posted on 1997-01-01, 00:00authored byMorris H. DeGroot, Joseph B. Kadane
This paper generalizes the problems of optimal selection considered by Roth,
Kadane and DeGroot by allowing a set of J items to be chosen by two decision
makers, the first of whom has A challenges and the second has B challenges.
The two decision makers each have an opportunity to challenge each item
before it is accepted, in some arbitrary fixed order. We assume that the
decision makers know the utility function of the other side as well as their own
over sets of J items, and that they know the subjective distribution, assigned
by the other side, of characteristics of potential items that will be observed,
as well as their own. Under these conditions the other side's response to each
potential item can be predicted with certainty, and backward induction defines
an optimal strategy. We study an important special case we call regular, and
show that it is never disadvantageous to go first in the regular case. The use
of peremptory challenges in jury trials motivates our model. The basic model
in which jurors are challenged one at a time is extended to a more general
class of problems that includes the group system and the struck jury system.