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PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?
journal contribution
posted on 2020-04-13, 15:56 authored by Denise RousseauDenise Rousseau, Donna Beck, ByeongJo Kim, Ryan SplendaRyan Splenda, Sarah YoungSarah YoungThis is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of
this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict
firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive
terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest
in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting
financial information.
History
Publisher Statement
© 2019 The Authors.Campbell Systematic Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Campbell Collaboration Campbell Systematic Reviews. 2019;15:e1064Date
2019-12-02Publisher DOI
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