don't Tell debate into the classroom (in, say, a class on language and culture), I am often tempted to set students on a scavenger hunt and ask them to find one each of the following: a gay soldier listing their awards, concerns about HIV, someone calling the issue "the last civil rights frontier of our time," etc. Rhetoricians and others who study public discourse will not be surprised by the observation that public discourse is repetitive—few if any public issues have been resolved by novel arguments that appear suddenly on the scene. Rather, it is likely that anyone who studies a public issue over a long period of time will find themselves in possession of a long list of topics and tropes that are raised again and again until either 1) the issue is resolved in some definitive way, perhaps through the action of a strong legislative public or 2) the topic or trope in question slowly fades in favor of another.

The question becomes, then, why these topics and tropes and not some others? Why, for example, does the image of the predatory gay lurking in the shower captivate so? An easy explanation would be that the "shower scenario" is an effective appeal or that participants think it is and so choose to repeat it. But to stop there would be to miss the connections between the shower scenario and other arguments that circulated over and over during the course of the decades-long debate over gays in the military. In other words, the shower scenario doesn't exist in a vacuum; it shares important characteristics with arguments about how gays will behave in foxholes and the question of what will happen if several soldiers (one or more of them gay) are forced to huddle on a mountaintop for warmth. All of these scenarios depict gay people introducing a sexual element into a previously, supposedly, asexual social context (see the gay spoiler archetype in the next

chapter). Rhetorical archetype analysis emerged from my own attempt to systematize observations like these. It is a method designed to help rhetoricians and others tease out the deeper significance of commonplace public arguments. We can gain powerful insight into public debates by isolating the archetypes behind the identity-based arguments that circulate most frequently within those debates. Although rhetorical archetype analysis is not an entirely new idea (relying, as it does, on membership categorization analysis), it is unique in its focus on identity categories in large bodies of public discourse. And because many public controversies directly or indirectly implicate identity categories, as I argued in chapter one, rhetorical archetype analysis has broad applicability to the study of public discourse.

2.1 The Rhetorical Archetype as a Concept

At the core of rhetorical archetype analysis is the *rhetorical archetype*. Put crudely, rhetorical archetypes are the stock characters that support widely circulating public arguments. In more depth, rhetorical archetypes (e.g. the gay warrior) are widely circulating, prototypical representations of individuals, real or hypothetical, who fall within (or are perceived to fall within) an identity category or categories (e.g. gay, soldier). Each archetype contains a complex set of motives, attributes, and habitual actions. For example, the gay warrior (an archetype at the center of this project) is motivated by duty and patriotism. Gay warriors are brave, dedicated and their utmost concern is for their mission and the safety of their comrades (see chapter four for a detailed treatment of this archetype). Once an archetype has attained a sufficient currency or power within a discourse, it can be invoked implicitly to support public arguments. The detailed analysis of discourse surrounding Don't Ask, Don't Tell in chapters four and five reveal that the gay warrior archetype mostly

supports arguments in favor of allowing gay people to serve openly, such as the argument that gay people make good soldiers, and should therefore be allowed to serve.

But before I expound further on the nature and power of rhetorical archetypes, I should explain from where exactly I take the term "archetype," why I have chosen that term, and how my usage differs from other senses of the term. A rhetorical archetype is similar to a literary archetype; in both usages, an "archetype" refers to

> [a] basic model from which copies are made…a prototype. In general terms, the abstract idea of a class of things which represents the most typical and essential characteristics shared by the class; thus a paradigm or exemplar. An archetype is atavistic and universal… (Cuddon, 1991, p. 58)

Readers who have read the psychological treatises of Carl G. Jung will be familiar with the idea of the archetype, which in Jung's theory is the building block of the collective unconscious:

> In addition to our immediate consciousness… there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconsciousness does not develop individually but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the *archetypes*, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents. (Jung, 1968, p. 43, emphasis added)

A rhetorical archetype differs in important ways, however, from literary and psychological uses of the term. First, rhetorical archetypes are neither atavistic nor universal. This is to say that archetypes do not spring from a mystical or primordial collective unconscious. Rhetorical archetypes do not exist in every individual, nor can they be said to be identical in

the individuals who do share them. They do not endure across time and culture and we are surely not born with them. Rhetorical archetypes *are* a fundamentally shared, social phenomenon, but they are discursive entities that exist and have power *only* by virtue of wide circulation within a public discourse. Rhetorical archetypes have power because they are recognizable and offer a significant argumentative shortcut for a rhetor—one need not, for example, go into any detail at all in invoking what I have here called the shower scenario; one need only mention showers or intimate spaces to get across the general idea that gay people "spoil" these spaces in important ways. Another difference between a rhetorical archetype and "archetype" in its other senses is that rhetorical archetypes are both *prototypes for* and *products of* argumentative tropes: rhetorical archetypes are the source of commonplace arguments but they are also brought into being and modified by those arguments. In the sections that follow, I develop these and other characteristics of rhetorical archetypes in greater detail.

2.2 Rhetorical Archetypes are Rich Sources of Inferential Knowledge, Structures for Organizing and Invoking Everyday Knowledge.

To define rhetorical archetypes and explain their inferential power, I will need to draw on Sacks' (1972, 1979, 1995) notion of membership categories,[1] which I refer to here as identity categories. Whatever you call them, they are categories for organizing individuals into groups based either on the self-perceptions of those individuals or the perceptions of others. Typical examples of these categories include mother, brother, soldier, plumber, lesbian, gay man, rock star. These categories can then be organized, in varying combinations, into "membership categorization devices" (MCDs) or "collections" of identity categories. That is, certain membership categories can be said to go together in

important ways. For instance, "mother" and "brother" could be placed into a collection titled "family" (Sacks, 1972, p. 332), but "brother" could also be placed alongside "nun" in a collection titled "religious occupations." "Plumber" and "rock star" could both fit under "occupations," whereas only "rock star" could fit into the collection "types of celebrities." According to Sacks, identity categories hold enormous significance for human communication and cognition; membership categories are

> …the store house and the filing system for the common-sense knowledge that ordinary people—that means ALL people in their capacity as ordinary people—have about what people are like, how they behave, etc. This knowledge is stored and accessed by reference to categories of member/person. (Schegloff, 2007, p. 469, emphasis original)

Categories contain everyday knowledge in the form of category-bound activities and category-bound predicates.[2] Category bound activities are "activities that are, in situ, linked to categories such as 'Why are *men* (category) so *reluctant to go to the doctors* (activity)?'" (Stokoe, 2012, p. 281). Predicates function in a similar way, linking categories to characteristics, such as mothers having a tendency to care for children (Stokoe, p. 281). Category-bound activities (or attributes, actions, predicates, etc.) give categories their inferential power. If a particular man is reluctant to go to the doctor, we may interpret that reluctance as a function of that man's maleness, at least if we have access to "reluctance to seek medical attention" as a category-bound attribute of men. This is known as the viewer's maxim (Stokoe, p. 281). The significance of this idea becomes clearer when we view it in relation to a marginalized group. If sexual predation is understood to be a category-bound attribute of gay men, then a particular gay man who commits a sexual assault is likely to be

seen to have done so *as a function of being gay*. Furthermore, it becomes very easy to infer, imply or argue that other gay men have the potential to commit sexual assault—regardless of the actual statistics—if the hearer has access to "are sexual predators" as a category-bound attribute of gay men. In its inference-making capacity, identity categories function much like schemas do from the perspective of cognitive psychology.[3] They help us predict what members of identity categories are likely to do, and this prediction becomes crucial if that identity category lies outside our immediate experience.[4] As Schegloff (2007) puts it:

> So one can allude to the category membership of a person by mentioning that person's doing of an action that is category bound, and the doing of a category-bound action can introduce into a scene or an occasion the relevance of the category to which that action is bound… (p. 470)

The inferential resources bound up in identity categories—and brought into discourse through rhetorical archetypes—influence public deliberation in the same way that frames do (cf. Goffman, 1974). A rhetorical archetype suggests a particular vision of the members of an identity category (who its members are, what they are likely to do, etc.) just as a frame can "define [public] problems, state a diagnosis, pass judgment, and reach a conclusion" (Fischer, 2003, p. 144; Entman, 1993, p. 52). The connecting link between all of these concepts is their ability to do a lot with a little: a few words (often well-chosen) import a large set of assumptions, ideas, problem-solving strategies and other conceptual baggage into an interaction (see chapter five for more on the connection between rhetorical archetypes and political master frames).

Rhetorical archetypes support inference-making in the same way that schemata and political frames do. What sets rhetorical archetypes apart from these other conceptual

apparatuses is that archetypes deal in *persons* or *types of people*: they combine an identity category with a specified, interrelated set of category-bound activities and attributes. Take gay warriors: they are motivated by patriotism and loyalty to their comrades and, as a function of these motivations, seek "only to serve their country" or "get the job done and come home alive." Each attribute relates to and explains the next. Furthermore, rhetorical archetypes are more specified than identity categories. Rhetorical archetypes draw our attention to the fact that circulating representations of identity categories are not unitary. Rhetorical archetypes (gay warrior, gay spoiler, gay activist, etc.) might all refer to a single category, but their category-bound attributes may conflict, even within a single text. For instance, the rhetorical archetypes that I have named "the gay activist" and "the gay warrior" (see chapter four) have conflicting category-bound attributes even though they invoke the same identity category. The activist places a "gay rights agenda" ahead of any other concern, whereas the gay warrior explicitly subordinates their affiliation with "gay matters" to patriotism or other civic virtues. These category-bound motives conflict, but they can coexist within a text or set of texts because they belong to different *versions* of the same identity category. The gay activist and the gay warrior are different subspecies of "gay people" (i.e. they are separate archetypes). I argue below that rhetorical archetypes have an internal coherence; the motives, actions and attributes that they ascribe to the members of identity category should make intuitive sense to most observers. Here, however, it will suffice to say that rhetorical archetypes differ from Sacks' membership categories primarily in that they are specific versions of membership categories, each version having a specified set of category bound activities (note that this set of category-bound activities must be verified in real, representative texts). A rhetorical archetype, in other words, is an

instantiation of an identity category and a set of category-bound attributes. The inference-making potential, however, remains the same.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that, like membership categorization devices, rhetorical archetypes offer inferential resources that are sometimes not apparent in the text. When Harvey Sacks (1972) introduced the idea of membership categories and membership category devices, he related this widely quoted fragment: "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up" (p. 330). Sacks theorizes that most people who hear or read the fragment understand the mommy in the fragment to be the mommy of the child specifically, even though it is not made explicitly clear. The point of MCA, Sacks argues, is to explain where such knowledge could have come from and, in so doing, problematize that which is taken for granted—one of the central goals of Sacks' research (see, for example, Sacks, 1984). Emanuel Schegloff (2007) has, rightly I think, pointed out that the baby-cried anecdote is not so much an example of membership categorization analysis as it is a way of showing the kind of work that categories and collections of categories do, as well as the type of challenge that membership categorization analysis sets for itself (p. 465). But in any case, the anecdote reveals an important function of categories and the knowledge they encompass. The work that these categories do in everyday life is often invisible and can only be revealed through careful analysis. Kitzinger (2005), drawing on Sacks' suicide call center data, points out that the use of heterosexual categories of kinship (husband, wife, etc.) eliminates the need for help-center callers to explain why they are calling on behalf of someone else. Someone need merely say, "my wife is having issues" to have their authority on the matter accepted because, after all, husbands know their wives—this is a category-bound attribute. On the other hand, according to Kitzinger, someone calling on behalf of a friend may

choose to present "an epistemically downgraded version of the history of the person she calls about" by adding the qualifier "I believe" before telling the call center about her friend's difficulties (pp. 236-237). A friend may call on behalf of another, but additional explanation is needed.

2.3 Rhetorical Archetypes Are Both an Obstacle to Social Change and a Means of Achieving That Change

Identity categories, and the rhetorical archetypes in which they are instantiated, are both an obstacle to social and change a means of achieving that change. To begin with, archetypes and Sacks' membership categories are extremely resistant to change. Schegloff (2007) explains this aspect of categories by pointing out that they are "protected against induction:"

> If an ostensible member of a category appears to contravene what is "known" about members of the category, then people do not revise that knowledge, but see the person as "an exception", "different," or even a defective member of the category. (p. 469)

On the other hand, the durability of categories is not absolute, and if the meaning of a category can be altered (say, by making room for a new rhetorical archetype entering broader circulation), that change is likely to have major significance for members of that category.[5] Several scholars have made the connection between altering the meaning of categories and larger processes of social change. Housley and Fitzgerald (2002) argue that membership categories are integral to the construction and reconstruction of prejudices in situ (p. 78), and therefore changing the meaning of categories would be key to addressing out-group prejudices. For Stokoe (2012), the categories are durable but can be altered:

> Proffered category-bound activities and predicates may be resisted; resisting such ties transforms the commonsense meanings of categories, and therefore such categorization work becomes central to social change. (p. 290)

In fact, the connection between identity categories and social change has been a recurrent theme in MCA from the very beginning; it appears in Sacks' (1979) work too:

> It's in that regard, then, that the important problems of social change, I would take it anyway, would involve laying out such things as the sets of categories, how they're used, what's known about any member, and beginning to play with shifts in the rules for application of a category and with shifts in the properties of any category. (p. 14)

For marginalized groups, the durable, inference-rich nature of categories are especially integral to the process of social change. This is because, when an individual who belongs to a category takes an action or displays an attribute, that individual is often presumed to be a representative of the group as a whole. Sacks (1979) makes this point about categories generally and what he calls "groups" (which I take to mean socially marked—i.e, marginalized—categories):

> …any person who is a case of a category is seen as a member of the category, and what's known about the category is known about them, and the fate of each is bound up in the fate of the other, so that one regularly has systems of social control built up around these categories which are internally enforced by the members because if a member does something like rape a white woman, commit economic fraud, race on the street, etc., then that thing will be seen as what a member of some applicable category does, not what some named person did. And the rest of them will have to pay for it. (p. 13)

Schegloff (2007) too makes this point when he argues that "[a]ny attributed member of a category (that is, anyone taken to be a member of the category) is a presumptive representative of the category" (p. 469). Moreover, we can see this idea in many different fields of study. At the intersection of composition studies and public sphere theory, Patricia Roberts-Miller (2004) points out that one pitfall of explicitly bringing difference into the public sphere (rather than bracketing it off as irrelevant) is that people will assume there is

> …a necessary connection between one's membership in a group and one's beliefs. This fall may be unintentional, but it can also be well-intentioned, as when students or teachers—trying to be inclusive—turn to another student in class discussion and ask how minorities/women/foreigners/poor people feel about the topic. (p. 198)

Writing from philosophy and argumentation studies, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) make a similar point, though they address not marginalized groups, but individuals and groups generally:

> Individuals influence our impression of the group to which they belong, and, conversely, what we think of the group predisposes us to a particular impression of those who form it. (p. 322)

Of course, this tendency to presume that category members are *representative* of their categories cuts both ways. It's true that a single individual can easily, by his or her actions, contribute to or reinforce negative category-bound attributes if he or she is seen as having done something wrong as a function of their membership in that category. But, if an individual is perceived to be admirable in some way (say, a decorated war hero who is gay) their acts can, over time, create an association between their category and another, more culturally desirable category or concept (see section 3.1 in the previous chapter). Given the

durability of category-bound attributes, I suspect that it is much easier for an individual to reinforce a negative category-bound attribute than to add a new, positive category-bound attribute, not least of all because it is all too easy to see a single individual as an exception or marginal case, as when decorated gay veterans are dismissed as mere exceptions to the rule that gays cannot fight. But it is nonetheless possible for individuals who are perceived as successful to become spokespeople for their category, assuming, of course, that they are seen as a member of that category. According to Goffman (1963), for marginalized individuals who attain high status, there is an almost compulsory representativeness: "…once a person with a particular stigma attains high occupational political or financial position—how high depending on the stigmatized group in question—a new career is likely to be thrust upon him, that of representing his category" (p. 26).

2.3 Rhetorical Archetypes Circulate Widely and Matter Outside of Individual Contexts

One final and key aspect of rhetorical archetypes has to do with the question of pre-existing knowledge. This question will also further separate rhetorical archetype analysis from membership categorization analysis. Part of the analytical value of rhetorical archetypes stems from the fact that they do not have to be constructed, ad hoc, in each and every interaction in which they are invoked. However, many MCA practitioners (especially those who also practice CA) self-consciously avoid assuming that any individual speaker has access to a particular identity category—and the inferential resources it offers—unless that speaker *shows* that he or she does. For many CA practitioners, it must be proven, *in each and every interaction*, that speakers and hearers have access to commonly held assumptions about an identity category. This approach makes sense for conversation

analysis and other ethnomethodological traditions because researchers in these traditions are often examining interactions between small numbers of people. Since this project is concerned with large-scale cultural shifts in huge, multi-voiced texts, demonstrating that each and every speaker has access to a particular category is not feasible. But, we do need to ask whether or not it is fair to assume that, for example, a given speaker *probably* has been exposed to images of gay men as promiscuous simply because that speaker is from a culture in which this is a commonly circulated image.

The validity of this project—and rhetorical archetype analysis as a whole—depends on the idea that there are circulating images of identity categories (i.e. archetypes) that most people in a given public will have some awareness of. This is not an unproblematic assumption; we must always be willing to allow for multiple interpretations of a given utterance, including interpretations in which a speaker might not be aware that, for example, gay men are commonly perceived to be more promiscuous than heterosexuals or lesbian women. Most importantly, one must still demonstrate that it is likely that a particular speaker or hearer holds an assumption. The uptake of other speakers and hearers is the best way to do this. If a speaker makes a statement that is logically incoherent without access to a given archetype, and no one present seems confused by his or her statement, we have strong evidence that, in fact, the audience was able to fill in the missing blanks.

It should be said that rhetoric has a long history of presuming common knowledge on the part of an audience (endoxa, and Farrell's [1976] "social knowledge" in particular come to mind). But, there is a middle ground between 1) assuming a large body of universally held knowledge on the part of a public, and 2) practicing a highly localized, radical agnosticism that assumes interlocutors have only the knowledge that they have

directly expressed. One option for addressing this problem, which is pursued here, is to think in terms of intertextuality rather than mental structures. Since we do not have access in any meaningful way to the contents of a public's brains to know what associations, frames, and membership categories they contain, we can draw inferences based on widely circulating, public discourse. This assumption is shared by discourse analysts, many of whom presume that "subtle text and context analyses often provide more or less direct access to what people believe, that is, to the contents of mental representations…" (van Dijk, 1993, pp. 32-33). Focusing on circulating texts fits well with this project's aim of examining large, significant, public texts (e.g. public hearings); MCA practitioners typically study *very* short interactions between a limited number of participants, although there are notable exceptions, such as Francis and Hart (1997), who deploy MCA to examine a television advertisement.[6]

3. Rhetorical Archetype Analysis: A How-To

This section offers a "how-to" for doing rhetorical archetype analysis in several steps. The first step is to choose the identity categories that are to be the subject of analysis or, alternatively, to choose a context or text and seek out the identity categories invoked within it. The second step is an inductive coding of the text or texts, in which the researcher generates a long list of actions and attributes that participants ascribe to the identity category or categories under analysis. The third step is to organize those actions and attributes into named archetypes. One way to do this is to organize actions and attributes around the motivations that support them. The fourth step is to run informal tests for inter-rater reliability and validity and revise the coding scheme accordingly. The end result is a coding scheme that can be used to track archetypes across multiple texts and over time.

3.1 Finding Categories, Choosing Texts

One of the key problems confronting both membership categorization analysis and rhetorical archetype analysis is this: how do we know an identity category or archetype when we see one? Where do we look, what are we looking for, and how will we know when we find it? Discourse analysts have pointed to the inherent difficulty in seeking out identity categories in natural speech because we do not know when people will use these categories or in what sense these categories are being invoked (Van Dijk, 1987; Pomerantz & Mandelbaum, 2005). Rhetoricians who are concerned with a specific issue (such as gays in the military) will have a much easier time locating texts in which speakers orient to an identity category both implicitly and explicitly. In fact, it is reasonable to begin by following Stokoe's (2012) advice and simply "build[ing] collections of explicit mentions of categories" (p. 279). However, not all public issues will invoke identity categories in a significant way, and some controversies that do not at first seem to directly concern identity categories (e.g. the debate over nuclear power) may in fact invoke categories (e.g. "environmentalist," "scientist" etc.) with regularity and rhetorical significance. Moreover, we should keep in mind, too, that "speakers make contexts [i.e. identity categories] relevant in other ways besides referring to them directly" (Kiesling, 2006, p. 274). But even if we can find categories being used in speech, we should also show that participants have "oriented to" these categories and made them "procedurally consequential in their interactions" (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998, p. 5). Rhetoricians may find this burden easier to meet if they are examining large, public texts whose purposes have been made explicit (the hearings studied here are clearly labeled by participants as an opportunity to debate the consequences of allowing gay people to serve in the military).[7] Hearing participants are

entering a context in which identity categories related to sexual orientation have been made broadly relevant. Researchers should keep in mind, also, that participants may orient to additional identity categories outside of their original collection and research agenda (see the untroubled comrade archetype in chapter five). It is important to be open to this possibility.

The next step in rhetorical archetype analysis is to choose a set of texts that are 1) public, 2) significant and, 3) representative or influential. I have chosen congressional hearings held by the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC) in 1993 and 2008. Although the hearings might be considered influential, this is not my primary reason for choosing them. I see these hearings as *representative* rather than *influential*. That is, whether or not people actually watched, heard or read the hearings, they gave political elites on both sides of the issue a chance to make their case. The hearings provide, in other words, a sample of what important voices saw as their best options for defending their positions on the issue of gays in the military. Given the public, formal and planned aspects of this forum, I think it is fair to assume at least a modicum of rhetorical self-consciousness on the part of participants.[8]

In addition, the hearings include multiple voices: politicians, activists, veterans, soldiers, clergy, firefighters, police and a select few "ordinary" individuals. Both sides were able to call their own witnesses and question witnesses called by the other side. This gives the texts a dialogical element: no one person is responsible for the topic under discussion. Individual members of Congress were mostly free to ask whatever questions they saw fit, and witnesses had some degree of latitude in how they framed their responses (limited, in important ways, by the constraints of the forum). The dialogic quality of these texts offers

an opportunity to observe which arguments were "taken up" and made the subject of extended discussion and which weren't. And, given that the transcripts are divided into discrete turns, frequency counts and quantitative findings become possible.[9]

Lastly, these two congressional hearings, when studied together, reveal changes in the way people think and talk about gay people between 1993 and 2008. Indeed, the two hearings are ideal candidates for a change-point analysis because the U.S. House of Representatives held no hearings dedicated to the issue of gays in the military in the years between 1993 and 2008. The 1993 hearings took place just before DADT was passed and implemented; the 2008 hearing was held near the end of DADT's lifetime. Both hearings were chaired by a Democrat who favored lifting the ban on gay soldiers and yet both hearings feature significant, public resistance to the idea of gay people serving openly in the military. The 1993 hearings in particular showcase "some of the most virulent homophobia yet voiced in a public debate" (Frank, 2009, p. 105). To put it another way, speakers in both hearings show support for and resistance to changing the military's policy on gay people. But, the nature of that support and opposition changed in important ways.

3.2 Finding Attributes/Actions, Constituting and Naming Archetypes

Having chosen texts, the next step is to isolate and name archetypes. This is a highly interpretive process, but it is also an empirical, bottom-up way of understanding textual data. Having chosen identity categories for which we want to find rhetorical archetypes and a set of texts in which to find them, the next step is to inductively code for any action or quality attributed—directly or indirectly—to gay and lesbian people by participants. This is a rather tedious process, but it ensures that the archetypes are drawn from the text, not merely imagined by the analyst and then cherry-picked from the available data. Below is an

excerpt from the 2008 testimony of a retired servicemember, Joan Darrah. I have bolded segments of the text from which I took actions and attributes:

1. When I **join[ed] the Navy**, I didn't **know that I was gay**.
2. By the time **I realized it**, I was well into my Navy career.
3. And according to **my promotion record** and my fitness
4. reports, I was **making a significant contribution**.
5. It is only now that I have **been retired for six years**
6. that I fully **realize how incredibly stressful it was** to
7. live under Don't Ask, Don't Tell. For the last many
8. years of my career, whenever **the admiral would call**
9. **me into his office**, I **would be 99.9 percent certain** it
10. was to discuss an operational issue, but there was always
11. that **fear in the back of my mind that somehow I had been**
12. **outed,** and that the admiral was calling me in to tell me
13. that I was fired. The **constant fear of being outed and fired**,
14. even though your **performance is exceptional**, is hard to
15. quantify.
16. Don't Ask, Don't Tell **discourages thousands of talented**
17. **and patriotic citizens** from joining the military because,
18. rightly so, they **refuse to live a lie**. This is a tremendous
19. loss to our military. When a **smart, energetic young person**
20. who **happens to be gay** asks me about joining the service,

21. **I recommend that they do not join**. **I love the Navy**. It is

22. **painful for me** to **encourage someone who could contribute**

23. **so much to take their talents elsewhere**.

In this excerpt, gay people are represented as doing and having a large set of actions and attributes, including: realizing/discovering that they are gay, serving in the military, serving with distinction (promotions, performing exceptionally, etc.), experiencing stress as a result of the ban, living in fear of being outed (and, hence, keeping their sexual orientation a secret), fearing being fired, discouraging young gay people from joining the military, refusing to live a lie, desiring to join the military, just "happen[ing] to be gay," and, finally, being smart, young and energetic. An astute reader may be able to locate additional actions and attributes. Once large portions of the texts have been inductively coded in this way (creating pages and pages of actions and attributes), patterns emerge. One begins to see the same attributes and actions over and over, sometimes expressed in the exact same words ("*happens* to be gay" is a notable example).

These actions and attributes can now be grouped into a set of archetypes (see figure 3.1 for an idea of what the finished product looks like). It is impossible to define a standardized analytical procedure for the creation of archetypes, both because it is a highly interpretive task and because there is probably more than one way to go about it. However, one way to move from attributes/actions to archetypes is to isolate motivations.[10] That is, consider what motivations are implied by the most commonly repeated actions/attributes, and then use those motivations to group actions/attributes in a meaningful way. In focusing on motivation, I am drawing on Flower's (2003) notion of situated experiential knowledge,

in which a public's sense of individuals' motivations offers a crucial resource for decision making. For instance, the actions/attributes that I have grouped into the gay victim archetype all share some element of fear and stress, motives that explain—or could explain—all of the category-bound actions of the gay victim. Emphasizing motives reflects how important it is for people to know not just what gay people do but also *why* they do it. Motivation, I would argue, can lead to radically different interpretations of the same actions. Viewed from the outside, a gay person joining the military could be expressing patriotism, or a desire to infiltrate and undermine a cherished institution—the difference between the two is perceived motivation. Another way to group actions/attributes into archetypes is by seeking out manifest intertextuality, or the use of repeated, formulaic phrases. I have already offered "happens to be gay" as an example; other examples are "lives a lie" and "forced cohabitation." Sometimes individual words are unique enough to suggest a pattern; "flaunt" is a notable example.

The task of naming archetypes does important argumentative work. The name of each archetype functions as a compact argument for what each archetype is about. And, when you are seeking inter-rater reliability, giving archetypes fitting names helps co-coders understand what is at the core of each archetype. In a few cases, the name of the archetype may be pulled from the texts themselves (which was the case for the gay activist). I take the practice of giving rhetorical archetypes names from the work of Michel Foucault. In his influential *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction* (1978), Foucault names four "figures" important to the changing discourse of sexuality in Western cultures: "the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult" (pp. 104-105). Although these figures are not grounded in a bottom-up textual analysis, their memorability

and explanatory power is such that, once you have been exposed to them, it is hard not to see them out in the world.

3.3 Testing the Coding Scheme for Reliability and Validity

Although rhetorical archetype analysis is not a scientific process (not even close), the coding scheme it produces is still systematic and should be tested for inter-rater reliability and validity. I addressed the first concern, inter-rater reliability, by enlisting a fellow researcher to code a randomly selected piece of data (a five page excerpt from one of the hearings) with a tentative coding scheme. First, we coded the data separately and then compared our results, focusing on points of disagreement to clarify the coding scheme. We then coded the same excerpt a second time, together, to ensure that we were not only finding the archetypes in the same places, but also through reference to the same signs.

An additional goal for reliability testing is to make the coding scheme more open and accessible to readers. For example, the gay spoiler was at first named "the gay predator." After my informal reliability testing, I realized that this name did not truly fit the archetype, which made it difficult for another researcher to spot the archetype when it didn't involve sexual elements (the gay spoiler introduces an unwelcome element into a previously unspoiled environment or context, but that element isn't always sexual). Working closely with a co-coder, I determined that "spoiler" was a better adjective to describe the archetype and make the archetype easier for her to spot. In addition, testing the coding scheme forced me to explain and justify my own coding to another person. In the following chapters, I take an additional step to ensure that the coding scheme makes sense to others: I include both subtle and overt examples of each archetype in the finished analysis. This ensures that readers can see each archetype's borders, that is, each archetype at its most and least

obvious. My goal was to create a coding scheme accessible enough for readers to be able to find these archetypes elsewhere, in texts they encounter.

A second concern in RAA is validity, or the question of whether this methodology is actually measuring the things it sets out to measure: patterns in circulating representations of identity-category members. I used another simple, informal test to get at what might be called "face validity," or the extent to which the coding scheme makes sense to others at face value. I had colleagues look at the coding scheme during its development to see if they found the archetypes to be mostly self-explanatory (they did). Having others assess my coding scheme on its own, without showing them data, did two things for the project. First, it tested whether or not I did an adequate job naming and describing the archetypes clearly. Second, it gave me some indication that I had isolated archetypes that are truly in wide circulation. Because the gays-in-the-military issue has been the subject of extended public deliberation, my colleagues had already been exposed to public discourse surrounding the issue. Given this exposure, they were able to recognize the archetypes simply because they are consumers of political discourse. They were already "infected" with these archetypes, so to speak.

Another way of checking for validity is to ask the following question: do my archetypes lead me to the same arguments being made by different speakers? The point of rhetorical archetype analysis is to see what kinds of arguments come from prototypical representations of identity categories; this is what makes archetypes "rhetorical." Some archetypes, especially *the gay victim*, are quite flexible and support a number of different arguments from both sides. Other archetypes, especially *the gay activist*, are narrower in their range. But, in nearly all cases, each archetype should support a limited number of

arguments, and each archetype should show up in proximity to those arguments, over and over. Moreover, the opposite should be true. Each time you see an argument that gay people should not be allowed to serve because they lack some basic sense of propriety, you should find some marker of the gay spoiler nearby. This heuristic for testing validity is based on the premise that, if archetype markers lead to the same kinds of arguments over and over, then RAA is measuring what it is supposed to be measuring: argumentative patterns.

The final way of testing the validity of RAA is to ask a simple question: does the analysis provide a plausible explanation for what actually happened? We know that DADT was repealed, so it seems likely that there was a positive change in the way gay people were viewed. If the analysis had revealed that *the gay spoiler* had doubled in frequency in relation to the other archetypes, this finding would raise serious validity concerns. This is an important test, but it is also somewhat circular: if a researcher knows that the circulating image of gay people changed in a nominally positive way, won't he or she then subconsciously set out to find a positive change? Yes and no. The researcher may know that something changed with a particular result, but they will not know *what precisely* led to that result. A public that had been convinced of the worthiness of gay people could have latched onto several different arguments and archetypes. A strong legislative public could have bought into the civil rights frame (see chapter five) and viewed the matter as a question of fundamental rights. But that same public could also have come to see the humanity of gay people via the gay family member. Neither of these scenarios are what happened, as I'll show in the next chapter. But, they might have happened and I had no way of knowing that they didn't. My eventual finding, a rise in the occurrence of the gay warrior relative to the other archetypes, does offer a well-supported explanation for what actually happened. Its

validity is further bolstered by the fact that it is consistent in many ways with the accounts of activists and historians. But this last point is not a requirement for validity.

4. Conclusion: The Goals and Benefits of a Rhetorical Archetype Analysis

The final step in a rhetorical archetype analysis is the actual analysis, which is covered in the next chapter. Here it will suffice to say that a set of well-defined rhetorical archetypes—once found, named and tested—can be used toward a number of theoretical ends. In this project, I use the archetypal coding scheme described above to track how arguments about gay people in the military changed between 1993 and 2008. To do this, I examine the frequency with which each archetype was used, and, more importantly, the most common arguments supported by each archetype. The goal is to blend an empirical, semi-quantitative approach with an on-the-ground, qualitative assessment of how participants actually invoke the archetypes toward rhetorical ends all the while using social and historical context to enrich the analysis. This methodology can be used for various research agendas. It could, for instance, be used to compare public deliberation around a contentious issue at national and local levels. Its benefits, I would argue, are that it supports fine-grained rhetorical analyses of individual uses of identity categories while at the same time grounding claims about those usages in large bodies of data. The methodology is designed for the kind of open, bottom-up inquiry that one sees in sociolinguistic methodologies like conversation analysis. But, it is distinctly public in its orientation: it is designed for the critical analysis of discursive patterns across multiple texts and contexts.

Figure 1. A Five-Archetype Coding Scheme

Gay Warrior CODE: W	Gay Victim CODE: V	Gay Spoiler CODE: P	Gay Activist CODE: A	Gay Family Member CODE: F
MOTIVATION: Motivated by duty, allegiance to the military, allegiance to a paramilitary organization (e.g. police or firefighters), and/or loyalty to colleagues. ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS: ***Just* wants to**…serve their country, come home alive, do their job, be a professional. **Serves with distinction**: Wins awards, gets promoted, takes on a leadership role, is vital to unit, risks life for others and may have been injured in the course of duty. **Subordinates sexual identity to identity as a soldier**: Is a "soldier first, patriotic and loves his or her country KEYWORDS: happens to be gay, brave, selfless, distinguished service, award, wants to serve, patriot, "soldier first," ability to do job, performance	MOTIVATION: Motivated by fear of harassment, discharge, violence and other forms of persecution. ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS: **Lives in fear of or has experienced marginalization/unfair treatment**: worries about losing job, being discharged, being investigated or being the victim of violence. Talks about the stress of serving under ban or DADT. **Is part of an oppressed or marginalized group:** Discourages others from joining the military because of anti-gay policy. Does not have equal rights in society. Is being treated in the same way that women or black people have been treated in the past. **Keeps sexual orientation private** where possible: "Admits" or "confirms" sexual orientation, does not or would prefer not to "declare" or "announce" it. Is forced to "live a lie" to serve. KEYWORDS: Lives a lie, admit, confirm, fear, stress, discharge, harassment, discrimination, oppression, civil rights, sensitivity training, stereotypes, diversity, tolerance, integration, minority group	MOTIVATION: Motivated by their sex and/or sexual identity to the exclusion of situational needs (e.g. bullets flying), civic responsibilities or institutional roles. ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS: **Disrupts social norms** and institutions by adding a "spoiling" or **undesirable, unclean or inappropriate element.** Brings **disease** (e.g. HIV/AIDS) into disease-free or "pure" military. Brings **sex and sexual desire** into sex-free, shared private places (e.g. group showers, bunks) or dangerous places. Violates **gender norms** through dress and behavior. Violates rules/norms of command structure by **abusing authority**—possibly a "sexual predator" Disrupts **cohesion** or **discipline** through mere presence. KEYWORDS: predator, flaunt, immorality, corrupt, practicing, recruitment (of homosexuals), shower, cohabitation, privacy, cameras, arousal, foxhole, huddled together for warmth, discipline, cohesion, readiness, disease, HIV, blood	MOTIVATION: Motivated by politics, self-interest, or allegiances to the gay rights movement or "gay agenda." ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS: **Places politics and self-interest ahead of the military**: is concerned with special rights and special protection, will accuse of prejudice those that do not agree with them. Wants to change rules out of self-interest. **Is out and proud** and refuses to "live lie" or keep sexual orientation a secret. Has desire or need to go public with sexual orientation. Wants to tell stories of experience to others. Know they're gay and join anyway. Acts as a **group** with other gay people or larger **agenda**: Has an agenda that is shared with other gays, acts in concert with or represents a larger gay community. Is a member of a gay rights organization. KEYWORDS: agenda, rights, special rights, social experimentation, activist, refuse, declare, announce, parade	MOTIVATION: Motivated by family, love, concern for loved ones. ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS: **Has spouse** and/or children. Makes decisions based on the **needs of partner** and/or children. May have brothers, sisters, mother, father etc. **Desires to include partner** or lover in their daily life. KEYWORDS: partner, domestic partnership lover, spouse, public display of affection, equal housing, same-sex marriage, family tradition, family legacy

Chapter 4

The Rise of the Gay Warrior: A Rhetorical Archetype Analysis of Congressional Hearings on Gays in the Military Held in 1993 and 2008

1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I drew on a diverse array of theories from rhetoric, sociolinguistics, public sphere theory, and sociology to propose a methodology called *rhetorical archetype analysis*. In this chapter I use rhetorical archetype analysis to investigate how the commonsense knowledge associated with gay and lesbian identity categories changed between the beginning and end of DADT's lifetime. I analyze two Congressional hearings held by the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC). The first hearing, held in 1993, offers a snapshot of how a legislative public—in this case, the United States House of Representatives—discussed the issue of gay people in the military just before the creation and implementation of DADT. The second hearing, from 2008, provides a sample of how that same public[1] discussed the same issue after a 15-year gap in which no hearings were convened to discuss DADT or the broader issue of gay people in the military.

The goal of this analysis is twofold. First, it seeks to understand how speakers drew on and represented identity categories encompassing gay, lesbian and bisexual persons in

public discourse surrounding the issue of gays in the military, and how those representations changed over time. The second, broader goal is to offer a framework for understanding public deliberation partly as an extended process of identity-category revision and social argument in which the typically durable, commonsense knowledge associated with identity categories can be slowly altered. This second goal stems from the idea that the congressional hearings that led to the creation and repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell were, like the debates about homosexuality in the military that preceded and surrounded them, partly about the value and merit of gay people as soldiers and citizens (Parco & Levy, 2013, p. 357). What was at stake were not merely policy decisions but also the assumptions from which those policy decisions should proceed. The subjects covered in the two hearings analyzed here are diverse, and yet a vast portion of discussion seems to answer unasked questions such as "what are gay people like?" and "what sorts of things do gay people do, as a general rule?" Even in strong legislative publics, important decisions were still being driven by assumptions related to identity categories. Moreover, these identity categories were both the source and focus of extended arguments within the hearings.

2. Five Rhetorical Archetypes in Two Congressional Hearings

The hearings analyzed here are vast. The official transcripts of these hearings separate the 1993 hearings into 1062 unnumbered turns[3] and 1993 hearings into 294 turns. Given the volume of this data, tracking speakers' rhetorical use of gay and lesbian identity categories and making meaningful claims about those usages present a serious challenge. One solution, proposed in detail in the preceding chapter, is to track rhetorical archetypes that emerge over time. I have identified five such archetypes based on an inductive coding[2] of both hearings: the gay warrior, the gay victim, the gay spoiler, the gay activist and the

gay family member. Each archetype is broken down into elements that can be spotted individually, including motives, attributes, actions and keywords (see the preceding chapter for an in-depth discussion of this method). In the following sections, I offer a discussion of each archetype's 1) appearance in the texts,[4] 2) argumentative functions, and 3) changing frequency between the 1993 and 2008 hearings.

2.1 The Gay Warrior

The most important thing to know about the gay warrior—what gives this archetype its character and distinguishes it from the others—is that the gay warrior acts out of duty, allegiance to the military (or a paramilitary organization such as a police or fire department), loyalty to colleagues or patriotism. Participants in the hearings sometimes attribute these motives explicitly (e.g. "they want to serve their country") but often express them by attributing various actions and attributes to gay people, including mentions of military accolades, the use of adjectival phrases such as "proud American" or "brave soldier," a description of sacrifices made in the line of duty (e.g. a lost limb or a risk to life and limb) and other markers. As is evident from the archetype name, the gay warrior must be gay, lesbian or bisexual. When speakers describe a named individual or themselves, additional information is sometimes needed to determine that, on the basis of the interaction alone, a listener could easily identify that person as gay, lesbian or bisexual.[5] In at least one instance, a speaker identified himself as gay *after* describing himself in a manner consistent with the gay warrior archetype.

Gay people who fit into the warrior archetype are sometimes, but not always, described as a particular *type* of gay person. Their sexual orientation is often subordinated to their professional role as a soldier or, in a few cases, police officer or firefighter. That

subordination may be explicit (e.g. “he was a soldier first”) or more subtle (e.g. “these soldiers happened to be gay”). The phrases “happened to be gay” or “happens to be gay” appear often to subordinate membership in the gay identity category to membership in the soldier identity category. But, interestingly, “happens to be” only appears in connection with a positive description of gay soldiers and never in the dialogue of someone who favors maintaining the ban or is skeptical of gay peoples’ potential as soldiers. In fact, after an exhaustive review of both the 1993 and 2008 hearings, my analysis would support using “happens to be” and its variants as prima facie evidence that the gay warrior archetype is present, although additional context was always used during my coding. Other key words and phrases that strongly indicate the presence of the gay warrior archetype are “brave,” “selfless,” “distinguished service,” “award,” “want to serve,” “patriot,” “ability” and “job performance.” Human judgement—and not simple concordance—is needed to determine when these words are being used in reference to gay people.

The Gay Warrior Archetype in Use

Participants in the hearings spoke of the gay warrior in ways both subtle and overt. Sometimes the gay warrior can be easily seen in a participant’s words; sometimes speakers bring the gay warrior into the hearings through mere implication. To show you what I mean, it will help to look at some examples that run the gamut between overt mentions of the gay warrior and quite subtle appearances. This example comes from the testimony of Christopher Shays (R-CT) during the 2008 hearing:

> I suspect when I look at Arlington Cemetery some happened to be gay. I suspect—and I have a little more proof of this—that the first person injured in the Iraqi war happened to have been gay. (HASC, 2008, p. 32)

The gay warrior archetype isn't hard to see in this passage. The speaker theorizes that some of the grave markers in the Arlington National Cemetery belong to gay people, perhaps suggesting that gay people should be allowed to serve openly because they are already serving and have been for some time. Moreover, because the speaker is talking about a military cemetery, there is a strong implication that at least some of these soldiers may have lost their lives during their military service. Notice too the use of the phrase "happened to be gay," which subordinates the sexual orientation of these servicemembers to their identity as soldiers by making their gayness incidental. "Happened to be" suggests that their sexual orientation has limited relevance, and perhaps is relevant only because the speaker is trying to make a point about the *irrelevance* of that orientation to the military service of these men and women (see discussion of the "ordinariness" of the gay warrior in chapter five). The speaker makes these gay warriors soldiers first, and in the process offers us a textbook example of what the gay warrior archetype looks like in use.

Another clear example of the gay warrior archetype appears in the prepared statement of retired Major General Vance Coleman, an African-American servicemember whose testimony emphasized the parallels between his own experience with segregation and the experiences of gay, lesbian and bisexual servicemembers. After drawing the parallel between "first class patriots" who are treated as "second class citizens," he relates his own experiences with gays and lesbians in the military:

> As a battery executive officer in Korea, I supervised a supervisor first class, who happened to be gay. I was the communication chief in our unit. He was in charge of the unit's communication, the system setup, the maintenance, and to make sure all the systems were working. He was, to put it in plain, essential terms, a critical part of

> that unit. Having to remove him from the position and from the Army entirely would have harmed our unit's ability to perform its mission (HASC, 2008, p.5).

In addition to a dismissal of this officer's sexual orientation as only marginally relevant, Coleman offers a description that fulfills several criteria of the gay warrior archetype. Coleman describes a soldier who is competent (he is given important duties), trusted by comrades and superiors (he has been placed in a leadership position) and essential to the mission (removing him would have harmed the "unit's ability to perform its mission"). And, of course, this soldier *just happens to be gay*.

Sometimes speakers bring the gay warrior archetype into the hearings simply by mentioning the military accolades of a known gay servicemember. Take, for example, the prepared statement of retired Captain Joan E. Darrah, a former naval intelligence officer:

> I joined the Navy in 1972 and served for 29-1/2 years. I was an intelligence officer and retired in June 2002 at the rank of captain. I was awarded three Legions of Merit and three Meritorious Service Medals. My final tour of duty was as the officer and enlisted community manager where I was responsible for all policies that impacted recruiting and retention for the intelligence community. (HASC, 2008, p. 6)

Two or three sentences later, Darrah explicitly identifies as gay, connecting her record of distinguished service to her sexual orientation. She points out that she was not even aware of her own homosexuality when she joined. Objective evidence (i.e. her service records) suggests that she was a good soldier both before and after she knew she was gay.

Hearing participants invoked the gay warrior archetype far more often in the 2008 hearing than they did in the 1993 hearing, proportionally speaking. The gay warrior accounted for 12% of archetype occurrences in 1993 and rose to 34.1% of archetype

occurrences in 2008 (see section three of this chapter and chapter five for a discussion of the significance of this finding). Nevertheless, the gay warrior archetype does appear in the 1993 hearing, albeit usually quite briefly, perhaps because other speakers in 1993 didn't pick up on the archetype and recirculate it. Take, for instance, this statement made by Tanya Domi, a former Army captain and the leader of the Military Freedom Initiative, a project of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force:

> As far as with regard to a quota, and affirmative action, frankly I think the record speaks for itself and in the PERSRC report documents—that gay and lesbian people demonstrated an equal if not better propensity and ability to adapt to military life. So I don't think we need any affirmative action. I think we have comported ourselves and distinguished ourselves in an outstanding manner. (HASC, 1993, p. 59)

There are important differences between how Domi calls forth the gay warrior archetype and the stronger, more overt examples I offered above which are more common in the 2008 hearing. Here, a speaker raises the gay warrior archetype in response to an analogy between African American civil rights (i.e. the integration of the U.S. armed forces under President Truman) and the question of gays in the military. I suspect that Domi begins her turn with the phrases "affirmative action" and "quotas," words which are indicators of the gay victim archetype (see subsection 2.2), because retired Colonel Lucius K. Truscott III makes a comparison between gay integration and racial integration two turns before Domi speaks. Domi pivots to issues of compatibility to military life and, in my view, this reflects a preference for justifying the right to serve openly on the basis of aptitude (i.e. an argument that uses the gay warrior archetype), rather than seeing it as an anti-discrimination effort. But, of course, Domi does not have very much control over the interaction, and her shift is

quickly reversed in the next turn, when the chair of the hearings observes that it is "legitimate to raise the issue of civil rights because some of us come down very strongly on that matter quite apart from the other matters" (HASC, 1993, p. 59). Domi's warrior archetype is reflected in neither the turns the precede her remark nor the turns that follow, even though those who speak before and after her are in favor of ending the ban on gay service, and thus on the same side, politically speaking.

In many cases, speakers summon the gay warrior archetype through a passing comment and, again, this is especially true in the 1993 hearing where the gay warrior archetype is both less present and often quite subtle. This comment is a good example: "If those figures are true, here is a group of people who have benefited, done very well by this country and want to serve their country" (HASC, 1993, p. 164). One can find even more subtle references to the gay warrior archetype in statements that do not directly attribute "warrior" traits to gay people, but rather depend on the assumption that gay people, as a category, are as capable of adapting to life in a military or paramilitary organization as their heterosexual counterparts. Take, for example, a statement made by Deputy Chief Gregory M. Dean of the Seattle Fire Department about his department's hiring policies:

> Because of city, State, and Federal ordinances, performance is the only criteria we presently use for exclusion, not orientation and not disabilities. That's the only criteria we're allowed to use within the Seattle Fire Department. (HASC, 1993, p. 242)

I argue that this passage contains an instance of the gay warrior archetype because the speaker discusses job performance in the context of a paramilitary organization that *does* allow gays to serve. If job performance is the only criterion, and gays are able to serve, then

they must fulfill that criterion. The proximity of sexual orientation to “disability” is also notable here, as it places Dean’s statement within an additional archetype because it associates the presence of gay people with *mandated inclusion* in the sense of legal non-discrimination (again, see section 2.2 for more information on the gay victim archetype).

Speakers can also appeal to the gay warrior archetype to argue against allowing gay people to serve openly in the military. In the 1993 hearing, General Weise (whom we heard from in the introduction) is willing to admit that some gay people may have served well, but argues that, overall, gay people are more trouble than they are worth:

> I say that these 14 cases [of misconduct by gay people] are only the tip of the iceberg. There are literally thousands of other cases and I strongly recommend that this committee subpoena them from all the services. Get them all and look at them and examine them. Compare them in number to the isolated individuals that step forward and said yes, I served for 30 years and I served honorably. I applaud those. I don't deny that some homosexuals may have served honorably, even in combat. But as a class, as a status, we get more problems from the homosexual community than from the heterosexual community, proportionate to size, than from any other community that we have in the military. (HASC, 1993, pp. 152-153)

Weise's comments contain a small, carefully hedged invocation of the gay warrior archetype ("some homosexuals *may* have served honorably, *even in combat*," emphasis added), but his allusion to the gay warrior archetype is preceded and followed by a stronger, much more certain assertion that homosexuals cause more problems than heterosexuals, proportionate to the size of their population within the military (see the "gay spoiler" archetype in section 2.3). Weise concedes that there are gay men and women in the military, but only as part of a

larger argument against allowing them to continue to serve. Weise's use of the gay warrior archetype is still clear in the sense that he is saying that some gay people *may* have what it takes to serve in the military. What is much more common among those opposed to gays in the military, however, is a straightforwardly negative invocation of the gay warrior archetype.

When speakers invoke a negative version of the gay warrior archetype, they make a claim which either directly asserts that gay people cannot be good soldiers or perhaps claim, directly or indirectly, that gay people have qualities that are counter to cultural images of a warrior or good soldier. Again I turn to the testimony of General Weise for an example:

> But let me tell you, if the reputation of the marines that landed on that beach hadn't preceded them, [the Somalians] wouldn't have quieted down. That is why we went ashore with our battle gear, not to prove we were macho but to let them know we meant business and they knew we meant business because our reputation preceded us. They knew we were combat effective. What would have happened if we had a wishy-washy force land there? Well, actually the mobs in Somalia were really bullies. You ever talk to a bully in a schoolyard? He will pick on anybody that lets him. (HASC, 1993, p. 93)

This passage contains other archetypes, most notably the gay spoiler archetype and the gay victim archetype, but it also raises the gay warrior archetype because it is an assertion that runs directly counter to the image of the gay warrior. Weise's audience is treated to an image of a weak, unimpressive gay soldier, perhaps prancing up the beach in a way that would be so recognizably homosexual that it would forever tarnish the reputation of the United States Marine Corps. But, our imaginary gay person is still being represented as a soldier, even if

he or she is a terrible one. To suggest that gay people make bad soldiers is still a tacit admission that they can make soldiers; it may also be a response to a circulating idea that gay people make *good* or *adequate* soldiers.

More Rhetorical Implications of the Gay Warrior Archetype

The gay warrior archetype can support a number of arguments, both implicit and explicit. Perhaps the most direct argument that emerges from the gay warrior archetype is a utilitarian one: gay people should be allowed to serve openly because they are good soldiers and the military needs good soldiers. This argument is much stronger in the 2008 text, and one can safely assume that this is due, at least in part, the United States' being embroiled in two prolonged conflicts at that time. Speakers made this argument frequently in the 2008 hearing. Here's an example from the opening statement of Rep. Susan A. Davis of California, who chaired the hearing:

> With this policy [DADT] comes the loss of service members with critical skills needed in the field right now, including much-needed language expertise. In my opinion we must carefully review a policy that rejects otherwise well-suited individuals from military service. This is especially true at a time when the military is trying to reduce the strain on our military by growing the force. (HASC, 2008, p. 1)

Pennsylvania Representative Patrick J. Murphy makes this same argument with even more urgency, later in the 2008 hearing:

> I would like to mention also when you talk about military necessity that, Sergeant, I think you would agree, we need more soldiers in our military, and Army, and our Navy as well, and the marine Corps, especially when you look at the rapid amount of

> deployments, the fact that the divorce rate is as high as it has ever been. And the suicide rate in 2007 is the highest it has ever been. We need help, and we need more good people, whether they are gay or straight, to join our military and to serve honorably. (HASC, 2008, p. 40)

Notice that both of these arguments proceed from the needs of the military, rather than the needs of gay people or the idea that military service is a right that has been denied to a segment of the population. Nor does Murphy suggest military service is employment and thus DADT constitutes job discrimination. The our-military-needs-gay-warriors argument is, in other words, quite separate from an argument based on a civil rights analogy or the harm that DADT causes to gay people who are already enlisted. On the other hand, the military-needs-warriors argument can and does coexist with these other points of view.

The gay warrior archetype can also support an argument which holds that because gay individuals have successfully adapted to military culture (by adopting a warrior identity and serving abroad) they have *earned* the right to serve, or *proven* that they ought to have that right. This argument appears several times in the hearings, and this isn't surprising because in a military context, describing one's past acts of bravery is a common ethos-building move. However, the argument becomes a bit more troubling when one considers how it would look in other contexts. It does not, for example, seem entirely benign when applied to an argument for civil rights (e.g. African Americans deserve the benefits of full citizenship because they have proven themselves to be good citizens). One might well point out that the contributions of gay and lesbian soldiers are relevant in the sense that they counter arguments against allowing gay people to serve. However, using a marginalized group's contributions as an argument for extending rights to them has the side effect of

placing the burden of proof for extending rights upon the marginalized group, rather than those who would deny or exclude that group access to a right, opportunity or institution. I doubt that this argumentative implication—that marginalized groups must prove they are deserving of equal treatment *before* they receive it—would occur to a casual observer of the hearings. Nevertheless, if hearers recirculate argumentative claims for minority rights that depend upon this idea (I'll call it a "prove-yourself-first assumption"), it would hardly be surprising to see it become a hidden cultural logic and indeed carrying over into later, parallel deliberations about extending rights or privileges to marginalized groups. This reading of the prove-yourself-first argument draws on critical discourse analysis, which asks us to consider, among other things, the "the relationship of discourse and power, the discursive construction of social subjects and knowledge, and the functioning of discourse in social change" (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 37-38). If speakers circulated this variation of the gay victim archetype beyond these hearings, it may have affected the way other marginalized and marginalizing archetypes function within public deliberation. This is merely a hypothetical possibility; however, many speakers in the 2008 hearings make statements that depend in some way on the idea that gay people should be allowed to serve *primarily* because they have demonstrated their capacity to do so well.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the larger social implications of a prove-yourself-first assumption (i.e. the genesis of the gay-people-have-proven-themselves argument), let us return to the details of its use in these hearings. The gay-people-have-proven-themselves argument appears in both the 1993 and 2008 hearings, but rarely on its own; it is often an implication that follows from the our-military-needs-gay-warriors argument (e.g. we need soldiers and gay people have shown that they can be good soldiers). Earlier I excerpted a

moment in the 1993 hearing in which a leader from a gay rights organization says, "I think we have comported ourselves and distinguished ourselves in an outstanding manner" (HASC, 1993, p. 59). This statement is one of the rare moments in which a speaker posits that gay people have been on their best behavior, but does not continue to say or imply that their service is needed. Indeed there are moments in these hearings when one gets the sense that a speaker believes that gay people do not deserve consideration on principle, but rather have earned it through bloodshed, as when Rep. Christopher Shays states, in response to a witness asking why Congress should be bothering with the issue of gays in the military at all, that the service of gay people justifies paying attention to the issue:

> I am still wrestling with anyone in this panel saying, I don't understand why we are having this hearing. I could give you a lot of reasons. Sgt. Alva is one reason. He lost his leg. He will never have his leg back... We know that gays have served in every conflict in our country. They served in every war, and we know that gays have given their lives for everyone in this room. So, Sergeant Jones, that is why we are having this hearing, because gays have given their lives in service to our country and you and every one of us has benefited from their service. (HASC, 2008, pp. 44-45)

I shall describe in this section just one more argumentative possibility created by the circulation of the gay warrior archetype and, although I am certain that there are other possibilities, the three that I have mentioned here played the biggest role in the hearings. The gay warrior archetype can also undercut other arguments, such as the notion that gay people act as a contaminant or spoiler, corrupting the military and society as a whole:

> Sergeant Alva: ...As we saw in Somalia in 1993, there weren't that many conflicts arising until late 1993 [when DADT was implemented]. But we did live amongst

> each other, we slept—the stadium was pretty full with 3,000-5,000 Marines and Navy trying to live together. Some of our cots were touching each other. We didn't have portable showers like they do in Iraq as today. They were built out of plywood and makeshift hoses that were made as our showers. Everybody was there to do a job, regardless of how someone showered or slept had nothing to do with it. It was there to make sure we all finished the mission and came home." (HASC, 2008, p. 44)

This passage is also notable because it contains a clear example of an archetype that does not refer to gay people at all: the untroubled comrade, a name for heterosexuals who, whatever their feelings toward gay people, have “no problem” serving alongside gay people (see chapter five for a full description of this archetype and its significance).

2.2 The Gay Victim

An easy way to understand the gay victim archetype is to pay attention to two things: fear and compromised agency—both are key signifiers that this archetype may be present. The gay victim acts out of fear of harassment, discharge, violence and other forms of persecution, fears that are often justified by previous experiences. Participants in the hearings rarely ascribe motives directly to the gay victim archetype (e.g. "gay people act out of fear"). More often they imply a fear motive in such a way that that motive could be categorically associated with membership in the gay identity category. Speakers describe gay people as fearing or having experienced marginalization or unfair treatment and worrying about losing their jobs, being discharged, being investigated or being the victim of violence. If the speakers are gay people themselves, they may discuss the stresses of serving under Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Speakers, both gay and straight, raise the gay victim archetype whenever they draw analogies between gay people and other marginalized groups. Mentions

of civil rights, rights, the prior treatment of women and African Americans by the military are also signs of the gay victim archetype. The gay victim keeps his or her sexual orientation private if possible, usually preferring to do so. If outed or forced in some way to disclose, the gay victim will use—or be described using—verbs such as "admit" or "confirm" but never "declare" or "announce." Other key words and phrases tied to this archetype are "lives a lie," "fear," "stress," "discharge," "harassment," "discrimination," "oppression," "civil rights," "sensitivity training" (for those around them), "stereotypes," "diversity," "tolerance," "integration" and "minority." Finally, although this is not at all a prerequisite for an appearance by the gay victim archetype, one often sees gay victims, whether real individuals or hypothetical ones, given compromised agency at a grammatical level (e.g. "she is forced to live a lie" rather than just "she lives a lie"). Speakers made remarks consistent with the gay victim archetype throughout both hearings, with the archetype accounting for 30.8% of archetype occurrences in 1993 and 22% of archetype occurrences in 2008.

The Gay Victim Archetype in Use

As with the other archetypes, speakers invoke the gay victim archetype when they are talking about a specific person. But they may also bring the gay victim archetype into the hearings by talking about a hypothetical or prototypical gay person, for instance:

> A gay person, unfortunately, is faced with the situation they can either go to the chain of command and complain that for some reason that are not being treated fairly, but if they do that then they will have to out themselves and they will be fired. (HASC, 2008, p. 35)

Furthermore, speakers also circulate the gay victim archetype when they ascribe elements of the archetype to gay people by suggesting that they are a group or class that is subject to negative stereotyping and other forms of mistreatment:

> I think that one of the reasons that we see so much opposition now from members of the Armed Forces is that lesbians and gay men are portrayed as 'them'. They are a group. They are a set of stereotypes and abstract things that heterosexual people have heard about. (HASC, 1993, 289)

Speakers frequently raise the gay victim archetype by implication. Take, for example, this statement from Dr. Paul Sherry, President of the United Church of Christ:

> I have nothing further to say. I think the education and sensitivity training are critical. I think it can be done. It is being done. I talked recently with the chaplain in the armed services who said to me that he sees the role of the chaplains as central in this effort as we begin to work through that. (HASC, 1993, p. 73)

Sherry implies that those who work with gay and lesbian people will require "education" and "sensitivity training," ideas often associated with diversity, affirmative action and minorities in the workplace. But, more broadly, he is implying that gay people require special accommodation as a class because their colleagues might mistreat them, or treat them "insensitively." The implication is that gay people, as a group, *tend to be mistreated or victimized* in a military or paramilitary setting. Terms like "discrimination" and "minority" almost always indicate that the gay victim archetype is present.

At times, speakers circulate gay victim archetype in reference to unequal status in civil life, rather than military life, as in this excerpt from Staff Sgt. Eric Alva:

> That land mine may have put an end to my military career that day, but it didn't put an end to my secret. That would come years later when I realized that I had fought and nearly died to secure the rights for others that I myself was not free to enjoy. I had proudly served a country that was not proud of me. (HASC, 2008, p. 8)

Alva draws a contrast between his sacrifice for his country and his own treatment when he returned. This formulation is relatively common in the hearings: soldier serves country in which he or she cannot enjoy full civil rights. But, again, what's important here isn't so much the setting in which the individual has been marginalized. What matters is that the statement represents gay people as a marginalized class and circulates and image of them as a victimized group.

Another, common way that speakers' statements draw on the gay victim archetype is through comparisons to the ongoing plight of women and African Americans in the military. In both hearings, speakers frequently draw on (and contest!) comparisons between marginalized groups to support their arguments for ending or maintaining a ban. Take this comment by Gen. Weiss, for instance,

> I realize you were talking to Master Chief Jackson, but you asked for some differences between the integration of the blacks. I realize I am not black, but I can tell you one difference. I can stand up and, even with my poor eyes, I can count every black in this room, but I dare say I cannot count every homosexual in this room. (HASC, 1993, p. 161)

This speaker contests the comparison between marginalized groups, but he still invokes the gay victim archetype because, to argue that these issues are dissimilar, he must still recirculate, by implication, the idea that these issues might be comparable, even if only to

suggest that they are not.[6] Weise, a white male, puts gay people in a double bind: he claims that they are different from, and more insidious than, "the blacks" because gay people are not always readily identifiable. The problem arises when one places Weise's argument alongside complaints about the gay tendency to "flaunt" their identity, thus solving the problem of invisibility, but, presumably, making gay people even less acceptable to someone with Weise's views. In this way, Weise is using the gay spoiler archetype (i.e. the implication that gay people are a hidden, unseen menace) to dissociate them from other, legitimate victims, in this case, African American people.

When speakers call on the gay victim archetype in the form of a comparison between black people and gay people, one often hears the phrase "benign, non-behavioral characteristic" used to counter the notion that a racial identity category is in any way comparable to an identity category based on sexual orientation. That is, speakers argue that black people are different from gay people because race is "benign" and does not stem from, or manifest as, a set of objectionable behaviors.[7] In fact, the "benign, non-behavioral characteristic" formula has circulated widely enough that speakers employ it as a rebuttal to the rebuttal, a way to argue that, despite what you may have heard, there are indeed commonalities between the treatment of black people then and gay people now:

> Colonel Truscott: I have been asked several times whether I agree with General [Colin] Powell's, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, comment that color is benign when we integrated the blacks in 1948, 1949 and 1950. Color was a very strong and emotional aspect of the integration of the blacks. General Powell, being a black, I don't think could ever really get inside the heads of some of the whites in the Army

> who violently objected to the integration of the blacks. Color was not benign then, just like this business of sexual orientation is not benign today. (HASC, 1993, p. 35)

Given the plethora of ways in which speakers call on the gay victim archetype, it is difficult to offer an example of every possible guise in which a reader could encounter it. Perhaps it will suffice to say that the most common versions of the gay victim archetype involve depictions of gay soldiers and citizens as victims of mistreatment, invocations of civil rights or multicultural keywords (e.g. "discrimination," "sensitivity training," "stereotypes," etc.) and direct comparisons between the treatment of gay people and other marginalized groups, such as women and African American people. One can also see the gay victim archetype whenever a speaker *contests* or challenges one of the above ideas. What unites these ideas into an archetype is simple: they all depend, at least in part, on the idea that gay people are victimized because of their membership in an identity category.

More Rhetorical Implications of the Gay Victim Archetype

The gay victim archetype can support a diverse array of arguments, both for and against allowing openly gay people to serve in the military. It offers much more flexibility than the gay warrior archetype in this regard. Although the gay warrior archetype too can both support and argue against gays in the military, the gay victim archetype is different in that it is regularly used for both purposes. Here I cover what I see as the most significant three arguments.

Probably the most obvious argument that stems from the gay victim archetype is the notion that a ban on either open service or service altogether causes gay people to suffer, and that that suffering is a bad thing. I have already offered a few examples of this argument and, in any case, it is not difficult to picture. What is more interesting than a simple gay-

people-are-suffering-and-that's-bad argument are the ways in which this argument can be combined with other arguments. Take, for example, the following excerpt from a turn spoken by Capt. Joan Darrah:

> And my other fear is there is tremendous talent in the military, and people that are living under Don't Ask, don't Tell and enduring the stress that I did, and if these people decide they don't want to serve anymore, that is another tremendous loss. So I think we lose a tremendous number of people. And there are wonderful people out there that happen to be gay that would love an opportunity to serve our country. (HASC, 2008, p. 24)

Here, the gay victim archetype and the gay warrior archetype (note the cameo appearance of "happen to be gay") are deployed in an argument that gay people have the talent and desire to become good soldiers but, because they are treated poorly, are less inclined to do so. The above anecdote also shows the gay victim archetype supporting an argument that, given a growing awareness of the stresses imposed by DADT, young people will choose not to enlist in the military or not to stay. We should take note, however, of the different reasons that can be given for ending the suffering of gay people. In the above argument it is a utilitarian reason (i.e. that the military will be deprived of talented recruits), but in other instances, the reason might simply be that no one deserves to be forced to conceal their personal life from their colleagues and "live in fear," whatever their value to the military.

The gay victim archetype also plays a key part in attempts to understand the question of gay people in the military as a civil rights issue. The 2008 hearing offers a perfect case in point in the testimony of Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA):

> And [civil rights] is a lot [of] what this is about. And I do believe that this is the last frontier of civil rights opportunities we have in this country, that we have figured out how to deal with racial integration, gender integration and that this is the last frontier. And this is a special thing, our United States military. (HASC, 2008, p. 43)

Tauscher might strike some readers as having gone too far in declaring military service by gay people to be the "last frontier of civil rights." She may have meant to refer to gay rights in general. But, setting aside the fact that Tauscher's claim may be a bit jaw dropping, she employs the civil rights frame (and the gay victim archetype) with textbook clarity. For other participants in the hearing, however, equating gays in the military and gay rights in general with previous civil rights struggles (most notably the African American civil rights movement) is a much more complicated and troublesome business. During the 1993 hearing, this comparison often drew strong protest from participants. One witness alleged that to compare the two issues would be to "degrade the great glory and the majesty of the civil rights movement of this country" (HASC, p. 163). Another participant suggested that the comparison of gay rights to the African American civil rights movement could not be made because stakeholders within the African American community do not support gay rights:

> I would say that if you look around at those who are advocating the policy of lifting the ban, I have not seen a great number of black civil rights leaders taking that position. In fact, many of the black people that I talk to, many of my brothers and sisters are offended and incensed that they try to equate the fact of blacks being able to serve the same as a homosexual with the same struggle for freedom that blacks when through in the 1960s. (HASC, 1993, p. 157)

One cannot help but marvel at the vehemence with which some participants rejected this use of the gay victim archetype and the imagery of the civil rights movement, especially in light of the frequent support given to the gay-service-as-a-civil-right argument offered by the chair of the hearings, himself an African American man.

A third variation of the gay victim archetype shares some qualities with arguments that hold that a ban on open service causes gay people to suffer. This third argument confers victimhood status on gay people, but uses that status to argue in favor of either an outright ban or a ban on open service. In other words, because gay people are a despised and harassed group within the military, greater visibility on their part would cause increased violence. Therefore, DADT becomes a *protective* measure for gay people, preventing them from being abused or, in some cases, murdered outright. Testimony by retired USMC Colonel John Ripley offers a particularly frightening instance of this argument:

> I learned as a very young officer a rule that is not codified or written in any red book and was called the Queers, Cowards and Thieves Rule, and it is a very simple one. Any time one of these individuals is discovered in the unit, the immediate response… is to isolate the individual to protect them. You do that in almost an explosive fashion. Get him out of his troop bay. Get him out. Get him above deck. Get him in anywhere you can supervise. That is the reason why we put them in the brig—for their own protection. The result of not doing that is almost certainly, well, if not death, at least serious injury. I have seen this. I have seen the results of this… I can think on a number of occasions, once en route to the Med aboard ship, when a man didn't show up for morning quarters. It was determined that he was a well-known homosexual, and he went over the side. (HASC, 1993, p. 171)

Although Ripley couches his opposition to gays in the military in concern for the safety of oft-victimized "well-known homosexual[s]," his version of the gay victim archetype portrays gay people as so despised that the only solution is to isolate and protect them from their comrades rather than, say, "sensitivity training" or one of the other, similar alternatives proffered by others to address prejudice. Moreover, his comments are all the more credible because they emanate from experience, even if that experience may be years old. Although Ripley does not directly legitimize the murder of gay and lesbian people, at one point directly saying that he and other military leaders do not condone such behavior, he does suggest that it is at least a somewhat understandable reaction, by soldiers, to the "predation" of gay people:

> The simple fact is when you place men into extremes and the extremes are in some cases indescribable as so-called living conditions, then they will find a way to solve that problem. If they are preyed upon and their own leadership can't control the problem, they will find a way to control it." (HASC, 1993, p. 172)

The predatory gay soldiers that he describes are victims, but they are partly responsible their victimhood because they *cause* the animosity from which that victimhood arises. In effect, Ripley has combined the gay victim and gay spoiler archetypes into a single figure, which makes his comments a fitting transition into the next archetype.

2.3 The Gay Spoiler

The gay spoiler archetype appears more than any other in the 1993 hearing, accounting for 39.9%—nearly half—of archetype occurrences in 1993. By 2008, this falls to 22% of archetype occurrences. The gay spoiler, as the name suggests, "spoils" or contaminates previously unspoiled things, whether they be a concrete thing such as a blood

supply or something more abstract, such as a social institution or an atmosphere. The motive that defines the gay spoiler is typically, but not always, a sexual one. They sexualize a previously non-sexualized space, such as group showers or foxholes. The sexual motives of the gay spoiler can be distinguished from normal human sexuality by virtue of appropriateness; that is, the gay spoiler acts on or is affected by his or her sexual desires at times when a heterosexual person, it is assumed, would not be: when she or he is in mortal danger (i.e. in a foxhole), in shared intimate spaces (the shower, the locker room, etc.), and when inhabiting roles with authority over others. The gay spoiler frequently inhabits the role of sexual deviant, but not all instances of the gay spoiler directly entail sex. The gay spoiler may also "spoil" something by violating gender or other social norms, neglecting civil responsibilities or institutional roles, bringing immorality into sacred spaces, or, most common of all, disrupting cohesion or discipline by mere virtue of their presence. Important keywords and phrases for detecting this archetype include "predator," "shower," "immorality," "corrupt," "cohabitation," "privacy," "cameras," "arousal," "foxhole," "huddled together for warmth," "discipline," "cohesion," "readiness," "disease," "blood" and "HIV." Mention of the gay spoiler's sexual orientation will often include such words as "flaunt," "practicing" and "recruitment" (of straight people into homosexuality).

The Gay Spoiler Archetype in Use

Although the gay spoiler is in some ways the most significant (i.e. present) archetype, speakers can raise it by uttering short phrases and often invoke the archetype, through mere mentions of cohesion and discipline. This excerpt from the testimony of anti-gay activist Elaine Donnelly typifies how subtle the gay spoiler archetype can be:

> We know what [other countries] do in their military is nothing like the demands that we have in our Armed Forces. We have the strongest military in the world. Good order and discipline is important. (HASC, 2008, p. 12)

Donnelly brings the gay spoiler archetype into her comments in about six words. To merely point out that good order and discipline is enough to draw on—and subtly reinforce—the notion that gay people either lack qualities that contribute to good order and discipline, or else undermine these qualities in those around them. Donnelly casts gay people in the role of spoiler without much elaboration on what exactly it is that they do to spoil discipline and order. However, others, and also Donnelly herself at other moments in the hearing, were quite willing to elaborate on how and where gay people spoil and contaminate.

Speakers also raise the gay spoiler archetype by citing concerns for medical safety or, as was often the case in the 1993 hearing, the safety of the blood supply from diseases such as HIV. In often-graphic terms, participants described situations under which bodily fluids are spread on the battlefield, with the idea that gay people have dirty or contaminated blood always in the background:

> It seemed to me in combat that on a regular basis several times a day I was pinching off someone's artery, sticking a thumb in a chest hole to prevent loss of breath, giving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, pouring a canteen of water into an open abdomen to flush out the filth and the blood, just trying to find the wound, trying to gently put a man's jaw into place so he wouldn't choke to death on his own blood, replacing eyes back in their sockets, collecting limbs and throwing them into ponchos so they could be evacuated with the body. This was regular activity. This was normal activity, not unusual at all. Can you imagine the extraordinary fear

> fighting men have thinking that at least some of that blood may come from a homosexual who, without question, to our way of thinking, would carry a life-threatening disease? (HASC, 1993, p. 90)

Retired Navy Master Chief Chuck Jackson presents a gory image of battlefield medicine that is nonetheless compelling for all its concrete detail. In his view, the danger of having gays in the military, however good they may be at fighting, comes from their blood itself. It's hard not to look at Jackson's testimony and be struck by the symbolism of dirty blood, especially given that Jackson does not claim that gay men *are* diseased, but rather that fighting men simply fear that gay men carry disease. It is almost as if gay men symbolize the specter of contamination quite apart from the reality of whether they are or are not actually infected with HIV. In fact, speakers spiritedly debunked the HIV argument in both hearings (e.g. HASC, 1993, p. 163; HASC, 2008, p. 18). Nevertheless, the gay spoiler archetype frequently assumes the form of blood contamination fears, sometimes with direct appeal to notions like "purity:"

> I agree with you. Heterosexuals also have AIDS and that is why we do all the testing, but it is very difficult to have that snapshot in testing and time. Would you agree or not agree that when you add a larger homosexual community into the military, it does increase the risk for contamination on the battlefield as opposed to the *purity of the force* we have now? (HASC, 1993, p. 77, emphasis added)

There is no way of knowing why this speaker chose the word purity, but it, and comments like it, demonstrate an almost pathological fear of gay bodies and gay blood.

Concerns over privacy are another important marker of the gay spoiler archetype. Privacy concerns were a feature of the debate over gays in the military before and during

DADT's lifetime (Lehring, 2003, p. 130) and I suspect these concerns may outlive the policy. If these hearings are any indication, soldiers mostly fear (or are seen by others to fear) for their privacy the shower. The gay spoiler archetype carries with it a ready-made drama or narrative. In this narrative, gays (men, usually) violate the sanctity of the group shower, ruining what had previously been an entirely asexual environment. It is not rape that the straight soldiers in this scenario fear, but rather the lingering, sexual gaze of their compatriots. Lehring theorizes that the preoccupation with showering stems from the fact that, to put it far more crudely than he does, white heterosexual men are used to doing the objectifying, rather than being the subject of it. In any case, both sides of the debate addressed the issue of privacy via shower scenarios, real and imagined:

> We do not make women shower with men. So you cannot make men shower with people that are oriented toward them, even if they promised to keep their eyes fixed on the shower fixture or the ceiling. It just does not work that way.
> (HASC, 1993, p. 304)

Proponents of gay service also chose the shower as a locus for privacy concerns, as in this comment from Colonel Cropsey:

> I agree that all people should be given the sexual privacy they have come to expect and deserve, whether it is in showers or in sleeping quarters, but the unsubstantiated fear of heterosexual males that gay soldiers first find them attractive and then will approach them is unfounded. In my 23 years commanding, about half that time commanding soldiers, I never had a report and never discharged anyone for homosexual conduct, and it wasn't because I was gay. I never saw any misconduct and none was reported. (HASC, 1993, p. 41)

It may be amusing to picture dozens of soldiers in a group shower, resolutely examining the shower fixtures in an attempt to avoid seeing one another in the nude, thus avoiding any unwanted sexual feelings. However, the focus on the shower is also revealing because it so directly parallels concerns about blood: a previously unspoiled thing is corrupted by the mere presence of gay people. The shower (a safe, intimate space) is contaminated by the presence of an invisible predator.

Speakers sometimes characterize gay people as spoilers more generally, alluding to the ways in which they despoil broader social institutions such as marriage and the family:

> So that is the concern that I have. I think it is inconsistent to argue this to the civil rights issue but not want to discuss the long-term impacts that this change would have in terms of changing the fundamental way this society operates, and that is what the American people need to focus on. (HASC, 1993, p. 193)

Anyone who studies the ongoing debate over same-sex marriage will find a statement like this one very familiar. On the occasions that marriage does crop up within these hearings, it is often use to raise a slippery-slope argument, in which society will be forced to redefine social institutions if gay people are allowed to serve openly. Here too we see an unnamed institution presented as pure, but also vulnerable to contamination: in this case, "redefinition" by gay people. But this comment also shows how subtle the gay spoiler archetype can be. We are given a quite vague allusion to changes in "the fundamental way this society operates" with no elaboration or specific examples of how exactly viewing the issue of gays in the military as a civil rights matter would alter society. Instead we are left to assume that these changes, although unnamed, are fundamentally serious and not to be taken lightly. This shows that spoiler archetype is such a powerful part of the cultural logic that

surrounds the gay identity category that one can allude to it without having to explain what one means. The respondent who spoke next did not say, "wait, what do you mean by fundamental changes?" Nor is there any other indication that participants needed clarification on this matter.

More Rhetorical Implications of the Gay Spoiler Archetype

As you might imagine, speakers do not usually invoke the gay spoiler archetype to argue that gays ought to serve, unless they are invoking the archetype to debunk it. In fact, the argumentative value of the archetype is quite straightforward. What's remarkable is the sheer diversity of guises in which it can appear—i.e. the sheer number of different things that gay people can spoil—and the ubiquitous appeal that the archetype apparently held for participants in both hearings. Whether speakers describe the gay spoiler in explicit terms, or refer to the archetype indirectly, they tend to draw on it to argue that gay people corrupt something (most likely something that is cherished or highly valued) and that, therefore, gay people ought to be excluded from that thing in order to protect it. This archetype should be familiar to readers because it appears in connection with other issues related to gay people, especially same-sex marriage (e.g. in the very name of the Defense of Marriage Act). When a speaker supports an argument against gay military service with the spoiler archetype, it almost always functions something like this:

> The message of the [Non-Commissioned Officers Association of the United States of America] is that if the policy banning homosexuals from military service is reversed, it is… the enlisted community that would be most affected in terms of morale and discipline by such a drastic change in policy." (HASC, 1993, p. 83)

As you can see, the argument is a simple one. Homosexuals do bad things to morale and discipline. Although here the wording here is somewhat vague (e.g. "affected" rather than "harmed"), the negative implication is clear. Gay people harm morale and discipline and should therefore be excluded from military service. The above example is generic and one could find dozens of almost identical examples throughout both hearings. When speakers invoke the gay spoiler archetype to argue that gay people *should* be allowed to serve, they typically invoke the archetype in order to challenge its validity, as in this turn by retired Army Colonel Lucian K. Truscott III:

> I have a feeling about this business of associating with gays and I will pose this question to you: I have associated with these two [gay] people here today and on one other occasion and, I don't feel at all that I am contaminated because I am associating with gays. I am not sure that any guy down in a rifle company would feel that way either. (HASC, 1993, p. 55).

In Truscott's remarks, he raises the gay spoiler archetype so that he may sweep it aside. However, as in the case of the other archetypes, to bring the question of "contamination" stemming from association with gays into the hearings requires that a speaker also re-circulate the idea that associating with gay people *may* lead to contamination, or that some believe it may.

Although the gay spoiler supports arguments with simple structures, the structure itself is versatile, functioning almost like a formula into which different institutions, places, and concepts can be plugged. Gay people, it can be argued, tend to spoil almost anything. They make living spaces intolerable:

> We would lose thousands of people if they were told under a zero tolerance policy that you must accept the new paradigm, which is forced cohabitation of men and women with homosexuals in the military, force cohabitation in all branches of the service, all communities. (HASC, 2008, p. 10)

Protecting gay people from discrimination would disrupt the free speech rights of others:

> And if people disagree they are going to be forced out of the military because we have a new policy called zero tolerance of any dissent. That means denial of promotions. (HASC, 2008, p. 20)

Gay people complicate training, which must take place during a limited timespan:

> A problem person in a company for a commander takes a lot of time, because we are very thorough. And when you have two weeks to get your troops into the Iraqi theater or the Afghanistan theater, you are going to have to put that on hold. You are going to have to put that on the back burner and deal with it at a later time. (HASC, 2008, p. 14)

Having gay people in the military disrupts the trust one must cultivate in order to have effective leadership:

> When sexuality enters that equation, these bonds of trust are simply blown away. No one can trust a leader nor can a leader trust a subordinate if he thinks there are sexual feelings just underneath the surface. It makes no difference if the individual is suppressing those feelings. It makes trust virtually impossible. (HASC, 1993, p. 89)

Gay people spoil other large institutions, including religious orders:

> Intense hatred is being generated against my Christian denomination because the Vatican said this is a functional disorder and also because my denomination was

> very charitable and generous and looked at individuals in the 1950s and 1960s coming into seminaries; we are now losing $500 million a year because of pedophiles. The dominant media culture won't say homosexual, which 95 percent of the cases are… (HASC, 1993, p. 79)

In the most extreme cases, the gay spoiler archetype can portray a gay servicemember as something truly monstrous, a predator who lays waste to those that surround him:

> The point is, if you put homosexuals in a situation like that—and in a study that I seen (sic), less than 2 percent claim celibacy—it is like putting a hungry dog in a meat shop. It is like putting a fox guarding a hen coop. It just doesn't make sense. (HASC, 1993, p. 165)

The other remarkable thing about the gay spoiler archetype is its apparently broad appeal for participants in both hearings. As I mentioned above, it was the most common archetype in the 1993 hearings and a close second in 2008 (where it is overtaken in frequency by the gay warrior archetype). That so many speakers invoke the gay spoiler archetype—often in very few words—speaks to the commonsense power of the gay spoiler archetype. I think it is safe to assume that not everyone present at the hearings, and certainly not everyone who saw media coverage of them, believed that gay and lesbian people damage good order, discipline or cohesion by their mere presence. However, the ease and frequency with which this archetype circulates is evidence in and of itself that the archetype offered a good deal of rhetorical force or, at the very least, that many people believed it did.

2.4 The Gay Activist

The gay activist is not nearly as common as the spoiler, warrior or victim archetypes. In 1993, the gay activist accounted for 9.2% of archetype occurrences, falling to 3.1% in the

2008 hearing. Put simply, the gay activist is a figure who politicizes the military by placing the concerns of a minority over the good of the military and the nation. Whereas the gay warrior is a "soldier first," the gay activist is a gay person first. In other words, the gay activist does not merely "happen to be gay"; he or she chooses to emphasize or "declare" that orientation, intentionally making it public and engaging in political activism. The gay activist has a political motivation, and acts out of self-interest and allegiance to the gay rights movement. He or she *refuses* to "live a lie," preferring that others—including the public—know of his or her sexual orientation. Gay activists act in cooperation with either the gay rights movement or simply other gay people, rendering their allegiance to the military suspect. Key words and phrases that signal the possible presence of the gay activist archetype include "agenda," "rights," "special rights," "social experimentation," "activist," "parade," "refuse," "declare" and "announce." Disclosure verbs in particular can be a strong indicator that the figure of the gay activist is being referenced. Strong, public forms of disclosure (declare, announce) are much more common with this archetype than verbs that connote a reluctant disclosure only undertaken because of the actions of others (e.g. admit, confirm).

The Gay Activist Archetype in Use

The gay activist archetype is somewhat unique in that speakers in the hearings often invoked it by name, referring explicitly to "gay activists" who were engaging in "social experimentation" by advocating for the right of gays to serve. The word "activist" in particular appears to have had a negative connotation on both sides. According to Belkin (2011) parties on both sides preferred to refer to themselves as unbiased experts and their opposition as "activists." At least in the hearings, this tactic appeared to more often tar those

who favored open service for gay people. Only one proponent of gay service willingly inhabiting the role of "activist," and she did so only indirectly, in her self-introduction:

> I am here today as a former Army Captain. I am here also to represent the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. I am also a lesbian. (HASC, 1993, p. 16)

Notice that the speaker identifies herself first as a former Army Captain and then as a representative of a gay rights organization. Subordinated as it is, this passage is as close as any of the participants in the hearings come to actually identifying themselves as a gay activist.

Much more common in these hearings are comments in which participants—almost always those opposed to gay people serving in the military—dismiss the effort to secure the right to serve for gay people as a noisy minority either demanding undue consideration of its needs or else pursuing "special rights" or special treatment. The testimony of retired Sgt. Major Brian Jones offers a clear example of the gay activist archetype:

> Our soldiers are overtasked with deploying, fighting, redeploying, refitting and deploying again. These brave men and women have achieved what many million Americans thought impossible. With all the important issues that require attention, it is difficult to understand why a minority faction is demanding that their concerns be given priority over more important issues. (HASC, 2008, p. 13)

Jones argues against the right of gay people to serve by impugning their motives: he casts the entire movement as a minority that is noisily "demanding their concerns be given priority." In effect, he dissociates servicemembers from those who favor allowing gay people to serve. That is, his statement allows no overlap whatsoever between those who wish to allow gays to serve and those who are actually serving (the overburdened soldiers

who already have enough to do). Jones statement contains a key element of the gay activist archetype: a minority faction, speaking "noisily" in a way that interferes with the functioning of the military. Crucially, he portrays the military as an apolitical institution, concerned only with deploying, fighting, redeploying, etc., ignoring the significant political activism undertaken by military leaders during the creation of DADT (cf. Frank, 2009) and drawing a stark contrast between highly politicized gay activists and politically neutral soldiers.

In contrast to the gay victim, the gay activist implies a clear, strong agency on the part of gay people, and this makes it easy to recognize the archetype in texts. One place to see this clearly is in verb choice. Verbs like "announce" and "declare" show up when a speaker describes a gay person (or gay people in general, as the case may be) as engaging in public, political disclosure of sexual orientation, e.g.:

> …there was a sergeant that came out of the closet when the President made his announcement [that he intended to lift the ban], and for a couple of months he was in his unit and he was an announced gay and he appeared on panels and he went to places and held himself up as a paragon of virtue and so forth and so on and there was a disruption in his unit. But he was never beaten, even though I am sure a lot of Marines felt that way. But in the Marine Corps we try not to let that happen. (HASC, 1993, pp. 174-175)

This particular gay man came out in a specific way: he made an "announcement" (and hence became an "announced gay") and proceeded to speak in the decidedly public forum of television. The speaker who describes him points out that, despite his public actions, this marine was "never beaten," a credit to the United States Marine Corps. The underlying

assumption here is that when gay people speak in public, they become much more threatening to those around them. Being gay is bad; being a publicly out gay person (i.e. an activist) is worse. In other cases, this agency is quite literally equated with loudness, as in "…we do have a very vocal and active gay and lesbian faction within the city of Seattle" (HASC, 1993, pp. 205-206). Gay activists can speak and act for themselves, but these abilities become symbols of a loud, demanding minority composed of individuals motivated by self-interest. These activists invite the violence that is directed toward them or else are not beaten because of the admirable restraint of those around them or, perhaps, an unusually progressive locale such as Seattle.

More Rhetorical Implications of the Gay Activist Archetype

The gay activist has several argumentative possibilities, all of them fairly straightforward. Speakers can use the archetype to discredit an otherwise strong argument by associating the person making it with a despised group, such as the gay rights movement. One can suggest that advocates of gay rights are only speaking out of self-interest, which can discredit their efforts or (and this would be a subtle implication indeed) cast doubt on the sexual orientation of heterosexuals who speak in favor of gay rights. One gets the sense from the gay activist archetype that at least one circulating image of gay people portrays them as having a tendency toward collusion, intimidation and, somewhat paradoxically, bullying:

> [The military does] have recruiting and retention problems. They have problems and issues with what is called homosexual bullying. This is from the Stonewall Group that objects to anybody who objects to the agenda of the Stonewall Group. (HASC, 2008, p. 19)

I'll call this tendency of gay people to "flock together," to prioritize their loyalty to one another over any other loyalty or obligation, a gays-put-gays-first argument. It is powerful because it can turn solidarity—one thing both sides are willing to ascribe to gay people—into a problematic tendency toward segregation and exclusion on the part of gay people themselves:

> You say it's working fine in the police department Chief, but have you had incidents where it's not working fine? Have you had incidents where, is there a tendency for gay officers to hang together in a group? (HASC, 1993, p. 221).

This version of the archetype offers a powerful counterargument to the image of gay people as a marginalized group fighting for their rights as so many other marginalized groups have done. The gays-put-gays-first argument renders their cooperation itself suspect. Indeed, it is also a strong counterargument to the gay warrior because it suggests that gay people lack one of the most important aspects of the warrior ideal: loyalty to one's comrades-in-arms.

The gay activist archetype supported one other significant argument in the hearings: the notion that gay service is merely a stepping stone to other, increasingly radical demands:

> The point is whether or not homosexuals want nothing more than to serve with honor. Homosexual activism will demand more. The cost to readiness of turning the military into a legal, social, and cultural battleground for years to come are almost incomprehensible. (HASC, 1993, p. 3)

Notice too the way the slippery-slope version of the gay activist archetype interacts with other archetypes. Rep. Floyd Spence (R-SC), who was the ranking member of the minority party (Republicans) on the House Armed Services Committee, draws on two other archetypes: the gay warrior and the gay victim. Spence dismisses the possibility that a gay

person might be motivated by desire to serve, setting the matter aside in favor of an alternate motive: desire to advance gay activism (i.e. the gays-put-gays-first argument). His dismissal of the warrior motivation confirms that, even in 1993, the image of the gay warrior (i.e. someone who *wants to serve*) was circulating. Moreover, it is another example of how archetypes are invoked together and, in some cases, used to contest one another.

2.5 The Gay Family Member

The gay family member is perhaps the simplest archetype, both in terms of recognizability within a text and a limited argumentative potential. The gay family member accounted for 8% of archetype occurrences in 1993 and remained at 8.1% in 2008. The gay family member's motivation is love or concern for his or her family. In this case "family" includes immediate family, extended relatives and partners or spouses. Key phrases that signal the presence of the gay family member archetype include "partner," "domestic partnership," "lover," "spouse," "public display of affection," "equal housing," "same-sex marriage," "family tradition," and "family legacy." That a gay person has a family may seem an entirely unremarkable piece of information. However, mentions of parents, siblings and spouses can support a powerful, implicit claim that gay people are "normal" in that they too have families. Nevertheless, speakers made relatively few mentions of family in the hearings, and those mentions did not always seem intended to support an impression of normalness.

The gay family member archetype does not require extensive elaboration. Its use and argumentative value can be summed up in two examples, showcasing how this archetype can both support and argue against the right of gay people to serve. When speakers invoke the archetype to support arguments in favor of gay service, they point out that gay people

too have loved ones that they care about, particularly partners. This variety of the gay family archetype pairs well with the gay victim archetype, expanding the scope of that victimhood to include the gay servicemember's loved ones. Take, for example, this back-and-forth between Rep. Vic Snyder (D-AR) and retired naval Intelligence Officer Captain Joan E. Darrah:

> Dr. SNYDER. That you could slip up.
>
> Captain DARRAH. Absolutely.
>
> Dr. SNYDER. And you could say-
>
> Captain DARRAH. Yes, sir.
>
> Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I don't know your partner's name—Leslie and I had a great time at the beach.
>
> Captain DARRAH. Right. My partner actually is Lynn Kennedy, sitting right behind me, a Library of Congress former employee, but yes. She wouldn't even dare to call me at work. If there were any kind of an emergency, she would get a male co-worker to call me. And you are right. If I slipped up and said, my partner and I went to the movies, I would be fired. And I know so many people in the military that are still living under this, and I admire them, and that is why I am here. (HASC, 2008, p. 19)

Notice that this variety of the gay family archetype works alongside with the gay victim archetype, expanding the scope of that victimhood to include the gay servicemember's loved ones.

When speakers invoke the gay family member archetype to argue against the gay service, they usually mention a lover or partner (rather than, say, a brother or mother) and almost always do so to raise the specter of same-sex marriage or equal housing rights for

same-sex couples. In other words, they argue that allowing gay people to serve will mean bringing their partners—and, therefore, their "lifestyle"—into military spaces. They might, for example, wish to bring their partner to a promotion ceremony, a possibility that is seen as inherently problematic:

> [The Non-Commissioned Officers Association] believes that any action to allow homosexuals to serve in the military services must inevitably include the acceptance of their lifestyle and sexual practices. That, in turn, means concessions to that lifestyle. These concessions must just as inevitably include providing housing, health care, survivor and other dependent benefits to life partners of homosexuals. NCOA believes this is too high a price to pay for social experimentation. (HASC, 1993, p. 86)

One assumption operating here is that gay people will want their loved ones to participate in military life in the same way that heterosexuals do. To allow these loved ones in is to give same-sex relationships the kind of legitimacy that one confers with phrases like "military wife" or "military families." It's also clear from this and other instances of the gay family member archetype that the partners and lovers are the perceived dangerous element. At no point does anyone fret over the possibility that a gay servicemember's mother might want to attend a promotion ceremony; it is only their partners and lovers that are cause for concern. Moreover—and this is revealing—I could locate only a single instance in any of the hearings in which a gay servicemember was said or implied to have children, and this instance was ambiguous. Although gay servicemembers, both real and imagined, are represented as spouses and, occasionally, people with parents and siblings, they are almost never depicted as parents. Whether or not this depiction reflects an empirical truth (it may

be fair to say that gay servicemembers probably have fewer children on the whole), it demonstrates that this archetype was in some ways limited in its ability to present gay and lesbian people as fully human.

3. Conclusion: The Rise of the Gay Warrior

The most significant[8] finding that emerges from this rhetorical archetype analysis of the 1993 and 2008 hearings is a surprising rise in the frequency of the gay warrior archetype (see Figure 2). This rise reflects the emergence of a powerful new version of an already-circulating identity category, and offers key insights for understanding why the debate over gays in the military played out in the way that it did. The rise of the gay warrior also has broader social significance: it offers a portrait of how identity categories both influence and are influenced by extended public deliberations.

Figure 2: The Frequency Share of Each Archetype in the 1993 and 2008 Hearings

	1993 (649 archetype occurrences in 1062 turns)	2008 (223 archetype occurrences in 294 turns)	Change
Gay Warrior	**12%**	**34.1%**	**+22.1%**
Gay Victim	30.8%	22%	-8.8%
Gay Spoiler	39.9%	32.7%	-7.2%
Gay Activist	9.2%	3.1%	-6.1%
Gay Family Member	8%	8.1%	+0.1%

This chart shows which types of archetypes appeared in each year's hearings and what share of the overall archetype frequency each category is responsible for. So, for example, coding revealed 649 instances of rhetorical archetypes related to gay and lesbian identity categories in 1993. The gay warrior accounted for 78 of those 649 occurrences, or 12%. Note that 649 occurrences does not mean that archetypes were present in 649 out of 1062 turns—a single turn might account for as many as five archetype occurrences (one from each category).

The rise of the gay warrior represents an *association* (see chapter two) of gay people and what Allsep (2013) calls the "warrior myth," a socially constructed image of martial masculinity. The gay warrior did exist in 1993, but its appearance in the 1993 hearings was infrequent and limited in scope. By 2008, the image of the gay warrior becomes much more available to speakers, who now seem willing to talk about "gay soldiers" without worry that the concordance of those two words will seem like an oppositional pair. Rhetorical archetype analysis reveals more than just changing frequency; it also helps explain *why* the gay warrior seems to have been so successful in making an argument for gay service. The gay warrior represents a strong counterargument to the negative aspects of other archetypes that were also circulating. Whereas the gay spoiler is a detriment to discipline, good order and cohesion, the gay warrior contributes to these things. Whereas the gay victim is relatively powerless in the face of a hostile military bureaucracy and homophobic comrades-in-arms, the gay warrior serves bravely despite the obstacles presented by DADT and wins over comrades despite their initial feelings about gay people. Whereas the gay activist seeks the right to serve because they want to advance a gay rights "agenda," the gay warrior is motivated purely by patriotism and a desire to serve their country. The only archetype that is relatively compatible with the gay warrior is the gay family member, and this archetype remains almost perfectly constant across the 1993 and 2008 hearings.

This chapter presented the results of a rhetorical archetype analysis of congressional hearings on the issue of gays in the military in 1993 and 2008. I described five rhetorical archetypes for gay people that circulated in the hearings and analyzed those archetypes for rhetorical significance and frequency. Based on that analysis, I concluded that a rise in the frequency of the gay warrior archetype was a key factor in the evolution of circulating

representations of who gay people are and what they do. The next chapter offers a more in-depth look at the implications of the rise of the gay warrior. In addition to socio-historical factors that help contextualize the rise of the gay warrior (the availability of actual gay warriors and a self-conscious rejection of the civil rights frame) I offer an additional supporting archetype, the untroubled comrade, that can help explain how elements of the gay warrior archetype became more ordinary and thus more accessible to speakers in both hearings.

Chapter 5

The Untroubled Comrade and the Changing Image of Gays in the Military

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I offered an analysis of five rhetorical archetypes operating within Congressional hearings on gays in the military in 1993 and 2008, a period that corresponds roughly with the lifetime of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. I concluded that one archetype, the gay warrior, rose significantly between 1993 and 2008 and helped shape the resolution of this controversy. In this chapter I contextualize the gay warrior and offer an additional archetype—the untroubled comrade—that can help explain the increasing frequency and "ordinariness" of the gay warrior archetype.

It's hard to overstate the argumentative power of the gay warrior archetype, and it's tempting to conclude that the rise of the gay warrior is simply a matter of supporters of gay service "wising up" and finally agreeing on the best way forward. And, indeed, many accounts of the effort to repeal DADT would support this narrative (e.g. Belkin, 2011). But this would be an oversimplification. When historical and social trends are taken into account, we can see that additional factors are needed to help explain why speakers drew on the gay warrior archetype so much more often during the 2008 hearing than they did in

1993. First, for the purposes of public deliberation, gay warriors became more materially available in the intervening years. Second, activists and other important voices in the debate made a self-conscious effort to reject the civil rights frame and its corollary, the gay victim archetype. Those same voices instead chose to focus on arguments from national security, which fit much better with the gay warrior archetype. However, neither trend totally accounts for the increasing *ordinariness* (Sacks, 1984) of the gay warrior. To explain the increasingly taken-for-granted, rhetorical availability of the gay warrior archetype, I again turn to rhetorical archetype analysis, this time to track the "untroubled comrade," a heterosexual soldier archetype that helps support, legitimize and, most importantly, render "ordinary" the gay warrior archetype.

2. The Material Availability of Actual Gay Warriors

Did the gay warrior archetype become popular simply because the public finally gained access to real, living gay warriors? The rise of the gay warrior definitely showcases the power of physical presence, in the sense that, in 2008, *actual* gay warriors were increasingly available to advocates of repeal. Organizations of gay soldiers played a crucial role in publicizing the ordeal of both currently serving and recently discharged gay servicemembers. This achievement is especially remarkable considering the silencing power of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. For gay and lesbian servicemembers to speak out—or organize in any way—meant risking discharge. Fulton's (2013) DADT postmortem, "OutServe: An Underground Network Stands Up," offers a clear account of the role played and risks taken by current gay and lesbian servicemembers:

> For OutServe, the main opportunity was connecting active duty gay and lesbian service members with key decision makers, but it was a risky proposition. As eager

> as the Obama Administration might have been to speak with actual service members affected by the policy, DADT presented significant legal hurdles for service members to talk about being gay in the military to anyone in a position of responsibility. (p. 221)

Fulton also notes that "gay military social networks" preexisted public activism by active-duty gay and lesbian servicemembers. It was the creators of these social networks, Fulton explains, that wanted something "more than a safe social network." To borrow Fraser's (1993) terminology, these men and women wanted to turn outward, to go public and transform enclaves into subaltern counterpublics. And, indeed, one striking difference between 1993 and 2008 hearings is the presence of active-duty or recently active-duty gay and lesbian servicemembers. Participants like Eric Alva, a gay man and the first Marine seriously injured in the Iraq War (Thompson, 2007) present striking images of the gay warrior as a man or woman willing to make serious sacrifices in the name of patriotism. Alva's testimony offers a real-world demonstration of the power of rhetorical presence in a physical, embodied sense (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).

However, gay warriors appear long before the 2008 hearings, both in a symbolic and material sense—they are mentioned but they are also physically present (see, for example, the testimony of retired Col. Karl Cropsey in the 1993 hearings). And, indeed, when servicemembers who were being discharged 1980s and 1990s portrayed themselves as soldiers—often supported by the testimony of comrades (see section 3.3 in the previous chapter)—they were nonetheless discharged (Warnke, 2007, p. 220; Kier, 1998). The physical presence of individuals who embody the archetype cannot alone explain why or how the gay warrior took on a greater role between 1993 and 2008. That is, if we take

rhetoric to be partly about the search for the best *available* means of persuasion, it makes sense to ask, why did the gay warrior, as a rhetorical archetype, seem so much more rhetorically available as an effective means of persuasion to participants in 2008? The material availability of actual gay warriors is surely a part of the answer, but not the entirety of it.

3. A Self-Conscious Rejection of the Civil Rights Frame

Another way to explain the rise in frequency of the gay warrior archetype is to consider a self-conscious abandonment of the civil rights frame.[1] Activists, academics and other parties with a high level of rhetorical awareness had a significant impact on the course of the DADT controversy. One result of that rhetorical awareness has been close attention to framing, specifically a self-conscious move away from the civil rights frame and toward other frames that resonate more strongly with audiences not already invested in gay rights. Although the civil rights frame is a powerful resource for sense-making within American politics, recent scholarship has attempted to showcase its weaknesses as an overarching master frame, a go-to for making a case for causes such as gay rights (Hull, 2001). Activist-academics involved with the DADT controversy seem to have been keenly aware of the limitations of the civil rights frame. For example, Belkin (2011) explicitly draws on George Lakoff's (2004) popular account of framing in political discourse, *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate*, in which Lakoff advises arguers to steer clear of their opponents' frame and instead pursue an alternative. Belkin acknowledges the importance of political frames, but parts ways with Lakoff and criticizes gay activists' insistence on reframing the military issue as a question of civil rights:

> And yet, many activists in the DADT repeal community were following Lakoff's advice when I came onto the scene in the late 1990's. Rather than going after the lies of the opposition, activist groups got to work re-framing the conversation, transforming it into a civil rights campaign and trumpeting the freedom of all Americans to serve. (n.p.)

Belkin recalls advocating that advocates of gay service instead focus on a "national security" frame:

> …I felt that, as a community, we should get away from rhetoric about fairness, freedom and the suffering of gay troops. It's not that these weren't crucial topics. But in order to win repeal, I believed we had to prevail on the national security argument. And instead of coming up with a new frame, we should use the one that conservatives had invented. But, we should flip it on its head. My message was this: It wasn't gay soldiers that harmed the military. It was discrimination." (n.p.)

Nathaniel Frank (2013), another activist-academic and a colleague of Belkin's, offers a similar account, referring to a "strategic shift in focus by advocates from attacking the ban as a moral violation of fairness to attacking it as a practical violation of national security" (p. 195).

However, it's important to note two things even as we account for the influence of activists, academics, and anyone else who may have advocated for a move away from a civil rights frame. First, although Belkin emphasizes what he calls a "national security frame," his proposed argument for openly gay service still relies on the civil rights frame and what I have here called the gay victim archetype. This is evident even in his description of his alternative to the civil rights frame: notice that he is still talking about "discrimination," a

key term in a civil rights frame. Second, although the chair of the 2008 hearings framed the question of gays in the military in much the same way that Belkin and Frank advocate, other important voices, such as Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), continued to insist that it was an issue of civil rights, and name it that way explicitly:

> I am the author of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell repeal. And I am very proud to be here, not only because this is the first time in 15 years that we have had the ability to talk about this issue, but because this week is also the 60th anniversary of President Truman signing the executive order ordering the racial integration of the Armed Services. And contrary to what Ms. Donnelly wants you to believe, this is a civil rights issue. I believe that repealing the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is probably the last civil rights issue we have. (HASC, 2008, p. 30)

While some voices clearly turned away from the civil rights frame, others did not. Given its use by such prominent voices, the civil rights frame—and the gay victim archetype—are clearly still a major part of the conversation and a widely available choice for participants in the debate. Given the multi-voiced nature of public deliberation, elite voices alone cannot ensure (or explain) the rise of a particular archetype. An emerging archetype will still have to outcompete more entrenched archetypes and frames.

4. The Ordinariness of the Gay Warrior and the Rise of a Supporting Archetype: The Untroubled Comrade

The material availability of actual gay servicemembers and a rejection of the civil rights frame help explain the rise of the gay warrior. However, they alone are not enough to account for what I above called the growing *ordinariness* of the gay warrior. By this I do not mean to say that people find the gay warrior unremarkable; I suspect that “gay” and

"warrior" placed together still form what Elizabeth Stokoe (2012, p. 281) calls a category-puzzle, an unexpected combination of a category and a descriptor in the vein of "killer nuns." Rather, I mean to say that the figure of the gay warrior, although still remarkable in discourse, is achieving greater "ordinariness" in the sense that Harvey Sacks (1984) describes it, a kind of powerful banality that, for those who have access to it, obviates the need to explain or legitimize our perspectives. For Sacks, ordinariness is not something one is or has; ordinariness is an achievement that we strive for in the way we present ourselves and narrate life events—it is the way we "do" identity. In the case of the gay warrior, we might imagine this ordinariness as having been achieved when speakers no longer have to talk about soldiers who "just happen to be gay" but are able simply to refer to soldiers. If these soldiers did indeed happen to be gay, this information could be made available either by implication (e.g. in the pronouns used to describe their significant others—see Kitzinger [2005]) or not at all because we assume that some people are gay and some people aren't and that it is only occasionally relevant.[2] This kind of ordinariness is a long way off, not least of all because many still see gay people as worthy of remarking upon in almost any context. Additionally, we can see that gay warriors have not achieved this ordinariness because speakers still frequently see the need to *argue* for ordinariness, to assert that "it was no big deal" or that "it didn't matter." Nevertheless, a rhetorical archetype analysis of debates in 1993 and 2008 reveals progress in the quest for ordinariness on the part of the gay and lesbian servicemembers, and that progress is best revealed by an additional archetype: the untroubled comrade. The untroubled comrade appears alongside the gay warrior, providing an ongoing commentary on the ordinariness of the gay warrior. In fact, as I will demonstrate, this is an explicit rhetorical function of the untroubled comrade:

participants invoke it to directly assert that gay warriors are "no big deal," an unremarkable part of a heterosexual servicemember's experience.

Figure 3. The Untroubled Comrade

MOTIVATION:
Motivated by job, professionalism, desire to come home, desire to get job done.

EXPLICITLY UNMOTIVATED BY: homophobia, discomfort with marginalized group (gay people, black people, women, etc.)

ATTRIBUTES/ACTIONS:
May or may not be comfortable with gay people (or other members of stigmatized groups), but is **explicitly unconcerned with their presence in a unit or work situation.** May have shared facilities with gay people and had no problem. **Performs job** regardless of the stigmatized identity of comrades—but this is still presented as surprising or remarkable information. **May have had life saved by gay person** (and not minded). **May have saved the life of a gay person** (and not hesitated to do so).

KEYWORDS: don't care, won't care, doesn't matter, unconcerned, so what, no problem, professionalism, mission, do the job

The untroubled comrade refers to heterosexual soldiers who are motivated by professional performance and who, whatever their feelings about gay people, find that they have no trouble serving (and even showering) alongside gays and lesbians. This archetype offers the point of view of heterosexual soldiers who not only see the gay warrior as an effective soldier but also find that effectiveness to be ordinary or "no big deal." The untroubled comrade is nearly always male (if gender is specified) and rarely appears outside the company of the gay warrior. In 1993, the untroubled comrade shows up alongside only 5 of the 78 occurrences of the gay warrior (6%). In 2008, the untroubled comrade appears with 13 out of 76 (17%) occurrences of the gay warrior. These numbers are not large enough to warrant statistical analysis,[3] but they suggest that the untroubled comrade played a role in the increasing availability of the gay warrior archetype. Furthermore, the untroubled comrade undergoes a transformation between 1993 and 2008 that is more revealing than simple changes in frequency. When the untroubled comrade shows up in

1993, the archetype mostly describes soldiers finding that they have no problem serving alongside black people or women. By 2008, untroubled comrades are more often untroubled by gay people.

In text, the untroubled comrade is formulaic. Both gay people and heterosexuals drew on the archetype. Staff Sgt. Eric Alva's testimony provides a typical example:

> Even under the military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell law, I was out to a lot of my fellow marines. The typical reaction from my fellow service members: So what? I was the same person, I did my job well, and that is all they cared about. Today I am godfather to three of those men's children. (HASC, 2008, p. 8)

Alva's short anecdote has all the hallmarks of the untroubled comrade, especially the key elements of casual unconcern (so what?) and professionalism. The emphasis on professionalism ("getting the job done," etc.) reflects broader trends in our culture's warrior identity. Indeed, the conditions of modern warfare have meant that success as a soldier hinges far more on technical skill and professional training than on a warrior mentality, a reality that is directly contradicted by popular representations of U.S. Marines slaying dragons on mountaintops (Allsep, 2013).

The untroubled comrade can be also be generic (e.g. "they didn't care who I was") or, as is often the case in the 1993 hearings, the comrades in question can be untroubled by other characteristics, such as race, gender, religion or some other characteristic, as in the following passage:

> I have got to go back one more time to the integration of the blacks, and I am going to do it by telling you a little war story. Mr. Truman directed the Army to integrate and I had a company up on the mountains in Korea and one morning we got 14 black

> soldiers along with our rations and ammunition. I am sure if we had run a little poll of our company before those men came up that morning, that 95 percent of the men would have said, we don't want them. It didn't take us until our first fire fight we found out, hell, these guys will stick right with us, that we made out fine. I think it would be the same way with the gays. (HASC, 1993, p. 55)

Truscott's 1993 hypothesis—that soldiers untroubled by racial differences would also be untroubled by gay people—typifies the how the untroubled comrade changed between 1993 and 2008. In the jump from 1993 to 2008, the untroubled comrade is more focused on gay people and increasingly involves actual, reported experience rather than hypothetical experience. That is, it becomes less and less a matter of extrapolating on the experiences of soldiers during the integration of women and black people (e.g. "soldiers didn't mind women or black people so much; I'll bet they won't mind gays either") and more a matter of relating actual experiences with gay people, as in this comment by Rep. Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH):

> And from my experience—and, by the way, I have a cousin who also is in the submarines, and I spoke to him about this. [The presence of gay people] didn't bother him one bit. Because it really has to do with how people perform at their job, not who they are or what they are born to be. (HASC, 2008, p. 23)

If we step outside of the 1993 and 2008 House hearings on gays in the military and into the larger debate about DADT, we can see the untroubled comrade archetype taking the stage at crucial moments preceding repeal and being pushed out into wider circulation. For example, the untroubled comrade makes an unambiguous appearance in the commentary of a special operations warfighter whose comments are buried in the "Report of the

Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'." This servicemember describes vividly the experience of serving alongside a gay person:

> We have a gay guy [in the unit]. He's big, he's mean, and he kills lots of bad guys. No one cared that he was gay. (p. 125)

This short anecdote was repeatedly endlessly by politicians, journalists and even comedians as DADT repeal was being considered in Congress. Sen. Susan Collins, (R-ME) used the anecdote during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC):

> I was struck by one observation by a special ops operator who said at a town hall meeting, quote, "We have a gay guy in the unit. He's big, he's mean and he kills lots of bad guys, and no one cared that he was gay." (SASC, 2010, p. 28)

Later in that same hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) repeated the same anecdote almost verbatim (SASC, 2010, p. 135).

The Big-Mean-Kills narrative pushed the untroubled comrade into circulation in a big way. The short anecdote reappeared over and over in the mass media, spoken by various commentators and politicians on television programs including *The Situation Room* ("Deadly fire blazes," 2010) and *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*. The quote reappeared in online publications such as *The Dreyfuss Report* (Dreyfuss, 2010), *Slate Magazine* (Kaplan, 2010) and *Politico* (Lubold & Gerstein, 2010). It was covered by the Associated Press (Flaherty & Gearan, 2010) and reprinted in dozens of regional and major newspapers including *The New York Times* (Dowd, 2010; Bumiller, 2010). Most significantly, President Obama used the anecdote during his speech on the passage of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010.

Another important circulating untroubled comrade narrative is Lloyd Corwin's story, which was first publicized by his son, Miles Corwin, in a 1993 *Los Angeles Times* story. The story was re-introduced into wide circulation in Obama's end-of-DADT remarks:

> And during the firefight, a private named Lloyd Corwin tumbled 40 feet down the deep side of a ravine. And dazed and trapped, he was as good as dead. But one soldier, a friend, turned back. And with shells landing around him, amid smoke and chaos and the screams of wounded men, this soldier, this friend, scaled down the icy slope, risking his own life to bring Private Corwin to safer ground. For the rest of his years, Lloyd credited this soldier, this friend, named Andy Lee, with saving his life, knowing he would never have made it out alone. It was a full four decades after the war, when the two friends reunited in their golden years, that Lloyd learned that the man who saved his life, his friend Andy, was gay. He had no idea. And he didn't much care. Lloyd knew what mattered. He knew what had kept him alive; what made it possible for him to come home and start a family and live the rest of his life. It was his friend. (The White House, 2010)

The Corwin narrative is worth mentioning here because it demonstrates both the argumentative value of the untroubled comrade and some of its more problematic aspects. Corwin's story epitomizes the strangeness of the untroubled comrade: the lesson of the story is that this man didn't mind *having his life saved* by a gay person. The fact that this is presented as surprising tells us a great deal about the anti-gay animus against which this archetype is set. The legitimizing effect of the story demonstrates the effect that the untroubled comrade can have on the gay warrior. The story offers an argument for the value of gay soldiers from the perspective of heterosexuals, whom the story implies would be the

most ardent opponents of gay people in the military. But at the same time, the Corwin narrative summarizes the value of gay servicemembers in terms of their ability to save the life of heterosexuals, and establishing Corwin's heterosexuality seems to be a major concern of the storyteller, as it is clearly established in three ways: Lee's relationship with Corwin is carefully, *repeatedly* circumscribed ("it was his friend"), Corwin is said to have had "no idea" that Lee was gay, and Lee's sacrifice is described as valuable because it allowed Corwin to return home to start a (presumably heterosexual) family.

One last point to make about the untroubled comrade is that it underscores the interdependency and relationality of identity categories and their instantiation in rhetorical archetypes. To put it another way, the untroubled comrade reminds us "that identities are never autonomous or independent but always acquire social meaning in relation to other available identity positions and other social actors" (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 598). The perspectives of heterosexuals help make the gay warrior seem ordinary insofar as the untroubled comrade helped support and legitimize a new view of gay people (as warriors and not just victims, spoilers or activists). This is surely not the first time that a marginalized identity category has been legitimized by the presence of "normal" people outside of that category: the visibility of white people in the African-American civil rights movement in particular comes to mind.

5. Conclusion: The Larger Implications of the Gay Warrior and the Untroubled Comrade

This chapter discussed the social and historical factors that can help contextualize the rise of the gay warrior, including an increase in the material availability of gay warriors and an effort to abandon the civil rights frame (and, hence, the gay victim) as an argument

for gay service. However, neither of these two factors can alone explain why the gay warrior increased in frequency. Alongside shifting cultural attitudes toward gay people, an additional archetype, the untroubled comrade, helps account for the increasing ubiquity and "ordinariness" of gay warriors. I conclude by discussing three major implications of these findings, implications that matter both for the study of the DADT controversy and for future inquiries into the rhetoric of identity and social change.

Rhetorical Archetypes Are a Poor Substitute for Real Experience

Identity categories, especially as they are instantiated in widely circulated rhetorical archetypes, undergird the public's changing understanding of who other people are, what they do and why. Any change in these archetypes is going to be hugely significant, because speakers use them to make sense of the world. Archetypes call forth canned narratives, attribute motives and predict outcomes. They are a substitute for what Flower (2003) calls "situated experiential knowledge"—that is, archetypes help people make sense of things that fall outside of their direct experience. For people who have never known a gay person, it is easy to see the kind of powerful, inferential shortcut that archetypes offer. It is easy, too, then, to see why political actors of all stripes would have a strong motivation to alter circulating archetypes, or at least to alter their frequency in relation to one another. The durability of these archetypes makes them both a formidable obstacle to social change and the very means by which that social change can be achieved.

At the same time, archetypes are often a poor substitute for real, experiential knowledge. This is particularly evident in the case of the gay spoiler: it reduces the complex humanity of gay people to a rapacious sexual desire unbounded by privacy norms, situational dangers or common human decency. Of course, the same can be said about the

gay warrior: it reduces the complex humanity of gay people to a selfless, mostly uncritical patriotism. One question to consider going forward is, must the members of a marginalized identity category always fight essentialized representations by circulating their own esssentialized representations? Can a negative or demonizing archetype be disrupted without recourse to an alternative archetype? If the answer is no, then how do we face this tension—between competing oversimplifications—with wisdom and ethical awareness?

Rhetorical Archetypes Are Also About Seeing Ourselves in Relation to Others

Archetypes do more than tell us what *others* do and why they do it; archetypes also help us see how *we* are likely to react when, because of social change, we come into contact with individuals in a category of difference that is new to us. Take, for example, the untroubled comrade. That archetype circulates the perspectives of troops in the "contact zone" between heterosexual servicemembers and openly gay servicemembers. These perspectives offer a powerful model for other troops who have not yet interacted with openly gay people in a significant way. If we see ourselves reflected in an archetype, we may be reassured (or terrified) by how that archetype portrays our own future experiences. I can imagine my future self quivering fearfully in my shower sandals or I can picture my future self pleasantly surprised by how normal and useful gay people are. A successful archetype can make the difference.

On the other hand, there is something troubling about this paradigm. From a critical standpoint, the untroubled comrade and other archetypes like it are oddly instrumental: they seem to argue that marginalized people deserve better treatment because of their *value* to us and not their needs or wants or intrinsic humanity. This tension leaves us in a bit of a double bind with regard to future controversies, especially the inevitable conversation about

transgender people in the military. Should public actors seek to increase the circulation of archetypes like the untroubled comrade because doing so might accelerate positive social change? Or, should they downplay such archetypes on the grounds that they require "normal" troops to come forward and say that serving alongside transgender people is no big deal? These are both moral and pragmatic questions which research with similar tensions should consider. Have other publics created a framework that can help balance the need to reassure a larger dominant public while at the same time recognizing that marginalized groups deserve just treatment in principle and not because of public attitudes?

Rhetorical Archetypes Have Significant Tradeoffs

As I hope this study makes clear, archetypes are not necessarily a force for good within political deliberation. Three out of the six archetypes described here malign gay people and reduce them to stock villains. And if we step outside of the debate over gay rights, we see much the same thing. Asen (2002) offers a particularly poignant example when he shows that a "welfare queen" archetype (though Asen never calls it an archetype) all too often substituted for the perspective of actual welfare recipients during congressional hearings. Introducing a redeeming or more nuanced archetype to help decision makers better understand a contentious social issue won't be easy (see, for example, Higgins & Brush's [2006] work with welfare recipients). Moreover, that redeeming archetype will likely also have social consequences. This is particularly true of the gay warrior. Although it seems to have been rhetorically effective for gay rights activists, the gay warrior also implicitly endorses military culture and perhaps even the United States' troubled history of military intervention (Belkin, 2013). This tacit endorsement could limit the gay rights movement's ability to mount a critique of state power. Some activists and scholars seem to have been

aware of this danger since the beginning of the movement's embrace of the gays-in-the-military issue. Michael Warner (2002), in a piece originally published in 1995, offers a striking account of this trade-off:

> In the 1993 march on Washington, for example, organizers pushed the gays-in-the-military issue, rather than AIDS into the spotlight. In a culture of patriotism where dying for one's country is thought to be virtuous, this shift of emphasis did not simply enlarge the queer agenda. With its vision of national loyalties trumping all other partisan ties, the military issue seems designed to produce amnesia about AIDS. What beside patriotism could smother the antinational sensibilities of queers who have seen so many die for no country? …What could more weaken the culture of resistance to a state that has added AIDS inaction to its earlier history of heteronormative policing? During the march on Washington, some people were heard chanting, "We're here, we're queer, we want to serve our country." It's possible to oppose the ban on gays in the military and still believe that this sentiment costs too much. (p. 223)

On the other hand, it is also possible to argue for the overall strategic value of gaining the right to serve. Gaining equal access to the military is both a material victory (because the military is one of the largest employers in the country) and a symbolic win (because it grants the gay rights movement access to the military and its cachet in American political culture).

But what is the alternative to the gay warrior? Would it be any better? The DADT controversy might not have unfolded as it did. What if the gay victim had instead become a more dominant archetype? Perhaps the public would have been moved by the injustices perpetrated against gay servicemembers, rather than the bravery and selflessness of gay

troops. Instead of an untroubled comrade who finds gays in the military to be "no big deal," perhaps we would have seen comrades who *were* troubled—and indeed moved—by the suffering of their gay comrades. It's a fascinating alternative to consider, although I am not prepared to argue that it would have been any purer. In fact, I suspect that had the gay victim prevailed, I would be making exactly the same point about archetypes always having tradeoffs. You would now be reading a dissertation arguing that, although the gay victim secured better treatment for gay people, it nonetheless required that they occupy a position of compromised agency. Indeed, I suspect that most civil rights victories have tradeoffs for the marginalized groups involved, and the question of what goals to pursue and how to pursue them will always be a fraught enterprise for those with agenda-setting power.

Saying that rhetorical archetypes will always carry trade-offs is not the same thing as saying that it doesn't matter which archetypes activists and other public actors push into circulation. On the contrary, the rhetoric we use to pursue social change always matters. Rhetorical archetype analysis can help us understand such rhetoric better in two ways. For scholars interested in identity and social controversy, it can clarify how the rhetoric of social change operated in a particular case and evaluate the consequences in light of possible alternatives. Second, and perhaps of greater use to those actually involved in social controversies, rhetorical archetype analysis can offer a birds-eye view of a controversy *before* it has been resolved by 1) cataloguing the archetypes in broad circulation and the arguments they support, 2) clarifying the available alternatives, and 3) evaluating the trade-offs that each one carries.

Notes

1. Introduction

1. Readers will encounter, throughout this dissertation, the phrases "public deliberation" and "public discourse" used interchangeably. In the context of this project, these phrases refer to discourse that 1) seeks to influence opinion related to issues of shared concern; 2) circulates broadly; and, 3) is understood to circulate broadly—i.e. physical audiences understand that they are not the only ones being addressed. These are quite general characteristics offered primarily to distinguish public discourse from more private discourses (e.g. interpersonal exchanges between known individuals) and institutional discourses (e.g. policy in-and-of-itself). Of course, these divisions are far from absolute. Vernacular exchanges between individuals can shape public opinion in important ways (cf. Hauser, 1999) and the actual language of institutional policies often becomes fodder for public debate. This understanding of what makes public discourse *public* is predicated on a discursive understanding of publics as constituted through mere attention, and driven by the circulation of texts over time (Warner, 2002).

2. Following the lead of David Frank (2009), I use the phrase "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (and the acronym DADT) to refer to the "1993 government policy, together with its implementing regulations and directives, and to a federal statute that Congress passed the same year" (p. xiii). The policy was known in full as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" and later "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass," although neither of the last two strictures ever entered widespread public usage. As in the case of any complex piece of public policy, choosing an umbrella term like DADT will elide some organizational and hierarchical complexities of the policy. However, the primary focus of this project is on the public debate surrounding the policy, not the policy itself. It will suffice for readers to understand that DADT was a policy that ended the practice of asking U.S. military recruits about their sexual orientation and, at the same time, forbade them from allowing their orientation to become known in a broad sense (i.e. there were a myriad of ways that a servicemember's orientation could become known short of that servicemember "announcing it"). Although the policy ostensibly ended investigations seeking to expose gay and lesbian servicemembers, historical and firsthand accounts make clear that such investigations did indeed continue—see, for example, Frank's (2009) treatment as well as Seefried's (2011) volume of servicemembers' first-hand accounts.

3. Frank (2009) describes the role played by the religious right in whipping up resistance to gay service as "profound" (p. 56). The role of the military hierarchy was also significant: "the consistency, passion and vehemence with which conservative military officials methodically set about to inject themselves into what might have been a relatively minor discussion over military personnel regulations was unusual even in the heated history of military-political disagreements and is further evidence of the success of the social conservative crusade" (p. 56).

4. The repeal of DADT in 2010 was by no means a "sure thing." For a full accounting of the repeal process, see Frank (2013).

5. I discuss the essentialism/constructivism debate from a rhetorical perspective in the next chapter. For a more extensive treatment of essentialism specifically in the context of military policies toward homosexuality, including DADT, see Lehring (2003). For a detailed

history of how changing understandings of sexual identity and gender affected military policy *before* DADT, see Haggerty (2003), Bérubé (2010) and Meyer (1996).

6. Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN), perhaps the most widely known organization dedicated to securing the right of gay people to serve openly, wouldn't be founded until after the creation of DADT.

7. Although "controversy" has a commonsense meaning, it's worthwhile to reflect, albeit briefly, on what type of controversy we're dealing with. On the one hand, the DADT controversy bears some resemblance to what Phillips (1999) calls a "discursive controversy" insofar as the "deliberative mechanisms for adjudication and resolution are left [intact]" (p. 489). On the other hand, the DADT debates bear some resemblance to what Olson and Goodnight (1994) call a "social controversy," which they define as "an extended rhetorical engagement that critiques, resituates, and develops communication practices bridging the public and personal spheres" (p. 249). I find G&O's notion of a social controversy compelling because it accounts for controversies that involve changes in discursive practices—debates that change not just policy but also the ways in which we talk about policy. Remember that DADT in particular was about not the right of gays to serve but rather their right to serve *openly.* In other words, discursive practices (e.g. coming out) are at the heart of the controversy.

8. This may strike readers as an unnecessarily broad claim. Of course "identity" means different things in different cultures at different times, if it means anything at all. Identity politics in particular seems to me to be a distinctly Western, modern practice. However, given the centrality of identity to human activity (cf. Blommaert, 2005) as well as the apparently atavistic human need to construct in-groups and out-groups, I think we can safely assume that the discursive construction and modification of identity categories is likely to be a widespread human activity, especially when human groups deliberate democratically to address shared problems.

9. Lehring (2003) in particular makes a strong case for seeing the military as an important force in the "officialization" of gay identity, explaining that "it was in the military that the question of gay and lesbian identity and the presence of gay and lesbian persons first made an appearance in the official records of the U.S. government" (pp. 5, 6). Although this is a difficult claim to verify, it is probably safe to say that the gay and lesbian person made a very *early* appearance in military policy.

2. The Rhetoric of Identity Categories in Public Discourse: A Theoretical Framework

1. See, for example, Foucault's (1978) account of the emergence of the category of "homosexuality" in the 18th and 19th centuries.

2. I have labeled Miller's argument about homosexuality constructivist, but it could also be called voluntarist because it posits sexual orientation as something one consciously chooses. Voluntarism and its opposite, determinism (the idea that sexual orientation cannot be chosen or changed), are often conflated with essentialism and constructivism. It is often assumed that essentialist understandings are always determinist, and that constructivist understandings of homosexuality are always voluntarist. It's important to understand that the divide over whether or not homosexuality can be chosen or changed does not precisely mirror the essentialism/constructivism debate: "While it may turn out that many social constructionists are voluntarists and all essentialists are determinists, it is certainly *not* true

that the pairings are universal" (Stein, 1992, p. 327). The reasons that these pairings do not always match up is that many constructivists (or constructionists, to match Stein's terminology) are also determinists: they view homosexuality as a socially invented category which is, nonetheless, not choosable or escapable.

3. It's worth noting that "identity" occupies contradictory places in scholarly and everyday discourse. One such contradiction can be observed in the status of essentialism and constructivism in academic and non-academic discourses surrounding identity. In the popular, political identity talk that one finds in the public sphere, identities are overwhelmingly essentialized—one is constantly confronted with arguments that implicitly assume, for example, that homosexuality has a biological cause that we simply haven't found yet. On the other hand, within academic identity talk—especially the humanities—constructivist understandings dominate, particularly the constructivist viewpoints developed in Foucault's work on the history of sexuality.

4. On the issue of marginalization (what it is, who's subject to it, etc.), I take the same position as Asen (2000), viewing counterpublics (which are so often constituted around the identity categories discussed here) as "discursive entities" rather than a particular set of persons, places or topics (p. 444). In other words, rather than talking about the condition of marginalization in-and-of-itself, I turn my attention toward marginalized and marginalizing stances that can be taken in discourse regardless of whether or not a speaker is, in fact, marginalized. This approach "draws critical attention to emergent collectives constituted neither necessarily nor exclusively by actually or potentially excluded individuals, but formed by participants who recognize exclusions in wider public spheres and resolve to join together to overcome these exclusions" (p. 444). This is not to say that material inequality is irrelevant, or less important than symbolic or perceived inequality. Rather, a discursive approach divorces the study of counterpublic discourse from judgments about whether or not a group is "really" marginalized or subaltern (Fraser, 1993).

5. The Big-Mean-Kills anecdote is the subject of an extended analysis in chapter five.

6. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are careful to distinguish the dissociation of concepts from the breaking of links. The breaking of links involves "affirming that elements which should remain separate and independent have been improperly associated" whereas dissociation of concepts entails a new division, one which "brings about a more or less profound change in the conceptual data that are used as the basis of argument" (pp. 411, 412). Of course, the difference between dissociation of concepts and the breaking of links is one of degree and so is not always clear-cut. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out that "[d]epending on whether the connecting links between elements are regarded as 'natural' or 'artificial,' as 'essential' or 'accidental,' one person will see a dissociation where another sees only the breaking of a connecting link" (p. 412). In any case, because the breaking of links and dissociation accomplish similar tasks—separating elements in order to alter the characteristics associated with an identity category—it makes sense to address them together.

7. To understand the ongoing conversation about identity categories in public sphere scholarship, one must recognize that scholars do not always name problems as matters of identity categories. Rather, public sphere theorists address the role and value of identity categories indirectly, discussing issues such as the relationship between individual status and the norms of rational critical discourse, the tension between public and private concerns, the damaging influence of identity politics and interest groups on public deliberation and

many others. It is possible that some readers will see me discussing issues like the politics of recognition and the politics of multiculturalism and wonder if I have perhaps conflated "identity" with other, separate issues. But I see all of these areas of inquiry as united by their concern with discourses of identity, or sets of public arguments rooted in the assumption that identity categories and their associated characteristics are a basis on which a public can make decisions about policies and rights.

3. Introducing Rhetorical Archetype Analysis, a Method for Studying the Rhetoric of Identity Categories in Public Discourse

1. This is in no way meant to be a comprehensive overview of MCA. The full methodology entails a complex set of maxims and rules of application and only a few of these will be relevant for rhetorical archetype analysis. For a user-friend introduction to the concepts and maxims of MCA, see Hester and Eglin (1997), Schegloff (2007) or Stokoe (2012).

2. In this sense, drawing inferences based on category membership is similar to the process popularly known as "stereotyping," which entails

> perceiving and understanding the real through a preexistent cultural representation, a fixed collective schema. A concrete individual is thus perceived and evaluated as a function of the preconstructed model diffused by the community of the category in which they place that individual. (Amossy, 2001)

Stereotypes and archetypes share important characteristics and readers may find it helpful to think of archetypes as a kind of stereotype. However, there are three reasons why "stereotype" may not be a good synonym for "archetype" as the word is used here. First, archetypes tend to be more fleshed out, carrying as they do an entire set of motives, attributes and habitual actions, expressed through keywords and ready-made narratives. Second, a stereotype is often thought of as a *negative* representational schema, whereas archetypes are a more neutral entity. Third, the word "archetype" can describe shared schemas that are still emerging, but are not yet widely recognizable enough to be called stereotypes. The gay family member archetype discussed in the next chapter is a good example. I am not at all convinced that the gay family member has anywhere near enough traction to be considered a stereotype. And yet it still plays an important albeit small role in the DADT hearings.

3. Here I am drawing on Fiske and Linville's (1980) definition of schemata: "structures of organized prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances" that "guide the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information" (p. 543). See also Anderson (1977) for an introduction to the concept of schemata. One important difference between schemas and membership categories, as understood by practitioners of membership categorization analysis, is the level of "prior knowledge" implied by each concept. For some MCA practitioners, membership categories cannot be presumed to be a source of prior knowledge, at least not until that knowledge has been made evident in a particular interaction.

4. Here is another area of overlap between identity categories and schemata. Both are explanatory accounts of how individuals (schemas) and publics (rhetorical archetypes) process new information and make "reasonable guesses, where knowledge is incomplete or ambiguous" (Fiske & Linville, 1980, p. 552).

5. Here we can see yet another overlap with schema theory. Both schemas and identity categories are conceived of as semi-rigid knowledge structures that are, nonetheless, able to be revised if enough countervailing experiences intervene. It is worth pointing out, however, that while both schemas and rhetorical archetypes attempt to reveal knowledge structures (in the sense of inferential resources), neither claims to represent those knowledge structures directly. Researchers pursue schemas through external signs (behavior, language, etc.) and the same can be said of rhetorical archetypes (which are revealed through discourse).

6. On the whole, I am not convinced that there is any incompatibility between Sacks' original conception of membership categorization analysis and the notion of rhetorical archetypes that circulate beyond particular interactions, so long as there is evidence that these archetypes are indeed circulating widely and in important contexts. But, because MCA originates in a tradition of ethnomethodology, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that, for some practitioners of MCA, my approach could be dismissed as a "decontextualized" version of MCA in that it presumes broad access to certain identity/membership categories and seeks out widely circulating, trans-contextual assumptions about those categories. Hester and Elgin (1997) for example, attempt to systematically disqualify any interpretation of Sacks' work that suggests that speakers might have preexisting knowledge of membership categorization devices. They argue that a "radical occasionality of meaning" is a "primordial" element of ethnomethodology and, hence, MCA (p. 17). For strict practitioners then, category-bound predicates (i.e. things members of a category do as a function of membership in that category) cannot be presumed to exist unless they have been established or "oriented to" by the speakers in that specific interaction. That is, we can only establish that a membership category is being imbued with a category-bound predicate (e.g. "men sure do like sports, don't they") *in a single stretch of talk* and only if participants themselves make this claim explicit. But, as Fitzgerald (2012) argues, "the strength of MCA is found in its analytic flexibility and hence its potential relevance to any discipline interested in aspects of identity and social knowledge…" including, as I argue here, rhetorical studies (p. 307).

7. Researchers should be wary of taking participants' definition of a text or interaction at face value. For example, Frank (2009) has argued that the Senate hearings on gays in the military held in 1993 were not, in fact, a genuine attempt at deliberation but rather designed to create a delay so that opponents of gay service could "build an arsenal of weapons to defeat the effort to lift the ban [on gay service]" (p. 86). But even if we accept Frank's argument, it is still evident in both the Senate and the House hearings that opponents of lifting the ban wanted to legitimize their stance, and so likely chose what they saw as their most compelling or effective arguments.

8. One tension inherent in choosing congressional hearings as a source of public discourse is that hearings lack a clear separation from state activity. Many traditional visions of the public sphere—most notably Habermas' (1989)—suggest that publics operate separate from the state and so can in theory be critical of it. However, drawing on Habermas' later work as well as the work of Nancy Fraser, Daniel Brouwer (2001) makes a compelling argument for seeing congressional hearings as an important "context of discovery" in public deliberation. He describes hearings as a forum through which "citizens, experts, academics, and elected representatives…participate in discursive wrangling designed to elicit information and arguments, to publicize issues, and to mobilize support for specific policies" (p. 92).

9. A quantitative analysis requires some way of limiting the influence that any individual can have over the content of the text. We don't want to presume an increase the incidence of *the gay warrior* simply because one person invokes it over and over. In the analyses that follow this chapter, my frequency counts are based on the number of turns that contain each archetype, not the number of times each archetype is mentioned within those turns. I did this to control for the influence of individuals who had longer turns (e.g. prepared statements) in which they invoked an archetype over and over again (see the next chapter for a more detailed explanation of this methodological decision).

10. I use motivation here to mean "a phenomenon that exerts a directive force that activates and shapes behavior, simultaneously providing an explanation for that behavior," rather than the related, but more technical sense in which Kenneth Burke uses the term (Benoit, 1996, p. 69).

4. The Rise of the Gay Warrior: A Rhetorical Archetype Analysis of Congressional Hearings on Gays in the Military Held in 1993 and 2008.

1. The 1993 hearing was held in front of the entire House Committee on Armed Services, whereas the 2008 hearing was held by the Military Personnel Subcommittee, which is one of seven subcommittees that comprise the House Committee on Armed Services.

2. Here, "turns" is used in a non-technical sense to describe the discrete, non-overlapping conversational turns created by the transcribers of each congressional hearing. I am confident that the transcripts would appear far too clean to a practiced conversation analyst—they are almost scriptlike in their neatness. From a sociolinguistic perspective, we could describe these transcriptions as highly naturalized accounts which present very little evidence of the transcription process, elide differences in pronunciation and, mostly, make it appear as though speakers only rarely spoke over one another or out of turn (Bucholtz, 2000). I have chosen to use these transcripts because they are the authoritative record and because the claims made in this chapter do not rely on aural cues such as stress or pronunciation. However, I recognize that the omission of these phenomena is not meaningless. The process by which the transcribers separated overlapping dialogue into an almost scriptlike form is unclear, though the transcribers seem to have relied at least partly on the recognition of the chair (i.e. instances in which the chair legitimizes speakers by calling on them by name) and, based on the limited video recordings I was able to review, remained faithful to the actual words spoken by participants. Nevertheless, especially during question-and-answer periods, participants frequently spoke out of turn, or spoke when the chair had not recognized them. And, although the norms of Congressional hearings discourage multiple participants from talking over one another, it is sometimes clear even from these limited transcripts that participants interrupt one another and speak at the same time. In a few cases interruptions, repairs or repetition create additional turns. None of these "splinter" turns contributed to the overall incidence of the five archetypes, because none offered significant content. And, in any case, this happened in fewer than a dozen instances in both transcripts combined.

3. Here inductive coding refers to a preliminary coding of the 2008 hearing in its entirety, and a significant portion of the 1993 hearing for every action and quality directly and indirectly attributed to gay, lesbian and bisexual people. I then used the results of this

unstructured (but rather exhaustive) procedure to create the five-part coding scheme around which this chapter is organized. Once the coding scheme was fully developed, I re-coded the entirety of both hearings. Each turn of each hearing was numbered and coded for which archetype elements it contained. Many turns contain more than one archetype or multiple instances of the same archetype. However, each turn is allowed to add only one instance of an archetype to the overall count (e.g. if a turn has five instances of the warrior archetype, it only adds one instance to the overall count). This is a conservative measure designed to limit the ability of any individual speaker to dramatically alter the frequency of any of the archetypes.

4. My descriptions of these archetypes might strike some readers as almost literary: the gay warrior, for example, reads almost like a character. I chose this style for the sake of clarity. In addition, some readers may see my description as implying a strong version of agency, in which speakers always draw on archetypes strategically and self-consciously. Although the speakers in these hearings are typically individuals with a high degree of rhetorical skill, I do not think that they are always—or even often—aware that they are drawing on circulating, archetypal images of gay people. When I use a phrase like "speakers invoked the gay warrior to do X," I do so to avoid longer, clumsy formulations such as, "elements of the gay warrior appear in the speech of speakers who seem to be trying to argue X." In addition, I do not mean to suggest that speakers are referring to a single gay warrior who shows up again and again in exactly the same form. Rather, as I discuss in chapter three, rhetorical archetype analysis draws our attention to archetypal *elements* that, over the course of long documents and large bodies of discourse, coalesce into archetypes with rhetorical power. Rhetorical scholars can choose to name these archetypes for clarity, but that requires interpretation. It is worth noting, however, that some participants in the larger debate do talk explicitly about frames and other terms that suggest a high degree of rhetorical awareness. Allsep (2013) is a notable example because he refers to the "gay warrior" by name, though he doesn't call it an archetype.

5. Because this analysis is based on written transcripts of long texts and not on audio transcripts, it was only possible to identify speakers as gay when they self-identified as gay or were identified by others as gay. It was not possible, in other words, to code for linguistic markers that can create the perception of homosexuality in an audience (see Cameron & Kulick [2003] for a discussion of the problem of looking for "gay language"). And, in any case, the ongoing relevance of sexual orientation throughout both hearings meant that participants left little doubt about their membership in identity categories related to sexuality. But it should be noted that, in a few instances, one could read portions of the text in isolation and be unaware that an archetype is present because one does not have the context necessary to know that a speaker or referent is known to be gay.

6. See Bakhtin (1986, pp. 91-94) for a discussion of the idea that utterances are partly determined "by others' utterances on the same topic to which we are responding or which we are polemicizing" (p. 91).

7. One might well see this argument as a de-essentialization (see chapter two) of an identity category because it suggests that homosexuality is not an inborn, unchangeable identity but rather a set of behaviors that people can, presumably, avoid or cease.

8. The surprising rise in the frequency of the gay warrior archetype between 1993 and 2008 is statistically significant based on a chi-square test of independence, a non-parametric test suitable for verbal data (Geisler, 2003). Of the five original archetypes, three showed

possible or marginal significance based on a typical threshold for statistical significance: the gay warrior ($p < .002$), the gay activist ($p = .003$), and the gay victim ($p = .012$). However, only the gay warrior met the Bonferroni-corrected standard for statistical significance used here (alpha = .002). The changes in the frequency of the gay victim and the gay activist can be considered marginally significant.

5. Chapter 5: The Untroubled Comrade and the Changing Image of Gays in the Military

1. By civil rights frame, I am referring to a master frame through which "unjust differences in life circumstances are attributed to encrusted, discriminatory structural arrangements rather than to the victims' imperfections" (Snow & Benford, 1992, p. 139).

2. See Warnke's (2007) book *After Identity: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Gender* for a full accounting of what it would mean to limit the relevance of identity categories such as sexual orientation in certain situations.

3. Because the figure of the soldier and comrade is so ubiquitous in these debates (almost to the point of invisibility), I chose to track only the new and emerging category of the untroubled comrade. The untroubled comrade is worth searching out because, although it shows up fewer than two dozen times, it showcases the way in which images of the heterosexual soldier are changing. To put it another way, we can say without much difficulty that it is mostly representations of gay people, not heterosexuals, that are changing in the interim between these two hearings. The untroubled comrade, however, is one important exception.

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